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Witness Name: Peter Batten
Statement Number: WITN11540100
Dated: 10 October 2024
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF PETER BATTEN
I, PETER BATTEN, will say as follows:
1. I am employed by the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (“DESNZ”)
as a Grade 6 team leader, overseeing a number of delivery contracts relating to
the UK government's International Climate Finance commitments. This is a role
I have held since July 2020. Until February 2023, DESNZ was part of the
Department for Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy (“BEIS”).
2. I joined the Civil Service in 2008, shortly after graduating from a university
undergraduate course. My career as a Civil Servant is covered in further detail
below. I was employed by the Shareholder Executive (“ShEx”) between
September 2010 and December 2014.
3. I make this statement in response to a Rule 9 Request made by the Inquiry dated
9 August 2024. I have sought to address all the matters raised by the Inquiry. The
events that I describe in this witness statement occurred approximately 10 years
ago and I am therefore reliant, to a significant extent, on the contemporaneous
documentation I have been able to review. I have not had access to all the
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documents and e-mails that I would have had at the time. I have sought to make
clear in this statement where I have a direct recollection of the matters I describe
and where I am relying on the documentation I have seen as part of this Inquiry,
some of which I am not aware of having seen at the time. I have also sought to
make clear where I am applying hindsight rather than describing my views at the
time. In preparing this statement I have been assisted by lawyers employed by
UKGI, by Eversheds Sutherland (International) LLP (the recognised legal
representatives for UKGI in the Inquiry).
4. To begin this statement, I want to recognise the many hundreds of
subpostmasters who have been victims of a horrific miscarriage of justice at the
hands of a publicly owned company, and the long-lasting harm this will have
caused to them personally, and their families. The survivors of this injustice
deserve to understand what went so badly wrong to allow such a deeply flawed
system to be introduced, to be maintained, and to be defended to the last. I hope
to explain everything I can recall as clearly as possible to assist the Inquiry and
for this to support the Inquiry in helping all core participants understand what
went so dreadfully wrong, and in providing recommendations for tangible and
lasting changes that serve to prevent such suffering occurring again.
My role in the Shareholder Executive
5. Before I began work at ShEx, I had been an Executive Officer within the
Department for Business, Enterprise, and Regulatory Reform (a forerunner of
BEIS), working in the Private Office for the Special Advisors within the
Department, a role I held for 22 months between November 2008 and September
2010. An Executive Officer is an entry-level administrative grade, where you are
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concerned with diary and document management, note taking, and more
substantive work on non-contentious portfolios and issues.
I joined ShEx in September 2010 following an open recruitment process for a
role as a Higher Executive Officer (“HEO”). As the name suggests, this
represented a promotion to the next tier in the civil service. At that time, HEOs
sat below Senior Executive Officers (“SEOs”), and Grades 7 and 6, the latter
being the highest grade below the Senior Civil Service. As an HEO I was four
tiers below the Senior Civil Service. At the time I joined ShEx, I was 23 years old.
The recruitment process by which I was appointed was led by Mike Whitehead,
who was then the Grade 7 on the ShEx Post Office Team (“the ShEx POL Team’).
Mike was a highly experienced civil servant who acted as my line manager. As I
describe below, I succeeded him as the Grade 7 on the ShEx POL Team in
December 2013.
Although I formally joined the ShEx POL Team, I initially spent almost all of my
time working on the Postal Services Bill. I worked on the stakeholder
engagement plan, supporting the Deputy Directors who were leading the Postal
Services Bill team. The Postal Services Act was granted Royal Assent in June
2011, after which my time was divided between work towards the initial public
offering for the Royal Mail privatisation and, increasingly, work for the ShEx POL
Team. By the end of 2011 or the start of 2012, I was fully engaged on the ShEx
POL Team.
At that time, the structure of the team was as follows:
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a. The Deputy Director led the team. This was Oliver Griffiths until he was
replaced by Will Gibson.
b. Two Grade 6 civil servants reported to the Deputy Director: Jane Hoyle
(who was later replaced by Katrina Lidbetter), and Tim Mcinnes. Jane and
Katrina were career civil servants, whereas Tim had previously worked as
a banker. Given their respective backgrounds, Jane and Katrina were
responsible for matters relating to Government services, while Tim was
tasked with financial reporting on the Post Office (“POL”).
c. Mike Whitehead, the Grade 7, also reported to the Deputy Director. This
was the role that I would take on Mike’s retirement in December 2013.
d. The team contained at least one Fast-streamer, who would report to one of
the Grade 6 role holders. Jai Nathan and Katie Wake worked in that role.
e. I was the only HEO in the team and, as such, was the most junior member
until my promotion in December 2013.
As the HEO I fulfilled various roles. I was given specific responsibility for liaising
with the BEIS Parliamentary team, and for drafting initial drafts to
correspondence and Parliamentary Questions. By 2013, I assisted Mike on
matters relating to Horizon and the Justice For Subpostmasters Alliance
(“JFSA”), and work on a matter relating to the rateable value of ATM machines in
Post Offices, a discrete issue but one that was important for those
subpostmasters affected. I also worked with Katrina on matters concerning
Government services and local authorities. My roles, and those of others in the
team, are shown on the ShEx POL Team Planner that I circulated on 29 July
2013 (cover email dated 29 July 2013 (UKGI00001878); ShEx POL Team Planner
(UKG100001879)). Much of my work in this period would be signed off by Mike or
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another member of the team. I also undertook various administrative functions
on behalf of the team, as can be seen by the fact that I was the one who pulled
together and circulated the Team Planner.
Mike Whitehead and Will Gibson resigned on the same day in December 2013.
Mike was retiring, and his role was advertised via an open cross-government
recruitment process in autumn 2013. I applied and was appointed, being
promoted to fill the Grade 7 role. The new Deputy Director replacing Will Gibson,
Richard Callard, was my line manager. My old role as HEO was not immediately
backfilled, though in early 2014, James Baugh joined the ShEx POL Team.
James was an established SEO, having previously worked for the Royal Mail
Team (which had been disbanded following privatisation). James was the only
member of the team for whom I had line manager responsibility.
As Grade 7, I took responsibility for those roles on which I had previously assisted
Mike, including Horizon and the JFSA and the issue of local rates on ATMs, and
for the matters on which he had previously been responsible, such as Network
Transformation, Crown Transformation, consumer focus and stakeholders, and
relations with the National Federation of Subpostmasters (“NFSP”) (Richard
Callard being responsible for relations with the Communication Workers Union
(*CWU”).
I left SnEx on 12 December 2014, about a year after my promotion to Grade 7,
when I moved to the Department for Transport (“DFT”). I transferred as a Grade
7 following an open recruitment process to which I applied because of my interest
in transport policy. I was promoted to Grade 6 in January 2016 and have
remained at that grade. I stayed at the DFT until July 2020, when I returned to
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what was BEIS to work in international climate finance. Since December 2014 I
have had no professional responsibility for matters relating to POL.
Complaints Regarding the Horizon IT System
14. My knowledge of the complaints and concerns about the operation of the Horizon
IT system developed from the bottom-up as a result of the work I was undertaking
for the ShEx POL Team. I first learned of the complaints through my role in
helping to respond to correspondence and Parliamentary Questions. Later, I
became aware of the work of Second Sight and its Interim Report. My
understanding developed gradually, from the second half of 2011. I was not
involved in matters relating to Horizon before then, and do not recall having any
knowledge of them, or of the early reports in Computer Weekly and other
publications.
15. As the HEO for the ShEx POL Team, I was responsible for organising responses
to questions posed by Parliamentarians, subpostmasters and members of the
public on all matters relating to POL. The issue that generated the most
correspondence was the ongoing Network Transformation programme, which led
to many letters from constituency MPs and members of the public concerned
about their local Post Office services. Later, during industrial action by CWU
members in the Crown Post Offices, we received a large number of
representations from members of the public expressing support for the aims of
the strike, to which we had to respond. We also received complaints about
Horizon. During the period in which I was involved, Horizon formed a small part
of the total correspondence. Generally, it involved MPs passing on letters in
which subpostmaster constituents set out their experiences and concerns. In the
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majority of cases, we would respond to the MP and then hear nothing further
from them on the matter. There were, however, notable exceptions, such as
James Arbuthnot MP (now Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom).
Approach to responding to correspondence
16. When responding to a Parliamentarian as an HEO, I would draft a reply that
would then be reviewed by Mike Whitehead as the Grade 7 before being sent to
the Minister for approval. Ministers could, and did, send drafts back with
amendments or requests if they were not happy with the draft provided. Letters
to members of the public would go out in my name, or in Mike’s name. Again, I
was responsible for the first draft, which would be approved by Mike when
required, for example when the issue raised was new, or involved a point of
sensitivity or complexity, or when I wanted assurance.
17. These responses to Parliamentarians and members of the public were not
drafted from scratch each time. Instead, there were precedents that could be
used on particular topics, for reasons of both efficiency and consistency. This is
usual practice in Government Departments. The language and terminology of
these letters was therefore inherited to a certain degree, though it could change
and evolve over time, with additional information or shifts in policy. The
correspondence would also be discussed in weekly meetings of the ShEx POL
Team, or more informally with others in the team. We worked in an open-plan
office that was intended to encourage such discussions.
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When I became the Grade 7, the same approach was followed, but with me
taking Mike’s role of approving correspondence at that level. When James Baugh
joined the team, he took on my former role in assisting with the correspondence.
For responses to Parliamentary Questions (i.e. answers that would form part of
the formal record of Parliament), a similar process would be followed, but with
the additional step of approval by a member of the SCS. In most cases the
Deputy Director leading the ShEx POL Team would do this, unless this person
was unavailable in the time required. SCS approval would also be required for
responses to Freedom of Information requests. If that response included reliance
on an exemption from disclosure under section 36 of the Freedom of Information
Act 2000 (prejudice to the effective conduct of public affairs), Ministerial approval
was required.
Press enquiries would always be handled by the Department's Press Office.
Depending on the topic raised, I might be involved in providing background
information and suggested lines to the Press Office, but it would be for the Press
Office to decide whether or not to use them.
Other than through the processes set out above, I do not recall ever personally
advising a Minister on how a particular response should be framed, or otherwise
advising on how to deal with an issue that a Parliamentarian, subpostmaster or
journalist had raised.
Horizon-related correspondence
When dealing with correspondence and questions, the SnEx POL Team would
often contact POL to ask for information about the case that had been raised. To
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give an illustrative example, on 24 February 2012, Stephen Hepburn MP wrote
to Ed Davey MP, who until earlier that month had been the Minister with
responsibility for POL, to raise concerns about Horizon following contact from
one of his constituents, Carol Riddell, on behalf of her husband who was
subpostmaster of East Boldon Post Office (UKGI00001408). Mike then wrote to
Martin Humphreys at POL, copying me and others, to ask for information about
the case. Martin Humphreys responded by providing an account, from POL’s
perspective, of the investigation that had taken place and its outcome
(UKG100001407). The expectation within ShEx was that POL would provide
accurate and full information, given that this was a request made both on behalf
of the Shareholder and by a Minister who was seeking information about an issue
raised by a Parliamentarian. There was nothing on the face of Martin Humphrey's
response that seemed implausible at that time, and the ShEx POL Team did not
have direct access to the operational resources or operational expertise to further
investigate the matter itself. The information provided by POL therefore formed
the basis of the reply that was sent to Stephen Hepburn MP by the Minister, now
Norman Lamb MP, which also stressed that these were considered to be
operational matters that were the responsibility of the management of POL
(UKG100013948).
As part of my preparation for this statement, I have read Carol Riddell and Alan
Riddell’s human impact statements that provide much greater detail about the
suffering the Horizon system caused, and continues to cause, them. It is not
possible to read their statements without reflecting on the response sent twelve
years ago, and consider what they would have felt when reading it.
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This approach reflected the fact that POL was run as an Arm’s Length Body
(“ALB”), and Horizon was seen as an operational matter that was the
responsibility of POL rather than ShEx. The ShEx POL Team was small and did
not contain the degree of operational expertise that would have been required to
intervene directly in trying to resolve what seemed to be a dispute among some
subpostmasters and POL about how Horizon was operating. More widely, it was
not the job of those of us in ShEx to try to man-mark those in POL with operational
responsibility for the matters about which Parliamentarians and others asked
questions. It would not have been possible to have acted otherwise, given the
range of topics that prompted correspondence. Nor would it have been
consistent with principles of good governance, as it was for the POL Executive,
overseen by the relevant Board (the Royal Mail Board before separation, and the
POL Board thereafter), to take responsibility for the day-to-day running of the
company. In this regard, following its separation from Royal Mail, POL was falling
into line with the other assets in which ShEx exercised the shareholder function
on behalf of Government Departments.
However, there was no absolute distinction between matters that were
“operational” for POL, and those in which ShEx and the Department would
become more involved. The work done by Jane and Katrina on encouraging
Government Departments to use POL as their front office in providing services
to the public was an example of such a grey area. As Horizon became more
prominent an issue, including via the commissioning of Second Sight, ShEx,
Ministers and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (“BIS”) became
more engaged in monitoring POL’s handling of it. However, during the time when
I was with ShEx, the Postal Services Bill and subsequent transaction, separation
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of POL from Royal Mail, and securing funding for Network Transformation were
the issues on which ShEx and Ministerial attention was most focussed.
In addition to these structural points, and with the benefit of hindsight, I think
there are a number of reasons why I did not do more by way of challenging POL’s
answers to questions raised about Horizon at this time. First, we had to deal
quickly with the correspondence we were handling. For Ministerial replies to
Parliamentarians, we had a limited time period to provide a draft response to a
Minister. This timetable could be a disincentive to seeking to explore further
information beyond the initial responses to our queries, particularly if the initial
response seemed plausible. Second, during my time working on matters relating
to Horizon, Ministers usually signed the draft responses provided to them and
rarely sought more information, giving implied assurance they were content with
how ShEx was engaging with the issue. Third, the whole POL team was fully
deployed and did not have the capacity or direct access to operational
information to pursue additional avenues of inquiry. Fourth, the information that
was received from POL seemed credible. Cases were investigated and details
provided, sometimes with an indication about how subpostmasters had been
advised in response to their concerns. This gave a sense that each case was
being considered on its merits. As I have said, we expected full and accurate
information to be provided by POL. Fifth, at that time IT projects instilled greater
confidence within Government, and I and others lacked the wider experience and
context of failed or flawed IT systems that we now have. Finally, as a personal
reflection, I was at that stage a very junior, young and inexperienced civil servant,
which may have inhibited my confidence in my own curiosity when engaging in
matters where I lacked technical knowledge or expertise.
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27. A further factor that I think influenced my response, and that of the wider ShEx
POL team, to questions about Horizon was the attitude of the NFSP. We saw the
role of the NFSP as being the voice of subpostmasters and to champion their
cause. We would have expected them to bring problems to our attention, and to
help us understand issues affecting their members. The NFSP had access to
Ministers and a generally good relationship with the SnEx POL Team. There were
ample opportunities for it to raise concerns, but not only did it not do so, it actively
discouraged Government curiosity and intervention in the Horizon issue by
suggesting that there were only a small number of cases, some of which might
be explained by “bad apples”. This was, I believe, influential given that this was
the organisation that was supposed to stand up for its membership. I was aware,
in broad terms, that NFSP had a funding relationship with POL and that their
members relied on people having confidence in Post Office services, but at the
time I did not see this as being a reason for NFSP to disregard something that
was so important to the wronged subpostmasters. After all, the NFSP did
challenge POL Management on other matters fundamental to the future of the
company, including in respect of Network Transformation and mutualisation. Had
the NFSP raised concerns with the ShEx POL Team and with Ministers — as it
had plenty of opportunity to do — I think that this would have led to ShEx pushing
POL further and earlier on the accuracy of the information that it was providing.
Meetings with Ministers
28. I am asked what involvement I had in meetings between Ministers and others
(including Alan Bates, now Sir Alan Bates) to discuss complaints about the
integrity of Horizon. I do not recall playing a role in any such meetings. I was
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asked in February 2012 by the Minister’s Private Office for background
information in order to inform a response to an invitation to Norman Lamb MP to
join a meeting of subpostmasters arranged by James Arbuthnot MP, but I was
not involved in advising whether or not he would attend (UKGI00001403). As an
HEO at the time, I would not have expected to have been involved in such a
discussion.
The February 2012 exchange is helpful in showing the relationship between the
Minister’s Private Office and ShEx. The Private Office was extremely important
in conveying to ShEx the matters about which the Minister was interested and
the types of advice and information that he or she was expecting to receive. The
Private Secretaries of the Minister with responsibility for POL worked closely with
the ShEx POL Team and this would shape the submissions that went to the
Ministers, and the way in which advice was framed.
I am asked to describe any meetings that I recall attending in which Horizon
integrity, the prosecution of subpostmasters, or related complaints by
subpostmasters were discussed. I do not recall attending any such external
meetings as an HEO, and I can see from the papers provided that I was not
included in a meeting that took place with the Minister, Jo Swinson MP, in July
2013 in which JFSA issues were discussed ahead of a meeting between her, the
Secretary of State and James Arbuthnot MP (email to attendees dated 3 July
2013 (UKG100001654)). I am not surprised by this, as it was the three most junior
members of the team (me, Jai Nathan and Tobi Adetimilehin) who were not
included in the meeting.
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31. I was present in internal ShEx POL Team meetings at which Horizon and
complaints about Horizon were discussed, including Quarterly Review meetings,
some of which I discuss later in this statement. I am afraid I have no effective
recollection of what was discussed beyond what is contained in the minutes,
notes and other records of those meetings.
Second Sight and the Interim Report
32. I played no role in the decision to appoint Second Sight to conduct an
independent review into the complaints made about Horizon. I can see from an
email dated 16 July 2012 that I had to ask Martin Humphreys of POL about the
details of the review, including how many cases it was to consider and when it
would be completed (UKGI00001433). This reflects the fact that the Second Sight
review was instigated by POL on the basis that this was considered to be an
operational matter that lay within its area of responsibility. At that time, ShEx saw
its role as being to try to encourage the relevant stakeholders — POL, the JFSA,
subpostmasters and the campaigning Parliamentarians — to work together to try
to develop a process that would lead to a quick and just resolution. I understood
that the Second Sight review was broadly welcomed and so it appeared to be an
effective way to proceed. I remember James Arbuthnot MP’s support being
particularly important.
33. I can see that in his response to my email of 16 July 2012, Martin Humphreys
emphasised that the review concerned only a “very small number of individual
cases” within a context of “many millions of branch reconciliations,” and that POL
“continues to have absolute confidence in the robustness and integrity of its
branch accounting processes” (UKGI00001433). These comments were typical of
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those made by POL at the time. Its position was one of complete confidence in
Horizon as a system.
On 18 July 2012, I sent Martin Humphreys a further email asking for information
about a specific case raised by a subpostmaster. I also wrote that it would be
“helpful to know how many SPMs_ have been dismissed for false
accounting/theft/etc since the introduction of Horizon (and whether this is
proportionately higher or lower than before the introduction of Horizon)”
(UKGI00001436). I cannot now recall precisely why I asked for this additional
information, though I suspect it was because of the amount of correspondence
and discussion that Horizon was beginning to generate at that time. I probably
discussed the request with Mike Whitehead and other team members.
Martin Humphreys replied on 27 July 2012 with the details of the case I had
raised with him. On the wider questions that I had put, Martin Humphreys said:
“we do not have data on this as it is going back many years — and there are so
many other factors at play that even if we had the info what conclusions could be
drawn” (UKGI00001436). So far as I can recall, I did not follow up on this point. In
part, this was for the reasons that I gave earlier in this statement. I may also have
been influenced by my experience of POL being generally poor at sharing
network level data with ShEx in respect of Network Transformation and other
projects. The instruction of Second Sight would, it was thought, provide this
degree of independent, expert scrutiny.
I was copied to Mike Whitehead’s submission to the Minister, Jo Swinson MP,
about the Horizon issue on 4 October 2012 (UKGI00016102). This recorded the
position previously adopted by Ministers and noted that ShEx was keeping “an
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arm's length distance from the review,” such that we did not at that time know
how many cases it would consider or what the expected timescale for results
would be. This seemed to me to be sensible. The process had been established
with the support of other stakeholders, ShEx could not add substantially to it, and
to intervene would risk upsetting the delicate balance that had been achieved.
The thinking at that time was that if the process was going to work, it would work
by being independent of Government.
I do not recall having much more involvement with the Second Sight investigation
until late June 2013, when it became clear that what has become known as the
Interim Report was about to be provided to POL and then published. I can see
that I was copied into an email dated 28 June 2013 in which Martin Edwards of
POL sought to arrange a meeting with the ShEx Team on 5 July 2013 to discuss
the report (POL00189533). It was unsurprising that POL was seeking such a
meeting.
I can see from the papers provided to me that in the days that followed I was
involved in various email discussions about the potential response to the Interim
Report in the media and in Parliament. Again, this is unsurprising. The reaction
of James Arbuthnot MP was particularly important given his prominent role in the
campaign for the subpostmasters. There were discussions about the sequence
in which he should discuss matters with the POL CEO, Paula Vennells, and the
Minister, with it being thought appropriate that he should speak to the former first
as she would be better informed about the work of Second Sight and Horizon
generally. Consideration was also given for how to respond to an urgent question
that James Arbuthnot MP was thought likely to table once the report had been
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published on 8 July 2013. I was copied in on these emails and I would have
contributed to some of the drafts that circulated, at pace, in those days. I was still
the most junior member of the team and so my role was limited and subject to
review by those more senior to me both within the ShEx POL Team and the
Minister’s Private Office. As I mentioned earlier, I was not asked to go to the
meeting with the Minister on 3 July 2013 (UKGI00001654).
I did, however, attend the meeting on 5 July with Alwen Lyons, Martin Edward,
Mark Davies and Nina Arnott of POL, and Will Gibson and Mike Whitehead from
ShEx (meeting invitation dated 5 July 2013 (POL00296917)). Again, I was the
most junior official present. I remember that the meeting was held, but I cannot
now remember the specifics of what was discussed, though expect it related to
POL providing an overview of the Interim Report to ShEx as their shareholder.
A draft version of the Interim Report was provided by Second Sight to POL that
day, and POL provided this to ShEx in hard copy. I believe we were provided with
a hardcopy of the report at the meeting, which was held at POL offices in Old
Street. I was tasked with providing an initial summary of the report on return to
ShEx’s offices in Westminster, which was subsequently sent to the Minister's
Private Office (cover email dated 5 July 2013 (UKG100001693); attachment initial
summary of report — (UKGI00001695)). From memory, and based on the times of
the meeting (08:30 to 09:30) and the email containing the summary (14:29), I
had only a few hours to read the report, summarise it, obtain approval of the
summary, and then provide that to the Minister. It would have been a pressured
few hours and my summary was plainly not, nor was it intended to be, the final
word on the Interim Report. A scanned copy of the hard copy of the version of
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the report that had been provided to us by POL was also sent to the Minister.
This document was annotated with Mike’s handwriting (UKGI00001694).
In the summary, we used the word “anomalies” to refer to the two defects or
“bugs” that were identified in the Interim Report (which I understand the Inquiry
refers to as the Receipts and Payments Mismatch Bug and the Suspense
Account Bug). Inverted commas were placed around the word, suggesting that it
was a new term in the context of our understanding of Horizon. I do not recall
being aware of these two bugs or defects before, and to the best of my
knowledge ShEx was not aware of them either. I think we gained our initial
understanding of them from the Interim Report.
I do not recall why we used the word “anomalies” rather than “defects”, which
was the term used in the Second Sight report. I do not remember having any
discussion with POL or anyone else about using “anomalies” rather than “bugs”
or “defects” and I was unaware of any discussions within POL about this. I do not
think I was aware at the time of any significance in the distinction between
“anomalies” and “defects” in the context of the Second Sight Interim Report.
The three key themes of the report that we sought to get across in the summary
were: first, Second Sight had “so far found no evidence of system wide (systemic)
problems with the Horizon software”; second, that Second Sight was more critical
of the wider aspects of the operation, such as the interface with linked systems,
the complexity of some processes, and the perceived lack of training; and third,
Second Sight had reported that POL had identified two defects/anomalies/bugs
that had affected 89 branches in total.
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On 9 July 2013, the day after the Interim Report was published, I sent an email
to Rodric Williams at POL, requesting information “about the number of
convictions,” a breakdown of the type of conviction, and the number of cases in
which there were allegations that “Horizon was to blame.” The email also referred
to a voicemail that I had left Rodric Williams and a conversation that he had had
with Will Gibson on this point, which would have given more context to the
request that I was making. Will Gibson followed my email with a more detailed
series of four questions, to which he requested answers “very urgently”
(POL00099141). Will's email forwarded mine, although it is timed later — I am not
sure why this is, but I am confident that my email was sent first.
The context to this request was as follows. We had learned that James Arbuthnot
MP was intending to put an urgent question to the Minister about the Interim
Report, highlighting his concerns about possible wrongful convictions.
Submissions and briefings were circulated about how to respond before it was
decided that the Minister should give an oral statement. I was peripherally
involved, but very much in a junior role with decisions on strategy and wording
taken by others. One of the documents prepared for the Minister was a draft Q&A
sheet (UKGI00001818). I played a role in pulling together existing information and
placing it in this document. Question 7 of the draft was: “In how many of these
cases were there allegations that Horizon was to blame?” The reference to “these
cases” appears to be to the 47 cases that Second Sight were considering at that
time. The answer in the draft was that: “Of the XXX cases that the Post office has
prosecuted since 1999, XXX were for charges of theft, false accounting and
fraud.” I believe that my email to POL was prompted, initially, by the need to fill
in the gaps for the Q&A sheet. Additional details were requested (such as the
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number of guilty pleas and acquittals), as they were thought to be helpful in
informing ShEx and the Minister.
The incomplete answer in the draft Q&A refers to the total number of POL
prosecutions since 1999, not just the 47 cases considered by Second Sight. I am
not sure why this is, although I suspect it was a “holding” draft that might have to
be altered when we received the relevant information. As is standard practice,
the Q&A would go through several iterations before being signed off at Deputy
Director level and then being provided to the Minister. This was because the
information might have been used to inform a Parliamentary statement or
answer. It is perhaps of interest that the Q&A used the word “error” to describe
the bugs/defects that were reported by Second Sight. I do not know why that
word was chosen on that occasion.
In my email, I wrote that the information I was seeking had been urgently
requested by the Minister’s Private Office. I do not recall now whether this was a
specific request from the Private Office for this precise information, or whether I
was invoking the Minister in order to engage POL and impress upon it the
importance and urgency of this request (given that, ultimately, this information
was intended to go to the Minister to inform her comments in Parliament). The
fact that Will Gibson, the Deputy Director, weighed in with an email of his own
suggests to me that we were trying to ensure that POL answered the questions
quickly and fully.
POL’'s response to the questions posed was sent by Hugh Flemington to Will
Gibson a couple of hours later (POL00060681). I was not copied into this email
chain.
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POL’s reviews of criminal convictions
49. I am asked by the Inquiry what I knew of POL’s review of criminal convictions
from July 2013, and specifically whether and when I saw the following
documents:
a. Simon Clarke’s advice of 15 July 2013 (POL00006357)
b. Simon Clarke’s advice of 2 August 2013 (POL00129453)
c. Brian Altman KC’s interim review (POL00022619)
d. Brian Altman KC’s general review (POL00006581)
50. I did not see these documents at the time and only read them when they were
provided to me by the Inquiry. I have very little recollection now of what I knew,
and when, about POL’s review of criminal cases. I can see that in an email to Will
Gibson and me on 5 July 2013, Mike Whitehead mentioned that POL had
“commissioned external lawyers to review all cases where legal action against
an spm has been initiated by POL since separation or may be pending) in light
of the interim report findings” (UKGI00001691). I was not involved in this work,
and do not remember being further consulted or informed about it, or about the
changes in POL’s prosecutions policy. I do not think that I provided any
information or advice to Ministers about these matters, nor did I attend meetings
between Ministers and others (including Alan Bates) to discuss the Interim
Report or POL’s review of the criminal cases.
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The Working Group and Mediation Scheme
51. Following the publication of the Interim Report, my work relating to Horizon
concerned the Working Group and Mediation Scheme. Initially, this was as an
HEO assisting Mike Whitehead, then as his replacement as Grade 7.
52. The Working Group and Mediation Scheme was intentionally established to be
independent of Government. As such, I was not involved directly in operating the
Working Group or Mediation Scheme, nor was anyone else from ShEx or the
Department. As a consequence, I had no direct relationship with Second Sight
or Sir Anthony Hooper, the Chair of the Working Group, or CEDR who oversaw
the mediations.
53. My initial role, as HEO, in respect of the Working Group and Mediation Scheme
was primarily to engage with POL to understand the processes and progress of
the Working Group and Mediation Scheme, and to report to ShEx and Ministers
on these matters. From January 2014, as the Grade 7 in the ShEx POL Team, I
sought and obtained updates on how the Working Group and Mediation Scheme
was operating and on difficulties that were being encountered. It was through
POL that I received most of the information about the Working Group and
Mediation Scheme. I would ask for updates on behalf of the Shareholder, for
example on the progress made in establishing the Terms of Reference and the
mechanisms by which the Working Group and Mediation Scheme would operate,
and later on the number of cases that had been or were being considered.
54. As the Grade 7, I was also responsible for preparing briefings for senior civil
servants and Ministers ahead of their meetings with figures from POL, and these
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would sometimes touch upon matters relating to Horizon, the Working Group and
the Mediation Scheme. The briefings would provide information and
recommendations on the main points to be covered in the meetings, and the
Private Office of the Minister or the Permanent Secretary would liaise with ShEx
about the matters that should be included. Such briefings had to be concise. The
Minister or Permanent Secretary would receive many briefings and submissions
each day and so a premium was placed on making the briefings succinct. The
request for a briefing would sometimes come with an indication that it should be
a maximum of two or three pages. Even if that was not made explicit, the need
to keep the briefings to that length would be understood by those drafting them.
The Minister or Permanent Secretary could always request more information on
particular topics, if required. If a meeting was to concern a single issue, then the
briefing would be dedicated to that issue and hence would contain more detail
than could be put into a briefing for a more wide-ranging meeting.
One briefing that I prepared was that of 4 April 2014 (BEIS0000010), which was
sent to the Permanent Secretary at BIS, Martin Donnelly (now Sir Martin
Donnelly). The briefing was prepared ahead of his meeting with the POL Chair,
Alice Perkins, and was intended to cover “the company’s progress on key
issues.” This was an annual meeting intended to provide a forum for the
Permanent Secretary and POL Chair to discuss a wide range of topics. The
briefing, that I drafted with input from, and on behalf of, the ShEx POL team
included matters that we understood to be BIS’s priorities. In respect of Horizon-
related issues, at that time — early April 2014 — the main focus was the Working
Group and Mediation Scheme. As I wrote in the briefing, there were concerns
emerging about the slow progress being made, but the more fundamental doubts
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about the future of these processes, which I describe below, had not yet
emerged. Nor, at that time, did I know about the advice POL had received on
past prosecutions from Simon Clarke and Brian Altman KC. As it was, the briefing
reflected the ShEx POL Team understanding of the position at the time: that Alice
Perkins had commissioned Second Sight to review the integrity of Horizon, that
the Interim Report had not found systemic problems with the Horizon software,
but had identified matters of concern about training and support; that subsequent
to the Interim Report, a Working Group and Mediation Scheme with an
independent Chair had been established, and had received 147 submissions;
but that progress was slow and POL was “seized of the need for a swift
conclusion to this issue and is working to identify solutions.” One of my
recommendations in the bullet points at the start of the briefing was that the
Permanent Secretary should note the risks about the Horizon Working Group.
Inevitably, our knowledge and understanding of the relevant issues was coloured
as a result of coming, principally, from POL. At points, representations were made
by others, for example in Alan Bates’ letter to the Minister of 16 April 2014 (letter
from Alan Bates to Jo Swinson MP dated 16 April 2014 (UKGI00002264); letter
from Jenny Wilmott MP to Alan Bates dated 27 April 2014 (POL00100605)), which
would give us an insight into their thinking. We did not think that ShEx or
Government was well placed to seek to resolve the differences of opinion or
perspective, and where appropriate representations were shared with Sir
Anthony Hooper as the Chair of the Working Group. The Minister's Private Office
was engaged on the proposed handling approach (email chain from Sophie
Bialaszewski to Jane Hill, Nina Arnott and Mark Davies dated 28 April 2014
(POL00116507)).
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57.
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ShEx’s principal objective was for the Working Group and Mediation Scheme to
work, in the sense of providing a timely, effective, visible, and just way of
resolving the disputes between the 147 participating subpostmasters and POL.
The view taken at the time, I believe both within ShEx and outside it, was that
this was most likely to be achieved by the Working Group and Mediation Scheme
remaining independent of Government. Certainly, Sir Anthony Hooper strongly
guarded his independence. With the benefit of hindsight, and having seen how
the process moved so slowly, with minimal progress before falling apart amid
much frustration, I think the Minister could, and possibly should, have requested
that the Working Group and Mediation Scheme report into Government as an
interested party. This would have helped ShEx and the Shareholder more clearly
and directly understand the perspectives of the different stakeholders. It might
also have allowed for more thought to be given within Government to alternatives
to the Working Group and Mediation Scheme when it became apparent that it
was losing the support of MPs and subpostmasters.
I am asked to describe POL’s position in relation to sharing information relevant
to the Mediation Scheme or Second Sight’s reports that were submitted to the
Working Group. As neither I nor ShEx were participants in the Working Group or
the Mediation Scheme, I did not have first-hand knowledge of this. With hindsight,
it is obvious there was an optimism bias affecting all parties at the start of the
Working Group and Mediation Scheme about how quickly it could be conducted.
When those over-optimistic expectations were not met, I think we in ShEx initially
thought that the issue lay primarily with the limited resources that Second Sight
had, together with what we were told were concerns from Sir Anthony Hooper
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about the quality of the reports that they were providing. Later, we learned that
other participants thought that POL were being unduly slow and reticent in
providing information. I was not in a position to judge where the full measure of
blame lay, but I did become increasingly aware that there were very significant
problems that raised questions about whether the process could continue in its
existing form.
By the summer of 2014, the POL Executive had prepared a paper for the POL
Board on alternative approaches to Project Sparrow (the name given to matters
relating to Horizon) (UKGI00002376). This was provided to me on 10 June 2014
by Richard Callard, who was by then the Deputy Director leading the Shareholder
Team and the Shareholder NED on the POL Board (UKGI00002375). As can be
seen from the terms of the covering email, his purpose in providing them to me
appears to have been to allow me to draft a submission to the Minister providing
the background to the Working Group and Mediation Scheme, an account of the
process's problems, the options that the POL Board was considering, and our
views on the benefits and risks of each of those options. Richard and I had been
aware for a few months that POL was thinking about different approaches, but I
believe this was the first time that we saw how that thinking had become
crystallised into specific options for future action.
In his email to me, Richard had suggested that the third option under
consideration — ending Second Sight’s engagement, dissolving the Working
Group and “moving the governance and management of the Scheme in-house”
— was emerging as the preferred option (UKGI00002375). I replied setting out my
thoughts, which included my considerable concerns that Option 3 would give rise
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to allegations that the process had become a whitewash, and would be
unacceptable to the Minister who would want the Working Group retained
(UKG100002385). Later that day, Richard sent a further email telling me that
Option 3 was “off the table” as the risk of judicial review was too high
(UKGI00002386). Option 2 was emerging as the preferred approach, with the next
step being “to understand how far the boundaries can be pushed without
triggering a [judicial review]”. Option 2 was described in the Board paper as:
“Continuing with the Scheme but seeking to refine its work within the existing
Terms of Reference, with POL taking a firmer more proactive line to defend its
position and ensure a greater degree of transparency around our approach to
the Scheme, with mediation being based on our understanding of the legal
position and desire to control programme costs and timescales” (POL Board
Initial Complaints Review and Mediation Scheme: Sub Committee
Recommendation (UKGI00002376)). Richard would also have given me a verbal
update on the relevant discussions, though I cannot now recall what he said.
Richard's updates reflected the position that had been reached by the POL Board
at its meeting on 10 June (POL00021526). Looking back, and knowing more about
judicial review now than I knew then, it seems to me that the supposed legal risk
with Option 3 might have been a reason given to allow the POL Executive to step
back from a proposal that, on reflection, was thought to be the wrong course to
adopt. The fact that the Board was not supporting Option 3, and had only
identified Option 2 as a preferred option to be explored further, meant that the
submission that Richard had initially thought I would need to prepare was no
longer necessary. Ministers are extremely busy and access to the Red Box
containing the papers that they would review was closely guarded. The Board’s
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decision meant that the submission on Option 3 was redundant, while a
submission on Option 2 would be premature. Neither would have made the cut
to be included in the Red Box.
Discussions continued on how to improve and speed up the Working Group and
Mediation Scheme. On 17 June 2014 I emailed Mark Davies at POL following a
meeting I had with him and Martin Edwards the previous week at which we had
spoken about “the ongoing Sparrow discussions” (UKGI00004121). I had raised
a further option that I wanted to explore, which was to bring in other accountancy
firms to assist Second Sight with the workload. My email was intended to follow
up on this suggestion in writing, noting that Mark Davies had previously raised
some concerns around it, including the reluctance of other firms to work with
Second Sight, difficulties with managing additional parties in the process, and
issues about consistency. Mark Davies replied on the following day, writing that:
“We have looked at options like this to be honest and they aren't practical.
Belinda [Crowe] copied, can give you a full run down.” I cannot now recall what
further details I received from Ms Crowe, but I have no reason to doubt that she
would have provided them to me.
My discussions with members of the POL Executive on this point, and my email
following up on them, reflected the fact that I, and the wider ShEx POL Team,
wanted to encourage POL to think about ways of improving and speeding up the
Working Group and Mediation Scheme. We were conscious of the process's
problems and the risk of losing support from all of the stakeholders. However, as
I have discussed earlier, the Working Group and Mediation Scheme had been
set up to be independent of Government, so the leverage and influence that ShEx
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had was limited. Had we tried to push further, we believed we would risk upsetting
what was by then a fragile alliance between the stakeholders involved, at a time
when there was no readily identifiable alternative that could replace it.
I provided an update to the Minister's Private Office on the progress of the
Working Group and Mediation Scheme on 8 July 2014. This noted that of the 147
applications to the Working Group that have been received, 13 had been
resolved without the need for mediation. Only two cases had been approved for
mediation. I commented that these cases:
“can be seen as evidence that the Working Group is working, albeit at a slower
pace than envisaged. However, despite the slow pace, it is important to note that
[the Working Group] is serving its purpose of providing an agreed framework for
considering highly contentious cases. At the current rate of progress, the Working
Group will have completed its duties by November 2015. POL is actively seeking
to expedite progress within the agreed terms of reference.”
Looking back on this update, I think it again reflects the fact that I considered the
Working Group and Mediation Scheme to be the best of a limited series of
options. I was realistic about the challenges involved, but I think I was still hopeful
that the process could succeed, but only if it could become more efficient while
retaining the support of the stakeholders. My reference to the end-date of
November 2015 at the then current rate of progress was intended to alert the
Minister to the fact that this would mean that the Working Group and Mediation
Scheme was expected to still be ongoing at the time of the next General Election
(which was to be held in May 2015 under the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011).
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66.
67.
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The Working Group and Mediation Scheme continued to operate, and discontent
continued to grow, during the remainder of my time at ShEx. Immediately before
my departure, on 8 December 2014 a group of MPs led by James Arbuthnot MP
issued a press statement in which they expressed a loss of faith in the process
(UKG100002574). I provided this to the Minister’s Private Office on the same day,
adding that we were due to meet the Minister the following day and could discuss
the matter further then (UKG100002572). I wrote that it was important to reiterate
the independence of the Working Group, the Chair, and the Mediation Scheme.
I also noted that while the letter was disappointing, it did not call for Government
involvement at that stage.
I was informed by POL on the same day that James Arbuthnot MP had written to
Paula Vennells criticising in strong terms POL’s approach to the Working Group
and Mediation Scheme and POL's interpretation of their Terms of Reference
(UKGI00002579). This was a reply to a letter Ms Vennells had sent him on 28
November 2014, rejecting a proposal from MPs about reform of the process to
allow for a presumption that each case would be mediated (UKGI00002573).
Neither ShEx nor the Shareholder were party to that correspondence, though we
were provided with the letters.
Among the claims made by James Arbuthnot MP and the MPs was an allegation
that POL had opposed mediation in 90% of the cases brought to the Working
Party. This was later picked up by the media and, understandably, it caused
concern to the Minister and her Private Office. I did not think that this was an
accurate representation of POL’s position. As I explained in an email to the ShEx
POL Team on 10 December, 10% of cases had proceeded directly to mediation,
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while the remainder were to be discussed in the Working Group. The Working
Group had been established to form a view on which cases should be mediated,
so its involvement was part of the agreed process and not a “blocking” tactic by
POL (UKG1I00002613).
Members of the ShEx POL Team met the Minister on 9 December 2014 for a
regular update meeting, which was principally concerned with Network
Transformation. The Minister had requested such meetings as Network
Transformation was a priority for her, not least as it was seen as the way of
reconciling the Liberal Democrats’ policy objective to preserve the size of the
post office network with the level of subsidy that had been agreed by the Treasury
as part of the negotiations within the Coalition Government. At that time, Network
Transformation was falling behind schedule, hence the Minister’s requirement for
updating meetings on a regular (sometimes weekly) basis. Those meetings were
also opportunities to bring her up to date on other aspects of POL’s activities,
hence the plan to use the meeting on 9 December 2014 to appraise her of the
MPs’ press release and James Arbuthnot MP’s position. I would have attended
this meeting, but I have no recollection now of what was said at it. These ‘update’
meetings were unlikely to be formally minuted, but I have seen an email
exchange between Richard and the Minister’s Private Office that touches upon
some of the points raised. The email chain suggests that the Minister wanted to
follow up on matters relating to Network Transformation, while separately
Richard had clarified that POL had refused to mediate only in two cases (and not
90% as claimed) (UKGI00002610).
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70. In the days that followed I assisted Richard Callard and the ShEx POL Team in
preparing briefing documents to inform the Minister and others on developments
about the Working Group and Mediation Scheme. This included, on 9 December
2014, providing a proposed answer should the issue arise at Deputy Prime
Minister Questions (email chain from Peter Batten to Ministerial Advice team
dated 9 December 2014 (UKGI00002600)). I understand that there is no
reference in Hansard to any exchange on this point.
71. The following day, 10 December 2014, we learned that the Minister would be
required to speak in a Westminster Hall adjournment debate scheduled for 17
December 2014 (UKGI00002612). The ShEx POL Team were asked to provide a
draft speech and briefing documents. I worked with the team in pulling together
the material for the initial drafts. However, by this stage I was in my final couple
of days working at ShEx and hence I did not see the final product. I can see that
I sent an email at 13:37 on Friday 12 December, attaching a number of
documents and links to folders on the shared file system concerning the Sparrow
workstream that would be helpful to my colleagues when I left (UKGI00002632). I
began work at the DFT the following Monday and had no further involvement in
matters relating to Horizon.
Other matters
72. I am asked to describe my involvement with meetings concerning the Working
Group and Mediation Scheme that involved Ministers. As I have set out above,
the ShEx POL Team would have regular meetings with the Minister, particularly
to discuss Network Transformation. We would sometimes take the opportunity
presented by those meetings to raise other POL issues, including the Working
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Group and Mediation Scheme. I would also be involved in preparing briefings
and submissions to the Minister and the Secretary of State ahead of meetings
that they had with senior figures from POL, including the CEO and the Chair.
Those briefings might touch upon the Working Group and Mediation Scheme. I
was not usually invited to the meetings and I cannot recall being present at any
discussion of the Working Group and Mediation Scheme between a Minister and
representatives of POL.
73. Ido not recall being shown Deloitte’s Project Zebra report, or being briefed on its
recommendations, or POL’s representation of those recommendations.
74. During my time working at ShEx we were repeatedly advised by POL that there
was no remote access to the ‘live’ Horizon system or ability to make unrecorded
changes to subpostmasters’ accounts. Nor did we expect there would be
anything of the sort, as the inclusion of such features in the design of a system
such as Horizon would obviously completely and totally undermine the integrity
of the system and the trust of its users.
Relationship with senior management at POL
75. The Inquiry has asked me to describe my working relationship with the senior
management of POL. I dealt most frequently with Mike Granville (Head of
Regulatory Strategy), Martin Humphreys (Government Affairs team), and Belinda
Crowe (Programme Director for Project Sparrow), and would describe my
working relationship with them all as good. My understanding was the four of us
were, relatively speaking, fairly junior and this, together with our regular contact,
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meant that I had a closer relationship with them than with more senior members
of the POL Executive.
76. I had fairly regular contact with Mark Davies (Director of Communications) and
Martin Edwards (Chief of Staff), and I would say I had a normal working
relationship with them. Both had experience of working at a senior level in
Government and this gave them a degree of confidence in dealing with ShEx civil
servants. I do not recall any particular problems with our working relationship. In
October 2014, Martin Edwards was succeeded by Tom Wechsler, another former
experienced civil servant, so my relationship with him lasted only a couple of
months. Again, I cannot recall any difficulties.
77. \had no direct working relationship with Paula Vennells. I became aware during
2014 that concerns have been raised about her capabilities as CEO. My
understanding was that these concerns had come from Board members and that
they were being considered by Richard Callard and other more senior figures at
ShEx. I was not involved in assessing Ms Vennells’ performance or working on
contingency planning. As I had no direct working relationship with her, I do not
think I can comment further on her suitability as CEO of POL. That was a matter
for the Board, the POL Chair, those within ShEx who had more direct experience
of her work, and Ministers.
ShEx Team Planners and Risk Registers
78. While working as the HEO, one of my roles was to collate the ShEx Team
Planner, such as the one that I circulated on 29 July 2013 (cover email:
(UKG100001878); ShEx Team Planner: (UKGI00001879)). The substance of each
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79.
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entry was provided by the person listed as the “owner” in the first column. They
would send their contributions to me and I would then pull the document together.
I provided the entries for each of the topics for which I was responsible as sole
or co-owner. The ShEx risk registers were compiled in a similar way.
My recollection is that those risk registers were intended to identify and record
the risk to ShEx and the Shareholder of a particular issue, rather than the risk to
the asset. They were intended to capture matters over which ShEx had a degree
of control, and hence could mitigate, rather than providing a comprehensive list
of everything that could go wrong within the assets. I remember Richard Callard
emphasising to the ShEx POL Team the need to think about new and emerging
risks, and to avoid simply going through the motions by updating the matters that
were already to be found on the register.
The entries were, intentionally, brief. The ShEx risk register had to cover all of
the assets in the ShEx portfolio, meaning that lengthy entries would have made
the document unmanageably large and would undermine the purpose for which
it was produced. A risk for “Project Sparrow” is included as one of 20 risks for
POL in the Risk Register dated 13 February 2014 (UKGI00002903). I was named
as the person responsible within ShEx for this risk, and as such I would have
produced the summary. It was intended to cover all aspects of matters relating
to Horizon, though my focus at that time was on the ongoing Working Group and
Mediation Scheme, as that was the then ongoing process intended to address
the dispute. The numerous risks arising from Horizon could have been
disaggregated in much greater detail, but that was true of any entry on the
register. We drew on what we understood to be best practice at the time to create
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81.
82.
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the registers, though I am sure such practice has evolved in the decade since
this document was produced.
The risk register was not the sole mechanism by which concerns about Horizon
were discussed and disseminated within ShEx. The Quarterly Reviews allowed
for the ShEx POL Team to discuss its work and approach with other members of
ShEx, with the intention of those other members providing fresh perspective and
constructive challenge informed by lessons learned from their work performing
the shareholder function on other ShEx assets. There were regular meetings
within the ShEx Team where risks were identified and discussed, and ShEx
encouraged open discussions between colleagues, rather than a rigid hierarchy.
Where necessary, concerns could be escalated to more senior figures within
ShEx, or the Minister, either in meetings, or through submissions, or both.
lam asked why bugs, errors and defects that could affect the integrity of branch
account data was not identified on the risk register. As I have said, the entry was
intended to be brief and to reflect the risk to ShEx and the Government. It is
difficult to think back now to what would have been in my mind at the time, but
the position as I then understood it to be was that Second Sight had not identified
any system-wide flaws in the Horizon software, and the two bugs that had been
identified by POL had been rectified. There were, however, wider concerns about
how subpostmasters who had encountered deficits had been treated, and the
Working Party and Mediation Scheme had been established to try to address
those in 147 individual cases. I suspect that this explains why the focus of the
risk register was on that process, and the risks associated with it, rather than
underlying flaws in Horizon’s software.
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83. I am asked why the risk register did not include the risk that POL had secured
unsafe convictions. I think this was down to a combination of factors, as well as
the brevity and purpose of the ShEx risk register that I have described above. At
that time, POL was continuing to express its absolute faith in its systems in the
strongest of terms and it had not provided ShEx with the documents produced
by Simon Clarke and Brian Altman KC. I, and others in ShEx, had faith in the
integrity of the independent criminal justice system that had led to the
convictions. There may also have been a wariness about the separation of
powers, as criminal cases were instinctively seen as a matter for the judiciary,
free from interference by the executive.
Conclusions and Reflections
The scale of the issue
84. It is clear from the contemporaneous documents that mine, and ShEx’s
awareness of the scale of the issue was slow to form, despite the warnings of
the JFSA. In 2012, we had some understanding of around a dozen instances
where subpostmasters had raised concerns, this grew to 47 via the Interim
Report in June 2013. By the time entries to the Working Group and Mediation
Scheme closed there were 147 subpostmasters affected. Even this was much
lower than the figure of wronged subpostmasters that later emerged.
Lack of candour from Post Office
85. The flow of information from POL was not as candid as we were entitled to
expect, and information requested of POL was sometimes not provided. In
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hindsight, a pattern emerges of a lack of willingness from POL to share candidly
full and complete information about the number and nature of prosecutions. This
includes the failure by POL to share the advice from both Simon Clarke and Brian
Altman KC that raised extremely serious questions about the safety of
convictions.
Engagement with former subpostmasters
86. I recall engaging subpostmasters directly during my time at ShEx, including
attending NFSP conferences and branch meetings, and on various site visits.
While the Horizon issue was not raised in those engagements, it is, with
hindsight, perhaps not surprising given the lack of support affected
subpostmasters received from the NFSP, and the lack of concern the NFSP
showed regarding the now apparent Horizon flaws. Indeed, I remain firmly of the
view that had the NFSP spoken in support of concerns about the robustness of
Horizon, the issue would have gained prominence within government sooner.
87. I was never invited to join a meeting with the JFSA when they met the Minister,
and do not believe ShEx officials ever met them directly outside of Ministerial
meetings during my time in ShEx. The JFSA were an integral party in the Horizon
issue, and would have provided a relevant perspective that ShEx was not hearing
from more established parties such as POL and the NFSP. I regret that we did
not seek to establish a working level relationship with the JFSA.
Separation of powers
88. During my time at ShEx, the fact that criminal convictions were passed by an
independent judicial system provided me with an inherent level of assurance on
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the safety of those convictions. That system, independent of government and
POL, has its own checks and balances to ensure fairness, and convictions were
only obtained if the Court was satisfied of a person’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Added to this, POL promoted a narrative that they had complete faith in
Horizon and did not accept that there had been any wrongful convictions. It is
now apparent that POL received advice relating to the safety of convictions that
it took a decision not to share with ShEx. Having reviewed Simon Clarke’s and
Brian Altman KC’s advice as part of my preparation for this statement, I cannot
understand how POL reconciled receiving that advice and persisting with the
consistent, senior, and unequivocal statements regarding the robustness of
Horizon.
Arm's length
89. Witnesses before me have spoken about the development of ALBs and the
thinking that lies behind that model. This arrangement is, in my view, the best
approach available to managing the relationship between government and
publicly-owned assets of a commercial nature. It is not, however, a static model
and there will always be questions about how long the arm should be, and when
its length should be adjusted. The Horizon scandal happened at a time when the
arm was long, meaning that the Government's depth of understanding of the
operational nature and culture of delivery was commensurately weakened. This
was particularly so in respect of POL’s role in prosecuting subpostmasters, an
area on which I can see that we at ShEx had incomplete information when it
plainly generated very significant risks.
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90. In such a world, ShEx was more reliant on the flow of information from POL, and
in aless strong position to provide an evidenced challenge to the information that
was provided. In my view, we were too slow in shortening the arm in response to
the emerging concerns being expressed about Horizon.
ShEx engagement with the Working Group and Mediation Scheme
91. Documents from the time indicate concerns felt within ShEx about the capacity
of the Working Group and Mediation Scheme to match the scale of the need as
the number of applicants grew. While it is apparent in hindsight that the Working
Group and Mediation Scheme should have quickly evolved, we allowed
ourselves to become trapped in the belief that it was inappropriate for
government to play any role in the operation of the Working Group and Mediation
Scheme. While it seems that the Chair of the Working Group would indeed have
not welcomed government involvement, with hindsight it would, perhaps, have
been more appropriate for ShEx to have sought a more formally engaged role
with respect to receiving reports from the Working Group.
Standard lines
92. The use of so-called “standard lines” in responding to correspondence, press
queries, and Parliamentary questions is intended to prevent inadvertent
inconsistency when communicating outside of government. However, these
benefits come with the risk that consistency will drift into orthodoxy. When
combined with strict drafting deadlines, a perverse incentive can arise that affects
parties at all levels and acts against curiosity and seeking greater detail.
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Statement of Truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
Page 41 of 46
Index to First Witness Statement of PETER BATTEN
No.
Inquiry URN
Document Description
Inquiry Control
Number
UKGI00001878
Email chain from Peter
Batten to Will Gibson and
others re. update to Team
Planner
UKGI012692-001
UKGI00001879
ShEx POL Team Planner
UKGI012693-001
UKG1I00001408
Letter from Stephen Hepburn
MP to Edward Davey MP re.
Carol Riddell —- East Boldon
Post Office — issues with
Horizon
UKGI012222-001
UKGI00001407
Email from Martin
Humphreys to Mike
Whitehead cc. Peter Batten,
James Baugh and others re.
Stephen Hepburn MP.
UKGI012221-001
UKGI00013948
Letter from Norman Lamb MP
to Stephen Hepburn MP re.
concern raised by Carol
Riddell (East Boldin Post
Office) about the Horizon
computer system
UKGI024741-001
UKGI00001403
Email chain from Lamb MPST
to Peter Batten cc. Will
Gibson and Katie Wake re. ex
Sub-postmasters meeting
UKGI012217-001
UKGI00001654
Email from Will Gibson to
Mike Whitehead and others
re. Post Office catch up
UKGI012468-001
UKG1I00001433
Email from Martin
Humphreys to Peter Batten
cc. Mike Whitehead and
others re. Albert Owen —
JFSA
UKGI012247-001
UKGI00001436
Email chain from Martin
Humphreys to Peter Batten
cc. Mike Whitehead and
others re. James Withers (ex
SPM — Horizon review)
UKGI012250-001
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10.
UKGI00016102
Email from Mike Whitehead
to Jo Swinson MP’s Office re.
POL Horizon system
UKGI026895-001
11.
POL00189533
Email from Martin Edwards to
[GRO] re. PO/BIS meeting on
Second Sight investigation
POL-BSFF-
0027596
12.
UKGI00001654
Email from Will Gibson to
Mike Whitehead and others
re. Post Office catch up
UKGI012468-001
13.
POL00296917
Email from Sarah Paddison
to Alwen_ Lyons, Martin
Edwards, Will Gibson and
others re. PO/BIS meeting on
Second Sight investigation
POL-BSFF-
0134967
14.
UKGI00001693
Email from Peter Batten to
Swinson MPST cc. Will
Gibson, Mike Whitehead and
others re. draft Second Sight
report
UKGI012507-001
15.
UKGI00001695
Narrative and summary of the
Second Sight report
UKGI012509-001
16.
UKGI00001694
Interim Report into alleged
problems with the Horizon
system - v24 with
handwritten notes and
underlining
UKGI012508-001
17.
POL00099141
Email from Will Gibson to
Peter Batten, Rodric
Williams, Susan Crichton re.
Second Sight report — follow
up to Friday
POL-0098724
18.
UKG1I00001818
JFSA Q&A document re.
Horizon
UKGI012632-001
19.
POL00060681
Susan Rudkin Case Study —
email chain from Hugh
Flemington to Will Gibson re.
Will — intel on MP case —
JFSA case intel to follow
POL-0057160
20.
POL00006357
Advice on the use of expert
evidence relating to the
POL-0017625
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integrity of the Fujitsu
Services Ltd Horizon system
21.
POL00129453
Simon Clarke’s advice re.
disclosure — the duty to
record and retain material —
Post Office Ltd
POL-0134937
22.
POL00022619
Interim Review of Cartwright
King’s current process
POL-0019098
23.
POL00006581
Review of PO prosecutions
by Brian Altman QC
POL-0017666
24.
UKGI00001691
Email from Mike Whitehead
to Peter Batten, Will Gibson
re: SS - report highlights
UKGI012505-001
25.
BEIS0000010
Briefing prepared for meeting
with Post Office Ltd Chair
dated 4 April 2014
VIS00000904
26.
UKGI00002264
Letter from Alan Bates from
JFSA to Jo Swinson -
Minister for Postal Affairs
UKGI013078-001
27.
POL00100605
Letter from Jenny Willott MP
to Alan Bates
POL-0100278
28.
POL00116507
Email chain from Sophie
Bialaszewski to Jane Hill,
Nina Arnott and Mark Davies
re. letter from the Minister for
Employment Relations and
Consumer Affair
POL-0117439
29.
UKGI00002376
Initial Complaints Review
Mediation Scheme: Sub
Committee Recommendation
— Chris Aujard and Mark
Davies
UKGI013190-001
30.
UKGI00002375
Email chain from Richard
Callard to Peter Batten re.
Board papers
UKGI013189-001
31.
UKG100002385
Email from Richard Callard to
Peter Batten re. thoughts on
Sparrow for this evening
UKGI013199-001
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32.
UKG1I00002386
Email from Richard Callard to
Peter Batten re. Sparrow
UKGI013200-001
33.
POL00021526
Post Office Ltd Board
Minutes of 10.06.2014
POLO000059
34.
UKGI00004121
Email from Mark Davies to
Peter Batten cc. Martin
Edwards, Richard Callard
and others re. Sparrow
UKGI014935-001
35.
UKG100002574
House of Commons — note
from the Rt. Hon. James
Arbuthnot re. MPs lose faith
in Post Office Mediation
Scheme
UKGI013388-001
36.
UKG1I00002572
Email from Peter Batten to
Alysa (Swinson MPST) cc.
Joanna Fletcher, Alexander
Hamilton and others re.
Horizon Working Group
update
UKGI013386-001
37.
UKG1I00002579
Letter from James Arbuthnot
to Paula Vennells cc. Mr
Speaker, Alan Bates, Adrian
Bailey and others re.
Mediation Scheme
UKGI013393-001
38.
UKGI00002573
Letter from Paula Vennells to
the Rt. Hon. James Arbuthnot
re. Complaint and Mediation
Scheme
UKGI013387-001
39.
UKGI00002613
Email from Peter Batten to
Richard Callard, Tim McInnes
and James Baugh re. catch
up
UKGI013427-001
40.
UKGI00002610
Email from Richard Callard to
MPST Swinson, Tim
Mcinnes, James Baugh and
Peter Batten re. catch up —
Horizon Mediation Scheme
UKGI013424-001
41.
UKGI00002600
Email from Peter Batten to
Ministerial Advice Team cc.
Swinson MPST, SPAD Cable
MPST and others re. DPMQs
UKGI013414-001
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— Post Office Mediation
Scheme
42.
UKGI00002612
Email from MPST Swinson
(Alysa Remtulla) to Peter
Batten, James Baugh,
Richard Callard and others
re. Briefing Commission for a
Westminster Hall Debate on
Post Office Mediation
Scheme
UKGI013426-001
43.
UKGI00002632
Email from Peter Batten to
Richard Callard, Tim McInnes
and James Baugh _ re.
handover JFSA
UKGI013446-001
44.
UKGI00002903
Draft - the Shareholder
Executive Risk Register for
Post Office Limited (2014) by
James Baugh
UKGI013717-001
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