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Witness Name: Simon Clarke
Statement No
Dated? 23°Mai
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF SIMON CLARKE
I, SIMON CLARKE, will say as follows.
1. This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry (the
“Inquiry”) with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 13 December
2023 (the “Request’).
INTRODUCTION
2. lama former employee and later, a director, of Cartwright King Solicitors (CK).
Throughout my time at CK I held the position of senior in-house counsel. My
employment commenced on 6 January 2010 and ended in March 2016.
3. I was called to the Bar in October 1997 and entered independent practice in
chambers until I joined Cartwright King in 2010. My practice in independent
practice was almost entirely in criminal law. I left Cartwright King having become
disillusioned by my time there. Upon leaving Cartwright King I set up my own
law firm, with two other partners, Harry Bowyer and Martin Smith, practising in
a very niche area of Civil Regulatory law. I remain the Senior Partner of that
Firm. In July 2023 I decided to return to criminal practice on a limited basis whilst
continuing to be an active partner and lawyer in my law firm.
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4. Some of the material I provide in this statement will be subject to poor recall,
may be second-hand, was information I had picked-up merely by working
around others more involved in a subject-area, or was simply going on in the
background of my time with Cartwright King. Where I say anything which is
directly known to me I shall indicate that to be the case — equally, where I am
unsure of something, or where I mention something which is not directly known
to me, poorly or not remembered at all, or is ‘background’, I shall again indicate
that to be the case. Where something did not happen, or I was unaware of
something, I shall again indicate that to be the case.
BACKGROUND
5. For the first (almost) three years my work at CK was that of a criminal defence
barrister, representing clients of CK before the criminal courts. I was based out
of CK’s Nottingham offices, visiting other offices only to meet with the clients
allocated to me by, firstly, Stephen Gelsthorpe, and later Andrew Cash and later
again Mark Hopwell, all in their turn the Heads of the CK Advocacy team.
6. I was aware that CK undertook some ‘Agency’ work for the Royal Mail Group
(“RMG") of whom Post Office Limited (“POL”) were a constituent part. I recall
being involved in the prosecution of perhaps two postal delivery workers
accused of stealing letters and parcels, but I undertook no work related to POL
until after separation, which occurred on 1 April 2012.
7. My understanding of the position prior to separation was that RMG acted as
prosecutors, instructing local agents to act on their behalf in various
geographical areas. I understood that CK were the agents of choice for the
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Midlands area, but this was all managed by Andrew Cash and Martin Smith,
both Solicitors for CK. Whilst I was aware that CK undertook work for RMG,
other than undertaking CK instructions in the ‘postman’ cases I have mentioned,
I had no knowledge of, or involvement in, the RMG work — this includes any
work undertaken by CK for Post Office (as it then was).
8. In about February or March 2012 I became aware, simply by hearing what was
going on at the Derby and Leicester offices, which I occasionally visited when I
had general criminal work at Leicester or Derby Crown Courts, that POL was to
separate from RMG as a stand-alone organisation. I also heard that Andrew
Cash, whom I believe was the RMG lead for CK pre-separation, had used his
contacts at RMG to tender for the prosecution work of the new POL entity, and
that he had been successful in doing so. This work was to be conducted from
the Derby and Leicester offices of CK.
9. I recall that, late in 2012 I was instructed to provide some general advice on
prosecution procedures to Martin Smith for POL, and I may have provided
written advice about evidential requirements in a particular case, but I do not
recall — I’m afraid I only have a vague memory of having done so and cannot be
sure as to dates.
10.1 also recall being instructed by Martin Smith to attend at Newcastle Crown Court
to represent POL in two ‘mention’ hearings, and one at Chester Crown Court.
‘Mention’ hearings are interlocutory ‘housekeeping’ hearings. I think that I
conducted these hearings in early-2013 but I cannot be sure — one or more may
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have occurred in late-2012. I may also have settled an opinion on the merits of
a proposed prosecution, but these were very few in number.
1
.I was only instructed to prosecute two trials during my time at CK, one (R v. Paul
Swanson) in (I think) 2018, the defendant being a Director of POL accused of
stealing Virgin Holiday Gift Vouchers, and other vouchers, intended as prizes
for internal competitions run by POL. That case was not Horizorrelated in any
way — the theft consisted of the purchase of vouchers by a Marketing Director
based at POL Head Office using his authority to spend POL monies to do so,
and he then stealing the product of those purchases.
12. The only other case I was instructed to prosecute was that of R v Samra, about
which I shall speak below. I am reasonably certain that Andrew Cash was the
instructing solicitor because at this time I was aware that he ran the CK POL
prosecutions department out of the Derby office. It was also he who instructed
me to represent POL in Newcastle and Chester.
13.1 resigned from my position at CK by giving 3-months’ notice of my intention to
do so in December 2015, and I left the firm on 31 March 2016.
14.1 shall now describe my understanding of the hierarchy at CK vis a vis the POL
prosecutions function. Stephen Gelsthorpe was the Managing Partner of the
firm, and it was he to whom all others reported. Stephen Gelsthorpe ran the
Advocacy department at CK, based in Nottingham from where all of the barrister
advocates worked, and was thus my line manager from January 2010. He later
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appointed Andrew Cash and then Mark Hopwell to that role. Whilst they
occupied that role I reported to each in turn.
15.As I understood the position, prior to my joining CK and until POL’s separation
from RMG in April 2012, Andrew Cash was the line manager for CK’s POL
prosecution function, working with Martin Smith. I later became aware that
Andrew Bolc (based at CK’s Leicester office) also worked in the CK POL
department. Again, my understanding through this period, gained only from
having heard ‘around the office’, was that those three would attend Magistrates’
Court prosecutions for POL and would instruct counsel from the Independent
Bar to conduct Crown Court prosecutions.
16. Occasionally Harry Bowyer, who I think had joined CK some 18-months before
me as in-house counsel, received instructions from the POL department to
advise them on the conduct of a few prosecutions. Other in-house counsel at
CK between January 2010 and December 2015 included Alwyn Jones
(solicitor), Barry White, Matt Smith, Julie Warburton, Clarkson Baptiste, and
Philip Bown. Stephen Gelsthorpe, as head of Advocacy, allocated general
criminal work; Andrew Cash instructed counsel in respect of POL work. I cannot
say who Andrew Cash instructed, other than that I was aware that POL
prosecutions were conducted at CK.
R v Samra
17.In about May of 2013, I am unable to recall the precise date, I was allocated the
prosecution of Mrs Samra by Andrew Cash. The allegation against Mrs Samra,
from recollection, was that she was said to be defrauding elderly and frail
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holders of Post Office Account Card holders by asking them to enter their PIN
numbers twice on the pretext that the first entry had not gone through. I recall
reviewing the evidence and noted perhaps 8 or 9 witness statements from those
said to have been defrauded, together with some evidence showing the double-
withdrawals in question. I believe that this latter evidence (I cannot recall) was
provided by POL investigators and derived from Horizon. I recall considering
that, on this evidence alone, there was a case for Mrs Samra to answer.
18.Prior to my instruction in this case, I had no real knowledge of Horizon.
19. Notwithstanding that those representing Mrs Samra had not raised any Horizon-
related defence in her Defence Statement, I nevertheless considered it
important that an expert witness be asked to provide evidence that Horizon was
functioning properly, that the data relied upon was accurate, and that there were
no known defects in the system — I advised to this effect.
20.During the period in which I was working on the Samra prosecution I became
aware that criticism was being levelled at Horizon, and that POL rejected the
criticism. I had also, at about the same time, heard that an organisation called
‘Second Sight’ was inquiring into Horizon for POL as a response to that criticism.
21.On 27 June 2013 Martin Smith told me about an unpublished report which stated
that there were bugs in the Horizon system. On 28 June 2013 Martin Smith and
I conducted a telephone conference call with Gareth Jenkins. I asked him about
the Samra case; he informed me that all of the information concerning the
double-entries would have derived directly from Horizon.
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22.Gareth Jenkins told us that it was he who had informed Second Sight of the
existence of two bugs. He told me that the existence of the two bugs would not
have adversely affected the post office in the Samra case and that he was
satisfied that the integrity of Horizon was intact. Martin Smith recorded this
telephone call and I asked for a transcript of this call to be made — I believe that
transcript is POL00142322.
23. The 28 June 2013 telephone call was the first occasion upon which I learned of
Gareth Jenkins — I had never heard the name prior to my involvement in the
Samra prosecution and, since that date I have never met him nor, to the best of
my knowledge, had any other communication with him.
24.Following the 28 June 2013 telephone call, I determined that I would review
Gareth Jenkin’s work to identify whether, and if so to what extent, he had failed
in his duties as an expert witness. Here I took it upon myself to advise — I do not
recall any specific instructions to undertake this work or to advise in writing on
the topic. But I thought it too important not to undertake the work.
25.To complete the work, I asked Martin Smith to provide me with copies of
statements prepared by Gareth Jenkins in other prosecutions. I considered
those statements against his duties as an expert witness and drafted my 15 July
2013 Advice document — the entire process took a couple of days, ending on
the date I signed the Advice. The resultant Advice document POL00006357
speaks for itself. I recall advising Jarnail Singh that Gareth Jenkins could no
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longer act as an expert witness in prosecutions and should be replaced without
delay.
26.1 would here rely on my Advice document dated 15 July 2013 (POL00006357)
and refer to paragraphs 29 and 30 therein. I was provided with a copy of the
‘Second Sight Interim Review’ (“Interim Review”) as was clear from my
paragraph 30 of POL00006357.
27.1 also advised POL that the prosecution against Mrs Samra be postponed until
I had taken the opportunity to review that prosecution in the light of what was
then a changed landscape. On 22 July 2013 I advised that the prosecution
against Mrs Samra be discontinued — see POL000040022. I recall attending
court at Birmingham Crown Court for that purpose.
28.1 am asked to consider to what extent, if at all, I was asked or encouraged to
provide general advice to POL on Horizon issues. Prior to my involvement in the
Samra prosecution I was not. This was because I had very little involvement in
the CK POL prosecution function. Following my involvement in the Samra
prosecution, again I do not recall having received either request or
encouragement from POL to provide general advice on any Horizon issue. I
would say that, as best my memory serves, all my general advice was generated
as the direct result of my concerns with the rapidly evolving Gareth Jenkins
situation, the need to stop prosecutions pending the appointment of a new
expert witness, the need to review previous prosecutions, the requirement for a
proper POL Prosecutions Policy and a proper Disclosure Management process
— all of which I shall consider in more detail below. I did however receive the
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occasional instruction to advise on a specific topic and I refer to such advice in
later in this statement.
Use of Horizon data at trial
29. I am asked to summarise what I understood of the nature and operation of the
Horizon IT System, distinguishing between Legacy Horizon and Horizon Online.
I know nothing of Legacy Horizon. I know a little of Horizon Online, but only in
the most general of senses. I recall attending a briefing at (I think) Fujitsu’s
offices but cannot now say when that occurred. The briefing was attended by (I
think) Martin Smith and Rodric Williams with perhaps 7 or 8 others present. That
briefing again was given in general terms — a whiteboard was used to sketch a
depiction of the Horizon Online processing functions — it consisted of the
drawing of several boxes with lines running between them, accompanied by an
oral description. It seemed to me that the object of the briefing was to inform us
as to the robust nature of Horizon Online — I learned little from this briefing. I
am aware, but only anecdotally, that other CK personnel visited, and received
training on an Horizon Online terminal located at POL Headquarters in London.
30.1 am asked to describe my understanding of the nature of the data produced by
the Horizon IT System, which was used to pursue criminal prosecutions against
SPMs and to consider identified certain matters. I have very little understanding
of the data produced by Horizon. I was only ever called upon to prosecute a
single SPM, the case of Mrs Samra to which I refer earlier in this statement. As
to the other identified matters:
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a. I cannot say how data was produced. I have no knowledge or experience
of this aspect of Horizon.
b. I am not able to comment on the extent, if at all, there may have been
issues or limitations in such data. I did not in fact prosecute any POL trials
or conduct any meaningful preparation to do so. Accordingly, I have no
sufficient experience upon which to found any comments.
c. 1am unable to comment on the extent, if at all, I was aware that Fujitsu
held more data than was produced to court or relied on by POL in
prosecutions — I did not prosecute any POL cases to trial and have no
experience of this issue.
d. I have no knowledge of ARQ audit data. Whilst I had heard references to
this phrase during my time at CK, I do not know what ARQ audit data is.
31.1 have been asked to set out what my view was on the importance of the
following factors concerning prosecutions that relied in whole or in part on
Horizon data. If this question is directed specifically to cases prosecuted by me,
then I cannot provide a view because I did not prosecute any relevant cases for
CK/POL to trial, including that of Samra. In general terms however, my views
are, by reference to the formatting of the question:
a. “the integrity of the Horizon IT System”.
Save in a few rare cases, the need to demonstrate the integrity of the
Horizon IT system is paramount. Those exceptions arise only in cases in
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which Horizon is neither a source of prosecution evidence nor is an
element of the prosecution case. A good example of such a prosecution
would be that of R v. Paul Swanson, to which I refer to at my paragraph
11 above. My detailed view on this topic is set out in my Advice of 15 July
2013 - POL00006357.
. “the defendant's access to information concerning the integrity of the
Horizon IT System’.
The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 established a two-
stage process for disclosure. The first stage requires the prosecutor to
serve any material which meets the test for disclosure, or a statement
that there is no such material. The second stage requires a defendant in
the Crown Court to serve a Defence Case Statement — in the Magistrates’
Court the defendant may serve a Defence Case Statement (“DCS”). A
DCS should set out the nature of the defence advanced and must be
sufficiently detailed so as to enable the court and Parties to identify the
real issues in the trial. Upon service of a DCS the prosecutor is required
to identify, and serve any material which meets the test for disclosure in
respect of the defence disclosed. By these provisions it is clear that any
POL defendant who had served a Defence Statement and so was going
to trial, would be entitled to receive detailed and complete information
concerning the integrity of the Horizon IT System and, in my view, such
material ought to be disclosed to a defendant as part of the first stage
mentioned above. In reality, any prosecution brought in reliance on data
from a non-robust Horizon IT system ought not to be brought at all. This
is why I stopped the Samra prosecution.
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c. “expert evidence on the integrity of the Horizon IT System and/or the
presence or absence of bugs, errors and defects within the same”.
It is difficult to understand how the integrity of any IT system can be
attested to without the assistance of an expert witness. Such a witness
must be independent of the Parties and indeed the CPR provides that
such a witness, whomsoever called the witness, is a witness fo the court,
not to the calling party. The expert witness(es) should be fully informed
of all bugs, errors and defects and should comment directly upon them.
Again, I rely on my opinion set out in POL00006357.
d. “the impartiality of any expert evidence given, whether in writing or orally’.
Similarly, any witness must be impartial, regardless of the medium of the
delivery of evidence. This is one of issues I commented on in my 8 July
2013 General Advice document — see POL00006365.
Work for POL prior to July 2013
32.1 believe I have summarised the work I carried out for POL prior to July 2013,
as I recall it.
The Second Sight Interim Review and initial advice
33.1 am asked to describe the nature and extent of my involvement in reviewing
POL’s past convictions to consider providing further disclosure, including any
advice I may have provided on this topic.
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34. Having identified the issues set out above concerning the Second Sight Interim
Review and the role played by Gareth Jenkins, I provided various pieces of
advice to POL. I would note here that I had not been asked, nor instructed, to
provide any particular piece of advice; rather, I took it upon myself to advise
POL, considering it my duty to do so in what, to me, appeared to be a rapidly
evolving crisis. My decision to do so was informed, in part, by the distinct
impression I had formed that POL appeared to work in silo’s, no one department
either communicating meaningfully with, or listening to, the other.
35.1 am asked to set out the details of any discussions or conferences I had with
employees, agents, or representatives of POL (including counsel) or Fujitsu
(including Gareth Jenkins, whether or not he was employed or contracted by
Fujitsu at the material time) to discuss a number of matters listed in the request.
I would have discussed all such matters as are listed with Harry Bowyer and
Martin Smith, for shortly after I had written my 15 July 2013 Advice
(POL00006357) I was asked by Stephen Gelsthorpe to take over the running of
the POL prosecutions department at CK. I recall that Stephen Gelsthorpe was
very supportive of the CK POL department but my discussions with him were
usually only on an ‘overview’ basis. I do recall discussing with him the general
culture I detected at POL and in particular a sort of ‘back-covering’ mentality
following the publication of the Second Sight Interim Review. At some point (I
do not recall when) Stephen Gelsthorpe appointed Mark Hopwell to oversee the
Advocacy department and so I reported to him — I had no discussions at all with
Mark Hopwell on these matters; he seemed to me to be entirely disinterested in
the work we did. Whilst I met with Rupert Hawke regularly, I do not recall that
we ever discussed POL matters, for he was an accountant not a lawyer.
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36. Outside of CK, I would have discussed and/or conferred with on various aspects
of the POL work, with Jarnail Singh and Rodric Williams, both of POL, and
Andrew Parsons of Bond Dickinson. I recall meeting Chris Aujard on perhaps
one or two occasions; I do not recall ever meeting with, or speaking to, John
Scott, but he may have been present at meetings; I met with and discussed
various matters with Brian Altman QC (as he then was) on several occasions
and read his various Advice documents; I have never met with Gareth Jenkins
and only spoke to him on a single occasion (see my paras. 21 & 22 above).
37.From about 15 July 2013 onwards my main point of contact was Martin Smith,
who communicated with Jarnail Singh daily, usually several times per day. I
learned that Jarnail Singh reported to Rodric Williams. On occasions I forwarded
advice documents to Rodric Williams — a case in point being POL00006357.
Over the next few weeks and months, I began to settle written advice documents
on a variety of topics all connected with the Horizon system. Those advice
documents generally set out the issues under discussion and contained my
advice on how POL should proceed. I also made requests for information about
the functionality of Horizon and, where specific issues came to my attention, I
requested information about those issues.
38.1 attended meetings with Jarnail Singh and Rodric Williams — it seemed to me
that Rodric Williams was far more interested in the civil aspect of his work as a
POL lawyer, whilst Jarnail Singh was underequipped for his role as Head of
Criminal Law (as he described his title to me). Consequently, I received very few
direct instructions but rather interpreted my instructions from what was
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discussed at meetings and in telephone calls, seeking to identify issues which
required advice and then acting.
39.1 was aware from the Second Sight Interim Review that a multitude of complaints
had been made over the years about both the functionality of the Horizon system
and the training provided to SPMs by POL on the system. During the Review
Process I occasionally came across logs from Chesterfield (I think, the help line
location) and perhaps from some documents I saw in the Mediation Scheme,
but had no more dealings with this aspect of the system beyond that (although
I may have commented occasionally on the training issues in my written
documents). I cannot comment on POLs response to complaints other than to
say that I saw that Second Sight considered the response to be inadequate.
40.In the following paragraphs I will comment on particular issues I advised on. I
shall deal with each discreet topic before moving on to the next — this will explain
why some dates referred to do not run chronologically.
Disclosure
4
.I first became aware of the issue of bugs within Horizon on 27 June 2013, just
prior to the commencement of the trial of Balvinder Samra. I was informed that
an unpublished Interim Review, commissioned from Second Sight by POL, had
stated that Horizon was defective and contained at least two bugs. I recall that
one of my first actions was to attend Birmingham Crown Court to ask the Judge
to delay the Samra trial pending the release of the Second Sight Interim Review,
an application to which he acceded. I made that application because I needed
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to preserve the position whilst I considered the impact of the Second Sight
Interim Review on the Samra prosecution.
42.1 recall that I was also, around this time, provided with what later became known
as the ‘Helen Rose’ report. This too revealed issues with Horizon and added to
my concerns about Gareth Jenkins, for here Gareth Jenkins was telling Helen
Rose about Horizon problems.
43.On 3 July 2013 I attended a meeting at POL Head Office. I do not recall who
was present, but it would most likely have been Rodric Williams and Jarnail
Singh. We considered issues relating to the Horizon computer system and the
prosecution of criminal offences, including the findings of Second Sight. My
concern was the apparent failure by POL to understand their disclosure duties,
including the recording and dissemination of material which might require
consideration for disclosure. Here, I was concerned that POL appeared to me
to be operating in silos, that is, not communicating essential information across
the relevant departments - at the time I concluded that the failure to
communicate the existence of defects in Horizon to those who should know of
them, including the prosecuting lawyers, arose out of this ‘silo mentality’.
44.At the 3 July 2013 meeting I advised POL that there ought to be a single, central
hub, the function of which was to act as the primary repository for all Horizon-
related issues. The hub would collate, from all sources into one location, all
Horizon-related defects, bugs, complaints, queries, and Fujitsu remedies,
thereby providing a future expert witness, and those charged with disclosure
duties, with recourse to a single information-point where all Horizon issues could
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be identified and considered. The rationale behind this advice derived from the
need to protect POL from the current situation repeating itself in the future.
45.POL accepted that advice and accordingly a weekly conference-call meeting
was established to meet the requirement of the central hub. Participants were
informed that they should bring all Horizon-related issues they had encountered
to the meeting, minutes were to be taken, centrally retained, and disseminated
to those who required the information including any new POL Horizon expert
witness. Hub meetings were conducted by conference call on Wednesday
mornings, with representatives from CK attending each meeting. A minute-taker
was appointed for each call.
46.In order to assist the Hub’s work, I drafted a Protocol to be followed by those
attending the Hub and working on the disclosure task. Working. I recall drafting
the Protocol; I have not been provided with a copy of my Protocol but reference
to it may be found at paragraph 116 of Brian Altman QC’s ‘General Review’
dated 15 October 2013 — see POL00006581.
47.On 2 August 2013 I was in the CK Nottingham office on what was my last day
at work, immediately prior to taking a holiday. As I was leaving the CK
Nottingham office I was contacted by Martin Smith; he said that he urgently
needed to speak to me. He told me that he had just been informed by Jarnail
Singh that some at POL did not wish to minute the weekly conference calls. I
was told by Martin Smith that POL’s Head of Security, John Scott, had instructed
those attending the Disclosure Hub meetings that handwritten minutes taken at
the meetings were not to be typed, but should be forwarded to John Scott; he,
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as was relayed to me, had directed that the minutes of previous Disclosure Hub
meetings which had been typed and emailed should be, and had been
destroyed. I was also told that the feeling was that material not minuted was not
in the public domain and so was not disclosable.
48.1 immediately telephoned Jarnail Singh and he told me that John Scott had
instructed him directly to shred — this direct instruction was, he said, the reason
for his contact with Martin Smith.
49. This instruction was not, in my then view, an act of incompetence on the part of
John Scott or POL — he was a former police officer with experience of the
criminal investigative process.
50.1 immediately postponed my departure and drafted an urgent Advice document
to POL, see POL00006799. I believe Martin Smith forwarded POL00006799 to
Jarnail Singh and or to Rodric Williams. I do not recall receiving any response
or other feedback from this document or hearing anything more on the topic.
51.From time to time, I provided POL with further disclosure advice, and I recall
drafting a Disclosure Protocol for use by POL. I know that Duncan Atkinson KC.
considered that Protocol (with, I think, approval) but I have not been provided
with a copy of the Protocol.
Review Process
52.In my 8 July 2013 General Advice document POL00006365 I advised POL that
all prosecutions under way and all convictions going back to 2010 be reviewed,
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and CK was instructed to commence that review. Prior to giving this advice, I
had discussed the matter with Harry Bowyer, and we were agreed on what
should happen.
53. The Review was intended to consider all prosecutions back to 1st January 2010.
The purpose of the Review Process was defined as being to identify those cases
where, had POL been possessed of the Second Sight and Helen Rose reports
during the currency of the prosecution, that material might have met the test for
disclosure. I established the criteria for the Review Process, in consultation with
Harry Bowyer, although the final process decision was mine.
54.1 deliberately set a very low threshold for applying this test: if the material MIGHT
have been disclosable then we would advise that POL should provide the
Second Sight and Helen Rose documents to the defendant under review, so
that an SPM could consider whether to appeal against any conviction. This test,
and indeed the entire process, was directed towards the duty of any prosecutor
to provide to a defendant any disclosable material notwithstanding that we were
dealing with post-conviction disclosure.
55.We first asked POL and RMG to provide us with all of their prosecution files
going back to 1 January 2010. Whilst we received many files we also learned
than some files were no longer available. Cases were subjected to a'sift' review
in which those identified as being 'risk' cases were separated out and subjected
to a ‘Full Review’ The sift review was conducted by a qualified criminal solicitor
and entailed the reviewer reading the case papers, identifying the issues, and
considering whether Horizon was the source of evidence in the prosecution. Sift
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Reviewers were required to have relevant criminal experience and received
training in both POL prosecution practice and disclosure prior to commencing
work on the Sift process.
56.Full Reviews were conducted by senior counsel experienced in prosecuting and
defending criminal cases. In each 'Full Review’ case a report was provided.
Where it was determined that disclosure ought now to be made, the reports
were disclosed to the defendant's representatives. I conducted a number of Full
Reviews, as did Harry Bowyer — CK also engaged several barristers from the
Independent Bar to conduct Full Reviews.
57.1 also advised POL that they should not conduct or continue any further
prosecutions until such time as they had identified and received a full report from
an independent expert witness - I have not been provided with the written
document in which I gave that advice, but I note that the need to cease
prosecutions is implicit in my written advice of 8 July 2013.
58.On 4 and 5 September 2013 I, Martin Smith, and Jarnail Singh met with the
Procurator Fiscal for Scotland. The meeting had been called for by POL
because the Procurator Fiscal had informed POL that all SPM prosecutions in
Scotland were to be terminated. The Procurator Fiscal had taken this decision
on the basis that, as POL were then unable to prove that Horizon was wholly
reliable, and were concerned that a conviction could potentially be unreliable.
POL were concerned that an intention to stop all cases, rather than just those
where evidence of alleged misconduct derived from Horizon would have raised
a considerable public relations storm for POL. The Procurator Fiscal agreed that
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not all prosecutions should be stopped; rather, he would review each case
separately and take a decision taken on the facts of each individual case. The
Procurator Fiscal said that he would adjourn all his prosecutions for 6-months
whilst POL to instructed a new, independent expert.
59.On 2 August 2013 Brian Altman QC delivered his ‘Interim Review of Cartwright
King's Current Process’ - POL00006583. This Review found the approach taken
by CK to be fundamentally sound, and advised certain steps to be taken to
improve the scope and content of the CK Review Process; those steps were
taken. On 13 August 2013 Harry Bowyer provided his ‘Response to the Interim
Review of Cartwright King's Current Process’ by Brian Altman QC -
POL00066807.
60.On 16 October 2013 I prepared a Briefing Note for POL’s incoming General
Counsel - see POL00108136. I was not asked to provide this but considered it
important that new General Counsel would benefit from a short note on what we
were doing.
61.On 5 December 2013 I provided a document entitled ‘Observations and Analysis
of the Cartwright King Prosecution Review Process’ to POL - POL00040194.
That document sets out in some detail the process I designed and oversaw, and
I rely on the contents therein.
62.When we commenced the sift and Review Process I advised POL that they
ought to stop all prosecutions until a new expert witness had been instructed.
We were instructed that we should ‘pause’ all current prosecutions and review
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them on a regular basis to determine whether or not they should be continued
or abandoned. These ‘paused’ cases were referred to as the ‘Stacked Cases’ (I
don’t know why). I recall a number of stacked cases being stopped over time. I
do not recall any cases being prosecuted through the courts after 15 July 2013
— in effect I had stopped all POL prosecutions for the foreseeable future.
Alternative Expert Witness
63.In my 15 July 2013 Advice document POL00006357 I advised POL that Gareth
Jenkins should not be asked to provide expert evidence again. I had previously
advised in my 8 July 2013 Advice document about the need for a replacement
expert — see para.1 of POL00006365. On 13 August 2013 Harry Bowyer
reiterated this advice in his ‘Response to the Interim Review of Cartwright King's
Current Process’ by Brian Altman QC of that date - see paragraph vii) of
POL00066807.
64.In due course I was asked by POL to provide a shortlist of proposed candidate
experts and, over the next few months I visited a number of IT specialists to
ascertain whether they were suitable to provide the independent services
required. I met with, amongst others, BAE Systems, Qinetig, and Imperial
College Consultants. I was always accompanied by Martin Smith to these
meetings — I am aware that Jarnail Singh has stated that he had met with and
interviewed potential expert witnesses and am able say that he did not on any
occasion attend any such meetings with me.
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65.In considering the requirement for an independent expert witness I drafted a
number of documents setting out the requirements I considered necessary for
the role.
66.In due course I advised POL that in my view the most qualified and appropriate
proposed expert was Imperial College Consultants. On 23 July 2014 I settled a
document entitled ‘Advice - Expert Report - Imperial College, London’
POL00148749. It seemed clear to me at the time of writing that there was an
attempt by some in POL to limit the scope of the proposed work and seek to
‘steer’ it in directions convenient to POL. My objections to such a course were,
I think, made very clear in my 23 July 2014 Advice.
Prosecution Policy
67.It some point in mid-2013 (I cannot recall when) I asked Martin Smith to obtain
a copy of POL’s formal Prosecutions Policy. Martin Smith asked Jarnail Singh
to send a copy and in due course I was provided with a copy of what I considered
to be an wholly inadequate policy. I therefore commenced drafting a detailed
policy intended to at least meet the standards set out in the Code for Crown
Prosecutors, including the then two-part test for commencing a prosecution. My
draft can be seen at POL00030686.
68.That Policy was never accepted although I recall being asked to review a
different document, ‘Post Office Enforcement and Prosecution Policy for
England and Wales’ which, I think, may have been drafted by Brian Altman QC.
My review appears at POL00125210.
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Specific Requests to Review Documents
POL00022598 (the Helen Rose Report) and POL00099063 (Second Sight’s
Interim Review)
69.1 cannot now recall when I first saw the Helen Rose Report, but I am sure it was
very shortly after I first saw the Second Sight Interim Review — I know this to be
the case because I considered both when advising POL in July 2013. I first
heard of the Second Sight Interim Review on 27 June 2013 — Martin Smith
informed me that he had been told of it. I first saw the report in early July, but I
cannot recall the exact date. I know I must have seen it before 15 July 2013
when I wrote my ‘Gareth Jenkins advice because I refer to it there.
70.It was my reading of these documents, together with Gareth Jenkins admission
to me on 28 June 2013 that he knew of the bugs referred to in the Second Sight
Interim Review, which prompted me to review Gareth Jenkins witness
statements and to draft my 15 July 2013 Advice document.
7
.I have to say, the repeated assertions by Gareth Jenkins in his witness
statements and by POL to anyone who asked were, in my view plainly wrong. I
remember wondering just how much POL knew, but at the time thought that any
lack of knowledge was cultural — no one department ever seemed to talk to
another — this is why I advised the Disclosure Hub. It did not occur to me at the
time, as it now has, that we at CK were not being told the truth.
72.My concerns as to disclosure are fully recorded in my 15 July 2013 Advice.
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POL00145130 (email from Rodric Williams to me on 3 July 2013) and
attachments (numbered sequentially from POL00145131 — POL00145141),
POL00145142 (email from Rodric Williams to me on 4 July 2013),
POL00145145 (my email to Rodric Williams on 4 July 2013) and
POL00029648 (email from Susan Crichton to Simon Baker on 4 July 2013).
73.1 have to say that I do not recall these emails and many of them do not appear
to have been directed to me. Thinking back, it looks like I was advising on the
need for disclosure of the existence of ‘Bug14’ so-called because (I think) it
affected 14 offices. I recall the meeting at POL on 3 July 2013 — I refer to it in
my 2 August 2013 Advice POL00006799; it seems that we discussed this bug
at that meeting.
74.My reply to Rodric Williams’ email of 3 July 2013 (POL00145145) suggests that
I was concerned not to pre-empt publication of the Second Sight Report — I had
been told by Rodric Williams that it could not be published until Parliament and
the responsible Minister had authorised publication — there was a suggestion
made to me of Parliamentary Privilege.
75.1 am asked about an email from Hugh Flemington to me dated 4 July 2013 at
8:01 (POL00145142). From a reading of the email, I would suggest that Hugh
Flemington is asking reasonable questions about the disclosure process in
relation to B14. My reply does not appear in the bundle provided to me by the
Inquiry.
76.1 had no knowledge of any bugs, errors, or defects in the Horizon system prior
to 27 June 2013 — it should be remembered that I had very little to do with CK’s
POL prosecutions department prior to my instruction in the Samra prosecution
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and so knew very little about Horizon generally. The Samra case was my first
real involvement in CK/POL prosecutions. By 3 July 2013 I had heard of the
existence of bugs and errors is the system because I had then been informed
and/or seen the Helen Rose Report and Second Sight's Interim Review.
77.1n my 4 July 2013 reply to Rodric Williams’ 3 July 2013 email (POL00145145) I
say this: “Merthyr Dyfan. In this case there are competing interests: open and
transparent dealing by POL as against the proposition that this in likely to be an
appeal case.” This appears to be a typographical error on my part, but it appears
to me that I was saying that “this is likely to be....” My instinct (many years later
of course) is to suggest that I thought it might be an appeal case; if that is right
then the competing interests would be between open and transparent dealings
on the one part with the need to protect the sub judice principle on the other.
POL00062162 (email: Rodric Williams to me and others, 5 July 2013)
78.This email is not as described, but is an email dated 31 October 2014 from
Rodric Williams to Belinda Crowe. I have never seen this email before.
POL00006365 (my note entitled General Advice, 8 July 2013)
79.This General Advice document has the appearance of having arisen out of a
telephone conversation, in which questions were asked of me. At this point we
at CK were still in a reactive stage, responding to a changing environment. I do
not think that, at that time, we understood the full implications of our (CK)
discovery that Gareth Jenkins, prior to 27 July 2013, had not been giving a
truthful account in his witness statements and oral evidence. My immediate
response was to advise the stopping of ongoing prosecutions, the removal of
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Gareth Jenkins as an expert witness, and a proper consideration of the
disclosure position. So, this is me reacting to an unfolding situation, hence the
somewhat disparate structure of this General Advice document.
80.The reference at paragraph 1 of the document - Alternative Fujitsu expert — I
think arose because I had already advised that Gareth Jenkins could no longer
act as an expert witness, and POL had asked what Fujitsu be told about why he
could no longer occupy that role. My recollection is that POL did not want to
offend Fujitsu and so asked me to provide them with a ‘form of words’ to relay
to them.
81.1 am asked to expand on my sentence “Considerations as to the selection of the
Start-date include proportionality; resourcing; transparency; and POL
reputation”. This document was drafted prior to the commencement of the
Review Process and at a very early stage of my involvement in POL work for
CK. I had not at this point seen the Second Sight Interim Review, published on
the same day as I wrote this Advice.
a. Proportionality. At this point we had no real idea of the extent of the
problem. We had been informed that these issues were only related to
Horizon-on-Line, which went live at the beginning of 2010. At this point I
therefore asked myself the question: Do we need to look at the original
pre-online system? and concluded that it would be disproportionate to do
so. This approach quickly changed when we realised, much later, that
we were dealing with a bigger problem that at first thought.
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b. Resourcing. This consideration again related to our then current
information, that the problem only went to Horizon-on-Line and so the
cost of going back any further, in the circumstances then known to me,
would be disproportionate. Again, this changed.
c. Transparency. I considered this to be the most important consideration
— it was in my view essential that POL was not to be seen to be acting to
limit our work in any way; hence my dismissal of start dates of the
previous 12-months and post-separation.
d. POL reputation. I felt it important that POL was seen to be acting in a
proper and ethical way in dealing with the possibility of wrongful
convictions — again this consideration informed my advice against shorter
start dates.
82.1 would note here the following:
a. In his Interim Review of Cartwright King's Current Process’ document of
2 August 2013, Brain Altman QC said this at his paragraph 15: “/ can
conclude on the available information that the approach of CK and
counsel appears to be fundamentally sound.....: ”. Had he had any
concerns about the start date for the Review this would have been his
opportunity to comment -— here it is to be noted that in this document Brian
Altman QC did offer several recommendations for improvements to the
Review Process, all of which were adopted.
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b. In his General Review document of 15 October 2013 Brain Altman QC
said this: “The 1 January 2010 start date for Cartwright King’s review of
Horizon Online disclosure is logical, proportionate and practicable in light
of all the known circumstances.” Had he suggested an earlier start date
I am sure that we would not have demurred.
83.At the time I was considering the issue of start-dates I believed that, with the
knowledge I then had, 1 January 2010 was the correct starting point for the
Review; here I would note that others agreed with that proposition — see above.
84.1 am asked to summarise the written and oral instructions I received to prepare
my advice dated 15 July 2013. Paragraphs 24 and 25 of this witness statement
refer.
85. Whilst I would undoubtedly have discussed the issues raised in my 15 July 2013
Advice document, this would only have been on a generalised level, not least
because it was my function to advise rather than his. I have dealt with my
discussions with Jarnail Singh and Rodric Williams elsewhere in this witness
statement.
POL00142322 (undated transcript of call between me, Gareth Jenkins and
Martin Smith)
86.1 set out at paragraph 22 of this witness statement the circumstances of this
telephone call. The transcript at POL00142322 is a full transcript of the
telephone call. This is the only occasion upon which I have communicated with
Gareth Jenkins.
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87. The role of an expert witness is to assist the court — it is not a partisan role.
Gareth Jenkins understood this — in each of the witness statements I have seen
he says this: “/ understand that my role is to assist the court rather than
represent the views of my employers or Post Offices Ltd.” This narrative
informed me that Gareth Jenkins understood that his witness statements and
oral evidence in court, was provided by him as an expert witness. That narrative
also informed me that he understood the duties of an expert witness.
POL00006357 (advice: ‘Prosecutions — Expert Evidence’, 15 July 2013
88.1 have been asked to expand on my narrative: “Dr Jenkins credibility as an
expert witness is fatally undermined.” I consider this statement to be self-
explanatory, and it was intended to be so. In the Court of Appeal decision in
Hamilton & Ors v Post Office Ltd [2021] EWCA Crim 577 Lord Justice Holroyd
said that in this document I was “expressing [my]self...clearly and firmly’ — see
para. 87 therein. For the avoidance of doubt, I meant that Gareth Jenkins had
failed in his duties as an expert witness and should never assume that role
again.
89. In my view, and as I had advised repeatedly, POL was duty-bound to inform all
those who had been prosecuted in reliance on Horizon data and/or any evidence
provided by Gareth Jenkins, in part or otherwise, that Gareth Jenkins credibility
as an expert witness had been fatally undermined.
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Horizon weekly call and my advice on the duty to record and retain
material.
90.Beyond advising as the requirement for a weekly Horizon weekly call and my
drafting of a Protocol for the conduct thereof, I had very little involvement in the
process. I may have sat in on a call on a single occasion.
91.1 have been asked to comment on my email at POL00139747. All of this
occurred at the CK Nottingham office, where Stephen Gelsthorpe and Rupert
Hawke were based. When I initially spoke with Martin Smith about the
“shredding” issue Stephen Gelsthorpe was present. Having spoken with Martin
Smith in more detail, and with Jarnail Singh, I set to drafting my advice. I copied
my draft advice (POL00006799) (dated 2 August 2013, NOT 3 August as stated
in para.20 of the Rule 9 questions) to the recipients of this email because the
subject-matter revealed what I considered might amount to serious criminal
conduct. Stephen Gelsthorpe was the Senior Partner of CK, Rupert Hawke was
the Managing Partner, and Andrew Cash was the POL point of contact for senior
POL staff. Given the serious nature of the subject-matter I felt it important that
the senior echelons of CK knew what had occurred and what I was doing about
it. Stephen Gelsthorpe’s comments in his email neatly encapsulated our feelings
on the point. I do not know if Andrew Cash spoke with Hugh Flemington as
suggested in his reply to Stephen Gelsthorpe’s email.
92.1 recall that my conversations with those listed would have been conducted in
surprise and shock — we had just been informed that our client, or some of their
staff, were potentially acting criminally by attempting to pervert the course of
justice. We considered it essential that POL immediately be advised both of the
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unlawful conduct and the underlying law and duties on them to prevent such
conduct. This is why I delayed the start of my leave, due to commence that very
day. The conversation revolved around how we could best achieve stopping the
unlawful conduct and it was agreed that I would write POL00006799
immediately in in this respect please note the timings of the emails at
POL00139747.
93. Stephen Gelsthorpe was at the Nottingham office when I wrote POL00006799
and I recall speaking (in somewhat shocked terms) about the conversations I
had just had with Martin Smith and Jarnail Singh. What Stephen Gelsthorpe
describes in his email as “factions within [POL] who are running around trying
to lay off blame for their own shortcomings by lying about the advice they have
received then they lose privilege” represents our general feeling on that day as
to what was being done at POL. We were at a loss to understand why John
Scott would give such an instruction or why others within POL did not wish to
minute the weekly conference calls. The obvious conclusion, and the one which
we quickly arrived at, is neatly encapsulated in Stephen Gelsthorpe’s narrative.
We perceived the shortcomings referred to as being a complete lack of
judgement and understanding on the part of some, to fully appreciate the
importance of retaining material for disclosure, and in respect of others, a
deliberate back-covering exercise. As to whom we were referring to, the former
category included Jarnail Singh, and his criminal law team, and some other
department representatives attending the Weekly calls; in the latter category
we included John Scott and his security and investigative staff, all of whom
should, and likely did, know better.
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94.1 am asked to consider paragraph 3 of POL00006799. Please set out the basis
on which you wrote and / or the source of information for writing “Participants
were informed that they should bring all Horizon-related issues they had
encountered to the minutes were to be taken, centrally retained and
disseminated to those who required the information, this list to include POL's
Horizon expert witness.” I was the source: I wrote this requirement into my
advice on the Disclosure Hub/Weekly meetings Protocol.
95.1 am asked to consider paragraph 3 of POL00006799 and comment on the
various elements of that paragraph. I am able to do so succinctly: Martin Smith
was my direct source for all of this material; he in turn was informed of it all by
Jarnail Singh. When I spoke with Jamail Singh on the telephone to confirm what
was said and done. The source of each sub-paragraph was:
a. Jarnail Singh told me that it was John Scott who had given the
instructions contained in my sub-paragraphs i. and ii.
b. Jarnail Singh told me that the advice in sub-paragraph iii. re Privilege
came from Andrew Parsons at Bond Dickinson; and
c. Sub-paragraph iv. Represented Jarnail Singh’s own views.
96.1 was provided with all of this information on 2 August 2013; it is what prompted
my written advice of the same day.
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97.1 asked Jarnail Singh in my telephone call of that day to inform me of what
documents had been shredded. He informed me that because the minutes had
been emailed to others they would not all have been destroyed. I asked him to
ensure that this was the case and to forward to Martin Smith copies of the
minutes of all previous meetings — I also asked Martin Smith to follow up on this
request.
98.POL00006799 contains my advice to POL to remedy the failures set out there
and as to the future conduct. It also set out very clearly the implications for those
misbehaving themselves in the ways there set out.
99.1 am asked to consider POL00006797 (letter from Susan Crichton to Andy Cash
dated 16 August 2013). I do not recall ever having seen this document. I can
say that I sent my Advice (POL00006799) on 2 August 2013, I believe Martin
Smith forwarded to Jarnail Singh and or to Rodric Williams. I recall asking Martin
Smith to follow up, to learn whether there and been any response to my Advice.
Later Martin Smith informed me that he had telephoned Jarnail Singh, who had
said not. He (JS) had made enquiries and had learned that it had been left in a
drawer in Rodric Williams’ desk but that it had now gone to General Counsel. I
expect that the POL00006797 email was the result of this discovery.
100. I am asked to consider the CK Review of Convictions. I explain the process
earlier in this witness statement. I believe that the review was adequately
resourced. The only documents we received were the prosecution files - many
of these were incomplete; we asked for further material where we required it but
were invariably told (by Jarnail Singh) that we had been provided with everything
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available. None of the reviewers believed that they were assessing the quality
of work carried out by Cartwright King, not least because so few of the cases
were prosecuted by CK. It should be recalled that, prior to separation CK acted
as agents for RMG(POL) and that CK prosecuted very few cases after
separation.
101. To the best of my recollection, the Helen Rose Report and the Second Sight
Interim Review were regarded as amounting to a single piece of disclosure, that
is, if one went out so too did the other.
102. I am asked to consider POL00039998 (email from Martin Smith to Susan
Crichton on 16 July 2013) together with POL00039993, POL00039994,
POL00039995, POL00039996, POL00039997 and POL00039998. I recall
some involvement in advising POL about CCRC requests; I recognise
POL00039993 and POL00039995 as being my work. I have not seen email
POL00039996 before and make no comment on it.
103. I am asked to consider “we are not aware of any cases which meet the first
criterion”. The meaning of this comment is self-evident, the first criterion being
set out in the first sub-paragraph of POL00039993, as “The defendant has at
least tried to appeal his/her case to the Court of Appeal or, in the case of a
Magistrates' Court conviction, the Crown Court or High Court.”
104. I am asked to say why I did not suggest informing the CCRC as to the
concerns regarding the credibility of Gareth Jenkins raised in my 15 July 2013
advice. I suspect that I had thought that, together with my analysis of the
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problem highlighted in the document, and my sentence “The Second Sight
Interim Review demonstrates that this was not the case” would have been
sufficient to indicate that this should be done. I also know that I would have told
Rodric Williams that CCRC should be cooperated with in every respect and that
they should receive full disclosure. With the benefit of hindsight, I agree that I
should have put this advice in writing.
POL00060715 (advice in R v. Lynette Hutchings dated 19 July 2013)
105. Whilst the SPM in this case denied dishonesty at interview, in my experience
of general criminal practice I am aware that some facing allegations of
misconduct make denials in interview, but later change what they say, often
having received detailed legal advice. The unequivocal reference to R v. Eden
(1971) 55 Cr. App. R. 193 in the Basis of Plea was, to my mind, such an change,
for only a lawyer providing expert advice would have been familiar with the
principles set out in that decision. Taking what I knew at the time, that is, that
Gareth Jenkins was a tainted witness, and that the Interim Review noted in its
preliminary conclusion: “a) We have so far found no evidence of system wide
(systemic) problems with the Horizon” I clearly did not think that the Interim
Review or the Rose Report were disclosable. With the benefit of hindsight, that
is, knowing now that Horizon was itself unreliable, I would advise disclosure.
Advice to discontinue prosecutions
POL00040022 (advice in the case of R v. Samra dated 22 July 2013) and
POL00133633 (advice in the case of R v. Wylie on 23 July 2013).
106. Whilst both the Interim Review and the Helen Rose Report identified issues
with Horizon, the preliminary conclusion of the Interim Review was that there
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were “....n0 (systemic) problems with the Horizon”. The problem here was the
absence of a reliable expert witness who would be able to provide evidence that
Horizon was not systemically unreliable or that Horizon was not at fault in these
cases. In the absence of such a witness/evidence, there could be no question
of pursing a conviction. Again, it should be noted that I was working with what
was then known to me.
POL00108042 (advice in R v. Nicola Grech dates 23 July 2013).
107. I am asked to identify the source of the information which led me to state
that: “Routine systems analysis revealed that there was a high level of utility bill
reversals being conducted under Ms. Grech’s Horizon User ID”. I cannot recall,
but this information would have been taken from a witness statement or other
document in the prosecution file.
108. Iam asked to consider the narrative “ When challenged that this explanation
did not make sense as the reversals were all being carried out on the same day,
often only minutes apart, she was unable to offer any further explanation.” And
to say to what extent, if any, I considered this to be a case where SPM could
not explain the data generated by Horizon. Looking back, I did not. The SPM
has stated in interview herself that she had conducted a number of reversals
herself and that she was aware that others had also done so. It is quite likely
that here, the SPM was pointing to a factual basis (known to her) for the
discrepancies rather than a data-based absence of knowledge.
109. I would also note that I considered the Helen Rose Report separately here
and thought that it had a bearing on the issues in the case. I would note that this
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advice was a ‘holding’ advice pending the receipt of further inquiries asked for
by me: see my paragraph 17: “Once we have the information indicated in the
preceding paragraph, and a Defence Statement, we can then determine
whether the Second Sight Interim Review and the Helen Rose report are to be
disclosed.” I would also note that a general stop on all prosecutions was
imposed at about this time — this case would have gone into the ‘Stacked Cases’
file.
110. I cannot now say whether the Interim Review and the Helen Rose Report
were served; it is unlikely if the prosecution was terminated.
The impact of the review on ongoing prosecutions
POL00040095 (Bond Dickinson note titled “Civil claims by SPMRs) and
POL00114253 (note dated 12 September 2013).
111. I recall that on or about 12 September 2013 I CK was sent a copy of
POL00040095 and was asked to comment on the document. Martin Smith
asked me to respond, and I did so - POL00114253. I believe, but cannot be
sure, that POL00040095 was sent by either Jarnail Singh or Rodric Williams.
112. It is likely that I would have emailed the Advice to Martin Smith who would
then have forwarded it to the intended recipient.
113. I am asked to consider my narrative: “To clarify, whilst a number of criminal
prosecutions against SPMR"s and clerks have been terminated since the
publication of the Second Sight Interim report, none was stopped because of
errors found in the Horizon system” and to say how many prosecutions were
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terminated following the Second Sight Interim Report— I cannot now provide the
figure as I do not have access to the entire body of files. As to my meaning in
writing those words, it must be recalled that, at the time, we were still receiving
reassurances that Horizon was reliable and robust notwithstanding the bugs
noted in the Interim Report; and again, the Interim Report itself stated that there
were no systemic problems with Horizon.
114. I am asked to consider my narrative: “/n all cases the prosecution was
stopped because it was considered that the continued prosecution of a particular
SPMR/clerk no longer remained in the Public Interest’. The reasons for
termination were those set out in paragraph 1a. of POL00040095. What this
means was that, given that POL no longer had access to a reliable expert
witness, we could not be satisfied that the test for continuing a prosecution was
met. Simply put, in the absence of a reliable expert witness where one was
required, it could never be in the public interest to maintain a prosecution. It is
likely that this was true of all prosecutions stopped.
115. I am asked the question “To what extent, if at all, was there a difference in
frequency or the reasons with which POL terminated prosecutions following the
Second Sight interim report in comparison to before its release?’ I am unable
to answer this question. My substantive work commenced with the prosecution
of Balvinder Samra — it was this case which caused me to advise POL that all
prosecutions be stopped. Thus, I have almost no POL history prior to the
immediate release of the Interim Report.
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Brian Altman KC’s Review of the Process
POL00006583 (Brian Altman KC’s Interim Review of Cartwright King’s Current
Process) and POL00066807 (Harry Bowyer’s advice titled “Response to the
Interim Review of Cartright King’s Current Process by Brian Altman QC’).
116. I am asked to consider paragraph 6 of these documents. I was not then
concerned that some cases had been initially sifted by the solicitor responsible
for the prosecution of the case, for the reasons set out by Harry Bowyer in his
document. I discussed these issues with Harry Bowyer at the time he wrote his
response, and his comments represented our joint view on the matters raised.
That view was this: that the issue we were grappling with was not one of Horizon
reliability - what is now known was then unknown to us — the issue under
consideration was the reliability or otherwise of Gareth Jenkins, and the effect
of that issue on the disclosure process.
117. lam asked to describe my view of Brian Altman QC identifying a concern at
paragraph 12 of POL00006583. This concern was not a consideration in the
Review Process, which concentrated on the disclosure problem. The “root
cause of reported problems” was, in our then view, clouded by Gareth Jenkins
failure to inform us (and, we then believed, POL) of the presence of bugs.
118. I am asked to consider paragraph 14 of these documents and to set out
whether I, Cartwright King or POL gave any further consideration to disclosing
documents other than the two identified. The only documents then at our
disposal were the Interim Report and the Helen Rose Report.
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119. We were already alive to the issues posed in Guilty plea cases and indeed
the Review Protocol catered for those cases. We conducted a sift review on
every case sent to us and I have seen nothing to suggest that any Guilty plea
case ‘slipped through the net’.
120. Brian Altman QC describes his concern in the form of a rhetorical question:
“My concern is whether the questions may be too narrow.” He then indicates
his view that experience may inform the answer. Given that Brian Altman QC
did not return to this concern in his later review, it is likely that he (and we)
considered the questions to be appropriately cast.
POL00006485 (note of conference on 9 September 2013) and POL00139866
(note of conference on 9 September 2013).
121. This meeting was arranged by POL. Prior to the meeting the Review Process
was the subject of detailed discussions between me, Harry Bowyer and, to a
lesser extent, Martin Smith. Others worked on the process by it was driven
primarily by me, with the assistance of Harry Bowyer. Prior to this meeting we
not met with Brian Altman QC. Limited discussions were had with Jarnail Singh
and Rodric Williams whilst we got on with the task.
122. I believe POL00139866 to have been drafted by Martin Smith — it bears his
style.
123. I have very little recollection of the meeting but I do say that Martin Smith
was a competent minute-taker and his note is likely to be reliable.
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124. I have been asked to consider the narratives: “SC said that there had been
some “cultural issues” at the start which had now been overcome but he thought
that it was necessary to put duties on individuals” in POL00006485, and “Simon:
We discussed last Friday: main problem is cultural. People in different
departments. Need to be a proper coming together’ in POL00139866 and to
respond to a number of questions:
a. I do not recall any discussion about a failure to record minutes or the
“shredding” episode.
b. The term “cultural issues” is a reference to the silo mentality prevalent at
POL and the apparent resistance by some there to what we were doing.
c. I am unable to comment on Susan Crichton’s word: “Susan: People then
dump...”. I have no recollection of that being said. It is, in context, likely
to have been a reference to the “cultural issues” I had raised.
125. Ido not know who coined the term “band wagon” but it did not originate within
CK. I did not approve of the term but, to my regret, did not prevent its use. Whilst
not seeking to justify the use of the term in any way, it must again be recalled
that, at the time, we were still being reassured by POL that Horizon was sound
and that the only Horizon-related problem was that of the expert.
126. I have been asked to consider the narratives: “MS stated that he thought that
there was a lot of Horizon information within Fujitsu that had not been getting to
Gareth Jenkins” and “Simon: Goes back to GJ. Either he not aware of info or FJ
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ivory tower — not being taken seriously’. I have very little recollection of the
meeting or of what was said there. I do recall discussing the sentiments
expressed there with Martin Smith and it the note represents our joint views on
the matter. For my own part I recall my view being stronger that is expressed
here: I considered it to be the case that Gareth Jenkins had deliberately failed
in his duty as an expert witness for reasons best known to him.
127. Ihave been asked to expand on “Prior to the HOL rollout there was a cash
audit done so that all POL branches balanced. BA Advised that there was no
positive duty to seek out individuals pre-1 January 2010 but if POL was
approached it would need to make a case-specific decisions on disclosure” in
POL00006485 and “Susan: That's when the system rolled out — knowing that
branches balanced — so thought justifiable date.” I have no recollection of this
discussion, but this narrative represents one of the considerations informing the
choice of start-date. The fact of the pre-rollout branch audit would have been a
major contributing factor to the choice of start-date, because the audit
represented a fixed point at which branches balanced.
128. 1Ido not recall any discussion of the Callender Square bug; that is not to say
there was none, merely that I cannot now remember.
129. I have been asked to expand on: “BA advised considerable caution in
relation to mediation cases involving previously convicted individuals...The
concern is that lawyers acting for those individuals may be using the scheme to
obtain information which they would not normally be entitled to in order to pursue
an appeal’. I do not believe that I offered any contribution to this part of the
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debate, for it seems to me that it raises issued of civil law disclosure, about
which I then knew almost nothing of.
130. I have been asked to consider “BA advised that in relation to the Hutchings
case...that he believed that there should be disclosure”. I do not now recall the
grounds on which Mr Altman QC disagreed with me. Brian Altman QC occupied
a supervisory role over the entire Review Process and the CK disclosure
exercise and so, where he advised disclosure, we provided that disclosure.
131. I am asked to consider POL00006581, Brian Altman KC’s note of advice
titled General View and dated 15 October 2013. I do not recall when I first had
sight of this document, but it is likely to above been within a few weeks of the
date it was signed. I recall being impressed by the scope of the review and, to
that point, had neither been informed nor realised the scope of Mr Altman QC’s
instructions. Neither was I aware that he was reading the reviews completed by
me and Harry Bowyer. My overall impression was that Brian Altman QC
approved of the work we were doing and that, subject to a few improvements,
too the view that we should continue in the same vein. Importantly for me, he
approved of my decision to commence the Review with cases from 1 January
2010 and of the rationale behind that decision. His view that, should a pre-2010
case present itself as suitable for review then it should be reviewed, was one of
the factors leading to the enlargement of the review.
132. I have been asked to consider paragraph 64 of POL00006581 “When /
queried the rationale behind the cut-off date, I was told, and entirely accept, that,
prior to each branch rollout, a cash audit was done so that each branch
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balanced” and to provide my understanding of what Mr Altman KC meant, and
the source of his information. One of the considerations behind my decision to
select 1 January 2010 as the start date was the fact that all branches had been
audited to provide a baseline for the rollout of Horizon On-line. I was informed
of this fact by either Rodric Williams or Jarnail Singh. I do not know Brian Altman
QC’s source, but it is likely to be either one or both of those I mention, or some
higher authority within POL.
133. I did not take part in the 4 October 2013 telephone conference, and I do not
believe that anyone from CK took part — I do not believe that we were informed
that the conference was to take place. We had already been informed, by
Second Sight via their Interim report, and repeatedly by POL, that Horizon was
systemically sound. Our concern was centred upon the disclosure issues raised
by the Gareth Jenkins problem rather than by the question whether Horizon was
faulty — our instructions were that it was sound. We at CK, and I, had no role in
the mediation scheme, other than providing some advice concerning certain
aspects of criminal law.
134. I have been asked to consider paragraph 129 of POL00006581, “There is
understandable concern that offenders might use the mediation scheme to gain
information as a platform from which to launch a fresh or new appeal, and so
CK wish to exercise a measure of control over the dissemination of information
and material during the process”. I played almost no role in the mediation
scheme, although I recall thinking that it was a bad idea when explained to me
by, I believe, Jarnail Singh. But CK was not instructed to be involved in the
scheme and so had no input into the formulation or operation of the scheme. I
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remember thinking that it had been established by POL as a public relations
exercise in the hope of limiting reputational damage. I do not know of the
particular concerns referred to but we at CK were concerned with what
amounted to a review and disclosure process.
135. I do not recall taking any substantive steps in response to this advice, not
least because the advice expressed a general approval of what we were doing.
I would have implemented the small changes suggested and it was , in part at
least, this advice which led to the widening of the scope of the Review Process
to include pre-2010 cases.
Advice regarding Julie Cleife
136. I have been asked to consider POL00112905 and the basis of my advice
not to disclose the Second Sight Report or the Helen Rose Report. Whilst this
SPM had stated to auditors upon arrival that she had " .... no idea where the
money was .. .. [T]he discrepancy had been building up for a long time", she
within a short period thereafter provided a number of explanations as to where
the money had gone, including having delayed entering transactions and giving
cash to her children, sometime as much as £1,000. These were clear
admissions of misconduct wholly unrelated to the operation of Horizon. My full
reasons are contained in POL00112905.
Cartwright King reflections in December 2013
137. I have been asked to consider POL00040194. Whilst the document is not
signed by any individual, I believe to have been written by me, not least because
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I recognise both the style of narrative and the content. In particular I am asked
to consider the passage: consider “Until the publication of the Second Sight
Interim Review the Prosecutors for Post Office had adopted a firm approach to
requests for disclosure in relation to the Horizon system which was treated as
being robust and reliable” and to say how the “firm approach” to disclosure
differed from the post-Interim Report approach.
138. It should be recalled that, prior to the publication of the Interim Report I had
almost no dealings with POL and POL casework. For this reason alone, my
knowledge of pre-Report disclosure protocols at the time I wrote POL00040194
consisted of the result of enquiries made by me of Jarnail Singh and from my
case reviews. Looking back, I now see what appears to have been three strands
of thought within POL on the topic of disclosure. The first strand amounted to an
article of faith: ‘Horizon is both robust and reliable — there is nothing wrong with
it and if Horizon says money is missing then it is missing.’ The second strand
considered that the cost of providing disclosure was prohibitive and should
always be discouraged. The third strand, I felt, arose out of an almost religious
panic: ‘Horizon must not be seen to have been impugned’.
139. Paragraph 17 was a shorthand for the Review Process test — in every case
reviewed by me and Harry Bowyer the full review process was applied per the
protocol I had drawn up. That is not to say we were perfect, but we followed the
protocol, as attested to by Brian Altman QC during his oversight.
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Initial advice regarding Seema Misra
140. Here I consider POL00108223. During the course of the Review Process, it
became clear to us that we should conduct a review of the pre-2010
prosecutions. I had, I believe, been informed by Jarnail Singh that this case was
quite high profile and that it should be reviewed. I called for the file but found it
to be very short of relevant documentation, containing, I think, only trial
transcripts. I recall asking Martin Smith to obtain the full file, but it never came
—II cannot explain why. POL was quite keen for me to review the case and so I
did what I could from the trial transcripts alone — please see my preamble to the
Review . I did wonder why a transcript of the trial proceedings had been obtained
— this was, and is, most unusual in anything other than an appeal case.
141. Whilst I cannot be sure, I think that the narrative concerning Professor
McLachlan’s hypothesis was taken from the judicial comments as they
appeared in the transcript. Certainly, I recall that a Judge had, on several
occasions, heard and refused applications for disclosure from those
representing the SPM. It was on this basis that I considered there to be no valid
criticism of the approach taken by RMG to the topic — a Judge had ruled on fully
argued applications and had, by his ruling, arrived at that conclusion. I must
confess however that my advice in this case was almost entirely predicated on
the assumption that a Judge had repeatedly ruled on such applications, against
disclosure. As to the issue of “general and unspecified allegations’ this was a
reference to Professor McLachlan’s requests for material, again as described, I
think, by the Judge.
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142. It is easy now to look back and say, with the knowledge I now have, that “/
was wrong”. But I do agree that, had I been asked to conduct this review again
and with what I now know, I would have advised differently. I say this because I
then relied solely on trial transcripts of what was said in court, which never
reflects the full position, and by the Judge’s views on the topic, which is less
information than I now know the position to be.
143. I am at a complete loss to explain the conflict between paragraph 33 of
POL00040194, dated 5 December 2013 and POL00108223, dated 22 January
2014.
Advice regarding Jerry Hosi
144. I am asked to consider POL00133638. At paragraph 36 of my Advice, I say
that “..../ take the view that material relating to the 'Callendar Square’ or ‘Falkirk’
bug should have been disclosed to the defence in this case.” (see also para.40.ii
of POL00133638). I further note that, at paragraph 43 of my Advice I refer to
Brian Altman QC’s General Review document of the 15 October 2013, in which
he set out the test to be applied in cases such as this one. I applied that test.
Having advised POL in the terms there set out I had no further involvement in
this case.
Dealing with the Procurator Fiscal
145. I recall attending a meeting with the Procurator Fiscal in Edinburgh; this topic
is dealt with at my paragraph 58 above. I think we asked Jarnail Singh about
prosecutions in Scotland and Northern Ireland and he replied that POL had
representatives in both jurisdictions, who would investigate cases and refer
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them to the relevant prosecuting authority. I believe that I suggested that CK
contact the Procurator Fiscal’s office in order to identify, and review, any
Scottish prosecutions. This was the genesis for the 3 - 5 September meetings.
146. I do not now recall precisely what I said to the Procurator Fiscal at the
meetings — I note my comment to the effect that I provided a “The meeting with
a broad overview of the HOL difficulties’. Given what we then knew, that is, that
Gareth Jenkins was a tainted witness; that Second Sight had concluded that
there were no systemic failings with Horizon; and that we had not then managed
to recruit a replacement expert witness, my discussions would have centred on
POL’s inability to provide expert evidence in support of Horizon reliability and
that, until we were able to do so, we could no longer prosecute Horizon-evidence
based cases.
147. Ihave been asked to consider a meeting with the Procurator Fiscal I am said
to have attended on or about Monday 5 October 2015. I am sorry to say, I have
no recollection of this meeting.
General Counsel’s briefing note POL00108136
148. I recall producing this document on my own initiative — I do not recall the
precise timeline for its production, but I believe it was prompted by a change of
POL General Counsel. I recall thinking that it was important that new General
Counsel be informed of what CK was doing and our progress. I recall that the
document was largely welcomed by General Counsel, and I think it led to a
meeting with me, Martin Smith, Roderic Williams and Jarnail Singh at POL
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headquarters. I recall that, once completed, I forwarded the Briefing to either
Jarnail Singh and/or Rodric Williams.
149. I am now unable to recall which prosecutions I thought the Court of Appeal
might have overturned.
Post Office Prosecution Policy
150. I am asked to describe the nature and extent of my involvement in POL’s
review of its prosecutorial role and its policies relevant to the investigation and
prosecution of offences. I certainly recall asking Martin Smith to obtain a copy
of POL’s written prosecutions policy — shortly after I made that request he
produced a document sent to him by Jarnail Singh. This document, which
purported to be the then current policy was, I thought, wholly inadequate. I
therefore asked Martin Smith to obtain POL’s instruction that I draft a new policy;
Jarnail Singh provided those instructions, and I commenced work.
151. The product of this work is represented in document POL00030686; I was
the sole write of this document, although I did consult with Harry Bowyer on its
content. The only material provided to me by POL was that ‘policy’ mentioned
in the preceding paragraph; any other material I used arose out of my own
research. My main source material was the Crown Prosecutions Service’s Code
for Crown Prosecutors, the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and
the Code of Practice issued under Part 11 of that Act, the Protocol for the Control
and Management of Unused Material in the Crown Court, and the Attorney-
General's Guidelines on Disclosure. All of the ideas, concepts, principles and
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tests set out in my Policy were my own and represented my thinking on the
matters contained therein. I received no input at all from POL.
152. I had no access to any past POL prosecution policy save that mentioned in
my paragraph 150 above. As I have already said, I considered that document to
be wholly inadequate in perhaps every respect.
153. At the time the MoJ retained a list of ‘recognised’ prosecution organisations,
which included the RSPCA, NSPCC and others. POL was on that list.
154. Iam asked to consider my paragraph 4.5(i)(b) in the Policy and why whether
a shortage had been repaid was relevant to the public interest stage of the full
code test. Repayment of a modest amount of stolen money is but one
consideration within the overall public interest test and will never be
determinative; I have, and had then, seen instances where the repayment of a
sum had militated against prosecution. The public interest test requires a
consideration of issues of proportionality and, in some cases, that aspect of the
test may result in non-prosecution. Here I note paragraph 4.14. f) of the current
Code for Crown Prosecutors, which applies a proportionality test:
f) Is prosecution a proportionate response?
¢ In considering whether prosecution is proportionate to the likely outcome, the
following may be relevant:
i. The cost to the CPS and the wider criminal justice system, especially
where it could be regarded as excessive when weighed against any
likely penalty. Prosecutors should not decide the public interest on the
basis of this factor alone. It is essential that regard is also given to the
public interest factors identified when considering the other questions in
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paragraphs 4.14 a) to g), but cost can be a relevant factor when making
an overall assessment of the public interest.
POL00112937 (Brian Altman’s note of advice titled “Review of Post Office Ltd
Prosecution Role” POL00125209 (email from Gavin Matthews to Brian Altman
KC on 4 July 2014) and POL00125210 (my comments on Brian Altman KC’s
draft policy).
155. I have no knowledge of the email chain between Gavin Matthews, Brian
Altman and Jarnail Singh at POL00125209. I was aware however that Brian
Altman QC had some reservations about my proposed policy, and he
commented to that effect. We never met, or spoke, on the subject, all
communications being via email between me and POL. I am also able to say
that I had no substantive communications with POL on the detail of either my or
Brian Altman QC’s documents.
156. It is fair to say that Brian Altman QC and I took differing approaches to such
a policy: he preferred a generalised policy whist I tended in favour of a more
prescriptive policy. These differences of approach can be seen in both of our
reviews of the other’s documents, at POL00112937 and my POL00125210. I
think in the end Brian Altman’s views prevailed at POL, although some of the
recommendations which I offered were adopted.
POL00026941 (my note of advice on prosecution policy dated 24 August 2018)
and POL00126145 (policy with amendments in tracked changes).
157. Iamasked to set out the background to my advice document POL00026941.
I am unable to recall when, or indeed why, I was instructed to advise at this
point. I note however that I provided detailed and substantive advice and offered
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further minor but important amendments. Looking at the documents now, it
seems that I was asked to amend the policy document itself, which I did on 25
August 2018. I cannot say why I was instructed to complete this work — I do not
believe that I was given a reason. It does however seem to me to have been a
sensible request.
Fujitsu prosecution support and finding a new expert.
158. I am asked to set out the nature and extent of my involvement in (a) POL
finding a replacement expert to provide evidence on the integrity of Horizon and
(b) the prosecutorial support provided by Fujitsu.
159. On 15 July 2013 I advised POL that they should find a new expert witness
to replace Gareth Jenkins. I was asked by POL — Rodric Williams I think, to
identify a shortlist of suitable experts who might fill the role and I did so having
visited and interviewed several. I record this work at my paragraph 64 above.
160. Whilst I note that I was copied in the email at POL00145361, I have no
recollection of ever having seen it — that is not to say I did not, I simply do not
remember. I do not believe that I had any involvement in advising on the
Transitional Support Service Change Control Note.
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POL00040040 (Draft scope for computer experts dated 17 September 2013)
and POL00138289 (email chain ending on 9 May 2014) and POL00138290
(attachment).
161. I was asked by POL to draft a ‘Scoping Document’ to assist any proposed
new expert with the parameter sand aims of the work to be undertaken. The
result of that instruction was this document, POL00040040.
162. I have never seen the email chains at POL00040040 and POL00138289 of
the Fujitsu document at POL00138290, but they clearly arise out of my
recommendation that Imperial College Consultants be instructed as the new
experts. I note however the restrictions seemingly placed by Fujitsu on the
process and the suggestion that the work be restricted solely to the Mediation
Process — this is new to me, and I note that it did not follow the spirit or substance
of my advice.
163. I cannot say what steps POL took to carry out the work described in the
emails.
POL00146900 (email chain ending on 22 November 2013) POL00146901
(attachment), POL00146917 (email from Rodric Williams dated 26 November
2013) and FUJ00156931 (note titled “Update on Issues Impacting on the
Horizon System Arising from Second Sight Audit”).
164. I have no recollection of the email chain POL00146900. I do not believe that
I attended any such meeting. I do not believe that I have not seen POL00146917
or FUJ00156931 before today.
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POL00113136 (draft memorandum) and POL00113135 (note on Securing Data for
Future Prosecutions dated July 2014).
165. I see that I was instructed to produce POL00113136 but do not recall doing
so. I believe either Rodric Williams or Jarnail Singh would have told me of the Fujitsu
consideration of the proposed MoU - this on the basis that I generally dealt with
only those two from POL.
166. Iamasked to consider paragraph 4 of POL00113135. I do not recall the view
of Fujitsu’s commercial and legal team communicated to me. I do not think the
contract I refer to can be FUJ00000069, because that document does not
contain the pertinent clause numbers. My understanding was that POL had an
entitlement to receive all data from Fujitsu as was required by POL, but that POL
would be required to pay for the time required to extract the data sought. I also
understood that POL considered the charges levied by Fujitsu to be expensive.
POL00148748 (email from Jarnail Singh to Chris Aujard dated 23 July 2014)
and POL00148749 (attachment).
167. Ibelieve I was forwarded the Andy Holt email POL00148748 by Jarnail Singh
and was instructed to advise on the email because one or the other wanted my
input into the agenda for the proposed meeting. As is clear from my Advice,
which I settled without specific instructions to do so, I considered the content of
Mr Holt’s email to be inappropriate and wrong. I am not aware of any steps POL
took in response o my advice.
The Mediation Scheme
168. We at CK had very little involvement in the Mediation Scheme, save as is
discussed below. Similarly, we played no part in the work of the Working Group.
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169. 1Idonot specifically recall any instructions to advise as I did in POL00148720.
I do not see how my view on whether POL should mediate cases who had not
been convicted of a criminal offence is relevant. I was a lawyer instructed from
time to time to advise on matters of law. As POL00148720 makes clear, my
advice was that no applicant guilty of a criminal offence committed against POL
should be allowed into the Scheme — my reasons for providing this advice are
set out in POL00148720. In short, I was of the opinion that the proper route for
a convicted SPM was the Court of Appeal. Here I am asked to provide a
personal view based on hindsight. I am unable to do so, for I do not see how my
now informed view can properly inform past decisions. Furthermore, such a view
amounts to an invitation to say that I was wrong to advise as I did — I cannot say
that when considering what I knew at the time. Had I then known what I now
know then my view might have been different, but I consider the ‘with hindsight’
approach to be an unfair exercise to engage in.
POL00148720 (advice on criminal applicants to the Mediation Scheme).
170. The law does not restrict the definition of acting “dishonestly, with a view to
gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another” to a financial
or monetary loss and the “gain” or “loss” can be a non-financial gain or loss, e.g.
the loss may be the gaining or loss of an opportunity. In circumstances where
an SPM stated they believed the discrepancy was not a real loss but
unexplained, who has then acted in the way described because they believed
the discrepancy was not a real loss but was an unexplained one, may still fall
within the definition set out above. Here, the question is one of whether an SPM
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who was ‘forced’ into the conduct complained of because of a proper and real
fear, is one going to the application of the public interest aspect of the
prosecution decision. That is why I advised in the terms set out in POL00148720.
POL00023832 (advice on Second Sight dated 16 February 2015)
171. Iam asked to set out the basis for my opinion that “both offences are equal
in law: both are offences of dishonesty and both carry the same maximum
sentence”. This is not an opinion but rather a statement of the law — each of the
offences mentioned carry a maximum sentence of 7-years imprisonment, see
ss.17&17 of the Theft Act 1968. Accordingly, these offences are of identical
seriousness.
POL00130708 (email from Laura Pinkney to Jessica Barker dated 29 October
2014)
172. I had very little involvement in POL’s preparation of its responses to
applications to the Mediation Scheme, although I do recall occasionally
providing advice such as that set out in POL00130708.
Deloitte’s Project Zebra and remote access
173. I am asked to set out the extent of your knowledge on Fujitsu’s ability
remotely to write, edit or delete entries in branch accounts. Initially I had no
knowledge of such matters, not least because I had almost no dealings wilt POL
prior to my being instructed to prosecute the Samra case. After that instruction
I recall hearing from Jarnail Singh that some were suggesting that POL/Deloitte
were able to enter Horizon “through the back door’. I was informed by Jarnail
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Singh that such a thing was not possible. Later I recall Rodric Williams telling
me the same. I do recall visiting premises (possibly Fujitsu’s) for a presentation
on Horizon. I do not recall all of those present, but I believe that Rodric Williams
was in attendance.
174. The presentation was delivered by persons I did not know but whom I now
presume to have been Fujitsu staff. The presentation took the form of a White
Board explanation of Horizon functionality. It was a much-simplified
presentation, with a box being drawn on the white board with an explanation as
to how it was not possible for POL/Fujitsu to enter remotely. The distinct
impression I was left with was that Horizon was very secure and could not be
remotely accessed by anyone.
175. As time progressed the suggestions of a ‘back-door’ entrance to Horizon
grew louder, but each time II asked about the possibility, I was informed that
there was no ‘back door’. I have looked at POL00028062 (Deloitte — Horizon
Desktop Review of Assurance Sources and Key Control Features, Draft for
Discussion, dated 23 May 2014) and can say with a degree of certainty that I
did not see this document in 2014. I recall hearing about it anecdotally and,
because I considered it to be relevant to our disclosure exercise, I asked for it
on a number of occasions, informally and in writing, e.g. on 23 July 2014 - see
POL00148749 at paragraph 9.ii. I was told that it did not reveal any ‘back door’
and that it was commercially sensitive.
176. Eventually a redacted version was provided to me and here I note the date
as being 26 February 2015. This document was the source of POL00029843,
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a document I produced. My thoughts on the relevance of this document to the
disclosure process is set out at paragraph 4 in POL00029843.
177. I refer to my paragraph 6 of POL00029843: my telephone conference with
Rodric Williams and Andrew Parsons represented the first occasion upon which
I was informed that it was possible to ‘inject’ a transaction unilaterally into a
branch's accounting records without the consent, approval or indeed knowledge
of the SPMR. This instruction led me to produce POL00029843. I recall that,
having seen Andrew Parsons’ reply to my questions (POL00029843 and
attachments) I asked Martin Smith to organise a meeting with POL to discuss
the Deloitte findings and Andrew Parsons’ response, but I do not think this
meeting took place.
178. I have considered POL00021781 and attachments. It seemed clear to me at
the time that the Deloitte material should be the subject of a fresh disclosure
exercise — it seriously undermined POL’s strong assertions, given by them over
the years (and repeatedly, to me), that there was no ‘back door’. That is why I
asked my questions, and it is why I was not satisfied with the response to my
questions, and it is why I asked for a meeting on the topic.
179. I see from several documents provided to me that I advised that there were
disclosure implications arising out of the Deloitte findings.
180. By May 2015 CK had, I think, completed its Review Process and disclosure
exercise and POL seemed less than interested in a further exercise. Around this
time, I established a new and unrelated department within CK and most of my
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energies were directed towards establishing a CK presence in an altogether
different area of law. I did however continue to advise POL on matters but to a
lesser degree than hitherto. As an aside, I do not ever recall having dealings
with a ‘Project Zebra’ although this may have been because we were simply
unaware of any codename.
Ongoing involvement
181. I am asked to consider POL00067067 (email chain between Richard Pike
and Martin Smith on 7 May 2015). I do not recall providing any further advice on
this specific instance, but I think I provided some advice on other cases. I recall
commencing work on a list of cases where disclosure ought to be considered,
and because of my working habits, a list would have been produced. I cannot
say what has happened to that list. I have also looked at POL00065434. I do
not recall this work but clearly I had been instructed to deal with the disclosure
implications of the Deloitte Report and would have done so. It is equally clear
from the documents that I was concerned to ensure that proper disclosure
decisions were made.
182. I'm afraid I have no recollection of the Brian Altman QC meeting.
183. I have looked at POL00029867 (email from Andrew Parsons to you on 15
July 2015) and POL00029868 (attachment). I am asked to provide my views on
the content of those documents. I have no recollection of seeing them although
plainly I did. I was by this time doing much less on the POL work and more in
my new department (in which Martin Smith and Harry Bowyer were also
engaged). It seems clear to me now that Andrew Parsons’ desire to narrow the
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scope of any investigation into legacy Horizon was ill-judged, and it is likely I
would have thought so at the time. I say this because it was me who effectively
stopped POL prosecutions after July 2013 and I instigated the disclosure review
process. I do not think it likely that I would have taken a different view to what is
frankly astonishing material revealing, as it does, a high degree of corporate if
not personal failure on the part of POL.
184. I have considered POL00092640 (email from Martin Smith to Harry Bowyer,
copied to you, on 21 August 2015). I recall nothing of this correspondence,
although the reference to Martin Smith being “...on the CPC course” is a
reference to his training course for the new CK department I referred to above,
at my paragraph 180. The internal view at CK by this point was that we had at
the very least been mis-instructed on the issue of ‘back doors’ into Horizon. By
this time, we were coming to the realisation that something was seriously wrong
with POL’s corporate culture when dealing with Horizon-related issues whether
in a criminal or civil arena.
185. POL00065718 (email from Rodric Williams to you and others on 19
November 2015) and POL00065904 (my note of advice on R v. Misra —
Disclosure dated 7 December 2015). In this document I was saying that the
CCRC were now the lead organisation dealing with Mrs Misra’s case and that,
by reason of the CCRC’s statutory standing, it was that organisation to whom
disclosure should be given. I say this because by a s.17 Order, POL were
required to provide the CCRC with all documents and other material obtained
or created during any investigation or proceedings relating Mrs Misra. To this
Page 62 of 75
WITNO08130100
extent I was of the view that, whilst POL’s disclosure duties persisted, those
duties were owed to the CCRC standing in the shoes of Mrs Misra.
186. POL00140004 (email from Martin Smith to Andrew Winn on 30 March 2016).
I am asked to describe what further involvement I had with the issue of
potentially erroneous transaction corrections. In December 2015 I gave CK 3-
months’ notice of my resignation. Although that notice period expired on 30
March 2016, I had stopped working for CK a few weeks prior to 30 March 2016.
Accordingly, I had no further involvement with this issue.
187. POL00156681 (email from Rodric Williams to Gavin Matthews and another
on 25 April 2016), and documents attached (POL00065652, POL00065904,
POL00110276, POL00001733 and POL00021847). I have no memory of
POL00001733 and POL00021847. I certainly do not recognise them, and I do
not think I ever saw them.
188. POL00067037 (email from Harry Bowyer to Lucy Bremner on 19 October
2018). I am asked to explain Harry Bowyer’s narrative: “/ further concluded that,
had we known then what we now know, we would have disclosed the Helen
Rose and Second Sight reports”. I refer to my paragraph 142 herein in reply.
The Group Litigation
189. I had no involvement in assisting POL prepare for the Group Litigation or in
providing advice arising from the same and was never asked to advise on the
matter.
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190. POL00066972 (Advice on Disclosure Issues arising from the CCRC and
Civil Proceedings dated 20 December 2017). I do not recall the instructions I
received to produce this Advice document, although clearly I was so instructed.
My instructions almost always came via Jamail Singh, so it is likely that he
requested this advice, perhaps at the request of Rodric Williams. As to my view
that, whilst POL’s disclosure duties persisted, those duties were owed to the
CCRC, that advice was given in respect of the s.17 Notice as it applied to Mrs
Misra. It was not my view that this represented a general abrogation of the duty
in respect of any other case, but only those the subject of a s.17 Notice.
191. POL00042015 (email from Rodric Williams to me on 7 September 2018). I
have no recollection of the conference to which this email refers and indeed do
not believe I attended a conference with Antony de Garr Robinson KC. If I did I
do not know why; I was not involved in the 2018 GLO proceedings in any
respect. I do not believe that I reviewed any documents in the proceedings.
Other Documents
192. I am asked to consider a range of documents and to say whether I was
provided with and/or read a document, and if so to provide my views and
whether I considered that it ought to be disclosed. I can deal with this question
shortly: other than as set out elsewhere in this statement, I was neither provided
with or read any of the documents listed and indeed have never heard mention
of them.
Page 64 of 75
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General
193. I am asked to say whether, in hindsight, there anything that I would have
done differently in respect of the matters raised in your statement. It was I who
first identified the issues with Gareth Jenkins, and I instigated the Review
Process, Disclosure Hub and other initiatives intended to seek to cure the
problem. I occasionally wonder, had I not identified the ‘Gareth Jenkins issue’
when I did, for how long POL prosecutions would have continued: for some time,
I think.
194. lam professionally and personally proud of the fact that it was I who stopped
POL prosecutions from July 2013. Whilst I see various references to
prosecutions continuing until 2015, I recall none prosecuted by CK although I
acknowledge that some cases continued to be investigated after July 2013 (the
so-called ‘Stacked’ cases). I am also aware that the Crown Prosecution Service
continued to prosecute cases until 2015 — I recall being asked to visit two (I
think) CPS offices to advise them of the Gareth Jenkins issue.
195. I would ask the Chair to note the remarks of Lord Justice Holroyd’s
judgement in Hamilton & others -v- Post Office Limited [2021] EWCA Crim 577
at paragraphs 81 to 90:
81. As a result of its review of the many documents, POL disclosed further material
which had not been seen by Fraser J but which this court has been able to consider.
It includes what has been referred to for convenience as "the Clarke advice" and
other documents which were relied upon in the appellants’ submissions before us.
82. The Clarke advice is dated 15 July 2013, but was first disclosed in these proceedings
in November 2020. It was written by Simon Clarke, a barrister employed by a firm
of solicitors which was instructed by POL in relation to prosecutions. It was written
in order to advise POL about the use of expert evidence in cases of alleged crimes
Page 65 of 75
83
84.
85.
86.
WITNO08130100
by SPMs. Mr Clarke noted that POL generally only prosecuted for three types of
offence: theft, false accounting and fraud. He commented that —
"The detection and successful prosecution of such offences is almost always
dependant [sic] upon the proper analysis and presentation of Horizon data
and accordingly it is imperative that the integrity and operation of the
Horizon system is demonstrably robust."
He went on to summarise the nature of defences which either made an express
assertion that Horizon had failed in some way, or asserted that Horizon must be at
fault because the SPM had acted properly and the alleged shortfall was otherwise
inexplicable. He also noted that defendants who had pleaded guilty to false
accounting or fraud alleged that they had been covering up inexplicable losses. He
added that in all these situations defendants often also complained about a lack of
training on Horizon and/or inadequate customer support.
Mr Clarke then set out the duties of an expert witness, as required by the Criminal
Procedure Rules. He summarised the prosecution's disclosure duties under section 3
of the CPIA.
Mr Clarke stated that an employee of Fujitsu, Gareth Jenkins, had provided expert
evidence as to the operation and integrity of Horizon. He referred to a number of
statements which Mr Jenkins had provided to POL in various cases, attesting to the
robustness and integrity of Horizon. Mr Jenkins had ended most of those statements
as follows:
"In summary I would conclude by saying that I fully believe that Horizon
will accurately record all data that is submitted to it and correctly account for
it."
Mr Clarke summarised the statements as Mr Jenkins saying that there was nothing
wrong with the system. He continued:
"Unfortunately that was not the case, certainly between the dates spanned by
the statements I have extracted here, the 5"" October 2012 and the 3“ April
2013."
Mr Clarke went on to say that Mr Jenkins had been aware of at least two bugs which
had affected Horizon Online since September 2010, one of which was still extant
and would not be remedied before October 2013, but had failed to say anything about
them or about any Horizon issues in his statements. He expressed the firm opinion
that if Mr Jenkins had mentioned the existence of the bugs, that would undoubtedly
have required to be disclosed to any defendant who raised Horizon issues as part of
his or her defence.
Mr Clarke advised that Mr Jenkins had failed to comply with the duties of an expert
witness and should not be asked to provide expert evidence in any future
prosecution. We are aware that there is an issue as to whether Mr Jenkins had been
used by POL as an independent expert witness, a role which he could not fulfil for
the simple reason that he was an employee of Fujitsu. We do not think it necessary
to say anything about that issue, because whilst it may be important in other contexts,
Page 66 of 75
87.
88.
it does not affect our consideration of POL's breach of its disclosure obligations.
That is because the following conclusions expressed by Mr Clarke are equally
applicable whether Mr Jenkins prepared his statements as an independent expert or
as an employee of Fujitsu with particular knowledge of Horizon:
"- Notwithstanding that the failure is that of [Mr Jenkins] and,
arguably, of Fujitsu Services Ltd, being his employer, this failure has
a profound effect upon POL and POL prosecutions, not least because
by reason of [Mr] Jenkins' failure, material which should have been
disclosed to defendants was not disclosed, thereby placing POL in
breach of their duty as a prosecutor.
- By reason of that failure to disclose, there are a number of now
convicted defendants to whom the existence of bugs should have
been disclosed but was not. Those defendants remain entitled to have
disclosure of that material notwithstanding their now convicted
status. (I have already advised on the need to conduct a review of all
POL prosecutions so as to identify those who ought to have had the
material disclosed to them. That review is presently underway.)
- Further, there are also a number of current cases where there has been
no disclosure where there ought to have been. Here we must disclose
the existence of the bugs to those defendants where the test for
disclosure is met."
Given that SPMs had been complaining about Horizon for well over a decade, we
are bound to say that we find it extraordinary that it was necessary for Mr Clarke to
advise in those terms. We commend him for expressing himself as clearly and firmly
as he did. But it should not have been necessary for him to have to give such basic
advice to a prosecuting authority about its duty in respect of disclosure.
Mr Clarke wrote a further advice on 2 August 2013. From this it is apparent that,
before sending his earlier advice, he had advised POL in conference on 3 July 2013.
At that conference he had advised the creation of a single hub to collate all Horizon-
related defects, bugs, complaints, queries and Fujitsu remedies, so there would be a
single source of information for disclosure purposes in future prosecutions. POL had
accepted his advice and had set up a weekly conference call, three of which had
taken place by the time Mr Clarke wrote his later advice. After the third, he said, the
following information had been relayed to him:
"(i) The minutes of a previous call had been typed and emailed to a number
of persons. An instruction was then given that those emails and minutes
should be, and have been, destroyed: the word 'shredded' was conveyed to
me.
(ii) Handwritten minutes were not to be typed and should be forwarded to
POL Head of Security.
(iii) Advice had been given to POL which I report as relayed to me
verbatim: ‘If it's not minuted it's not in the public domain and therefore not
disclosable." 'If it's produced it's available for disclosure - ifnot minuted then
technically it's not."
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(iv) Some at POL do not wish to minute the weekly conference calls."
89. Mr Clarke then set out the relevant provisions governing disclosure. He emphasised
the seriousness of any attempt to abrogate the duty to record and retain material,
observing that a decision to do so may well amount to a conspiracy to pervert the
course of justice. He ended with the following:
"Regardless of the position in civil law, any advice to the effect that, if
material is not minuted or otherwise written down, it does not fall to be
disclosed is, in the field of criminal law, wrong. It is wrong in law and
principle and such a view represents a failing to fully appreciate the duties
of faimess and integrity placed upon a prosecutor's shoulders."
90. Again, we commend the firmness and clarity of Mr Clarke's advice. That he should
have had to give it is, if anything, even more extraordinary than the fact that he
needed to write his earlier advice. The need to give it suggests there was a culture,
amongst at least some in positions of responsibility within POL, of seeking to avoid
legal obligations when fulfilment of those obligations would be inconvenient and/or
costly to POL.
196. Hindsight is a spiteful master, but I can say that, had I been in the same
situation again I would have striven to act as I then did. I recall that the disclosure
decisions I then made were made on the basis of what I then knew; obviously
had I been aware of other more serious failings, then I would have acted
accordingly.
197. I can unequivocally say that I was never involved in the conviction of any
SPM. We at CK had no basis upon which we could have known that the real
issue was not that of Gareth Jenkins failures as an expert witness, but was
rather the lack of integrity in Horizon itself, Gareth Jenkins being but a symptom
of that wider malaise.
198. Returning to the benefits of hindsight, I am now sure that POL must have
deceived both me and CK; I say this because it is now obvious to me that highly
relevant material was not provided to me either at all, or when it should have
Page 68 of 75
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been provided. I conclude that this failure to properly inform me was a decision
taken by those in a position to do act as they did.
Statement of Truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
I Simon Clarke
Signed: Simon Andrew Clarke
Dated: 23 March 2024
Page 69 of 75
Index to First Witness Statement of SIMON CLARKE
No.
URN
Document Description
Control Number
POL00142322
Transcript between Simon Clarke, Martin
Smith and Gareth Jenkins re a criminal
case against SPM
POL-0143576
POL00006357
Advice on the use of expert evidence
relating to the integrity of the Fujitsu
Services Ltd Horizon System
POL-0017625
POL00040022
Case review of R v Balvinder Kaur
Samra- Birmingham Crown Court by
Simon Clarke
POL-0036504
POL00006365
CK advice on FJ expert and criminal case
review
POL-0017633
POL00006581
Review of PO prosecutions by Brian
Altman QC
POL-0017666
POL00006799
Advice on Disclosure and the Duty to
Record and Retain Material
POL-0017591
POL00006583
Interim Review of CK Processes by Brian
Altman QC
POL-0017668
POLO0066807
RESPONSE TO THE INTERIM REVIEW
OF CARTWRIGHT KING’S CURRENT
PROCESS BY BRIAN ALTMAN QC
POL-0063286
POL00108136
Briefing Note Post Office Ltd General
Counsel
POL-0106274
10
POL00040194
Observations and analysis of the
Cartwright King Prosecution Review
Process
POL-0036676
11
POL00148749
Advice from Cartwright King Solicitors re
matters of concern arising out of the
instruction of Imperial Consultants Limited
POL-BSFF-
0007870
12
POL00030686
Post Office Prosecution Policy England
and Wales (effective from 1/11/13, review
1/11/14)
POL-0027168
13
POL00125210
Post Office Enforcement and Prosecution
Policy for England and Wales -
Comments on BAQC draft Policy - Simon
Clarke
POL-0131181
14
POL00022598
Horizon Data Lepton SPSO 191320 by
Helen Rose (v.1 draft)
POL-0019077
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WITN08130100
15 POL00099063 I Signed Interim Report into alleged POL-0098646
problems with the Horizon system
16 POL00145130 I Email between POL staff members POL-BSFF-
regarding issues from the conference: 0004257
letters to be sent to branches and B14
timing
17 POL00145131 I Letter from Post Office Branch Support POL-BSFF-
Team to SPM Mr J Mistry regarding 0004258
branch discrepancies and investigations
regarding an error in Horizon.
18 POL00145141 I Report authored by Gareth Jenkins on POL-BSFF-
Local Suspense Problem which was. 0004268
identified earlier this year and was seen
to impact 14 of the current Horizon
Branches.
19 POL00145142 I email regarding letters to branches and POL-BSFF-
B14 timing 0004269
20 POL00145145 I Email between Cartwright King and Post I POL-BSFF-
Office regarding the discrepancies found I 0004272
in the 14 branches.
21 POL00029648 I Email from Susan Crichton to Simon POL-0026130
Baker and others, re: ‘FW Timeline for
Local Suspense Problem’
22 POL00062162 I Email from Rodric Williams to Belinda POL-0058641
Crowe, re: Spot Review Bible
23 POL00139747 I Email chain between Andy Cash, Steve POL-0141448
Gelsthrope, Simon Clarke, Rupert Hawke
and Martin Smith re: This morning's
meeting
24 POL00006797 I Letter to Andy Cash from Susan Crichton I POL-0017615
re Horizon Calls
25 POL00039998 I Email from Martin Smith to Susan POL-0036480
Crichton, RE: CCRC
26 POL00039993 I CCRC reviewing criteria POL-0036475
27 POL00039994 I Letter from Sally Berlin to Paula Vennells, I POL-0036476
RE: Horizon Computer System
28 POL00039995 I Draft Paragraphs for Insertion into Reply I POL-0036477
to CCRC
Page 71 of 75
WITN08130100
29
POL00039996
Email from Susan Crichton to Andrew
Parsons and Simon Richardson and
others, RE: For discussion
POL-0036478
30
POL00039997
Email from Amanda Brown to Susan
Crichton, RE: CCRC Letter
POL-0036479
31
POL00060715
Post Office Ltd - Case Review R v
Lynette Hutchings Portsmouth Crown
Court
POL-0057194
32
POL00040022
Case review of R v Balvinder Kaur
Samra- Birmingham Crown Court by
Simon Clarke
POL-0036504
33
POL00133633
POL Case Review of R v. Elizabeth Wylie
- Newcastle Crown Court by Simon
Clarke
POL-0138086
34
POL00108042
Case review by Counsel (Simon Clarke),
RE: R v. Nicola Grech.
POL-0106209
35
POL00040095
Bond Dickinson, Civil claims by SPMRs
POL-0036577
36
POL00114253
Post Office Ltd note - by Simon Clarke re
civil actions against POL.
POL-0113180
37
POLO0066807
RESPONSE TO THE INTERIM REVIEW
OF CARTWRIGHT KING’S CURRENT
PROCESS BY BRIAN ALTMAN QC
POL-0063286
38
POL00112905
Post Office Ltd - Case Review R V Julie
Elizabeth Cleife
POL-0110310
39
POL00040194
Observations and analysis of the
Cartwright King Prosecution Review
Process
POL-0036676
40
POL00108223
R v Seema Misra Post Office Case
Review Report by Simon Clarke of
Cartwright King Solicitors
POL-0106352
41
POL00133638
POST OFFICE LTD — CASE REVIEW R.
v. JERRY KWAME HOS! Snaresbrook
Crown Court
POL-0138091
42
POL00108136
Briefing Note Post Office Ltd General
Counsel
POL-0106274
43
POL00030686
Post Office Prosecution Policy England
and Wales (effective from 1/11/13, review
1/11/14)
POL-0027168
POL00112937
Post Office Ltd Review of Post Office Ltd
Prosecution Role - Brian Altman QC
POL-0110333
Page 72 of 75
WITN08130100
45 POL00125209 I Email from Gavin Matthews to Brian POL-0131180
Altman RE: Draft Prosecution Policy [BD-
4A.F1ID20472253]
46 POL00112937 I Post Office Ltd Review of Post Office Ltd I POL-0110333
Prosecution Role - Brian Altman QC
47 POL00125210 I Post Office Enforcement and Prosecution I POL-0131181
Policy for England and Wales -
Comments on BAQC draft Policy - Simon
Clarke
48 POL00026941 I Post Office Limited Policy Review 2018, POL-0023582
by Simon Clarke, Cartwright King
Solicitors
49 POL00126145 I Draft PO Conduct of Criminal POL-0131517
Investigation Policy - Version 3.0
50 POL00145361 I Email regarding The Court Case Support I POL-BSFF-
Services and TSS CCN draft language. 0004488
51 POL00040040 I Draft Scope for computer experts POL-0036522
52 POL00138289 I Email from Julie George to Lesley J POL-BSFF-
Sewell CC Gareth James and Rodric 0000514
Williams re Expert on the Horizon System
- Subject to Common Interest Privilege
53 POL00138290 I Note regarding Terms of Reference for POL-BSFF-
Horizon Integrity Audit for "Mediation 0000515
Process" (date taken from parent email)
54 POLO00146900 I Email from Michael Harvey to Rodric POL-BSFF-
Williams cc James Davidson and Pete 0006027
Newsome re Expert on the Horizon
System - Subject to Common Interest
Privilege
55 POL00146901 I Note regarding Terms of Reference for POL-BSFF-
Horizon Integrity Audit for "Mediation 0006028
Process" (date taken from parent email)
56 FUJ00156931 I Update on Issues Impaction on the POINQ0163125F
Horizon System Arising from Second
Sight Audit
57 POL00113136 I Proposed memorandum of understanding I POL-0110520
between Post Office Limited and Fujitsu,
RE: Horizon.
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58 POL00113135 I Post Office Ltd, Note to POL, Securing POL-0110519
data for future prosecutions- prepared by
Simon Clarke, Senior counsel
59 FUJ00000069 I Codified Agreement between POL and POINQ0006240F
Fujitsu Services Version 9.0
60 POL00148748 I Email from Jarnail Singh to Chris Aujard POL-BSFF-
re: IT Expert URGENT. 0007869
61 POL00148749 I Advice from Cartwright King Solicitors re I POL-BSFF-
matters of concern arising out of the 0007870
instruction of Imperial Consultants Limited
62 POL00148720 I Simon Clarke's advice to POL on criminal I POL-BSFF-
applicants on the mediation scheme 0007841
alternative processes
63 POL00023832 I Note on Second Sight POL-0020311
investigations/findings by Simon Clarke
64 POL00130708 I Email chain from Laura Pinkey to Jessica I POL-0124236
Barker re CRRs Draft
65 POL00028062 I Report: Horizon Desktop Review of POL-0023065
Assurance Sources and Key Control
Features - draft for discussion, Deloitte
66 POL00029843 I Note from Cartwright King Solicitors re: POL-0026325
Deloitte Report - Questions for POL
67 POL00021781 I Email from Andrew Parsons to Simon POL-0018260
Clarke and Martin Smith cc: Rodric
Williams, Paul Loraine RE: Balancing
Transactions [BD-4A.F1D20472253]
68 POL00067067 I Email from Richard Pike to Martin Smith, I POL-0063546
Andrew Parsons, Rodric Williams and
others Re: Draft CRRs: M012
69 POL00065434 I Email chain from Rodric Williams to POL-0061913
Martin Smith Re M081 (BD-
4A.FID25887446)
70 POL00029867 I Email from Andrew Parsons to Martin POL-0026349
Smith; Simon Clarke re: Locating
Balancing Transactions
71 POL00029868 I Fujitsu report on Old Horizon System by POL-0026350
Gareth Jenkins
72 POL00092640 I Email from Martin Smith to Harry Bowyer I POL-0092218
and others; re Horizon Call Notes
Page 74 of 75
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73
POL00065718
Email from Chris Powell to Rodric
Williams and Martin Smith re: Full Review
- Misra.
POL-0062197
74
POL00065904
Post Office Ltd R v Seema Misra - Note of
advice on disclosure by CartwrightKing
POL-0062383
75
POL00140004
Email from Martin Smith to Andrew Winn
CC Rodric Williams, Simon Clarke, Harry
Bowyen RE The Wimbledon Transactions
correction Issue
POL-0141180
76
POLO00156681
Seema Misra Case Study: Email chain
from Rodric Williams to Gavin Matthews
and Andrew Parsons re FW: Full Review -
Misra - New Instruction
POL-0145157
77
POLO0065652
Seema Misra case study: Letter from
Criminal Cases review Commission to
Jane Macleod/Rodric Williams for Seema
Misra, re: Requirement to Produce
Materials. Formal notice is addressed to
Paula Vennels as ‘appropriate person’
POL-0062131
78
POL00110276
R V Seema Misra Case Review by POL
POL-0108083
79
POL00001733
Correcting Accounts for "lost"
Discrepancies
V1IS00002747
80
POL00021847
Receipts-Payments Mismatch Issue
Notes (undated)
POL-0018326
81
POL00067037
Email chain from Harry Bowyer to Lucy
Bremner re: Post Office Group Litigation
[WBDUK-AC.FID27032497
POL-0063516
82
POL00066972
PO Advice on Disclosure Issues Arising
out of the CCRC and Separate Civil
Proceedings
POL-0063451
83
POL00042015
Email from Rodric Williams to Simon
Clarke, Martin Smith and Andrew Parsons
RE: Post Office Group Litigation - Horizon
Issues Trial - Monday Con with Counsel -
Strictly Private & Confidential
POL-0038497
POL00113278
Approved Judgment between Josephine
Hamilton & Others and Post Office
Limited
POL-0110657
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