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Witness Name: Sarah Munby
Statement No.: WITN11520200
Dated: 2 October 2024
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
SECOND WITNESS STATEMENT OF SARAH MUNBY
1.
I, Sarah Munby, will say as follows.
Introduction
I make this statement in response to the Inquiry's Rule 9 request for evidence
dated 26 July 2024. I have prepared it with the support of the Government Legal
Department and counsel. I served as Permanent Secretary to the Department for
Business Energy and Industrial Strategy (“BEIS” or “the Department’) from 20
July 2020 until 6 February 2023. I am presently the Permanent Secretary at the
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (“DSIT’).
This is my second witness statement to the Inquiry. My first witness statement,
dated 13 September 2024, concerned Henry Staunton’s removal as Chair of Post
Office Limited (“POL”) and the false allegations he subsequently made about a
meeting I had with him in January 2023. I understand that statement has been
given the reference WITN11520100.
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3. In this second statement, I set out my reflections on the adequacy and
effectiveness of POL’s corporate governance arrangements, the culture of POL,
and the arrangements for and delivery of compensation and redress to
subpostmasters (“SPMs”), as they relate to my tenure as BEIS Permanent
Secretary. As I stated in paragraph 4 of my first statement:
“I anticipate that my second statement may be of broader interest to the Inquiry.
In that statement I am keen to provide as helpful a perspective as possible on
the ongoing work to provide redress for the terrible injustices which had been
suffered by postmasters, and work to reform POL and HMG to ensure similar
events could never happen again. Understanding the extent to which redress
and reform have been effective and how they could be improved is a vital part
of learning from what has happened.”
Background
4. In paragraphs 5-8 of my first witness statement, I describe my professional
background and role as Permanent Secretary in the following terms:
“5. My background before Government (apart from a brief stint as a junior civil
servant after leaving university) was as a management consultant, where I
worked for McKinsey for 15 years. At the time I left McKinsey I was a Partner,
leading the firm’s strategy and corporate finance practice in the UK and Ireland.
I re-joined the Civil Service when I was appointed as a Director General in BEIS
in July 2019. I stayed in that role until 19 July 2020 when I was appointed as
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Permanent Secretary for BEIS (this was in the midst of the Covid pandemic). I
remained as Permanent Secretary at BEIS until 6 February 2023 when I moved
to the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology as Permanent
Secretary. This followed the Machinery of Government change that dissolved
BEIS and created several new Government Departments in its place. At that
point, responsibilities for POL were passed from BEIS to the new Department
for Business and Trade (“DBT’) and I ceased to be the relevant Permanent
Secretary.
6. As Permanent Secretary at BEIS I was the Civil Service head of the
Department with overall responsibility for its management and leadership. I was
personally responsible for the effective stewardship of Departmental resources
as Principal Accounting Officer, accountable to Parliament for Departmental
expenditure. The Civil Service team in the Department aims to support
Government in achieving policy objectives and ensure the effective running of
the Department. As Permanent Secretary I held primary responsibility for that
Civil Service team.
7. During my tenure as Permanent Secretary of BEIS, the Department
consisted of around 6,000 civil servants in the core Department divided into 9
Director General-led Groups with an overall Departmental budget of about
£30bn per annum. The Department was responsible for over 40 Public Bodies
including (among many others) UK Research and Innovation, the Nuclear
Decommissioning Authority, the Met Office, and Companies House. Our
responsibilities included supporting businesses through the Covid-19
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pandemic, overseeing the UK’s energy transition and net zero strategy,
managing the majority of HMG’s Research and Development funding, and
administering schemes to support energy bills in the aftermath of Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine.
8. Day-to-day Departmental matters concerning POL were handled by a team
of officials that formed part of the Business Resilience Directorate headed by
Carl Creswell, Business Resilience Director, then to the relevant Director
General, and through them to me.”
It is worth briefly situating my tenure as Permanent Secretary in the wider context
of the Post Office. At the time I became Permanent Secretary in July 2020 the
HMG Independent Review [Horizon Review: Progress Update submission, dated
29 July 2020] (BEIS0000952) had just been launched (before being converted
into a statutory inquiry during my tenure); Nick Read was the CEO of POL (Paula
Vennells having left in 2019); the GLO settlement had taken place; the Historical
Shortfall Scheme had just opened; and although the first postmaster convictions
had not yet been overturned by the courts, 47 cases had been referred for appeal.
At the point I left BEIS in March 2023, the HSS scheme had made offers to 95%
of claimants; redress payments had started to those with over-turned convictions;
the GLO scheme was in the process of launching; HCRS had not yet been
launched; and the Post Office (Horizon System) Offences Bill had not yet been
introduced. My commentary only applies to this period — I did not remain involved
after I left my role at BEIS.
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Initial briefings
The Inquiry has asked me whether I received any relevant briefings before or at
the time of my appointment as Permanent Secretary of BEIS on 19 July 2020.
During my time as Director General in the Department, I was copied into a range
of documents that related to POL. This included updates from UKGI in respect of
the Horizon Litigation from around September 2019 [Email from Tom Aldred to
PO, Perm Sec, dated 19 September 2019 RE Post Office litigation: Appeal update]
(UKGI00024240) and an email in September 2019 to the Permanent Secretary
(Alex Chisholm) which attached a briefing [Briefing Note: Introductory Meeting with
Nick Read, CEO of POL, 30 Sept 2019] (UKGI00016309) for a meeting between
Alex Chisholm and Nick Read, POL’s CEO, and POL’s Quarterly Update [Email
from PO Policy and Sectors Briefing Hub to PS, dated 26 September 2019]
(BEIS0000955). Those documents provided me with an overview of the current
issues arising in respect of the Horizon Litigation and the work of the Criminal
Cases Review Commission (“CCRC”).
I was copied on some further updates (including on the referral by the CCRC of a
number of cases to the Court of Appeal) during the rest of 2019, and then on 14
May 2020, I was copied into a submission summarising issues associated with the
Horizon Litigation which included introductory details on the HSS [Briefing to
Secretary of State and Minister re POL Group Litigation background and latest
status, dated 14 May 2020] (BEIS0000956).
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10. This history meant that when I was appointed as Permanent Secretary, I did not
receive an “introductory briefing” as such, given I was already aware of many of
the points of background and recent events. However, almost immediately after
becoming Permanent Secretary, I was provided with a Quarterly Update for POL
[Submission on Post Office Limited (POL): Quarterly update dated 21 July 2020]
(BEIS0000957) on or shortly after 21 July 2020.
11. On 1 September 2020, I attended a meeting with both POL and Minister Scully
which concerned, in the main, POL’s approach to the cases of SPMs with
convictions which were at that time in the process of being appealed [Email from
Joshua Scott to Scully, Minister (Private Office), Permanent Secretary, SpAds
Office (Private Office) RE: POL - SoS/Minister Scully/Lord Callanan/SPADs - 1
Sept Meeting dated 28 August 2020] (BEIS0000958) [Update on POL Post-GLO
Litigation, dated 1 September 2020] (BEIS0000959); [Post Office Ltd. (POL) —
Update to BEIS on POL Litigation dated 1 September 2020] (UKGI00013178);
[Email from Minister Scully to Scott, Joshua - UKGI, Callanan, Minister (Private
Office), Permanent Secretary, SpAds Office (Private Office) dated 8 September
2020 RE: [OFF:SEN] RE: POL - SoS/Minister Scully/Lord Callanan/SPADs - 7
Sept Meeting] (BEIS0000961). This followed the 3 June 2020 decision of the
CCRC to refer the convictions of 47 SPMs to the Court of Appeal. The meeting
therefore concerned how POL would respond to these referrals — acknowledging
a very substantial liability for POL and HMG that could reach towards £1billion.
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12. At the time, I felt appropriately briefed. The materials appeared thorough and of
sensible quality. I was aware that very serious failings at POL had led to terrible
injustice and suffering for postmasters; that the work of providing redress had only
just begun and was going to expand hugely; and that POL had started (for
example by proposing the creation of postmaster NEDs), but not completed, the
necessary organisational change.
13. With hindsight, I have two additional reflections. First, that the briefings were
(perhaps unsurprisingly) typical Civil Service briefings, focused on the facts and
next steps. I couldn’t honestly say that they brought home the ongoing human
tragedies at the heart of this case, and with hindsight I think I should have
personally pushed to meet with postmasters myself. Second, I am not sure these
briefings emphasised sufficiently the ongoing cultural challenge at POL.
POL’s corporate governance and oversight
14. The Inquiry has asked me to set out my reflections as to the adequacy and
effectiveness of POL’s corporate governance arrangements and the adequacy
and effectiveness of the Department's and UKGI's oversight of POL, during my
tenure as Permanent Secretary at BEIS between 19 July 2020 and 6 February
2023. I address these issues in turn.
The adequacy of POL’s own corporate governance arrangements
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As a Public Non-Financial Corporation (“Public Corporation”), POL had a properly
constituted Board of executive and non-executive directors who were responsible,
both legally and in practice, for the corporate operations of POL. (One of the
members of this Board was a government representative; the other non-
executives were appointed by the Secretary of State.) They were required to fulfil
their duties as officers of the company in accordance with their legal duties and in
line with corporate governance principles. POL’s Board of directors was
accountable to the Secretary of State as sole shareholder for the performance of
POL and was required to seek their consent in respect of certain matters as
dictated by POL’s Articles of Association. Nick Read, POL’s CEO during my
tenure, was POL’s Accountable Officer. As set out in POL’s Shareholder
Relationship Framework Document [Post Office Limited - Shareholder
Relationship Framework Document] (UKGI00010387), it was his responsibility to
safeguard POL’s funds and ensure that POL was run on the basis of standards of
governance, decision-making and financial management as set out in Managing
Public Money [Managing Public Money (May 2021 version)] (POL00413475) and
to ensure that audits were used to improve internal controls and performance. He
was responsible for the day-to-day operation and management of POL.
These are structurally sensible governance arrangements, broadly in line with
what you would expect to see in other corporate settings. Of course, though, the
effectiveness of Board level governance in any corporation depends on the
implementation of this structure, including both the quality of the Board itself (mix,
skills, culture of challenge and so on); and the quality of the relationship between
the Board and the Executive (candour, respect and so on). It is failings in these
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kinds of areas that had allowed the Board to make earlier severe governance
failings that so strongly contributed to this scandal.
During my tenure, the POL Board had a large number of hard-working and well-
meaning members, and I think had learned from past failings. The Board was
significantly strengthened (with support from BEIS) by the appointment in 2021 of
two postmaster representatives and a dedicated Legal NED. However, there was
not a clean slate of good governance during my tenure. I give two examples below.
The first example concerns how the Board responded to what had been a much
earlier governance failure. Soon after I began as Permanent Secretary I wrote (in
line with Ministerial wishes) to Tim Parker (then Post Office Chair) formally
censuring him for not disclosing the Swift Review to POL’s Board in 2016 [Letter
to Tim Parker from Sarah Munby dated 7 October 2020] (POL00104180). This
was a significant error of judgement by Mr Parker, which contributed to the slow
recognition of the very serious problems identified by Jonathan Swift QC. After
learning of this, and giving consideration to whether we should advise Ministers to
fire Mr Parker, formal censure was chosen as the appropriate course of action.
We took this decision in part on the advice of Ken McCall, POL’s Senior
Independent Director, who had consulted the rest of the POL Board and viewed
dismissal as “unfair/disproportionate” given Mr Parker had been a “strong force for
positive change” [Email from Sarah Munby to Creswell, Carl (Professional
Business Services, Retail & Post Directorate), Cooper, Tom - UKGI, Watson,
Richard - UKGI, Mark Russell, Donald, Charles - UKGI dated 27 August 2020 RE:
Highly confidential. POL Litigation/Governance] (BEIS0000963); [Email from Carl
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Creswell to Putt, Lily - UKGI, Cooper, Tom - UKGI, Watson, Richard - UKGI, Mark
Russell, Donald, Charles - UKGI dated 3 September 2020 RE: Highly confidential.
POL Litigation/Governance] (UKGI00045960); [Email from Tom Cooper to
Donald, Charles - UKGI, Mark Russell, Watson, Richard - UKGI, Creswell, Carl
(Professional Business Services, Retail & Post Directorate), Munby, Sarah (BEIS)
dated 16 September 2020 re POL Litigation/Governance - Confidential]
(UKGI00012703). With the benefit of hindsight it was perhaps the wrong decision
not to take the harsher course of action and terminate Mr Parker's appointment (in
light of the serious consequences of Mr Parker’s mistake), even though it would
have been very destabilising for POL at what was a critical moment. Ultimately
responsibility for this decision must sit with me and Ministers, but I also think Mr
McCall and the POL Board gave HMG the wrong advice, reflecting some
remaining level of group-think and conservatism.
The second example concerns how the Board interacted with BEIS and the POL
executive over pay. POL’s Remuneration Committee acted in breach of their
responsibility by making a CEO Short-term Incentive Plan payment without
appropriate approvals from HMG [Briefing Note - 20221027 Sarah Munby call with
Lisa Harrington] (BEIS0000966). The Chair of the committee had to write to me
making a formal apology [Letter to Sarah Munby from Lisa Harrington dated 4
October 2022 Re: Letter of Apology] (BEIS0000967) and also came to my office
to apologise in person [Email from Rajeswaran, Siv — UKGI to Permanent
Secretary, Gourlay, James — UKGI dated 25 October 2022 OSCOMMERCIAL
Briefing Note - 20221027 Sarah Munby call with Lisa Harrington] (BEISO000968);
[Email from Permanent Secretary to Siv Rajeswaran, David Bickerton, Carl
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20.
21.
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Creswell and others re Sarah Munby call with Lisa Harrington, dated 28 October
2022] (WITN11520201). This was a relatively less significant process failure in the
grand scheme of what the Inquiry is investigating, but I mention it here as it cannot
be considered a sign of fully robust governance at POL and was unusual in my
experience of working with large numbers of Arm’s Length Bodies.
Overall, like many aspects of POL’s performance during this time, I think POL's
internal governance was very much improved, but still not fully adequate.
The adequacy and effectiveness of the Department's and UKGI's oversight of POL
The POL Board itself was primarily responsible for the oversight of POL. As sole
shareholder, the Department was (alongside UKGI) providing a “second line” of
assurance. The Secretary of State had a number of levers to influence POL
including: the ability to withhold consent to the appointment and removal of Board
members and the CEO; the ability to influence Board decisions through a
representative on the Board; the ability to provide or withhold public funding to
POL; the ability to veto individual expenditures over £50m; and the ability to
approve the Strategic Plan of the organisation. From early 2020, the Secretary of
State also had a power to issue directions to POL [Articles of Association of Post
Office Limited] (UKGI00016507).
Although it is true that Ministers and the Department should and must take an
active interest in matters involving an ALB like POL, there is nothing inherently
wrong about using an independent Board to provide primary oversight. A
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23.
24.
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Department running an organisation like POL directly would be very hard to
imagine given the scale, complexity and nature of decision-making required; and
creating too many opportunities for the Department to intervene in operational
matters has a tendency to both politicise and to gum-up what should be
operational decisions taken by properly qualified people. This is why Arm’s Length
Bodies exist.
However, while ALB arrangements are (by design) supposed to limit the ability of
Ministers directly to influence the day-to-day operations of organisations they are
responsible for, in the case of POL this certainly created challenges as I will go on
to discuss.
Historically, I understand from the record, there had been serious inadequacies in
HMG's oversight of POL. By the time I took over, I do think much of this had been
addressed. A dedicated POL policy team had been created in the Department, led
by a full-time member of the Senior Civil Service, and closely overseen by Carl
Creswell, Director of Business Resilience. We had a Minister leading on Postal
Affairs spending very significant time on the Post Office, who (for example) met
monthly with the CEO. We had an engaged and activist Board representative in
Tom Cooper. I certainly spent more time on POL issues myself than I did on any
other one of BEIS’s more than 40 ALBs.
Insofar as there were governance challenges during this period I do not think they
related to a lack of interest or involvement on the part of HMG (perhaps in contrast
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26.
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to what had happened earlier during the initial scandal itself). For this reason, I did
not make any substantial changes to these structures.
I think the hard part tended to be actually getting POL to do what Ministers wanted.
As described above, the Department did, from 2020, have a power to issue
directions to POL, but Ministers could not routinely become involved in the nuts
and bolts of operational decision making. Fundamentally altering the ALB
structure would have caused different, but likely equally (or more) profound,
problems.
A good example to illustrate this would be our efforts to get POL to tighten up its
management of legal costs. As I explained in my first witness statement, we had
an ongoing push to get POL to better forecast and control the amount of money it
was spending on lawyers. On 28-29 September 2021, Minister Scully and I
approved the decision to withhold planned Network Investment and Network
Subsidy payments of £64m and £12.5m from POL on the basis that POL’s
management and control of its litigation costs was not adequate [Email from Desai,
Meet - UKGI to Permanent Secretary dated 23 September 2021 re Post Office -
withholding funding] (BEIS0000970); [Network Investment and Subsidy
Payments due to POL by BEIS] (BEIS0000971); [Email from Desai, Meet - UKGI
to Permanent Secretary, Submissions Distribution List dated 27 September 2021
re OFF-SEN COMMERCIAL: Post Office Limited (POL) - funding delay from BEIS
to POL] (BEIS0000972); [Email from Scully, Minister (Private Office) to Permanent
Secretary dated 29 September 2021 re FW: OFF-SEN COMMERCIAL: Post
Office Limited (POL) - funding delay from BEIS to POL] (BEIS0000973); [Email
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from Permanent Secretary to Desai, Meet - UKGI, Submissions Distribution List
dated 29 September 2021 RE: OFF-SEN COMMERCIAL: Post Office Limited
(POL) - funding delay from BEIS to POL] (BEIS0000974); [Letter to Nick Read
from Sarah Munby dated 29 September 2021 Re Post Office: Budget 2021/22]
(BEIS0000975). This was a difficult choice to make, given POL’s challenged
financial picture, but instruction had not got us far enough. It’s also interesting to
note that at the time there was in fact a theoretical legal risk that by doing this
BEIS was over-reaching its powers in relation to POL, further emphasising the
comparative lack of potency we had. This process did result in the introduction of
cost controls, and the payments were released in February 2022 [Email from
Barnett, David - UKGI to Permanent Secretary, Submissions Distribution List
dated 11 March 2022 re [OFFICIAL COMMERCIAL] Submission on Release of
POL withheld funding] (BEIS0000976); [Post Office Limited (“POL”) Budget For
2021/22 And Release Of Network Subsidy And Network Investment Funding
dated 11 February 2022] (BEIS0000977). Yet by December 2022 I was writing to
the new Chair Mr Staunton, asking him to ensure “effective management of legal
costs” [Letter from Sarah Munby to Henry Staunton re Strategic priorities for
2022/23] (BEIS0000987). For these kinds of important but ultimately operational
matters, if POL did not do as we asked we had relatively few levers with “teeth”
other than ones that had other issues (like removing the Chair or pushing the
organisation into financial trouble).
More governance and assurance is not always better governance and assurance,
and I would acknowledge that while we may have sometimes felt it hard to get
messages across, at times POL felt the Department was overbearing and
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bureaucratic. (For example, the CEO reported this in regard to BEIS’s involvement
in compensation governance in October 2022 [Briefing for Perm Sec for Nick Read
meeting - 17th October 2022] (BEIS0000978). I don’t agree, but it is a good
illustration of the challenges of just putting ever tighter layers of governance and
more approval points upon things — one really good and effective layer would of
course be better.
POL’s culture
29. Aside from the Department's and UKGI’s collective ability to provide adequate
and effective oversight of POL’s culture and leadership, I have been asked by
the Inquiry about my understanding of the culture of POL .
30. Given the role I played, my exposure to the detail of POL’s culture (within the
organisation and at Executive and Board level) was fairly indirect, and my
observations should be taken in that context.
31. At Executive level, POL was unstable in the lead up to and during this period
[Annex B: Personnel changes in POL’s Board and Group Executive over the
last 3 years] (BEIS0000979). Changes had included the departure of Paula
Vennells, her interim replacement by Alisdair Cameron in April 2019, and then
permanent replacement by Nick Read in September 2019. Most of the
Executive team were new as of 2020 (reflecting a need to change over roles
given all that had happened) and I think there were a number of further
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changes during the time I worked with POL, although the majority of my
personal interactions were directly with the CEO, Nick Read.
BEIS and UKGI spent an unusual amount of time dealing with executive
compensation matters at POL. Both Tim Parker and subsequently Henry
Staunton were concerned about key executives leaving if we did not pay them
more, particularly Nick Read [Email from Cooper, Tom — UKGI to Emerson,
Edward - UKGI, Gourlay, James - UKGI, Rajeswaran, Siv — UKGI dated 26
August 2021 FW: OFFICIAL SENSITIVE PERSONAL: Nick Read, Post Office]
(BEIS0000980) [Letter from Tim Parker to Secretary of State dated 30
September 2021] (BEIS0000981). I am not sure I draw any particular cultural
conclusion from this, other than that POL existed in an uncomfortable space
between the public sector (where lower salaries are usually and necessarily
just accepted by leaders as part of the package, in the knowledge they are
providing public service) and the private sector (where pay is higher than what
POL usually offered). However, it certainly raised the temperature of our
interactions with POL leadership, and took up time. I was concerned that POL
executives would leave and we would be left with no ability to replace them,
which I understood Mr Parker and Mr Staunton to be concerned about too
[Readout - Minister Scully call with Tim Parker 15.11.2021] (BEIS0000982).
As to cultural change within POL more broadly beyond the Executive team, by
the time I became Permanent Secretary in July 2020 Nick Read had already
announced a programme of reforms of the organisation focused on forging a
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new relationship with SPMs and making fundamental changes to POL’s
culture, practices and operating procedures.
34. The key cultural changes I was told had already been made by POL included:
a. An agreement to appoint a current SPM as Non-Executive Director to
POL’s Board to influence POL’s strategy and the implementation of
programmes affecting postmasters.
b. Increasing postmaster remuneration by £20 million a year on top of the
£17 million increases secured for banking services through POL’s new
framework with the high street banks.
c. Undertaking a programme of improvements to overhaul culture,
practices and operating procedures throughout POL to forge an open
and transparent relationship with SPMs. Area Managers had been
appointed to provide support to SPMs.
d. Comprehensive improvements to recruitment and training to daily
transaction accounting, with dedicated Post Office teams available to
SPMs for support.
e. Setting out for SPMs the detailed responsibilities and commitments
which support them to build thriving businesses.
f. Establishing claims schemes to provide redress for former and current
postmasters who experienced unexplained shortfalls .
35. My ability to judge the success of this programme mainly rested on what we
heard from Postmasters — improvements in feedback began in around 2022
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but by 10 August 2022 I was told by Mr Cooper and Mr Creswell that, while the
Second POL Annual Research survey showed an overall increase in SPM
sentiment, it remained low at 28% [Post Office Limited (POL): Quarterly update
10 August 2022] (BEIS0000983). Whilst the level of SPMs satisfaction was
therefore still poor, it was the view of UKGI and the BEIS team that those
improvements, small though they were, were as a result of the work POL had
been doing on the feedback from previous surveys. By that time POL had
introduced WhatsApp groups to improve Area Manager communications, and
there had been engagement through the Regional Forums and the Voice of
Postmasters to identify opportunities for continuous improvement.
Pressing for continued cultural change was to form an ongoing part of my
relationship with POL, and on 23 May 2022 I wrote to Tim Parker requesting
further assurance on POL’s systems and processes [Letter to Tim Parker from
Sarah Munby re STRATEGIC PRIORITIES FOR 2022/23] (BEIS0000984).
On 1 September 2022, Tim Parker wrote to me setting out the changes that
had been or were in the process of being made by POL in response to the
principal findings of the Common Issues Judgment and the Horizon Issues
Judgment [Letter from Tim Parker to Permanent Secretary dated 1 September
2022] (BEIS0000985) . I was told that POL had commissioned a project, ‘Shine
a Light’, within its Historical Matters Business Unit to review the Common
Issues Judgment and identify areas for improvement. That work I understand
was supplemented by a review undertaken by Deloitte published in March
2021 which identified completed improved actions. This, together with a third
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report published in June 2021, a stock report issued by POL’s Group
Compliance function, framed the actions to be taken in response to the
Common Issues Judgment. The key changes identified to me were:
a. A restructuring of the business which focussed on SPMs, with better
regular reporting the deliverables arising from the Common Issues
Judgment to the Group Executive and POL’s Board.
b. All automatic deductions from SPMs remuneration were stopped,
unless these had otherwise been agreed with SPMs.
c. An independent appeal panel had been set up, including former SPMs,
to review disputed investigations, suspensions and terminations.
d. A discrepancy investigation process was put in place that included
processes to improve quality and consistency
e. A suite of policies had been introduced to ensure all SPM support
practices are consistent with POL’s duty of good faith.
f. POL’s “Branch Hub” had launched as a portal for SPM communications,
trading data, e-forms, and other day-to-day operational support.
g. New training, content and learning aids had been developed to support
SPMs better in how they run their branch and grow their business.
h. New SPM onboarding was simpler, with a single point of contact, and
with an average time to onboarding reducing from over a year to 5
months.
38. I was told that changes were assured by POL’s Internal Audit function and the
commissioning of a number of reviews.
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39. In respect of POL’s culture, Mr Parker recognised the systemic cultural issues
at POL in his letter to me and said that “we must change the way we work
comprehensively so that the issues as raised in the ClJ, can never happen
again”. He told me that POL had “embarked on an extensive culture
transformation programme with the aim of ‘putting Postmasters at the heart of
the business”.
40. To that end, POL had appointed a Director of Culture Change,
Communications and Engagement to develop and execute a programme of
cultural change lead by the Senior Leadership Group. POL had developed a
new “Ways of Working” to “align all Post Office to our behaviours of ‘working
in partnership, as one team to deliver’”. I was told that all POL Leadership and
Group Executive members had undertaken the first phase of POL’s “Leading
to Serve” programme which had been extended to Regional and Area
Managers. I was told that all POL staff had participated in a SPM-oriented
immersive learning programme of activities. Mr Parker told me that POL had
“aligned all Postmaster facing teams under a single Group Executive member
to break down solos and ensure consistency of interactions”.
41. Others will be better placed to comment on how effective these changes have
been. From my perspective at the time, it looked like considerable corporate
effort was being put on this agenda, in a sensibly structured and serious way,
but that actual results were slow (at least in terms of how SPMs were feeling).
That was perhaps unsurprising — given the terrible betrayal of postmasters’
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trust by POL management, rebuilding trust was always going to be a
challenging journey. This was one of the ongoing priorities I set for the new
Chair, Henry Staunton, when he was appointed [Email from Permanent
Secretaries to Gourlay, James - UKGI, Rajeswaran, Siv - UKGI, Creswell, Carl
(Business Sectors - Services Directorate), Bickerton, David (Business Sectors
DG Office), Brooks-White (Jobshare) dated 9 December 2022 RE: OS
COMMERCIAL: Perm Sec letter to new POL Chair] (BEISO000986); [Letter to
Henry Staunton from Sarah Munby] (BEIS0000987).
Redress and Compensation
42. AsIam aware the Inquiry has received detailed information on the specifics of
the compensation schemes (reflected in the Interim documents produced by
the Chair, several of which were produced during my tenure as Permanent
Secretary, and which the Department responded to at the time), I have tried to
focus the rest of this witness statement primarily on my own reflections as to
the effectiveness of redress during this period, and what lessons might be
learned from the process. This evidence is, therefore, primarily based on my
own views — I am acutely aware that other views exist and it will be for the
Inquiry to look in the round as it reaches its conclusions. Nevertheless, I hope
these reflections are helpful.
43. I view these conclusions as broadly consistent with those the NAO reported on
in its July 2024 report on Lessons Learned from government compensation
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schemes [National Audit Office - Lessons learned: Government compensation
schemes Cross-government] (RLIT0000258), which emphasises stakeholder
trust and engagement. My thoughts are a little more specific about how this
relates to the POL schemes as an individual case, but I would not personally
disagree with any of the NAO’s broader conclusions (though some are
inevitably general to the point of being imprecise, simply because of the
variation in individual schemes).
. I want to start by framing the overall context as it has looked from my position.
Ministers, officials in BEIS and UKGI, and those I encountered from the Post
Office were all clear that the goal was prompt, fair and full compensation. I
never encountered anything that could be described as resistance or
opposition to that intent, from anyone. However, translating an intent into
actual, delivered work does inevitably involve delays, complexities and
challenges. In the case of compensation and redress for SPMs, like in many
other areas of government policy, such delays and complexities have a real
human cost. I have tried to reflect on where we could have done better, faster.
Of course, just because these lessons look clear (at least to me) in hindsight,
that does not necessarily mean they could have easily been fixed at the time.
My experience of government policy as a whole is that when you get nearer to
the end, you wonder why you couldn't have just jumped to there from the
beginning. In reality though, at the start of the process, you don’t have all of
the information, or wisdom, that you will have gained by the end, and waiting
to have a full picture before you act is damaging in its own way. I return to this
in specifics below.
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45. I have broken down my evidence into a series of specific reflections. This is
my own list and is, of course, therefore an incomplete one.
HSS and the slow beginning
46. In brief summary, the HSS was introduced by POL in 2020 for the purposes of
the investigation and compensation of SPMs not party to the Group Litigation
Order. By July 2020 (when I became Permanent Secretary), the latest
estimates were to expect approximately 500 claims costing around £35m. In
the end, the HSS attracted around 2,500 applications and eventual costs were
estimated in the region of £150m. POL committed to funding a little under £90m
with BEIS committing to fund the compensation exceeding that threshold.
47. I add my own personal apology to the institutional apology that POL has
already made for slow progress during the early part of the scheme’s operation.
POL (and, in turn, HMG) had seriously under-estimated the scale, complexity,
and cost of the problem, and consequently HMG did not press POL hard
enough to, and POL did not themselves, set up a sufficiently robust operation
at the start. Operation got a lot better during 2022, with the end-2022
performance target being hit by POL.
48. I do not have any direct evidence to explain why this mistake was made. But
with the benefit of hindsight, I think it is reasonable to conclude that, in the run-
up to the scheme’s launch, there was not yet a sufficient understanding of the
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depth of the scandal and hence the scale of the response. Everybody knew by
this time in mid-2020 that awful injustices had happened to significant groups
of SPMs. The HMG Independent Review had been established and was about
to become a Public Inquiry. However, there had not yet been a “no stone
unturned” approach to understanding events, either by POL or HMG. The
problem was assumed to be of a scale something like that already reflected in
the GLO. In my view, that under-estimation of the scale of the problem was the
fundamental cause of the early delays, rather than any unwillingness to deliver.
49. It looks like a version of this problem of insufficiently complete digging into the
issue continued for some time. Although the Department was aware that some
postmasters had missed the HSS open window, the scale and importance of
the late applications issue was not really emphasised by POL, and hence by
HMG, until the time at which it was mentioned by POL in its submissions to the
Inquiry of May 2022. We then did serious work on how to handle the problem
(including securing new approvals from HMT for what was, in Whitehall terms,
a “new” expenditure). BEIS announced the new arrangements on 3 October.
However, looking at the record now, it is hard not to wonder why this issue had
not been raised more forcefully by POL to the Department earlier. There was,
to some degree, a feeling by this point of not wanting to pre-empt the Inquiry,
or step on its toes, but on this operational matter that doesn’t look like a good
enough reason.
The fundamental approach
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50. While it is true that the HSS scheme could have operated faster, sooner, if POL
had better understood its likely scale, it would have still taken time, and placed
a burden on SPMs, simply by nature of being an application-based scheme
with applicant-by-applicant assessments, and the accompanying work of
detail, panels and so on. The same applies to the OHCS and indeed the later
GLO scheme. This inevitably raises the question of whether an entirely
different approach could have been taken from the start.
51. Any such approach would necessarily have to have been much more “blanket”
in its nature, and probably would have meant we all had to accept paying
people whose circumstances were different the same amount as each other.
Likely the only way it could have proved acceptable to SPMs is if the numbers
had in general been much higher overall (“levelling up” the different individual
payments rather than “levelling down”). For HMG to have gone down this road
officials and Ministers would have had to have given up on two quite
fundamental principles. First, fairness, both as to between different applicants,
and as to between SPMs and other victims of past injustices. Second, standard
use of public money, as we would have had to accept making payments that
could not by any normal standard of judgement be viewed as compatible with
the formal guidance for spending taxpayer money (Managing Public Money).
52. It is not completely fanciful to think such an approach could have been taken.
During Covid, under Ministerial Direction (a specific public declaration that
Ministers are prepared to pay out public money in defiance of normal value for
money or other Accounting Officer considerations), HMG made widespread
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53.
54.
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payments to (broadly speaking) all furloughed workers and all owners of high
street premises. Shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, I was involved
in putting in place energy support schemes under Ministerial Direction that
(again, speaking broadly) provided significant support with energy costs to
every household.
There are some important reasons why this approach would have been difficult
to take here, and certainly at the time I was in post. First, it would have been
technically very challenging to identify the correct “class” of people to pay and
where to draw the appropriate boundary (at least for HSS). Second, the
circumstances of individual SPMs differed hugely, and so blanket approaches
could have been unfair to SPMs themselves. Third, giving out payments that
were not strongly related to suffering that had taken place would have been
seen by HMT as a very unwelcome precedent, effectively “ratcheting up” the
taxpayer's liability for other compensation schemes that might arise in entirely
different areas (that were nothing to do with POL). There are probably other
reasons as well. In due course HMG did get closer to this kind of model for
OHC, through the introduction in 2023 of fixed payments (as an option) for
those with overturned convictions: this group, of course, was a clearly defined
class with a strong pre-existing legal claim against POL. And I know that the
option of fixed sum payments has now been adopted across the various
Horizon compensation schemes.
However, despite the real challenges of taking a more radical approach much
earlier, and the particular challenges of doing so in relation to HSS, it is also
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the case that when the (metaphorical) “Emergency” button has been truly
pulled by HMG in other contexts, as it was during the energy crisis or the Covid
pandemic, HMG has demonstrated enormous creativity in overcoming these
sorts of problems, both technically and politically. Another example of this is
the passing of the Post Office (Horizon System) Offences Act in 2024 which,
in the face of significant concern about precedent from Parliamentarians and
legal and constitutional theorists, quashed convictions en masse.
55. So, beyond the important operational and speed improvements that could have
been made, particularly in the early part of the schemes’ operations, I have
reflected on how things might have looked if we had operated in a truly radical
mode, with a preparedness to rip up precedent; to do things that were not
compatible with the duties of Managing Public Money; and to be “unfair” to
some victims in the interests of speed and justice for the group as a whole. I
don’t know if this would have been better. It might well have been. Certainly,
given that Parliament ended up quashing convictions through legislation in the
end, it would have been better to have taken that step earlier (although until
that point it had not looked legally or politically plausible).
Independence and ownership
56. Postmasters have criticised the fact that the HSS and OHCS were run by the
Post Office, albeit with significant Departmental and independent oversight.
The later GLO Scheme was set up to be run by the Department in response to
SPM feedback.
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57. I did not personally see any evidence that POL running the schemes was
specifically causing unfairness, or that POL were not trying to put into action
their commitments. For example, I understand they never tried to pay out less
than recommended by an independent panel. The challenges that POL faced
in effective design and delivery were real, but many would have been
replicated under a different administrator.
58. While for HSS the decision for POL to lead its operation arose I think primarily
“by default” because it was originally a POL funded scheme that arose out of
commitments made by POL in the GLO settlement, the question of ownership
of OHCS was considered actively.
59. On 26 May 2021, Carl Creswell emailed me with his thoughts [Email Carl
Creswell to Sarah Munby dated 26 April 2021 re Update on Post Office
compensation next steps - OFF SEN COMMERCIAL] (BEIS0000988). He said
that:
“It looks increasingly likely to me that we should consider taking on
responsibility for the design and delivery of the compensation scheme
within BEIS, though that would have large resource implications . The
current HSS scheme (see below) is taking a long time and doesn't offer the
best model for the type of scheme we will need here.
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The big question for us [...] is whether we should set up a parallel team
alongside the current Post Office policy team (perhaps at Director level) to
oversee the criminal compensation scheme that we're likely to
need. Ministers are currently saying that the design and delivery are for
POL, which has its advantages, but we are all likely to face criticism if
compensation does not flow quickly. Much depends on whether it is decided
that we should go for mediation or to court with some ‘malicious prosecution’
test cases. We still aren’t completely sure what the postmasters want either,
though we are pressing POL for this information.”
60. I agreed with Mr Creswell that this was an issue, and we ultimately presented
analysis to Ministers on the pros and cons of HMG running the scheme on 10
June 2021 [Email from Carl Creswell to Secretary Of State (Kwasi Kwarteng),
Scully, Minister (Private Office), Callanan, Minister (Private Office), SpAds
Office (Private Office) dated 10 June 2021 OFF SEN: Post Office: Ownership
of Criminal Convictions Compensation] (BEIS0000989) [Post Office:
Ownership of Criminal Convictions Compensation dated 10 June 2021]
(BEIS0000990). The Secretary of State, following input from other Ministers,
ultimately decided that the scheme would be left with POL but that BEIS should
focus on “delivery and ensure appropriate governance structures in place with
POL” [Email from Carl Creswell to Secretary Of State (Kwasi Kwarteng),
Scully, Minister (Private Office), Callanan, Minister (Private Office), SpAds
Office (Private Office) dated 10 June 2021 OFF SEN: Post Office: Ownership
of Criminal Convictions Compensation ] (BEIS0000991) [Email from Secretary
Of State (Kwasi Kwarteng) to Scully, Minister (Private Office), Callanan,
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61.
62.
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Minister (Private Office), Holmes, Euan (Communications), Creswell, Carl
(Services Directorate), SpAds Office (Private Office) dated 6 June 2021 RE:
OFF SEN: Post Office: Ownership of Criminal Convictions Compensation]
(BEIS0000992).
There were substantial reasons at the time why POL running these schemes
looked to Ministers like the right approach. POL had first-hand access to all the
data and information required to make disclosures and review cases (and it
was difficult to do the necessary data transfers). It was also POL’s legal and
moral responsibility, and they were (at the start) paying for it - HMG would not
standardly step-in to correct an ALB’s mistakes by running the response. The
submission also notes that previous compensation schemes run directly by the
Department had had their own very significant operational difficulties. In this
case, had the scheme been run by the Department it would have been caught
(just to give a few examples) in the challenges that arose from Departmental
headcount restrictions and in the debates about reprioritisation of people to
deal with Covid and energy crises.
However, notwithstanding these legitimate practical reasons for the model that
was used, I think we all underestimated the impact on SPMs of having the
schemes run by POL. Even if the schemes were, in objective terms, being run
fairly and appropriately (which I appreciate is disputed), it is clear many SPMs
felt it was in principle wrong for POL to be administering this work. It is not
difficult to empathise with this position given the horrendous betrayals of trust
that had taken place in the past.
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63. On balance, I think we should probably have moved faster to adopt HMG
ownership of the schemes. I am not sure it would have improved their operation
— indeed it might very well have worsened it, particularly if we had shifted the
schemes while they were “in flight’. But the potential payoff in trust, and in an
even more acute sense of HMG accountability for performance, might well
have been worth it. In particular, bringing the operation of the schemes “closer
to the politics” might have led (though this is of course my own speculation) to
more effective engagement with postmasters, because ultimately Ministers
would likely have felt the emerging postmaster feedback on this point very
acutely, given their Parliamentary positions.
The GLO
64. Even at the very beginning of my tenure, it was obvious that the GLO
settlement had (while being legally sound) caused a deep natural injustice, as
those involved received so little money in their pockets after legal bills were
settled and the litigation funders received their slice (particularly in comparison
to other groups of SPMs). In March 2022 Ministers announced further funding
would be made available for an additional compensation scheme for this
group. Getting this scheme agreed took some time — between the recognition
of the problem (which certainly pre-dated July 2020) and the announcements
in early 2022.
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65. This was, in the early part, probably due to a conceptual assumption by officials
and Ministers that the GLO settlement had closed the book on this issue.
Obviously this was legally true (the relevant postmasters had no further legal
claim against POL) but it was not morally true. But by Carl Creswell’s email of
May 2021 (BEIS0000988) we were clear we needed to act. This proved difficult
to make happen. It took significant time to find a legal means to pay the money.
66. This problem was real (and I think BEIS and HMT officials did a good job
locating the Appropriation Act option). It does of course raise the question why
HMG didn’t just legislate to create spending authority, rather as eventually
happened in 2024 under the Post Office (Horizon System) Compensation Act.
I think the answer comes back to my point above about the extent of radicalism
both officials and Ministers were contemplating — emergency legislation of this
type is exceptionally difficult to make happen, and, speaking very frankly,
requires an enormous head of political steam to have built up. This could,
perhaps, be viewed as another example of not fully engaging on the human
side of the issues (in this case, the shocking unfairness the GLO settlement
created) and pushing for true radicalism in the approach.
Incremental improvement
67. Very significant improvements have been made to the operation of the
schemes. Examples include improving (or introducing) guidance and legal
support, introducing optional fixed sum offers, interim payment options,
disregarding payments for benefit assessment purposes and neutralising
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68.
69.
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taxation. Many of these have been in direct response to postmaster feedback,
or to recommendations from the Inquiry itself.
This is obviously a good thing (as in, better to have made these changes than
not). However, it gives rise to good questions about why each of those things
were not done sooner, or indeed right from the start. Others are better placed
to comment on each of the individual specifics, but I thought some more
general reflections might be helpful.
It is tempting to think that all of these issues should have been identified and
addressed in the design from the beginning, and that obviously would have
been ideal had it been possible. However, it has been my experience in every
similar large-scale scheme that I have been part of that you just cannot fully
see all the practical issues when you start. Waiting to get the fullest picture and
design the most ideal scheme tends to leave you waiting at the starting blocks
as the issues pile up. The “least bad” option is usually to get going, and then
make changes in flight, even if that is sometimes hard for users, and
sometimes politically difficult for Ministers who have to justify why officials
didn’t sort it out in the first place. For this reason, I do not think it was a
“mistake” that (for example) different schemes launched at different times, or
that schemes launched without a full set of interim options. Of course, with
hindsight, it would have been better to put all these things in from the start, but
it is only with hindsight that all the issues emerge, and many of them come
from feedback from those who are using the schemes.
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70. This of course does not preclude debate about whether, in any specific case,
the change could have been made earlier (and the slow introduction of
guidance for HSS looks wrong, under any light). But I don’t think in general
delays were caused by substantial resistance to making changes: but rather
the challenges of working them through in practice.
Overall conclusions on delivery of redress
71. In 2020 it was already clear that a terrible injustice had occurred and HMG and
POL were publicly committed to dealing with it properly. The Inquiry itself was
underway. During my tenure as Permanent Secretary, delivering
compensation and redress was a key priority for the Department. The schemes
were improved and expanded throughout. Notwithstanding real concerns,
much important work was done, and postmasters were very much at the
forefront of HMG’s considerations.
72. In the round, looking back on events, an initial underestimation of the scale
and depth of the challenge in truly delivering “redress” was then followed up
by a plausible but incremental set of decisions on how to deliver full and fair
compensation, with those decisions focused on deliverability, fairness,
appropriate use of public money, and good governance, justifying and building
up the response piece by piece. Such considerations are the mainstay of
government and we should not leave them behind hastily. However, had we
begun down the path with a deeper and more complete understanding at the
start of the true human impact of all that had happened previously, I wonder
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whether both officials and Ministers might have taken bolder, more radical
decisions earlier, that would have allowed us to reach towards full and fair
redress faster, and with less distress for postmasters.
Statement of truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
Dated: 02/10/2024
Page 35 of 39
Index to the Second Witness Statement of Sarah Munby
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Inquiry URN
Document Description
Control Number
BEIS0000952
Department for Business, Energy and
Industrial Strategy Report: Horizon
Review Progress Update
BEIS0000952
UKGI00024240
Email from Tom Aldred to Pranita
Bhargava re: OFF-SEN Pot Office
litigation: appeal update.
UKGI033135-001
UKGI00016309
Introductory meeting with Nick Read,
CEO of post Office Limited - 30th
September.
UKGI027102-001
BEISO000955
Email from Pranita Bhargava to
Permanent Secretary, Cc' Sarah
Munby, Beth White and others Re:
Briefing for Permanent Secretary/Nick
Read
BEIS0000955
BEISO000956
Briefing to Secretary of State and
Minister re POL Group Litigation
background and latest status
BEIS0000956
BEIS0000957
UKGI Post Office Limited (POL):
Quarterly Update
BEIS0000957
BEIS0000958
Email from Joshua Scott to Paul
Scully, Secretary of State, Minister
Callanan, Cart Creswell and SPADs
re [OFF:SEN] RE POL - SoS/Minister
Scully/Lord Callahan/SPADs - 1 Sept
Meeting
BEIS0000958
BEIS0000959
Post Office - update on POL Post-
GLO Litigation Briefing for BEIS
Ministers, Permanent Secretary and
Special Advisors
BEIS0000959
UKGI00013178
Agenda re: Post Office Ltd.'s Update
to BEIS on POL Litigation
UKGI023972-001
10
BEIS0000961
Email from Minister Scully to Joshua
Scott, Minister Callanan, Permanent
Secretary and others re: POL -
SoS/Minister Scully/Lord
Callanan/SPADs - 7 Sept Meeting
BEIS0000961
11
UKGI00010387
Post Office Limited - Shareholder
Relationship Framework Document.
UKGI021195-001
12
POL00413475
Managing Public Money
POL-BSFF-
0233694
13
POL00104180
Letter from Mrs Sarah Munby to Mr
Tim Parker re: Post Office
POL-0103763
14
BEIS0000963
Email from Sarah Munby to Carl
Creswell, Tom Cooper, Richard
Watson and others re Highly
BEIS0000963
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confidential. POL
Litigation/Governance
15
UKGI00045960
Email from Carl Creswell to Lily Putt,
Tom Cooper, Richard Watson and
others re: Highly Confidential. POL
Litigation/ Governance
UKGI023462-001
16
UKGI00012703
Email from Tom Cooper to Charles
Donald, Richard Watson, Carl
Creswell and others re: POL
Litigation/ Governance - Confidential.
UKGI023497-001
17
BEISO000966
Ministerial submission from Siv
Rajeswaran to the Permanent
Secretary re Lisa Harrington call and
NED Post Office Limited
BEIS0000966
18
BEIS0000967
PO - Letter RE: Letter of apology from
Lisa Harrington
BEIS0000967
19
BEIS0000968
Email from Siv Rajeswaran to
Permanent Secretary, James Gourlay
cc: Rebecca Stockbridge and others
re OS Commercial Briefing Note
(Sarah Munby call with Lisa
Harrington
BEIS0000968
20
WITN11520201
Email from Permanent Secretary to
Siv Rajeswaran, David Bickerton, Carl
Creswell and others re Sarah Munby
call with Lisa Harrington
WITN11520201
21
UKGI00016507
Articles of Association of Post Office
Limited (adopted by a written
resolution passed on 19 March 2020).
No 02154540
UKGI027300-001
22
BEIS0000970
Email from Meet Desai to the
Permanent Secretary cc'ing Tom
Cooper, Edward Emerson and others
re: Post office- withholding funding
BEIS0000970
23
BE!IS0000971
Post Office Limited (POL) - Network
Investment and Subsidy Payments
due to POL by BEIS
BEIS0000971
24
BEIS0000972
Email from Meet Desai to Permanent
Secretary, Submissions Distribution
List cc’ing Carl Creswell and others
re: OFF-SEN COMMERCIAL: Post
Office Limited (POL) - funding delay
from BEIS to POL
BEIS0000972
25
BEIS0000973
Email from Scully Minister to
Permanent Secretary and Scully
Minister re POL funding
BEIS0000973
26
BEIS0000974
Email from Permanent Secretary to
Meet Desai, Submissions Distribution
List, cc Carl Creswell and others re
BEIS0000974
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Post Office Limited (POL) - funding
delay from BEIS to POL
27
BEIS0000975
Letter from Sarah Munby to Nick
Read re: Post office Budget 2021/22
BEIS0000975
28
BEIS0000976
Email from David Barnett to
Permanent Secretary and
Submissions Distribution List. cc'ing
Carl Creswell, Brooks-White, Eleanor
Beal and others re:[OFFICIAL
COMMERCIAL] Submission on
Release of POL withheld funding.
BEIS0000976
29
BEIS0000977
Post Office Limited (“POL”) Budget for
2021/22 and release of Network
Subsidy and Network Investment
Funding
BEIS0000977
30
BEIS0000987
Letter from Sarah Munby to Henry
Staunton re Strategic priorities for
2022/23
BEIS0000987
31
BEIS0000978
Letter from Beth White to Permanent
Secretary re: Meeting Brief: Nick
Read, CEO Post Office
BEIS0000978
32
BEIS0000979
Annex B: Personnel changes in POL's
Board and group
BEIS0000979
33
BEIS0000980
Email from Tom Cooper to Edward
Emerson, James Gourlay and Siv
Rajeswaran re: FW: OFFICIAL
SENSITIVE PERSONAL: Nick Read,
Post Office
BE!IS0000980
34
BE!IS0000981
Letter from Tim Parker to Secretary of
State Re: Reward and retention
arrangements for Nick Read
BE!IS0000981
35
BEIS0000982
Readout of MS Teams meeting
between Minister Scully and Tim
Parker re Incentive Scheme
BEIS0000982
36
BEIS0000983
UKGI Post Office Limited (POL):
Quarterly update report - August 2022
BEIS0000983
37
BEIS0000984
Letter from Sarah Murphy to Tim
Parker RE: Strategic Priorities for
2022/23
BEIS0000984
38
BEIS0000985
Letter from Tim Parker to Permanent
Secretary re: Engaging with the Post
Office Horizon IT Inquiry and
Implementing change
BEIS0000985
39
BEIS0000986
Email from Permanent Secretaries to
James Gourlay, Siv Rajeswaran, Carl
Creswell and others re OS
COMMERCIAL: Perm Sec letter to
new POL Chair
BEIS0000986
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40
RLIT0000258
National Audit Office - Lessons
learned: Government compensation
schemes Cross-government
RLIT0000258
a4
BEIS0000988
Email from Carl Creswell to Sarah
Munby. CC: Permanent Secretary,
Michael Keoghan and others. RE:
Update on Post Office compensation
next steps - OFF SEN COMMERCIAL
BEIS0000988
42
BEIS0000989
Email from Carl Creswell, Secretary
of State, Minister Scully cc:
Permanent Secretary, Michael
Keoghan and others re Off Sen: Post
Office: Ownership of Criminal
Convictions Compensation
BEIS0000989
43
BEISO000990
DBEIS Report on Post Office:
Ownership of Criminal Convictions
Compensations
BEIS0000990
44
BEIS0000991
Email from Minister Callanan (Hannah
Cowie) to Euan Holmes, Minister
Scully, Carl Creswell and others RE:
OFF SEN: Post Office: Ownership of
Criminal Convictions Compensation
BEIS0000991
45
BEISO000992
Email from Secretary of State to
Minister Scully, Minister Callanan,
Euan Holmes and others re: OFF
SEN: Post Office: Ownership of
Criminal Convictions Compensation
BEIS0000992
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