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Witness Name: David John Courtley
Statement No.: WITN03530200
Dated: 5 November 2024
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
SECOND WITNESS STATEMENT OF DAVID JOHN COURTLEY
I, MR DAVID JOHN COURTLEY, will say as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry (the
“Inquiry”) with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 26 September 2024
(the “Request’), to the extent I have direct knowledge of the matters addressed in
the Request. I was assisted in preparing this statement by Morrison Foerster, who
represent Fujitsu Services Limited (“Fujitsu Services”) in the Inquiry.
2. The Request deals with events many of which took place over 15 years ago, so in
some cases my recollection is limited. I have therefore refreshed my memory by
reviewing the documents provided to me by the Inquiry. To the extent those
documents have assisted my recollection, I refer to the documents using the URNs
listed in the index accompanying this statement.
3. The Request largely seeks descriptions of my role as Chief Operating Officer
(“COO”) and Chief Executive (“CEO”) of the ICL group and Fujitsu Services, my
knowledge of the Horizon system, litigation support provided by Fujitsu Services
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to Post Office Limited (“POL”), corporate structure of and governance processes
within the Fujitsu group.
4. Inote that I have previously made a witness statement to the Inquiry dated 16 May
2023, which was submitted in response to a Rule 9 Request dated 24 February
2023 (WITN03530100, my “First Witness Statement”). Where relevant, I make
reference to paragraphs of my First Witness Statement in this statement.
BACKGROUND
5. As noted in paragraphs 1 and 6 of my First Witness Statement, I joined Fujitsu
Services in July 2001 as COO. I held that position from July 2001 to April 2004,
when I became CEO. I left Fujitsu Services in December 2008.
6. The Inquiry has asked me to provide background to these appointments.
7. Prior to joining Fujitsu Services, I was the CEO of a human resources outsourcing
joint venture between BT and Accenture, called E-PeopleServe.
8. During 2001, I was approached by a recruiter who informed me of the COO
opportunity at Fujitsu Services. I understood that Richard Christou, then CEO of
Fujitsu Services, was leading the search for a COO. At the time, there was no
formal COO position at ICL, and the role was being newly created. At the time I
was approached, the selection process for the role was already underway and I
believe there were multiple candidates involved.
9. After expressing interest, I met with Mr Christou to discuss the position and my
suitability.
10. I also met senior executives of Fujitsu from Japan (“Fujitsu”) both in the UK and
in Japan. These included Mr Hiroaki Kurokawa (then Group Executive Vice
President of Fujitsu), Mr Naoyuki Akiksusa (then President of Fujitsu), and a
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11.
12.
13.
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number of other senior executives. Further to these interviews, I was appointed as
COO of Fujitsu Services.
When I first joined as COO, Fujitsu Services was a loss-making business, and my
primary objective as COO was to improve business performance and ensure that
the company became profitable. During my tenure as COO, I led a restructuring
of Fujitsu Services’ business (as to which I provide more details below), and also
focused on bidding for and winning a number of large long-term outsourcing
contracts that ended up being transformative for the business’ revenue and
performance.
I was appointed as CEO in 2004. Mr Christou remained as Executive Chairman of
Fujitsu Services, and we worked closely together during my tenure as CEO.
The Inquiry has asked me about my knowledge, at the time I joined Fujitsu
Services, in relation to the following specific issues: (i) Bugs, Errors and Defects
(‘BEDs’) in the Horizon system, (ii) concerns as to a lack of integrity of the Horizon
System, (iii) Fujitsu Services’ ability to insert, edit or delete transaction data or data
in branch accounts without the knowledge of SPMs, managers and assistants, and
(iv) complaints addressing BEDs or integrity concerns. Prior to joining Fujitsu
Services, I had a briefing with Mr Christou, Peter Earl, John Bennett, and
potentially one other who I do not recall, about the company, its key contracts and
its financial performance. While I believe the Post Office Account was discussed
in that briefing, I do not recall any of the issues listed above coming up. When I
joined, while I had a general understanding of Horizon’s history, including
challenges in relation to the proposed Benefits card, I was not aware of any of the
specific issues outlined in (i)-(iv) above. During the course of my tenure, there
were some problems affecting Horizon — but, in my recollection, these were mainly
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outages affecting the availability of the system that had been escalated through
the alert system or other means. I describe the alert system and my role in relation
to it in greater detail below, and address an example of an outage that was
escalated to me in my First Witness Statement. Beyond those issues, I do not
recall being aware of any other serious problems with Horizon.
14. 1 did not have any training to operate Horizon when I joined, or during my
employment with Fujitsu Services.
CORPORATE STRUCTURE OF FUJITSU SERVICES
Corporate entities within the group
15. When I joined in 2001, ICL plc was a wholly owned subsidiary of Fujitsu. ICL plc
was the ultimate holding company of the group, International Computers Limited
was the UK operating company, ICL Global Investments Limited held the ICL
group’s non-UK operations, and ICL Pathway Limited contained the Post Office
Account.
16. In April 2002, the ICL brand was replaced by Fujitsu Services. At the time, there
was a feeling within the ICL group, Fujitsu and generally in the market that the
“ICL” brand was tired, and it was considered beneficial to signal a closer
relationship with Fujitsu. Related to this change, there were also changes made
to the ICL plc board structure. In particular, some external non-executive directors
left the board and more representatives from Fujitsu joined. These changes were
discussed in board meetings (for instance in the minutes of an ICL plc board
meeting on 7 February 2002 (FUJ00003644)).
17. To the best of my knowledge, while the names of the companies in the ICL group
changed to reflect the new Fujitsu Services branding and there were changes to
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the board, the corporate structure itself did not change. I do not recall the corporate
structure undergoing any further significant changes during my tenure at Fujitsu
Services.
Business restructuring within Fujitsu Services
18. At the same time as the brand change, I led a restructuring of Fujitsu Services’
business and management structure. While this occurred at the same time as the
rebranding, it was not a direct result of the rebranding.
19. The scope and rationale for the restructure were discussed in board meetings at
the time: see (i) the minutes of an ICL plc board meeting on 7 February 2002
(FUJ00003644) note “/CL would have a new start — a new name (Fujitsu Services)
a new Board and transfer of its business to DMR (Fujitsu Consulting)”, and (ii) the
minutes of a Fujitsu Services Management Committee (“FSMC”) board meeting
on 29 May 2002 (FUJ00003704) note that “/t/he last financial year, 2001/2002 was
one in which a great deal had been achieved: the restructuring, Project Fuji, the
rebranding and some difficult contract negotiations. The outcome had been
positive, with the break-even result showing that the Group was capable of
operating profitably’.
20. As noted at paragraph 8 of my First Witness Statement, when I joined Fujitsu
Services, its business in the UK was divided into multiple divisions, each led a by
a divisional director. The Post Office Account sat within the Large Projects
Division. Following the restructure, the Post Office Account moved from the Large
Projects Division to the UK Commercial Business Division.
21. The restructuring reorganised the division-based structure in place and had a
number of aims:
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First, was to increase the accountability each division had for revenue and
profit. Prior to the restructuring, some divisions within Fujitsu Services would
provide services to other divisions, and book revenue and profit from those
services. By way of example, Fujitsu Services’ operational services division
provided infrastructure services to (and therefore would gain profit from) the
Large Projects Division. This internal trading model obscured the true view
of profit within the organisation. We introduced the concept of core delivery
services, comprising common capabilities that delivered services to the
customer-facing divisions in the business. Core delivery services included
service desk, data centres, project management capabilities and networks.
Core delivery services did not record profit, but the cost of their services was
recorded against each account and division. I note that the introduction of
core delivery services was referred to in the board meetings recorded at
FUJ00003644 and minutes of an ICL Investment & Strategy Committee
meeting on 6 February 2002 (FUJ00116185). In addition to introducing core
delivery services, divisional directors had greater oversight, control of and
responsibility for the division's budgets and targets, which improved clarity.
Amongst other things, division directors were evaluated on the extent to
which their division remained within its budget and met sales and
performance targets.
Second, I agreed with Fujitsu to reduce the headcount within Fujitsu
Services, including through a redundancy programme.
Third, sales teams were rewarded differently. Prior to the restructuring,
yearly bonuses for sales teams were in place. We introduced a commissions-
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22.
23.
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based bonus structure, which meant that bonuses were more closely tied to
individual performance and new business.
I believe that this structure largely remained in place throughout the remainder of
my tenure with Fujitsu Services. However, the names of divisions changed within
that time. For example, as noted at paragraph 8 of my First Witness Statement,
the UK Commercial Business Division was later renamed the Private Sector
Division.
In general, the division directors reported to me as COO and then CEO. As noted
in my First Witness Statement at paragraph 9, the exception was a brief period
from 2001 to 2002 when the directorship of the Large Projects Division was
vacant, and individual account managers in that division reported directly to me as
coo.
Fourth, as noted at paragraph 7 of my First Witness Statement, I “worked on
managing and improving Fujitsu's relationship with its shareholder’, Fujitsu. When
I first joined Fujitsu Services, ICL was considered as a consistent loss-making
business. I visited Fujitsu on a regular basis to improve collaboration between
Fujitsu Services and Fujitsu, and the relationship did improve over time.
MY ROLE AT FUJITSU SERVICES
25.
26.
I have been asked to set out my role and responsibilities as COO and CEO.
I explain my responsibilities as COO and then CEO in my First Witness Statement,
at paragraphs 6 to 10. I also note the scale of Fujitsu Services’ business at that
time. I believe it had approximately 20,000 employees and contractors, who were
staffed across multiple major accounts (of which the Post Office Account was one)
and a number of countries in Europe, Scandinavia and Africa.
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27. My responsibilities were the usual duties of a senior executive in a multinational
company. In summary these roles included:
a. Overall responsibility for Fujitsu Services’ business activities in the UK,
Continental Europe, Scandinavia and Africa, including responsibility for
growth and profitability;
b. The development of new business and sustaining existing business for
Fujitsu Services in each of the markets mentioned above, including the
company’s approach towards sales, marketing, and managing customers;
c. Restructuring poorly performing parts of the business;
d. Evaluating and undertaking acquisitions to enhance Fujitsu Services’
capabilities and positioning in certain countries; and
e. Managing Fujitsu Services’ relationship with its shareholder.
28. As I note at paragraph 6 of my First Witness Statement, I had substantially similar
responsibilities as COO and CEO, except that while I was CEO the heads of
certain key functions (e.g. Finance, Human Resources, Commercial, Legal)
reported to me (when they did not while I was COO).
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BOARD REPORTING (GENERAL)
29. The Inquiry has asked me how Fujitsu Services’ Board and/or senior management
maintained oversight over a range of specific issues. I begin by addressing Fujitsu
Services’ processes for oversight generally. In this section I also address my
responsibilities in relation to review and reporting processes for major accounts.
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Mid-Term Plan
30. Fujitsu Services’ fiscal year ran from 1 April to 31 March each year. As part of
Fujitsu Services’ yearly budget process, a Mid-Term Plan (“MTP”) would be
prepared and presented to the Fujitsu Services Board on an annual basis.
31. Each MTP addressed the next three fiscal years, but with a particular focus on the
upcoming year’s budget. The MTP provided a plan together with a forecast for the
business as a whole (including sales and marketing strategy and initiatives, the
sales pipeline, upcoming projects/bids, or opportunities and forecasts on long term
customer accounts) as well as a budget to meet those goals over the same period.
In respect of long terms customer accounts, the MTP would cover how those
accounts would progress over the next three years.
32. The MTP was constructed from the bottom up — with individual accounts and then
divisions preparing their own contributions, which would then feed into the
business-wide MTP. The business-wide MTP would be subject to feedback
iteration and revision between divisional teams and senior executives then the
board, and it may be revised following such feedback. For example, the minutes
of the FSMC board meeting on 15 November 2007 (FUJ00003701) note that I
presented an MTP to the board, and the FSMC members “wished to understand
more of the detail underlying the plan”.
Internal and external audits
33. KPMG would perform an annual audit on all parts of the business and report their
findings to the Fujitsu Services Board. The report was available to Fujitsu, and
KPMG’s findings were used as input to prepare Fujitsu Services’ annual accounts.
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34. Fujitsu Services also had an internal audit function which undertook internal audits
of specific divisions and accounts. These were planned on a rolling basis at the
direction of the Fujitsu Services Board.
Monthly Divisional Meetings
35. During my time at Fujitsu Services, I attended a monthly divisional meeting with
the director of each Fujitsu Services division. These would also be attended by at
least the Chief Financial Officer and the Head of Legal and Commercial from the
senior executive team. On the division side, it would be attended by the division
director and other senior division leadership (including the division’s finance
director and, where appropriate, individual account managers as well).
36. As noted at paragraph 11 of my First Witness Statement, these monthly meetings
were one of the primary forums by which I received information and updates about
Customer Accounts, including the Post Office Account. The topics for discussion
during these meetings were generally quite wide. They would cover key issues for
the division such as financial results and forecasts, staffing levels, the division's
sales pipeline, as well as the business and relationship with key customers. As I
noted in my First Witness Statement, technical or other problems on individual
accounts would be discussed if they were of a major nature and could impact a
customer relationship or performance. As there would be a variety of issues
occurring across all accounts within a division, division directors would naturally
prioritise and focus on updates that were considered to be material to the division.
37. My recollection is that Fujitsu Services’ Business Assurance team would also
attend most of these meetings to take notes, circulate actions from the review
meetings, and ensure these actions were followed up (see email dated 2 January
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2007 (FUJ00116311) and the Post Office Account Major Account Review action
plan dated 31 January 2007 (FUJ00116312)).
38. The Post Office Account would have been reviewed as part of the relevant monthly
divisional meeting.
Account Reviews
39. In addition to the above, account reviews would also be set up on an ad hoc basis
for major accounts.
40. As noted at paragraph 11 of my First Witness Statement, account reviews were
an opportunity for the account manager and other members of his or her team to
present on progress, issues and performance to me, and others in the senior
leadership team, and for these to be discussed. During these reviews, we would
usually discuss the account's progress to key milestones, its financials and the
relationship with the customer, as well as any major issues that may have been
occurring on the account.
41. My recollection is that Fujitsu Services’ Business Assurance team would also
attend the account reviews to perform a similar role as in the monthly divisional
meetings as noted above.
Major Account and Bid Reports
42. Major account and bid reports (“Reports”) would be prepared ahead of each
month’s board meeting. These Reports were included in the board papers and
were discussed at board meetings. They were a formal avenue to update the
board on the status of the business’ major projects.
43. As the board meetings were held on a regular basis, according to a pre-defined
schedule, divisional directors would have responsibility for producing the reports
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44,
45.
46.
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on major accounts or bids within their areas of responsibility ahead of a board
meeting.
These draft reports would then be sent to me for review, before they were
circulated to the board. I was generally familiar with the issues raised in the reports
on major accounts and, in most cases, reports prepared by divisional directors
would be consistent with my knowledge.
If I had any queries about a particular report, after my review, I would clarify those
with the relevant division director, and the report may be amended before being
provided to the board.
Board reports covered, at summary level, both problems and successes on an
account. In relation to the Post Office Account, I note that the following reports
covered a number of ongoing problems: (i) outages of the online services in March
2004, which led to a red alert being raised (see FSMC Major Accounts Report
dated 11 March 2004 (FUJ00003591)); and (ii) delays in the delivery of the HNG-
X programme in or around February 2007 (see FSMC Major Accounts Report
dated February 2007 (FUJ00003696)).
During the board meeting, I would respond to queries from the board regarding
the reports. In relation to the Post Office Account, the minutes of the FSMC board
meeting on 23 February 2005 note that I presented a report on major projects to
the board, in which I raised a service problem relating to POL and noted that it
was a “priority to meet expectations, particularly having regard to the new contract’
with POL. The minutes indicate that I then invited questions, which was followed
by a discussion “on the proposed extensions to the Post Office project with respect
to the new generation architecture” (see minutes of the FSMC board meeting on
9 June 2004 (FUJ00003575)).
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48. The Inquiry has specifically asked me to identify the steps I personally undertook
and the extent to which work would be delegated to others in preparing reports to
the board. As I have explained above, the drafting of reports was largely delegated
to division directors, while I personally reviewed reports and responded to any
questions from the board about them.
49. The Inquiry has specifically brought to my attention a report titled “Commercial
overview of Large Projects” prepared by Tony Oppenheim (FUJ00116084), and a
report titled “/CL Pathway input to David Courtley’s Quarterly Board report on LPD
to Fujitsu” prepared by Stephen Muchow (FUJ00116088). The Inquiry has not
drawn my attention to particular passages or topics within these documents. I do
not recall either of these reports in detail.
50. I note that Mr Oppenheim’s report included a number of statements critical of the
Large Projects Division and the Post Office Account, including stating that POL
perceived the account as “reactionary, slow in everything we do, difficult to deal
with, risk averse and expensive”. He was also critical of Mr Muchow and Peter
Graham. These issues were not reflected in Mr Muchow’s report, who described
current performance of the Post Office Account as “good”.
51. I understood Mr Oppenheim’s report to be a reflection of his views and frustrations
at individual tensions within the Large Projects Division. I felt that Mr Oppenheim
wanted to communicate issues he considered to be important about the business
to me to ensure I was aware of his concerns and perspective. I recall discussing
his concerns with him, and found it to be helpful context regarding issues on the
account.
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Customer Satisfaction Processes
52. In general, account managers had primary responsibility for ensuring customer
satisfaction on the account they were responsible for.
53. However, in addition to the monthly division meetings and account reviews
described above, senior executives (myself included) monitored customer
satisfaction on major accounts via the Customer Satisfaction Interview
Programme (“CSIP”).
54. As noted at paragraph 53 of my First Witness Statement, the CSIP was a formal
process run by an external provider, involving “a number of customer
representatives being asked to respond to a detailed survey, providing narrative
responses and numerical scores on Fujitsu's performance.”
55. I recall routinely receiving and reviewing CSIP reports from major accounts. Given
they were independently prepared, I found they gave a useful perspective on the
customer's views and experience and whether Fujitsu Services was meeting
expectations. While the CSIP process focused primarily on the Fujitsu Services-
customer relationship, the relationship necessarily depended on the quality of the
service Fujitsu Services provided. I therefore expected any major issues with the
service to be reflected in the CSIP survey.
56. In general, where a project had been experiencing difficulties, a negative CSIP
report might be expected. Where a CSIP review was unexpectedly negative, I
would usually follow up with the relevant division director or account manager.
57. On various occasions, I directly met with representatives of customers which
would present an opportunity to discuss and review account performance, the
status of the relationship and any issues. As noted in my First Witness Statement,
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during the course of negotiations on the HNG-X contract, I met with Alan Barrie
who was the Commercial Director for POL on a number of occasions.
Alert System
58. As noted at paragraph 19 of my First Witness Statement, a red alert could be
raised by the account manager or the customer or Fujitsu Services where a severe
performance issue occurred. There were also amber alerts, which required
additional attention but were less critical in nature than red alerts. When an alert
was raised, my role was to ensure that Fujitsu Services were deploying
appropriate technical and other resources from across the organisation to resolve
the issue and to monitor progress to a resolution, including following up if we were
not progressing towards a resolution.
59. I generally received daily updates by email on the progress of the red alerts. In
relation to the Post Office Account, my recollection is that red alerts were mostly
in relation to the availability of the service — for instance, I recall a number of
service outages raised as red alerts and address an example at paragraphs 15 to
21 of my First Witness Statement.
Oversight and reporting by Fujitsu representatives
60. During my time as COO from July 2001 to April 2004, and as CEO from April 2004
to December 2008, Hiromichi Hirata and Atsui Nagai were based in the UK and
seconded to Fujitsu Services from Fujitsu. Mr Hirata was also a member of the
Fujitsu Services Board.
61. Mr Hirata and Mr Nagai would often attend the monthly division meetings and
account reviews for major accounts mentioned in paragraphs 35 to 41 above.
They would primarily attend as observers and would occasionally ask questions. I
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understood that they reported on the outcomes of those meetings to a support unit
within Fujitsu.
62. On various occasions, Mr Hirata would raise concerns following meetings directly
with me. These conversations were of an informal nature.
63. Mr Hirata and Mr Nagai were also involved in analysing, communicating and
obtaining support for any large bids and contracts that would require approval from
Fujitsu or a parent-company guarantee.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BOARD REPORTING (SPECIFIC ISSUES)
64. I have explained above how senior executives and the board of Fujitsu Services
maintained oversight over Fujitsu Services’ business generally. In this section, I
address how those groups maintained oversight over specific issues affecting the
Horizon IT system or the Post Office Account.
Litigation support, including the provision of ARQ data
65. During my time as COO and CEO, I was not aware that Fujitsu Services provided
litigation support or ARQ data to POL.
66. I have considered (i) Section 4.1.8 of the Codified Agreement between Post Office
Counters Limited and ICL Pathway Limited (FUJ00000071), which contains an
obligation on Fujitsu Services to provide data to POL for the purposes of
prosecution; and (ii) the Service Description for Implementation and maintenance
of security policy and procedures (FUJ00001743), which states that Fujitsu
Services employees and/or contractors would prepare witness statements or
attend court to support POL litigation and prosecutions. I was not aware of the
negotiation of these obligations, any training that individuals involved in litigation
support may have received or the provision of litigation support itself.
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67. While I was not aware of these obligations, I would have expected the Post Office
Account manager, commercial department and legal department to be aware of
these arrangements. I would have expected that any material issues regarding
litigation support would be raised to me through the oversight processes discussed
above or directly. I do not recall receiving any escalations concerning litigation
support during my time at Fujitsu Services.
68. The Inquiry has specifically asked me about the nature and extent of my
knowledge regarding Fujitsu Services’ involvement in Wolstenholme v Post Office
Counters Limited and Post Office Limited v Castleton. I was not aware of Fujitsu
Services’ involvement in these litigations.
Integrity of the Horizon system
69. In the first Rule 9 Request I received from the Inquiry, dated 24 February 2023, I
was asked about when the Horizon system became “robust”. I explained in my
First Witness Statement, that, while that term bore no special meaning in the IT
context, I understood it to mean a system that was meeting the customer's
expectations.
70. In this Request, I have been asked about oversight in relation to the integrity of
the Horizon system. In my view, a system having integrity means that (i) it meets
customer requirements, and (ii) it works, on a day to day basis, as a customer
expects in terms of its reliability, availability and performance, although I do not
believe the word has any special or precise meaning, technically or contractually.
71. At the point I joined Fujitsu Services, the Horizon system had already been
subjected to acceptance tests and had been accepted into service. I understood
this to mean that it met POL’s requirements.
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72. Of course, problems with the system also arose during the operation of Horizon.
During my employment at Fujitsu Services, the operation of Horizon was managed
by the account team and was subject to the general reporting and oversight
procedures I described above. As a result of those procedures, I was made aware
of performance issues with Horizon (including those which led to outages and/or
red alerts).
Quality of technical support services
73.1 understand technical support services to include service desk support services -
provided by Fujitsu Services to POL, as well as the technical support work
undertaken by Fujitsu Services on the Post Office Account more generally.
74.1 would have expected major issues relating to the quality of technical support
services to be escalated to the Fujitsu Services Board through the processes for
oversight and reporting described above, including the alert system and the
customer satisfaction processes.
PROJECT LIGHT
75. I have been asked to set out the background to Project Light and steps taken in
relation to the red alert in relation to the project. In preparing this portion of my
witness statement, I have reviewed several emails dated between July 2007 and
August 2008 (FUJ00168179, FUJ00168320, FUJ00168348, FUJ00168357,
FUJ00168363, FUJ00168365, FUJ00126070), a PowerPoint presentation titled
“Programme LIGHT Executive Conference Calf dated 28 June 2007
(FUJ00168180), and a report titled “Fujitsu Services Customer Satisfaction
Interview Programme — 2008” dated 29 May 2008 (FUJ00126071), which are each
documents the Inquiry has drawn my attention to.
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76. Project Light was a project Fujitsu Services undertook with the Royal Mail Group
(“RMG’), in relation to the installation of video screens at RMG sorting offices for
displaying internal corporate communications. It was managed separately from
the Post Office Account and the Horizon system.
77. The project was relatively small and not considered a major account for Fujitsu
Services. However, it was considered a “high profile” project as Allan Leighton (the
chairman of RMG at the time) took an interest in it.
78.1 believe RMG issued a red alert and a critical CSIP report occurred
(FUJ001260771) as (i) there was a delay in delivering screens for the video system;
(ii) a number of the screens did not work when delivered, and (iii) there was slow
and insufficient recovery by Fujitsu Services from these failures. I note that in
FUJ00168180 there is a reference to the “Database remain[ing] unreliable’,
though I do not recall what that particular issue was.
79. During the course of the red alert, I spoke to lan Terblanche (the account manager
on the project) to understand reasons for delay in delivery, what Fujitsu Services
could do to address the reliability of the screens provided, and what support the
RMG account required. From the documents the Inquiry has drawn my attention
to, I am aware that the project eventually came off red alert, and that I discussed
that with Stephen Windsor-Lewis, the point of contact at RMG.
80. I do not recall bringing these issues to the attention of the Fujitsu Services Board,
although I may have done. While I do not recall my thinking at the time, I would
not have regarded this project or this red alert as sufficiently material to bring to
the attention of the board.
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LEAVING FUJITSU SERVICES
81. I left Fujitsu Services in December 2008. The Inquiry has referred me to emails
dated 15 July 2009 (FUJ00173904) and 7 July 2010 (FUJ00174335) and asked
me to set out my reasons for leaving Fujitsu Services.
82. Around 2008, Fujitsu made the decision to acquire Siemens’ share of Fujitsu
Siemens, and to merge that entity into Fujitsu Services. Due to the significant
change in business and restructuring that occurred following that decision, I was
no longer required in the role of CEO and left Fujitsu Services.
83. I note that FUJ00174335 appears to be an email between David Roberts and
Gavin Bounds discussing me joining POL. I confirm that I have never been
approached for an opportunity to move to POL, nor did I consider such a move.
GENERAL COMMENTS
84. I have been asked by the Inquiry about my views on the adequacy of Fujitsu
Service’s oversight procedures, and whether there are any steps I would have
taken differently.
85. Fujitsu Services’ procedures were deployed over multiple accounts, divisions and
geographies and, in my recollection, they generally were undertaken diligently and
enabled escalation of critical issues to senior management and/or the board for
attention and where needed, to help facilitate solutions.
86.As noted at paragraph 45 of my First Witness Statement, despite the acceptance
and testing regimes that occurred for the Horizon system, and based on my current
knowledge and with hindsight, there were serious errors in the software and more
could have been done to identify these and their impacts. Fujitsu Services could
have undertaken additional technical and architectural reviews of the system and
Page 20 of 24
WITNO03530200
WITNO3530200
its operation, either using our own technical resources, commissioned an
independent third party review, or jointly commission an independent third party
review with POL.
87.With hindsight, I also believe that the litigation support service on the Post Office
Account should have been better understood at senior levels in the company. It
was an unusual arrangement for an IT services provider and the potential risks of
litigation support, especially in the criminal context, were not raised with me.
Looking back on what happened, it appears that the peculiarity of the litigation
support service and the risks that came with it were not adequately identified or
fully understood when these were put in place or subsequently.
Statement of Truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
Signed:
Dated: 5' November 2024
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INDEX TO THE SECOND WITNESS STATEMENT OF
MR DAVID JOHN COURTLEY
Exhibit
No.
URN
Document Description
Control No.
1.
WITN03530100
First Witness Statement of David
John Courtley
WITN03530100
FUJ00003644
Minutes of a Meeting of the ICL plc
Board of Directors on 7 February
2002
POINQ0009815F
FUJ00003704
Minutes of a Meeting of the Fujitsu
Services Management Committee of
the Boards of Directors of Fujitsu
Services Holdings PLC, Fujitsu
Services Limited and Fujitsu Services
(Investments) Limited on 29 May
2002
POINQ0009875F
FUJ00116185
Minutes of a Meeting of the ICL
Investment & Strategy Committee on
6 February 2002
POINQ0122356F
FUJ00003701
Minutes of a Meeting of the Fujitsu
Services Management Committee of
the Boards of Directors of the
Companies on 15 November 2007
POINQ0009872F
FUJ00116311
Email from Fujitsu Business
Assurance to David Courtley and
others with subject “Post Office and
Royal Mail Group Account Plan
Review — Actions” dated 2 January
2007
POINQ0122482F
FUJ00116312
Post Office Account Major Account
Review action plan dated 31 January
2007
POINQ0122483F
FUJ00003591
Fujitsu Services Management
Committee Major Accounts Report
dated 11 March 2004
POINQ0009762F
Page 22 of 24
WITNO03530200
WITNO3530200
Exhibit
No.
URN
Document Description
Control No.
9.
FUJ00003696
Fujitsu Services Management
Committee Major Accounts Report
dated February 2007
POINQ0009867F
10.
FUJ00003575
Minutes of a Meeting of the Fujitsu
Services Management Committee of
the Boards of Directors of the
Companies on 9 June 2004
POINQ0009746F
11.
FUJ00116084
Document titled “New Year Report
Commercial overview of Large
Reports” (undated)
POINQ0122255F
12.
FUJ00116088
Document titled “ICL Pathway input to
David Courtley’s Quarterly Board
report on LPD to Fujitsu” (undated)
POINQ0122259F
13.
FUJ00000071
Post Office Counters Ltd and ICL
Pathway Ltd, Information Technology
Services Agreement for Bringing
Technology to Post Offices — Codified
Agreement dated 28 July 1999
POINQ0006242F
14.
FUJ00001743
Service Description for
Implementation and Maintenance of
Security Policy and Procedures -
CS/SER/016 - v1.0 dated 6 January
2003
POINQ0007914F
15.
FUJ00168179
Email chain involving David Courtley
and others with subject “RMG View on
life” dated 2 July 2007
POINQ0174360F
16.
FUJ00168180
PowerPoint titled “Programme LIGHT
Executive Conference Call” dated 28
June 2007
POINQ0174361F
17.
FUJ00168320
Email chain involving David Courtley
and others with subject “Royal Mail —
Project Light” dated 21 October 2007
POINQ0174501F
Page 23 of 24
WITNO03530200
WITNO3530200
Exhibit
No.
URN
Document Description
Control No.
18.
FUJ00168348
Email chain involving David Courtley
and others with subject “Stephen
Windsor Lewis’ note” dated 7
November 2007
POINQ0174529F
19.
FUJ00168357
Email chain involving David Courtley
and others with subject “RMG DMN”
dated 12 November 2007
POINQ0174538F
20.
FUJ00168363
Email chain involving David Courtley
and others with subject “Royal Mail —
Project Light” dated 16 November
2007
POINQ0174544F
21.
FUJ00168365
Email chain involving David Courtley
and others with subject “Project Light”
dated 16 November 2007
POINQ0174546F
22.
FUJ00126070
Email from Fujitsu Services Customer
Satisfaction to David Courtley and
others with subject “CSIP REPORT:
Royal Mail Group” dated 1 August
2008
POINQ0127352F
23.
FUJ00126071
Report titled “Fujitsu Services
Customer Satisfaction Interview
Programme — 2008” dated 29 May
2008
POINQ0127353F
24.
FUJ00173904
Email chain involving Akihisa Kamata,
Richard Christou, Brian Harris and
Mark Baker with subject “Meeting with
Nozoe-san” dated 15 July 2009
POINQ0180085F
25.
FUJ00174335
Email chain between David Roberts
and Gavin Bounds with subject “D
Courtley” dated 7 July 2010
POINQ0180516F
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