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Witness Name: GERALD HARBINSON
Statement No: WITN08150100
Dated: 17 October 2023
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF GERALD HARBINSON
I, Gerald Harbinson, will say as follows:
1. I am a former employee of the Post Office Limited (the “POL”) and I worked
within the organisation for approximately 12 years. During this period I held
various positions, including a TV Enquiry Officer, Criminal Investigations
Manager, Compliance Manager, Financial Investigator and Financial
Investigation Unit Manager.
2. This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon Inquiry (the
“Inquiry” ) with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 8 September
2023 (the “Request”). The Request contains 92 questions, which I have
addressed below. I would like to make the Inquiry aware that I have received
legal assistance to produce this statement from my solicitor, Mr lan Manners
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of Ashfords LLP. When seeking to obtain assistance from Ashfords LLP, I was
assisted by the POL with the initial stage of confirming the availability of
insurance coverage, to cover the associated legal costs.
3. The Request relates to matters that occurred many years ago and some of the
documents that have been provided to me are over 20 years old. Due to this
passage of time, I have found it difficult to recall precise details on occasion.
Nevertheless, what I include in this statement is to the best of my recollection
and I where I cannot recall something or I have had to rely on a document
provided, I have ensured to state this clearly.
4. I joined the Post Office at some point in 1998 and left in April 2010, when I left
to join Royal Mail.
5. When I first joined in 1998 I was employed as a TV Enquiry Officer. I transferred
from this role at some point in 2000, when I was internally recruited into the Post
Office Security Team as an Investigation Manager. This role was based within
Croydon, London.
6. I would like to flag that whilst this job title contained the word ‘Manager’, this
did not mean that I held a managing position - all other individuals in the same
role were also referred to as an ‘Investigation Manager.’
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7. I can recall that there was a big intake of around 15 to 20 people into the
Security Team at the time when I was recruited in 2000. I went into the
Investigatory side of the Security Team. There was also a Property side of the
team, who I believe dealt with issues relating to locks and security doors at
branches, and a Case Management side, who were the central hub that
assisted with the processing of matters.
8. I do not recall needing any specific school or higher education qualifications to
be hired as an Investigation Manager. I think that everyone who was successful
in achieving the role was hired internally. As such, I imagine that some
experience working under the POL was desired. I do remember that during the
interview stage I had to travel to Birmingham to take part in an assessment
day. I assume that in order to achieve the role you had to pass the
assessments assigned on the day.
9. In terms of training for the role of an Investigation Manager, I was required to
attend a college in Milton Keynes, where a programme of relevant training was
delivered by experienced employees of the Security Team. I cannot remember
exactly when the training was delivered, but I remember it being early on in my
career and it took place over a few weeks. The training related to various
matters relevant to the role, which I deal with in more detail under the sub-
heading ‘Training, instructions and guidance to investigators within the Security
Team’ below. Once the training was complete, we were examinedon
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our learning and we could only continue in our role if we passed. I recall that I
passed all the prescribed training and examinations.
10.We also received training in the form of shadowing. When I initially became an
Investigation Manager I would assist a more experienced colleague in carrying
out an investigation. I did this until I became experienced enough to lead an
investigation of my own. When I was experienced enough to lead an
investigation, I would often have Investigation Managers who were newer to
the role shadow and assist me.
11.We had team leaders. I initially had Tony Utting and later Paul Dawkins, who
would allocate individual cases out to Investigation Managers when they came
in from the Case Management Team. If the case was allocated to you, you
would then be responsible for running and managing the investigation of that
case. Essentially, this involved investigating instances of suspected theft or
fraud. For example, I carried out investigations in relation to potential pension
allowance fraud, to help identify whether such fraud was committed internally
at the POL, or externally. We would usually be referred these cases after
anomalies were found in pension documentation, following a review held by a
team at a central site in Northern Ireland. I cannot remember the name of the
site, but I do I believe that all pension documentation for the POL was handled
and reviewed there.
12.1 also investigated cases where there was a discovery of a cash shortfall at a
Post Office branch following an audit. In that situation, the Auditor would report
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the shortage to the Security Team. If the matter was then allocated to me by
my Team Leader, I would be sent to attend the branch that same day to begin
an investigation.
13.When carrying out an investigation I would collate the necessary records and
documents (such as reports that the Auditor had printed from the Horizon
System on the day), take witness statements from relevant persons and
conduct interviews under caution with the relevant persons (for example, the
SPM).
14. Following this I would write up a report of findings and open a case file. Once
a case file was fully prepared, I would forward it over to my Team Leader for
review, who would eventually forward it to casework management to check it
over from a procedural standpoint, and they would then arrange for it be sent
to the head of the Security Team. I believe Phil Gerrish was the head of the
Security Team when I first started. At some point Tony Utting became headof
the Security Team, followed by John Scott. However, I cannot remember
precisely when these position changes took place.
15.Once the case file was with the head of the Security Team, it is my
understanding that they would then liaise with Case Management to get it
passed on to the Criminal Law Team in the POL. I do not know if there were
any specific factors considered to determine whether to pass it on or not, or
whether all case files were passed on in any event. Other than on an evidential
basis (which I deal with in paragraphs 18 and 19 below), I do not believe that I
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had any involvement with liaising directly with any other POL department
during my role as an Investigation Manager. I believe that any other necessary
cross department liaison was dealt with by colleagues in a more senior position
to me or with casework management.
16.1 believe that it was always the decision of the Criminal Law Team whetherto
pursue a criminal prosecution or not. I do not recall that decision ever being
made by anyone in the Security Team, although, potential offences would be
listed in the offender report produced by Investigation Managers as part of their
investigation. The offender report would have formed part of the case file
passed to the Criminal Law Team.
17.Once a case file was passed on to the Criminal Law Team, I believe that the
matter would have been allocated to a particular lawyer within that team. I do
not know how this allocation was made.
18.In the event that an incident I had investigated was being prosecuted, I would
continue to assist the Criminal Law team on an evidential basis. For example,
if the Criminal Law Team required additional evidence, the criminal Law Team
or my Team Leader would inform me and I'd carry out additional work to obtain
such evidence (for example, taking an additional witness statement). Due to
the passage of time, I am unable recall any specific examples of this occurring.
19.We also had to assist the Criminal Law Team with meeting any disclosure
obligations. This involved compiling a list of all used and unused evidence in
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the investigation, and collating those documents into a bundle. The Criminal
Law Team would then deal with any related filing and serving requirements
directed by the court.
20.At some point in early 2005 I was internally promoted to the role of Compliance
Manager. In this role I reported to David Pardoe, who was my direct line
manager. I do not recall needing any minimum qualifications or experience to
secure this role, but I do remember having to apply for it and being interviewed.
I assume that my previous experience working under the POL umbrella would
have been desirable, as the knowledge of processes and procedures I had
already gained would have been relevant to the role of a Compliance Manager.
2
.My Compliance Manager role was also based in the Croydon area and it
involved monitoring how casefiles were being processed through the business,
ensuring that the correct steps were being followed from a procedural
standpoint. It did not entail any involvement in the actual substance of an
investigation. For example, I would check that timescales on matters were
being met to help prevent progress from falling behind. If evidence in a case
file referred to exhibits, I would double check that the exhibits were labelled
and attached in the correct place. I would also ensure that all offender reports
were marked with the required red label if required so that the case file could
be processed quicker when sent to the Criminal Law Team. I only briefly
remained in this position because later in 2005 I became a Financial
Investigator for POL.
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22.Myself and another colleague, Mick Matthews, were both put forward for the
role of Financial Investigator by David Pardoe, which was essentially a new
role set up within the Security Team, campaigned by David Pardoe. Unlike my
previous positions based in Croydon, the Financial Investigator role had a
national remit and myself and Mick Matthews would manage a case load
covering all areas of the UK.
23.1 do not recall needing any minimum qualifications or experience to secure the
role of a Financial Investigator — I can only assume that my experience to date
of being an Investigation Manager and a Compliance Manager had provided
me with the relevant transferable skills in the eyes of David Pardoe.
24.All training for my Financial Investigator role was provided under the Asset
Recovery Agency (ARA), who at that time were the Government department
established under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (“POCA”) to take action
against those benefitting from crime. As far as I am aware, the Financial
Investigation Unit within POL were one of the first non-police bodies who
applied to exercise powers of recovery under POCA. The ARA took the lead in
delivering the relevant training to myself and Mick Matthews in order for us to
become Accredited Financial Investigators. In doing so, they provided us with
a mentor, Elaine Blewitt, who was an experienced Accredited Financial
Investigator in the police. Initially, we received mentoring from Elaine Blewitt
and carried out our work under her supervision and accreditation. This
continued until we passed the necessary exams in place to become accredited
ourselves. I cannot recall what the specific exams were, but I remember them
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being very difficult and requiring a lot of preparation and application of the
knowledge we had gained from our mentoring and experience so far. I was
qualified in POCA parts 2,4 and 8.
25. Once we passed our exams and became accredited, we were able to carry out
our duties as an Accredited Financial Investigator independently. Wereported
to our Senior Authorising Officer, David Pardoe, who would review and
approve any work we had done where necessary, in line with ARA Guidance.
Later on in my career, I undertook further training provided by the ARA in order
to become a Senior Authorising Officer myself.
26.My Role as a Financial Investigator essentially involved the recovery of
financial loss suffered by the POL following a conviction for crimes such as
theft of POL assets and false accounting. This involved investigating what
assets were held by the convicted individual and how they could potentially
cover the loss suffered, and the likelihood of recovery. In some cases it also
involved making a case for restraint over particular assets found, in order to
stop them from being dissipated prior to any application for a confiscation order
being awarded following a conviction. Any restraint considered would not be
done without the approval of my Senior Authorising Officer (David Pardoe),
and ultimately the approval of the Criminal Law Team.
27. I would also put together an application to the court for a confiscation order.
In doing so, I would produce a Section 16 Statement, completed on a pro-
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forma available from the ARA. Such statement would attach and address all
the evidence obtained during my financial investigation against the convicted
individual and attempt to logically set out my reasoning, aims and objectives
around obtaining a confiscation order, for the judge to consider. It would be
passed on to the Criminal Law Team to review and approve. If approved, they
would then arrange for it to be served on the Defendant's solicitor and filed at
court.
28.In circumstances where the court proceeded to grant a confiscation order, it
would always be requested that a compensation order was attached for the
same amount. I deal with the reasons for this in detail in paragraph 115 below.
29.Once a confiscation order was obtained, the Financial Investigation Unit did
not then take steps to ensure the order was fulfilled. I believe that there were
departments around the country who formed part of the ARA, who would do
the work required to enforce the confiscation order. I also believe that they
would approach the courts to bring about the enforcement of a confiscation
order, if necessary. The Financial Investigation Unit would only monitor the
progress of the order being enforced, so that we were updated from a recovery
standpoint.
30.Whilst a report relating to the investigation in any criminal proceedings was
available to us to understand the context of the crime, the Financial Investigator
role did not play any part in investigating the potential criminal incident. Our
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input did not usually occur until post-conviction. On the rare occasion where
an SPM had admitted to actions of theft or false accounting from the outset, a
Financial Investigator could start the recovery process earlier than after
conviction, however, they would have needed to have a clear rational
explained before a judge to obtain any POCA orders pre-conviction. Due to the
passage of time, I cannot remember any specific examples of where this was
done.
3
.In late 2006 or early 2007 Mick Matthews left the Post Office, which left me
with the entire Financial Investigation case load. Due to the large amount of
recovery work that existed nationally, 2 more people were brought in to the
team to help manage it — Paul Southin and Graham Ward. We were all the
same grade in terms of pay, but at some point after they joined, although I do
not recall exactly when, I was allocated the role of Financial Investigator Unit
Manager, I assume as a result of my experience to date.
32.As a Financial Investigator Unit Manager, I had to train Paul and Graham to
manage their own recovery cases. Later I was also their Senior Authorising
Officer. I initially supervised them on caseloads until they were experienced
enough themselves. I also held 1-1 training and review sessions with them on
any work I had allocated to them. Whilst taking on these new management
responsibilities, I continued to hold down a recovery case load of my own.
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33.Unlike my role as an Investigation Manager, I did have slightly more direct
interaction with the Criminal Law Team when I formed part of the Financial
Investigation Unit. For example, on occasion I was consulted in relation to my
views on the best mode for recovery and the prospects of a confiscation order
being achieved, to assist the Criminal Law Team with making the decision
whether to pursue an application for confiscation or not. I would provide my
opinion on this in line with training and mentoring from the ARA I had received,
and my past experience in the role.
34.In all of my roles in the Security Team, I have only ever been involved in
matters relating to criminal proceedings. I do not recall ever assisting in civil
matters or proceedings. Of course, not all matters I investigated when I was an
Investigation Manager ended up in criminal proceedings. Some would result in
no further action, or potentially go down an alternative route. I do not recall
what these other routes specially were, however, if it was civil proceedings I
did not ever assist further. As for my roles in the Financial Investigation Unit,
these always related to criminal proceedings, because as explained above,
usually our input only came into play following the conviction of a criminal
offence, to assist in recovering the proceeds of such crime.
35.I have been asked what role I may have had in any litigation case strategy.
During my time as an Investigation Manager, however, I do not believe I played
any part in the litigation case strategy of any matters. As far as I am aware this
was a consideration for the Criminal Law team only. As explained earlier in this
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statement, when I was in the Financial Investigation Unit I would provide my
Opinion to the Criminal Law Team in relation to the best mode of recovery and
prospects of confiscation, however, I do not believe this that can be considered
as litigation case strategy as such. I was simply providing an opinion — I was
not mandating that the Criminal Law Team should carry out any specific
actions. It was ultimately up to them as to whether they wanted to take on board
my opinion.
36.1 have also been asked to provide my views on the competence and
professionalism of my colleagues and managers. I have always believed that
in all of my roles in the Post Office, my colleagues and managers were very
professional, competent and hard working. My managers and team leaders in
particular were extremely good at their jobs and I aspired to be like them. They
taught me a lot and it was because of them I was able to progress and achieve
more senior roles within the POL myself.
37. I confirm that I have considered the following documents:
i. “Royal Mail Group Ltd Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Policy” (1
December 2007) ([POL00030578], which appears to be substantially the
same as the policy of the same date with a variation on the title at
[POL00104812)) (see, in particular, section 3);
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ii. “Royal Mail Group Security - Procedures & Standards — Standards of
Behaviour and Complaints Procedure” (version 2, October 2007)
([POL00104806));
iii. “Royal Mail Group Crime and Investigation (S2)” (version 3.0, September
2008) ([POL00031004));
iv. “Royal Mail Group Crime and Investigation Policy” (version 1.1, October
2009) ([POL00031003));
v. “Former Subpostmaster End to End Debt review” (December 2009)
({POL00084977)).
vi. “Post Office Ltd - Security Policy — Fraud Investigation and Prosecution
Policy” (version 2, 4 April 2010) ([POL00030580)):
vii. “Post Office Ltd Financial Investigation Policy” (4 May 2010)
([POL00030579));
viii. “Royal Mail Group Security - Procedures & Standards — The Proceeds of
Crime Act 2002 & Financial Investigations” (version 1, September 2010)
((POL00026573)).
ix. “Royal Mail Group Security - Procedures & Standards — Initiating
Investigations” (September 2010) ([POL00104857));
x. “Royal Mail Group Ltd Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Policy”
(version 1.1, November 2010) ([POL00031008));
xi. Post Office Ltd Financial Investigation Policy (version 2, February 2011)
((POL00104853));
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xii. Post Office Ltd Anti-Fraud Policy (February 2011) ([POL00104855)):
xiii. “Royal Mail Group Policy Crime and Investigation S2” (version 3.0, April
2011) ([POL00030786));
xiv. “Post Office Limited: Internal Protocol for Criminal Investigation and
Enforcement (with flowchart)”, (October 2012) ([POL00104929));
xv. “Undated Appendix 1 - POL Criminal Investigations and Enforcement
Procedure (flowchart)”, (October 2012) ([POL00105226));
xvi. Draft “Post Office Limited: Criminal Enforcement and Prosecution Policy”
(November 2012) ([POL00030602));
xvii. “Conduct of Criminal Investigations Policy” (version 0.2, 29 August 2013)
({POL00031005)).
xviii.“Conduct of Criminal Investigations Policy” (version 3, 10 February 2014)
((POL00027863));
xix. “Conduct of Criminal Investigations Policy” (September 2018)
([POL00030902));
xx. “Security & Investigation Financial Investigation Unit Criminal Debt
Recovery Process” (in which you are referred to as the FIU Manager)
(undated) ([POL00084989}).
Following a review, I can see that apart from the first 6 documents in the list
(POL00030578), (POL00104812), (POL00104806), (POL00031004),
(POL00031003) and (POL00084977) and the final undated document
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39.
40.
41.
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(POL000849889), all other documents appear to postdate my time as an
employee of POL. I am therefore unable to comment on those, as I would
not have had sight of them.
In terms of the first 6 documents in the list, they all seem to relate to
overarching polices in place at both Post Office Limited and Royal Mail. I do
not believe I was involved in the development or management of any of
these documents. Where they are dated within the period I spent working
at POL, it is likely that I did have sight of the documents when they were
circulated, but with the amount of time that has passed I have no direct
recollection of seeing them.
Given that it is undated, document (POL00084989) seems to be an early
attempt of a process map relating to the work undertaken by the Financial
Investigation Team, in line with the policies and guidance put in place by
the ARA. I suspect myself, Paul and Graham may have been consulted on
what to include in the document, but unfortunately I have no recollection of
this and I cannot remember ever seeing this document.
I note that I am referred to as the Financial Investigations Unit Manager in
document (POL00084989). This indicates that it must have been created at
some point from 2007 onwards, however, I do not recall writing or creating
it. It is more likely to have been created some time in 2009, as it refers to
the Joint Asset Recovery Database (“JARD”). JARD was a system
maintained by the ARA to log the actions taken ina Financial Investigation,
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42.
43.
44.
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and was implemented later on in my career. I believe that the Financial
Investigation Unit at the POL only started using JARD from 2009 onwards.
We could not access this system internally. We would have to attend a
police station computer suite to access it.
I have been asked to explain the organisational structure of the Security
Team and where the Financial Investigation Unit sat within it. As set out
earlier in this statement, the Security Team essentially had 3 distinct arms
- Investigatory, Property and Case Management. There were of course
individuals who held senior management roles within those arms, such as
Team Leaders and Direct Line Managers. We also had the head of the
Security Team, who as explained earlier in this statement, changed over
time. The Financial Investigation Unit sat within the Investigatory arm of the
Security Team. However, as alluded to above they were distinct from
Investigation Managers.
As far as I am aware, there were no changes to the organisational structure
of the Security Team. The only major changes that occurred related to a
change in those who held senior positions. For example, as mentioned
earlier in my statement, Phil Gerrish was head of the Security Team when I
first joined, but this role was eventually taken over by Tony Utting, and later
by John Scott.
As described earlier in this statement, those who held an Investigation
Manager role within the Security team would carry out criminal
investigations to assist with the potential prosecution of the accused
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individual. The Financial Investigation Unit did not become involved in any
aspect of this investigation. They only usually became involved in a matter
post-conviction, in order to assist with debt recovery to replace the loss
faced by the POL as a result of the crime in question. Once a conviction
was obtained, the Financial Investigation Unit would receive the
Investigation Manager's report of findings following their investigation into
the matter, but this was solely to help with understanding the background of
a case, to know which section of POCA to address. Such understanding
would also assist with formulating a Section 16 statement made in relation
to an application for restraint or confiscation of assets.
I have been asked to set out the legislation, policies and / or guidance that
governed the conduct of criminal and financial investigations during the
period I worked within the Security Team. When I worked as an
Investigation Manager within the Security Team, I do not remember any
particular internal policies or guidance that governed the work I carried out.
I believe that polices were created and introduced over time but I am unable
to pinpoint when or what they related to. I can only rely on the polices
provided to me with the Request, and as explained above, most of those
polices post-date my time at the POL. However, as I was investigating
incidents that may have a potential criminal element, which involved
carrying out interviews under caution and taking witness statements during
an investigation, I was of course required to understand and adhere to The
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and the PACE Codes of Practice.
There were other acts that I had to refer to and whilst I would not be able to
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46.
47.
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reference these from direct memory, I believe that it would have been all
the legislation listed in section 3.15 of document (POL00030580). When I
was recruited in to Security Team as an Investigation Manger, I remember
receiving training on this legislation early on to ensure that we understood
what was legally required of us.
Again, when I joined the Financial Investigation Unit, I believe there were
no internal policies or guidance to govern our practice in place. We were a
new subsection within the Security Team, therefore, internal policies and
guidance documents were yet to be created. We relied on the polices and
guidance put in place by the ARA, which our police mentor, Elaine Blewitt,
would have made us aware of. Unfortunately I cannot recall what those
specific policy or guidance documents were, especially as they evolved
continuously in line with developments to POCA and changes within the
ARA itself. For example, I believe the introduction of using the JARD system
in financial investigations would have instigated a change to ARA policies
and practices, but due to the amount of time that has passed, I am unable
to recall when those specific policy changes would have occurred.
As well as following ARA polices and guidance in place, we would have
relied heavily on POCA itself to ensure we were carrying out our practice
appropriately, as this was the central piece of legislation that governed the
activities we carried out as a Financial Investigator.
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48. It is clear from document (POL00084989) that there was an attempt to put
in place an internal policy document to govern the actions carried out in a
Financial Investigation, based on POCA and the ARA polices and guidance
in place. However, as already stated I have no direct recollection of seeing
this document and due to it being undated, it appears to be an early draft,
probably put together some time in 2009.
49. As farasIam aware, the practices in place regarding criminal investigations
and financial investigations brought against Crown Office employees and
SPMs, managers and assistants in regular branches were the same. I don’t
recall having to follow any polices that were distinct to each. I believe there
may have been a point where Crown Office employees were not
contractually required to make good any loss discovered in a stock unit,
whereas SPMs were, however, I cannot confirm for certain if this difference
did exist or when. I am unable to comment on whether there was any
difference to the policies and practices from an enforcement perspective,
as enforcement was dealt with by the POL Criminal Law Team.
Decisions about prosecution and criminal enforcement proceedings
50. As explained earlier in this statement, once I had carried out an initial
investigation relating to potential criminal proceedings, I had no further
involvement as an Investigation Manager in deciding whether a SPM, their
manager(s) and / or assistant(s) or a Crown Office employee should be
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51.
52.
53.
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prosecuted by the POL. I am therefore unable to comment on what
considerations determined whether a prosecution was brought or not. It was
my understanding that it was ultimately the Criminal Law Team who decided
to pursue a criminal prosecution, although, I am unsure if the Head of the
Security Team also had some influence on the decision, given that all case
files were reviewed by them before they were sent off to the Criminal Law
Team. The only time I had any further involvement following the initial
investigation is where additional evidence was required by the Criminal Law
Team, or when I had to assist with providing documents for disclosure, after
a decision to prosecute had been made.
I do not know what test was applied by those making prosecution and
charging decisions and I am not aware of the factors that were considered
at the evidential and the public interest stage. This was not an area dealt
with by Investigation Managers in the Security Team. I believe the Criminal
Law Team would have been responsible for carrying out these actions and
they did not liaise with us in relation to this.
I also do not know what advice legal or otherwise, was provided to those
making decisions about whether to prosecute and what charges to bring. I
simply completed my investigation and passed my findings on.
Relevant only to my roles within the Financial Investigation Unit, I have been
asked in what circumstances were steps to restrain a suspect's assets by
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54.
55.
56.
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criminal enforcement methods such as_ confiscation proceedings
considered. There is no straight forward answer to this, as the
circumstances these steps were taken in depended on various factors,
including the extent of the financial loss suffered by the POL, assets of the
convicted individual which you have been able to identify, the likelihood that
such assets may be disposed of and the need of the defendant to survive
on a day to day basis.
The decision to put forward a case for enforcement methods such as
restraint and confiscation to achieve debt recovery was never taken lightly.
You had to take a measured approach with these factors in mind and it
always had to be in line with ARA guidance and policies in place and of
course, POCA.
For example, a restraint or confiscation of assets could not result in a
convicted individual struggling to afford to live day to day. Restraint and
confiscation also had to be proportionate - you could not propose an
application for restraint or a confiscation order against a savings account
containing £100,000, where the total recovery required for the Post Office
only equated to £10,000.
In coming to the consideration that restraint was necessary, another
particular consideration was the risk of the convicted individual entering in
to receivership with third party organisations to whom the branch owed
outstanding money to, as if they entered in to receivership beforehand, a
restraint could no longer be issued of their assets.
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57.
58.
59.
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When putting a case forward for the best mode of recovery, you would have
to logically set out in a thought process log the reasons for why you believed
restraint and confiscation would be an appropriate avenue. Your reasoning
would need to be checked by a Senior Authorising Officer and if they
agreed, then your considerations would be forwarded to the Criminal Law
Team. When I was a Senior Authorising Officer, and also Financial
Investigation Unit Manager, Paul and Graham would come to me to set out
their thought processes on their caseload, before passing on the
considerations to the legal team.
Although not impossible, it was a lot harder to justify a case for confiscation
where a person had been convicted for false accounting. This is because
confiscation essentially relates to removing the convicted person’s benefit
they received as a result of criminal conduct, in order to recover the losses
faced by the POL. It could be extremely difficult to work out what the benefit
received actually was in a false accounting case.
As alluded to earlier, although Financial Investigators would provide an
opinion on the best mode of recovery, we never made the ultimate decision
whether criminal enforcement proceedings should be pursued. This
decision would have come from the Criminal Law Team, potentially in
conjunction with the head of the Security Team too, although I am not
certain on this. Therefore I am unable to describe what factors were
considered when making decisions around this. I imagine that any opinion
received from the Financial Investigators in relation to the best mode of
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recovery would have formed part of the considerations, but I do not think it
solely determined the decisions that were taken to pursue criminal
enforcement proceedings.
60. Even when I was promoted to the Financial Investigation Unit Manager in
2007, I still had no involvement in the decision of whether to pursue criminal
enforcement proceedings.
61. When I first joined the Security Team as an Investigation Manager, very
early on I was required to attend a formal training course at a college in
Milton Keynes, which was led by 2 or 3 senior members of the Security
Team. I recall that Mick Matthews was one of the trainers and I remember
he was very thorough in his teaching. Whilst I cannot remember all the
modules we were required to learn, I believe that they did cover the following
- the duties of investigators to conduct full and thorough investigations,
taking witness statements in the course of an investigation, conducting
interviews under caution, obtaining evidence in the course of an
investigation, seeking evidence from third parties who might hold relevant
evidence and drafting investigation reports and the legislation relevant to
our role. In order to continue in the role of an Investigation Manager you had
to pass an exam at the end of the course. I cannot remember the specific
details of that exam, but I do recall passing it.
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62.
63.
64.
65.
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We also learned the processes of an investigation through shadowing more
experienced Investigation Managers, as I have touched upon in paragraph
10 above.
I do also recall receiving training in relation to other topics such as Health
and Safety in the work place, as well as refresher training. For example, I
remember going on a search course led by senior members of the Security
Team in conjunction with the police, which covered necessary steps to
follow when attending a premises and searching it. I cannot recall the
specific dates as to when this course took place, but refresher training was
provided throughout in relation to various aspects of the role.
In relation to training about obtaining information from third parties,
particularly Fujitsu, I do recall receiving training on the processes to follow,
however, I cannot recall when and how this training was delivered. I deal
further with such processes under the sub-heading ‘Analysing Horizon data
and requesting ARQ data from Fujitsu’ below.
I have reviewed (POL00121639) and (POL00121640). I would like to flag
that document (POL00121640) is from 2019, therefore, I would never have
had sight of this. Whilst document (POL00121639) has my name on it, Ido
not remember the presentation contained within it or ever delivering such
presentation. Over the years the Financial Investigation Unit produced and
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66.
67.
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delivered training to the Security Team on various occasions. Due to the
passage of time, I cannot recall what specific training was given.
From reviewing the presentation slides within (POL00121639), this
particular training appears to be an attempt to raise the understanding and
the profile of recovery through POCA and the role of the Financial
Investigation Unit within the POL. As the Financial Investigation Unit were
not involved in carrying out criminal investigations, I do vaguely remember
wanting to get Investigation Managers thinking about the role of Financial
Investigators from the outset, so that they could flag anything relevant in the
event that the Financial Investigation Unit took on the matter from a recovery
standpoint in the future. For example, if during an audit shortage the
investigation team attended a home branch and saw that the SPM had a
motorhome on the drive, this would be useful information to note down as it
illustrates an asset potentially held by the SPM, and such information would
assist in carrying out investigations into the SPM’s financial affairs.
I confirm that I have reviewed the following documents:
i) The Casework Management document at [POL00104747]
(version 1.0, March 2000) and [POL00104777] (version 4.0,
October 2002);
ii) The Guide to the Preparation and Layout of Investigation Red
Label Case Files, Offender reports and Discipline reports
(undated), which appears to have been prepared by you
({[POL00121569));
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iii) The Guide to the Preparation and Layout of Investigation Red
Label Case Files, File construction and Appendices A, B & C
(dated around September 2005), which appears to have been
prepared by you ([POL00121570));
iv) The Guide to the Preparation and Layout of Investigation Non-
Red Label Case Files, File construction and Appendix (dated
around September 2005), which appears to have been
prepared by you ([POL00121582]);
v) The Guide to the Preparation and Layout of Investigation Red
Label Case Files, Case File Reports and Case Closure Report
(undated), which appears to have been prepared by you
([POL00121581));
vi) The document entitled “Identification Codes”
([POL00118104)).
I have no direct memory of either the 2000 or 2002 version of the Casework
Management documents at (POL00104747) and (POL00104777) and
cannot recall if I was provided with these during my roles within the Security
Team. In any event, it seems they were directed towards the Casework
Management team, which I was not ever part of. However, in terms of the
second, third and fourth bullet points on page 2 of the 2000 version and the
first, second and third bullet points on page 2 of the 2002 version, I did
understand this to be relevant to disclosure obligations. From review of the
wording of such bullet points, it appears that information about Horizon
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bugs, errors and defects would fall into such disclosure obligations. Had I
ever been made aware of Horizon bugs, errors and defects I certainly would
have reported this. However, as will be explained in further detail below, at
no point in my career as an Investigation Manager was I informed of any
Horizon bugs, errors and defects.
69. All investigations were subject to compliance checks, carried out by
Compliance Officers/Managers. The purpose of such checks were to simply
deal with how casefiles were being processed through the business,
ensuring that the correct steps were being followed from a procedural
standpoint. I have described this in detail under the sub-heading ‘Relevant
background’ above.
70. I note that the following documents appear to have been prepared by me
and all relate to how case files should be presented: (POL00121570),
(POL00121582) and (POL00121581). From a review of these documents I
believe that during my role as a Compliance Manager, my direct Manager
(David Pardoe) asked me to update previous versions of the documents
that had been created by Brian Sharkey and Ray Platt, who had left. This
was simply a case of copying and pasting the previous version into a new
document and adding the amendments requested by David Pardoe.
Unfortunately, I cannot remember what the specific amendments were.
rai I have reviewed paragraph 2.15 of the Guide to the Preparation and Layout
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of Investigation Red Label Case Files, Offender reports & Discipline reports
at (POL00121569). I believe that the rationale behind this was to ensure
that all lines of enquiry were followed in an investigation and failures relating
to security, supervision and product integrity were reported accordingly. I
believe that the wording of such section would encapsulate any failures
relating to the Horizon IT system (however, as touched upon above, I never
came across any failings with Horizon). Such paragraph confirms my
understanding that failings of this sort were to be contained in the
confidential offender report. The discipline report was separate to this and
was available to the potential discipline offender, so such information would
not be included within it as it could negatively impact any ongoing
investigations. My understanding in relation to disclosure of such
information is that should a case pursue to criminal proceedings after an
investigation, then such information would be disclosed by the Criminal Law
Team, with the assistance of the Investigation Manager in gathering all
disclosable information.
I note that the Inquiry has requested that I comment on the rationale behind
paragraphs 1.8, 2.4 and 2.5 in (POL00121581) and my understanding of its
relevance to disclosure obligations. The Inquiry refers to (POL00121581)
as being the “Guide to the Preparation and Layout of Investigation Red
Label Case, Case File Reports and Case Closure Report’. I would like to
flag that document (POL00121581) does not relate to ‘Red Label Cases’ -
it relates to the preparation and layout of ‘Investigation Non-Red Label Case
Files.’ My understanding is that non-red label case files were those that
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related to instances that were not going to be pursued via criminal
proceedings. As such, there were no disclosure obligations relevant to what
is contained in paragraphs 1.8, 2.4 and 2.5 of (POL00121581). I believe the
rationale behind these paragraphs was to ensure that such failings were
identified and reported within the business, so that they could be addressed.
73. I do notrecall having any involvement in drafting or reviewing the document
entitled “Identification Codes” at (POL00118104) and I cannot remember
seeing this document. I have a vague recollection of having to follow an
Identification Code produced by the police, but I do not know if document
(POL00118104) represents that and I cannot recall what my view at the time
was of the appropriateness of the identification codes described. I do recall
that Investigation Managers were instructed to assign identification codes
to suspected offenders, but I cannot recall the reasoning behind this.
Analysing Horizon data and requesting ARQ data from Fujitsu
74. When I was an Investigation Manager in the Security Team, I do not ever
recall a situation where a cash shortfall that I was investigating was
attributed to problems with Horizon by the SPM’s manager(s) or assistant(s)
/ Crown Office employee(s) subject to the investigation. Therefore, I am
unable to comment on what analyses would have been done on Horizon
data by the Security Team in such situation, nor on whether ARQ data would
have been requested from Fujitsu and if such ARQ data was shared with
the SPM in question.
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75.
76.
Al.
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I can comment on how Horizon data was obtained and analysed in more
general terms where a cash shortage was discovered during an audit. The
relevant Horizon printouts were obtained by the Auditor on the day at the
branch. If anything further was required during an investigation, for
example, printouts from an earlier period to determine at which point the
accounts no longer balanced, then you could receive this information
directly from Fujitsu. An Investigation Manager could simply ask the Case
Management Team to make this request to Fujitsu.
I believe that it was common to have a Fujitsu manager as an expert witness
in criminal proceedings relating to cash shortages, to provide their own
analyses on the data and to determine whether Horizon was operating
properly.
When I worked in the Finical Investigations Unit, neither myself nor my
colleagues in that team would have done any analyses on Horizon data,
whether or not a shortfall was attributed to problems with Horizon by SPMs.
As explained earlier in this statement, the Financial Investigations Unit did
not get involved in any initial investigation leading up to criminal
proceedings. All of our actions came after a conviction was obtained.
The Financial Investigation Unit never requested Horizon data from Fujitsu,
as such data did not assist Financial Investigators in their role. The Horizon
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data was useful to Investigation Managers in the Security team who were
investigation a potential crime, so they could look at transaction logs and
see what was happening on a day to day basis in a branch. It was of no use
to Financial Investigators, who were responsible for investigating what
assets an individual had after a prosecution decision had been reached.
The Horizon data did not contain that information.
Relationship with others
79. I have been asked to describe my involvement with Cartwright King
Solicitors, including the level of interaction I had with them in a case. I
believe that Cartwright King Solicitors were the firm that The Post Office
Criminal Law Team allocated work to when cases were based in the London
area. I believe they were the barristers or advocates that would take cases
through the court system.
80. When I was an Investigation Manager in the Security Team, I do recall
having some communication with barristers or advocates from Cartwright
King Solicitors, when they were instructed on cases that I had investigated,
in and around London and South East. However, I cannot recall what this
communication was about, or the specific individuals that I communicated
with. Usually the first contact I would have with any barristers would be at
court on the day of a hearing, where a brief discussion would be held about
the case and what was trying to be achieved. I do recall on the rare occasion
I attended a conference with counsel and the lawyer with conduct of a case
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81.
82.
83.
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from the Criminal Law Team, however, I cannot recall a specific case in
which I did this or the reason as to why I attended.
When I was a Financial Investigator, I recall being consulted more often by
Cartwright King Solicitors, as at that time I was probably just as experienced
in the process of Financial Investigations as they were. I cannot recall any
specific cases or reasons in which I was consulted, but I do vaguely
remember a situation where a defendant challenged a restraint order, and
a barrister or advocate asked my opinion on varying a restraint order.
Nevertheless, there is a chance that this was a barrister or advocate from a
different firm, as when I was Financial Investigator I had a national remit, so
I would have had communication with barristers and advocates based all
over the UK.
I do not have any direct recollection of this case and therefore I can only
rely on what is contained in the documents provided to me with the Request.
I have been asked to consider a memo dated 30 November 2005 at
(POL00047756). I confirm that I have reviewed this, and from such review
I believe that the point in which I became involved in the matter involving Mr
Mahmood would have been on the day that memo was sent to me. It is clear
from that memo that Collin Price was the Investigation Manager, who had
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84.
85.
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investigated the incident and potential crime itself. The memo goes on to
say that Mr Mahmood’s sentence was listed for 12'" December 2005 and
that Counsel seeks instruction as to whether the loss of £33,0000 should be
recovered by way of a compensation order or application for a confiscation
Order under POCA. It seems, therefore, that I am copied in to the memo as
the case would have been allocated to me to carry out the necessary
financial investigations and provide an opinion to the Criminal Law Team on
what the best mode of recovery would be. The Criminal Law Team would
have then provided instructions to counsel, either taking on board my
opinions or not.
I cannot directly remember what my understanding of the case would have
been at the time, but based on the contents of the memo dated 30
November 2005, I believe I would have understood that Mr Mahmood had
been found guilty of offences that caused a £33,000 loss to the Post Office
and that he was due to be sentenced on 12" December 2005. I would have
also understood that the matter would be passed to myself in the Financial
Investigation Unit to investigate the benefit that would have been gained as
a result of committing the crime, and what assets existed to assist in
determining the best mode for recovery.
I cannot recall if I was involved in any other proceedings against SPMs
involving the Horizon IT system prior to this case, during my time as an
Investigation Manager or as a Financial Investigator. However, I can say for
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86.
87.
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certain that I would not have had any involvement in any decision relating
to the recovery of investigation costs at any point in my career path with the
POL.
Unfortunately, I do not have any recollection on whether or not I provided
my view to the Criminal Law Team on the best mode of recovery. As such,
lam unable to comment on whether any opinion I provided influenced the
Criminal Law Team’s decision on the method by which recovery of “the loss”
should be sought.
I have considered the letters dated 13 January 2006 at (POL00047799) and
1 February 2006 at (POL00047817). These are simply applications to the
relevant bodies to receive the necessary information when carrying out my
financial investigations in the case. At the time these letters were sent by
me, I was still undergoing my training to become an Accredited Financial
Investigator. I believe this is why PC Rowntree applied for a production
order on my behalf (as indicated at (POL00047799)) and why I state in the
letters that I was being mentored by officers from the Metropolitan Police.
Nevertheless, it would have been my decision toapply for a production order
as part of the financial investigations I was undertaking — I just had to seek
assistance from police mentors at this time, as without doing so it is unlikely
the information would be released to me as I was not accredited.
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88.
89.
90.
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I have also been asked to consider the documents at (POL00047825),
(POL00047838), (POL00044858), (POL00047840), (POL00047841) and
(POL00047826), which I can see are further requests. Again, it would have
been my decision to make these requests when carrying out my financial
investigations, however, as I was still training and not yet accredited by the
ARA at the time, I would have had to seek guidance and approval of the
accredited mentors at the Police.
As I have no direct recollection of the case involving Mr Mahmood, I am
unable to recall any specific information I obtained during the course of the
financial investigations. I can only confirm that it would have been any
information that was received following any requests I made. The
information would also have been appended to any Section 16 Statement
that I eventually drafted in the case.
Whilst I cannot remember what specific information I obtained in this case,
I believe that I would have compiled any information that was received and
asked my police mentor to review it and check if I had obtained everything
that was required. It is my understanding that they were a Senior Authorising
Officer. At this point I believe David Pardoe was still training to become a
Senior Auhtorising Officer so I could not yet go to him for approval. Once
approval and authorisation was received from my Police Mentor, I would
have sent everything over to the Criminal Law Team to consider. From
reading the document at (POL00047756), I believe Juliet
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Macfarlane was the legal case worker in this matter, so it is likely I would
have forwarded the information directly to her. I believe she would have then
arranged for it to be submitted to the defence.
91. I donot have any direct recollection of the confiscation proceedings against
Mr Mahmood. I can only rely on the documents provided which illustrates
that the Criminal Law team did decide to purse an application for a
confiscation order, but I have not had any site of any advice I gave in relation
to the prospects of pursuing this route. I also do not know if there was a
hearing in respect of the confiscation proceedings.
92. I have been asked what my view is of how the proceedings were conducted
by POL. If this question relates to the criminal proceedings which led to a
conviction, I do not feel that I can provide any view on this as I was not
involved those proceedings. I also do not feel that I can provide any valuable
viewpoint on the confiscation proceedings as I simply do not remember the
case.
Prosecution of Hughie Noel Thomas
93. I confirm that I have reviewed all the following documents that were provided
in relation to this prosecution:
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94.
95.
96.
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i) memo dated 26 September 2006 at [POL00048180]
ii) memo dated 7 November 2006 at [POL00048229].
iii) memo dated 7 September 2007 at[POL00049024]
iv) Document POL00069056_007]
v) email dated 31 October 2007 (and the email chain beneath) at
[POL00044917]
Unfortunately I do not have any direct recollection of this case and therefore
I can only rely on the documents provided to me with the Request.
From such documents I can see that this was a case that Mick Matthews
dealt with all the way through to confiscation. The reason why I am also
copied in to the memo dated 7 November 2006 at (POL00048229) falls
down to the fact that it was just myself and Mick Matthews who worked in
the Financial Investigation Unit at the time, and we worked closely with one
another. Therefore, we would usually both be copied into correspondence
and memos before cases had been allocated between us, and more
generally to assist with covering each other’s case load in the event that
one of us were absent.
The memo dated 7 September 2007 at (POL00049024) and addressed
specifically to me states ‘this case was being dealt with by Mick Matthews.’
The memo appears to be the Criminal Law Team providing with me an
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97.
98.
99.
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update as to where the case had got to. I believe this was sent to me
because Mick was leaving the Financial Investigation Unit around this time,
and therefore his open matters were being handed over to me.
The email chain at (POL00044917) dated 31 October 2007 between Mick
Matthews and Clive Burton from the Finance Department clearly shows that
it was Mick who dealt with the case all the way through to confiscation.
Again, I believe the reason that Mick forwarded this email chain to me was
because he was leaving the Financial Investigation Unit and was handing
over his ongoing matters to me.
I can see that I am sent a memo at (POL00048180) from the Criminal Law
Team on 26 September 2006 to ask if a confiscation application was being
pursued. I believe this is simply the Criminal Law Team chasing up on how
far Financial Investigations had got and if an application had any prospect.
I am unsure why this was sent to me and not Mick, given that it appears he
had conduct of this case. In any event, I believe this memo is worded
ambiguously and should not be read to indicate that it was me or Mick who
would have made the ultimate decision to proceed to confiscation in this
case. It was always the Criminal Law Team who had the last say on this. I
am unsure how they would have come to the decision to proceed with
confiscation.
It appears that any involvement I had after the confiscation order was made
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by the court was to deal with some issues in relation to the terms of
confiscation order being exercised in order to achieve recovery.
100. I have been asked to explain why I stated the following at
(POL00069056_007) - “it would appear that Mr Thomas has not been full
and frank with the receivers .” Unfortunately I do not remember why I said
this. It appears from the letter received from the Insolvency Service attached
to the email chain at (POL00069056_007), that Mr Thomas had gone into
receivership, and informed the receiver that certain assets were already
taken by POL. However, at this time I do not think it was standard practice
for us to place a restraint on or seize pensions. This was something that
was implemented much later during my time as a Financial Investigator,
although, I do not recall when. As such, I may have made this statement
because Mr Thomas told the receiver that the POL had seized his private
pension, where it is unlikely this was the case. However, this is simply an
assumption based on the contents and timing of (POL00069056_007) and
I cannot confirm this for certain.
101. I have been asked what my view is of how the proceedings against Hughie
Noel Thomas were conducted by POL. If this question relates to the criminal
proceedings which led to a conviction, I do not feel that I can provide any
view on this as I was not involved those proceedings. I also do not feel that
I can provide any valuable viewpoint on the confiscation proceedings as I
simply do not remember the case, nor was I heavily involved in the
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confiscation proceedings, as the documents provided illustrate that I took
over the matter to deal with any outstanding queries after Mick left.
Prosecution of Josephine Hamilton
102. I confirm that I have reviewed all the following documents that were
provided in relation to the prosecution of Josephine Hamilton:
i) memo dated 12 April 2006 at [POL00047903]
ii) Compliance Case Review Report dated 18 April 2006 at
[POL00047945).
iii) memo dated 12 December 2006 at [POL00048309].
iv) memo dated 30 January 2007 at [POL00048454]
v) the emails of 9 and 10 October 2007 at [POL00049083
vi) the memo dated 15 November 2007 at [POL00049154]
vii) memo dated 19 November 2007 at [POL00044388
viii)emails dated 16 and 19 November 2007 at [POL00049168].
ix) closure report emailed on 10 September 2007 at
[POL00049025},
x) memo dated 6 February 2008 at [POL00049535]
xi) memo dated 18 February 2008 at [POL00052733
xii) Court of Appeal in Josephine Hamilton & Others v Post Office
Limited [2021 EWCA Crim 577 at POL00113278 (and in
particular at paragraphs 142 to 148).
103. Unfortunately, I do not have any direct recollection of this case and therefore
I can only rely on what is contained in the documents provided to me.
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Following a review of the memo dated 12 April 2006 at (POL00047903) and
the Compliance Case Review Report dated 18 April 2006 (POL00047945),
it appears that at this time I was still dealing with some matters as a
Compliance Manager in the Security Team, whilst slowly transitioning over
to the Financial Investigations Unit. The memo at (POL00047903) illustrates
that Graham Brander was the Investigation Manager carrying out the
criminal investigation in this matter, and in the memo he is providing me an
update in relation to why there was a delay in the case. The Compliance
Case Review Report at (POL00047945) illustrates that I had reviewed how
far the case had progressed, which would have included a review of
Graham's memo, and in response I noted that I would review the file again
in a month. I do not know from direct memory how far the case had
progressed. I can only rely on what Graham has written in his memo dated
12 April 2006. It was also not my role as a Compliance Officer to provide a
view on the case.
104. I was not involved in conducting the criminal investigation of Ms Hamilton’s
case. As such, I cannot comment on whether the information about Ms
Hamilton's ill health affected how the investigation was conducted. I also
had no involvement whatsoever in the decision to charge Ms Hamilton. As
explained earlier on in this statement, my role as a Compliance Manager
did not entail any involvement in the substance of criminal investigations. I
simply dealt with the procedural aspects of a case to make sure that case
files were being progressed efficiently and were presented correctly.
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105. I have reviewed the memo dated 12 December 2006 at (POL00048309)
and memo dated January 2007 at (POL00048454). Although I am copied in
to both memos, I did not have any involvement in the preparation of the
case before Ms Hamilton’s appearance in the magistrates’ court. I was also
not the disclosure officer in these proceedings, so I would not have
completed the schedule of unused material. The disclosure officer would
have been Graham Brander as he was the Investigation Manager working
on the case. It was usual that the individual responsible for conducting the
investigation would also be the disclosure officer and would be involved in
the disclosure process. I believe the reason I am copied in to these memos
is to either keep me updated on the progress of the case in my capacity as
a Compliance Officer/Manager, or because I was later to have some
involvement in the matter in my role as a Financial Investigator, as indicated
in the emails of 9 and 10 October 2007 at (POL00049083), the memo dated
15 November 2007 at (POL00049154), the memo dated 19 November 2007
at (POL00044388) and the emails dated 16 and 19 November 2007 at
(POL00049168).
106. From considering those documents, the only involvement I did seem to have
in my capacity as a financial Investigator is to provide an opinion in relation
to the following request made to me from Juliet McFarlane in her memo
dated 15 November 2007 at (POL00049154):
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107.
108.
109.
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“ Ged Could you let me have your views as to confiscation in this matter,
and if appropriate the prospect of recovery under such an order. A copy
of the Indictment is attached.”
In my response to Juliet dated 16 November 2007 (found within
(POL00049168) I summarise my opinion as followed —
“My opinion
1. Charge her with theft and go to confiscation, or
2. Accept a plea of false accounting and go to confiscation
3. If she pays us before we can always draw back out of the case but we
need minimum £40, 201.58”
I also I state in that email that “/ am never confident with false accounting
charges in relation to recovery under POCA 2002 and the theft charges
makes life so much easier.”
This illustrates that my opinion was that pursuing a charge of theft and going
to confiscation would be the more logical option in this case. The basis for
this view is that whilst it is not impossible, it is extremely difficult to determine
the benefit received by a defendant as a result of committing the crime of
false accounting. Confiscation is effectively the recovery of financial loss
suffered by the POL as a result of criminal conduct. The value of such loss
is determined by the financial benefit received by the offender in committing
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such crime. In cases of theft it is much easier to determine the benefit as
the figure is clear cut — it is the physical amount they have stolen and any
interest accrued on that value in line with Retail Price Index. It is not as clear
cut with false accounting because you would need to agree how the
offender benefitted and in what amount. If it hadn’t been found that they had
stolen money, what was the total of their financial gain? This was a very
difficult answer to determine.
110. Clearly my opinion did not determine the charging decision as the Criminal
Law Team decided to drop the charge of theft and pursue false accounting
charges anyway. I had no input in relation to the decision to drop the theft
charge against Ms Hamilton. Such decision could only be made by the
Criminal Law Team.
111. I do not remember whether I provided any further advice in respect of the
confiscation further to that contained in my email at (POL00049168). I also
cannot remember if I had any further involvement at all, nor what sources
of information I considered if I did.
112. From reviewing the closure report emailed on 10 September 2007 at
(POL00049025), the memo dated 6 February 2008 at (POL00049535) and
the memo dated 18 February 2008 at (POL00052733), I can see that the
case was concluded by way of a compensation order only and Ms Hamilton
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re-paid the loss via cheque to the Post Office in the sum of £36,644.89. I
have no direct recollection of what my view of this result in the case against
Ms Hamilton would have been at the time, however, I believe that it is likely
that I would have considered it a successful recovery of loss, and therefore
a good result for the POL.
113. Unfortunately I do not have any recollection of what my view was in relation
to the decision to drop the theft charge. All I am able to confirm is that I
believed it was usually more difficult to pursue confiscation in false
accounting offences. It appears here however, that only compensation was
pursued.
114. Ihave no recollection of the process in which the alleged loss was recovered
in this particular case. I can only rely on the documents provided to me,
which illustrates that the loss was paid back via a cheque from Ms
Hamilton’s solicitors.
115. I am able to comment in more general terms on the process by which
alleged losses were recovered. Where a confiscation order was obtained
from the court, the financial assets that got confiscated from a defendant
would be paid into the central account of a unit operated by the ARA. There
were various ARA units around the country. I believe the ARA would then
use the confiscated assets to drive training and further POCA confiscations.
However, where the POL had suffered a loss, it would be requested that a
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compensation order was attached to the confiscation order for the same
amount, (which was effectively for the same actual money, there was no
double jeopardy in this) so that the confiscated assets could be forwarded
on to the POL as a form of compensation once it was confiscated.
116. I have been asked what my view is of how the proceedings against
Josephine Hamilton were conducted by POL. If this question relates to the
criminal proceedings which led to a conviction, I do not feel that I can
provide any view on this as I was not involved in the substance of those
proceedings. I also do not feel that I can provide any valuable viewpoint on
the confiscation proceedings as I simply do not remember the case, nor do
I remember if I had any further involvement beyond providing my opinion in
my email dated 16 November 2007.
117. I have also been asked to consider the Judgment of the Court of Appeal in
Josephine Hamilton & Others v Post Office Limited [2021 EWCA Crim 577
at (POL00113278) and provide my reflections on the way the investigation
and prosecution of Ms Hamilton was conducted by the POL. Again, I do not
feel like I can provide a valuable reflection on this as I was not involved in
the substance Criminal Proceedings.
Prosecution of Janet Skinner
118. I confirm that I have reviewed all the following documents that were
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provided in relation to the prosecution of Janet Skinner:
i) memo dated 25 September 2007 at [POL00049061]
ii) memo dated 9 July 2008 at [POL00049840]
iii) memo dated 28 July 2008 at [POL00049916].
iv) memo of 19 August 2008 at [POL00049946
v) the memo dated 20 August 2008 at [POL00049976]
vi) memo dated 1 September 2008 at [POL00050022].
119. Unfortunately, I do not have any direct recollection of this case and therefore
I can only rely on what is contained in the documents provided to me. From
a review of the memo dated 25 September 2007 at (POL00049061), I
believe that the financial investigations in this case were dealt with by Mick
Matthews all the way through to the decision of the Criminal Law Team to
pursue confiscation proceedings. I believe I am simply copied in to this
memo so that the Financial Investigation Unit were updated on matters as I
believe Mick had already left by this point. It appears that I had to see the
final stages of the matter through in relation to obtaining the confiscation
order, and receiving the confiscated funds.
120. I do not recall having any input or providing Mick with any assistance in
relation to any financial investigations that he carried out in this matter. I
also had no input in relation to any criminal investigations that led to the
prosecution, carried out by the Security Team.
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121. Unfortunately, I cannot recall the report sent by Ms McFarlane, referred to
in the memo dated 9 July 2008 at (POL00049840). I can see that I am
copied in to the memos dated 9 July 2008 (POL00049841) and 28 July 2008
(POL00049916) in relation to my required attendance at court, however, I
do not recall in what capacity I attended. I believe that I would have had to
go in place of Mick as he had already left his position in the Financial
Investigation Unit by the time of the hearing. I have no recollection of
whether counsel contacted me on the date of the hearing.
122. Ican see from the memo dated 19 August 2008 at (POL00049946) that the
Criminal Law team confirmed to me that confiscated funds were lodged with
the North East unit, and that such funds would be forwarded on to the POL.
This illustrates the standard process of recovery via an ARA confiscation
unit, as described earlier in this statement.
123. I have been asked what my view is of how the proceedings against Janet
Skinner were conducted by POL. If this question relates to the criminal
proceedings which led to a conviction, I do not feel that I can provide any
view on this as I was not involved in the substance of those proceedings. I
also do not feel that I can provide any valuable viewpoint on the confiscation
proceedings as I simply do not remember the case, and it appears that I
only stepped in to tie up matters once Mick had left.
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124. I confirm that I have reviewed all the following documents that were
provided in relation to the prosecution of Susan Rudkin:
i) the memo from Jarnail Singh dated 18 November 2008 at
[POL00050392]
ii) My witness statement at [POL00050040]
iii) the investigation report at [POL00046485]
iv) the memo dated 26 March 2009 at [POL00124636]
v) the case closure report at [POL00046555],
vi) the memo dated 6 May 2009 at [POL00124632],
vii) memo dated 6 July 2009 at [POL00124651]
viii)the s. 16 statement at [POL00124659]
ix) the Land Registry form at [POL00124653]
x) the draft penal notice at [POL00124660]
xi) the memo dated 26 August 2009 at [POL00124641].
xii) the annotated email chain dated September 2008 at
[POL00061322].
125. The memo from Jarnail Singh dated 18 November 2008 at (POL00050392)
appears to relate to the case of Seema Misra, and therefore it does not
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assist me with my recollection of the case involving Susan Rudkin I note
that the Request does not ask any questions in relation to Seema Misra — I
would like to flag to the Inquiry that in any event, I have no recollection of
that case.
126. I also do not remember the case of Susan Rudkin in great detail and have
had to rely heavily on the documents provided to me. Prior to reading those
documents I only had a vague recollection of Susan Rudkin and her
husband who was the SPM and I could remember that I carried out the
financial investigations into Mrs Rudkin’s financial affairs in respect of the
recovery under POCA 2002.
127. I had no involvement in the criminal investigations carried out prior to the
criminal prosecution being brought. I can see from paragraph 6 of my
undated statement in support of an application for a restraint order against
Mrs Rudkin at (POL00050040), that I had no knowledge of what the case
concerned until I was informed by Mike Wilcox, the officer in charge of the
criminal investigation. I have no recollection of when Mike Wilcox provided
me with this information.
128. It is clear from my statement at (POL00050040) that Mrs Rudkin admitted
to actions of false accounting and theft of POL money during an interview
under caution with the investigation officers on 20 August 2008. Due to such
admission, I would have been able to begin financial investigations intoher
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financial affairs prior to a conviction being obtained. This explains why I took
the actions described in paragraphs 8 — 14 of my statement, whilst criminal
investigations were ongoing.
129. In terms of providing a detailed account of matters, including any
investigations I undertook and the sources of information I considered, I
have to defer entirely to the evidence and information contained in the
above-mentioned documents and provided in relation to this prosecution.
This is because I had no direct involvement in the criminal investigation, and
I have no direct memory of the specific actions I carried out during my
financial investigations.
130. In the email chain at (POL00061322) I can see that I state that Mrs Rudkin
had a criminal lifestyle for the purposes of the POCA 2002. I believe I would
have simply come to this conclusion in line with the interpretation of ‘criminal
lifestyle’ provided under POCA. I set this justification and reasoning out in
my email immediately after stating Mrs Rudkin had a criminal lifestyle. The
application of this interpretation is also provided in my Section 16
Statement, which explains that committing an offence over a period of at
least six months and benefitting from such offence in total of not less than
£5000 fell into such interpretation.
131. From reading the email chain at (POL00061322) the Inquiry will see that
although Mrs Rudkin had not yet been prosecuted by this point, she had
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admitted to false accounting to cover up losses experienced over a period
exceeding 2 years, and she had admitted to theft through taking cash from
the POL to cover general bills. An audit carried out at the branch on 20%
August 2008 found that such actions led to a shortage in the Post Office
accounts of £43,856.89. It is clear, therefore, that Mrs Rudkin’s actions
fulfilled the requirements for her to be considered to be living a ‘criminal
lifestyle’ under POCA, in line with the interpretation that POCA provides.
132. I do not believe that there were any consequences as such to this
conclusion I drew. I was simply providing my opinion to the Criminal Law
Team based on my financial investigations carried out and application of
POCA. I do not know whether my opinion had any influence on the Criminal
Law team’s approval to proceed with pursuing an application for restraint.
133. I cannot remember directly, but from a review of the documents I believe
that it was me who made the decision that an application for a restraint order
was appropriate in this case. However, my reasoning would have had to be
considered by a Senior Authorising Officer and their authorisation would
have to ultimately be approved by the Criminal Law team. I was a Senior
Authorising Officer myself at this time, but this did not mean I could
authorise my own decisions — I would have had to seek authorisation from
another Senior Authorising Officer, and the email chain at (POL00061322)
illustrates that I consulted Dave Pardoe in this case.
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134. The decision to make an application for a restraint order was not taken
lightly and it most definitely would not have been applied for in every case.
An application for restraint was only made when there was a real risk of an
SPM dissipating assets prior to a confiscation and compensation order
being obtained from the court. For example, this risk might be considered if
during financial investigations evidence came to light that an SPM had
misinformed us about the existence of assets. Further to this, there was a
likelihood of suspects entering into receivership and inconsequenceassets
being available to satisfy any future confiscation order set. In this scenario,
it would be vital to obtain a restraint order first, as once receivership had
been entered in to, you could no longer make and application for a restraint
order. The decision to make an application for a restraint order was always
carefully measured, and we had to log our reasoning for pursuing the route
of restraint in a thought process log. We would have to discuss this log with
a Senior Appropriate Officer before advice was given to the Criminal Law
Team, and such log was available for inspection by the ARA at any point.
135. Whenever confirmation was provided from the Criminal Law Team that an
application for restraint was being pursued, it would then be the role of the
individual with conduct of the financial investigations to draft and submit that
application statement in support for the court. Proformas for such statement
would be available from the ARA.
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136. I believe the reason why the Financial Investigator assumed this role and
not the Criminal Law Team is because they were better placed to draft the
statement in support, having directly carried out the financial investigations
to which the statement would refer. As such, I believe that no one would
have asked me to write my statement in support at (POL00050040) - I
would have just done it in line with standard practice once the Criminal Law
Team confirmed that the application would go ahead. Unfortunately, I
cannot remember when this was confirmed to me.
137. From my recollection, some courts dealt with restraint application
administratively. From a review of the documents I can see this application
was being dealt with at Croydon Court. I believe that Croydon Court did
require attendance when considering restraint applications, in which case it
is likely that I did attend court in relation to the application for restraint
against Mrs Rudkin. However, I do not have any direct recollection of
attending.
138. I have no recollection of considering the reasonableness of applying for a
restraint order in respect of the robbery which took place at Ibstock Sub Post
Office in 2006. I do not believe I ever considered this or applied for any
application in relation to this.
139. I note from my email dated 25 February 2009 at (POL00046513) to Jarnail
A Singh (the principle lawyer on this case), that at this point I advised that
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a confiscation and compensation figure of £44,689.22 should be sought.
This is clearly higher than the shortage of £43,894.15 in the POL accounts
that was discovered. The reason I advise to seek this increased amount is
because it accounts for the loss plus any increase of value to such loss
when acquired as a benefit, in line with Retail Price Index. This was a
calculation that I was required to carry out as part of my role as a Financial
Investigator, and such calculation would have to be shown in the Section 16
statement I produced in support of an application to the court for a
confiscation order. I would like to flag to the Inquiry that my final calculation
provided to the court in this matter can be found in paragraphs 9 to 10.1 of
my Section 16 statement at (POL00124659). This calculation shows that
the total benefit received was calculated to be much higher the stolen
amount, however, the overall figure for recovery was negotiated down to
only cover the theft amount.
140. I have been asked to consider the memo dated 26 March 2009 at
(POL00051248) and explain why was it necessary to pursue confiscation if
Mr Rudkin was repaying the sum owed to POL. I believe that this would
have simply been a belt and braces approach to ensure that the recovery
could be enforced by the court in the event that such payments stopped.
141. I have considered the documents at (POL00051371), (POL00052343),
(POL00051446), (POL00051792), (POL00051800), (POL00052022),
(POL00052072) , (POL00052308), (POL00052308), (POL00052349). I can
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see from the documents provided to me that Mr Dove was Counsel in this
case, but unfortunately I am unable to recall any discussions I may have
had with him. I believe that it is likely that I did attend the confiscation
hearing in this matter, but I do not remember any specific details of it. I defer
entirely to the updates provided in relation to the progression of the matter,
contained within these documents.
142. It would have been considered necessary to apply for both a confiscation
order and a compensation order for the same amount in this matter to
ensure that the confiscated funds were forwarded to the POL by the relevant
ARA unit as a form of compensation, as explained earlier in this statement.
143. I do not feel that I am able to comment on the result of the criminal
prosecution brought against Mrs Rudkin, as I had no direct involvement in
it. In terms of the POCA proceedings in which I was directly involved in, I
cannot recall what my view of the result would have been at the time.
However, I believe it is likely that I would have felt that it was a successful
result as we obtained an order that would achieve recovery of the financial
loss faced by the POL, which was caused by a crime of theft that Mrs Rudkin
had admitted to from the outset.
144. I have reviewed the email chain from October 2009 at (POL00053389) and
the email chain from January 2010 at (POL00060428). I do not have any
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knowledge of the circumstances in which Mr Rudkin repaid the loss owed
to POL as I was not involved in any arrangements concerning this. I can see
from these documents that deductions from Mr Rudkin’s salary of
£1000 were made each month. I believe that these payments would have
been offset against the confiscation order against Mrs Rudkin, but I have no
knowledge of the circumstances in which that arrangement was made. It is
likely that a member of the Personnel Department of the POL who dealt in
SPM contracts would have been involved in bringing about such
arrangement.
145. I cannot remember the discussion I had with Contracts Advisor, Paul
Williams, as referred to in (POL00053389). I believe the reason I would
have advised Paul Williams that the deductions from Mr Rudkin’s salary
should continue is for the reasons set out in that email — Mr Rudkin had a
Contract for Services which contained a clause regarding payment for
losses, and as the confiscation order was made against Mrs Rudkin, then
they should be treated individually as though they were agent and clerk.
Form hindsight, I believe in providing this advice I would have also been
considering the fact that the order needed to be met, and with the current
arrangement in place it appeared it was on track to be met.
146. I have considered the memo dated 23 February 2010 at (POL00054182)
and can see that I have simply been copied in for information. The
application for the extension of the confiscation order would have been
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made by Mrs Rudkin as a defendant either directly to the court or through
her lawyers, therefore, I am unable to explain the circumstances in which
such application was made.
147. Following a review of the emails dated 16 August 2010 (POL00055170), I
can see that I had already left the Financial Investigation Unit and any
further conduct in this matter was handed over to Graham Ward. I do not
recall having any involvement in the discussion about the appropriateness
of a certificate of inadequacy, as referred to in this email chain.
148. As far as I can remember, the circumstances in which a certificate of
inadequacy would be considered appropriate was when the terms of a
confiscation order could no longer be met, for example, the equity from an
asset was no longer realisable as it had changed in value.
149. From areview of the documents provided to me and in considering the case
from hindsight, I do not think that anything should have been done differently
from a Financial Investigation standpoint. I believe that all the correct
procedures were followed in the POCA proceedings and I feel comfortable
that in the end, the POL simply achieved a resolution that would recover the
financial loss suffered in relation to an offence which the defendant admitted
to. In terms of the criminal prosecution itself, I do not feel that I can provide
any valuable comment in relation to whether the case should have been
conducted differently, as I had no direct involvement.
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Prosecution of Mr Julian Wilson
150. I confirm that I have reviewed all the following documents that were provided
in relation to the prosecution of Julian Wilson:
i) report dated 2 December 2008 at [POL00119142]
ii) witness statement of Graham Ward dated 16 December 2008 at
[POL00064718_001]
iii) the antecedents document at [POL00051185]
iv) emails from January 2009 at [POL00050726]
v) memo dated 9 February 2009 at [POL00050878)
vi) memo dated 28 May 2009 at [POL00051720]
vii) Advice at [POL00119150]
viii) memo dated 15 July 2009 at [POL00052047].
151. I do not have any direct recollection of this case, therefore, I can only rely
on what is contained in the documents provided to me. From a review of the
witness statement of Graham Ward dated 16 December 2008 at
(POL00064718_001) it is clear that Graham had conduct of this case and
as per paragraph 4 of that statement, I was the Senior Authorising Officer.
152. The documents indicate that I did not carry out any investigations into the
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financial affairs of Mr Wilson. These investigations would have been done
by Graham, and any involvement I had would have only been to review and
authorise his work.
153. As already explained, it was the role of a Senior Authorising Officer (also
referred to as a ‘supervising officer’ in the Request) to go through a financial
investigator's work and to provide authorisation if it was believed that the
findings and reasoning of the investigator justified taking steps to advise the
Criminal Law Team to pursue an application for restraint and or confiscation.
I remember on various occasions acting as a Senior Authorisation Officer,
although I cannot recall any specific cases, where I turned cases back to
Financial Investigators if I believed they had not explored all possible routes
of enquiry in order to justify their reasoning to pursue restraint or
confiscation.
154. I cannot recall directly every step I took in authorising the application for
restraint in this case, but I imagine Graham would have spoken to me briefly
about the case background, presented his findings to me and discussed his
reasons for why he believed an application for restraint should be pursued.
It may have been the case that I agreed with his reasoning straight away
and provided authorisation for his work, or I could have asked him to make
further enquiries into matters. Unfortunately, I do not remember.
155. From reviewing the emails from January 2009 at (POL00050726) andthe
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memo dated 9 February 2009 at (POL00050878), I can see that Graham
made an application for restraint, and following the order being made for
restraint the defence wished to vary the terms of the order. It appears that
Graham had discussed the variation order with me as his Senior Authorising
Officer to check that it was ok. It would usually be the Defendant in a case
who would seek to vary a restraint order. I cannot remember specific
circumstances when this would happen, but clearly in this matter it was to
enable Mr Wilson to use two accounts that were restrained.
156. I would like to flag that the advice note of Counsel referred to as document
(POL0011915) appears to be another copy of the memo from Mr Singh
dated 28 May 2009 at (POL00051720). Such memo refers to the advice
note and is clearly directed to Gary Thomas as the Investigation Manger in
the criminal proceedings. It is clear that criminal proceedings are still
ongoing as the subject matter of the memo relates to the Plea and Case
Management hearing. I believe that myself and Graham are copied in simply
to receive background information, in the event the case would be
forwarded to the Financial Investigation Unit to assist with any further POCA
proceedings following a conviction. As such, neither myself or Graham
would have responded to Mr Singh’s memo and Counsel's advice.
157. From my reading of the memo dated 15 July 2009 at (POL00052047), it
appears that Mr Singh has received a letter to inform that there has been a
registration of a re-mortgage against Mr and Mrs Wilson's property, and he
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is forwarding this information to Graham and myself. I do not have any
knowledge of who decided to register that charge, and I can’t recall having
any involvement in such registration. It is possible that this was forwarded
by Mr Singh to assist Graham, as Graham may have already started
investigating into Mr Wilson’s financial affairs by this point. I believe this
because the memo shows that a sentencing hearing was arranged for 3
August 2009, which indicates that a conviction was obtained.
158. I have been asked what my view is of how the proceedings against Julian
Wilson were conducted by POL. If this question relates to the criminal
proceedings which led to a conviction, I do not feel that I can provide any
view on this as I was not involved in the substance of those proceedings. I
also do not feel that I can provide any valuable viewpoint on the POCA
proceedings as I have no direct recollection of the case and from review of
the documents provided to me, it was Graham who carried out the
investigation into Mr Wilson’s financial affairs.
Prosecution of Mr Peter Holmes
159. I confirm that I have reviewed all the following documents that were
provided in relation to the prosecution of Peter Holmes:
i) the memo dated 28 April 2009 at [POL00051356]
ii) emails dated 30 January 2009 at [POL00050817] and
[POL00050819]
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iii) memo dated 8 September 2009 at [POL00052429].
iv) emails dated 30 March 2010 at [POL00054543].
160. I would like to flag that the memo dated 28 April 2009 at (POL00051356)
relates to the prosecution of Mr and Mrs Wilson, therefore, it does not assist
me with my recollection of the case involving Mr Holmes. It also does not
assist me with elaborating on my responses in relation to the Prosecution
of Mr Wilson above.
161. I do not remember the specific facts of the case against Peter Holmes in
great detail but from reviewing the other documents provided in connection
with this prosecution, it appears that I was Financial Investigator with
conduct of the matter. Before reviewing the documents I did vaguely recall
that this was a matter in which financial investigations ceased early on. This
is because it involved a false accounting charge against an employee of an
SPM and not an SPM themselves. It would have been almost impossible to
attribute a financial benefit received by an employee of an SPM through
their actions of false accounting, so confiscation proceedings were
withdrawn. My recollection of this was confirmed when reviewing the emails
dated 30 March 2010 at (POL00054543).
162. I have reviewed the emails dated 30 January 2009 at (POL00050817) and
(POL00050819) and I am not entirely sure what the checks I authorised
were. It could have been the very early standard credit searches to retrieve
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information about bank and credit accounts held in the parties’ names and
whether there were any CCJs issued against them, but I can’t say for certain
as it is not clear from such emails.
163. I had no input into any decision made in relation to the plea being offered,
as referred to in the memo dated 8 September 2009 at (POL00052429).
This would have been a consideration for the Criminal Law Team and I
believe Ms McFarlane is just updating me on matters. Unfortunately I cannot
remember any conversations I had with Ms McFarlane about this case and
I cannot recall why a copy of the accountant’s report submitted by the
defence was sent to me by Ms McFarlane to consider. I can only assume
that Mr Holmes’ legal team were using the document in argument of his
defence, and with it being a document containing financial information, it
was forwarded to me as part of the Financial Investigation Unit.
164. I believe that the only involvement I had in the confiscation process before
it was withdrawn was in my capacity as the Financial Investigator, looking
into the financial affairs of the parties and gathering evidence to see if there
was enough to warrant confiscation proceedings. The reason as to why I
advised on withdrawing confiscation proceedings in this case is set out
clearly by myself within the emails dated 30 March 2010 at (POL00054543)
and I have expanded on this in paragraph 161 above. Once confiscation
proceedings were withdrawn, I would have had no further involvement in
the case, including in any civil proceedings or recovery though the SPMs
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contract.
165. I have been asked what my view is of how the proceedings against Peter
Homes were conducted by POL. If this question relates to the criminal
proceedings which led to a conviction, I do not feel that I can provide any
view on this as I was not involved in the substance of those proceedings. I
also do not feel that I can provide any valuable view on the POCA
proceedings as I do no directly recall the case in great detail, and in any
event, confiscation proceedings were ultimately withdrawn.
Knowledge of bugs, errors and defects in the Horizon system
166. I was not aware of any concerns regarding the robustness of the Horizon IT
system during my entire career within the POL. As far as I was aware, the
system operated as was expected.
167. As explained earlier in this statement, whenever criminal proceedings were
pursued following an investigation carried out by the Security Team, I recall
that one of the witnesses on the list to provide evidence in such proceedings
would be a Fujitsu Manager. I believe that they would be required to confirm
whether or not the Horizon data obtained was reliable at the time in which
a shortage was discovered on the system. If I had ever been made aware
that there was a potential problem with the robustness of the Horizon IT
system, I would have raised this with senior colleagues and flagged to them
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that in my opinion any criminal investigation would need to cease.
Other Matters
168. Other than what I have already provided in my statement above, I have no
further reflections on these matters, or on any other matters that are relevant
to the Inquiry’s Term of Reference.
169. There are also no other matters that I wish to bring to the attention of the
Chair of the Inquiry.
Page 67 of 78
to
less Statement o' id
WITNO8150100
WITNO08150100
inso
No
URN
Document Description
Control Number
POL00030578
S02 Royal Mail Group Criminal
Investigation and Prosecution
Policy December 2007
POL-0027060
POL00104812
Royal Mail Group Ltd Criminal
Investigation and Prosecution
Policy
POL-0080444
POL00104806
Royal Mail Group Security —
Procedures and Standards:
Standards of behaviour and
complaints procedure No.10-X
v2
POL-0080438
POL00031004
RMG Policy - Crime and
Investigation (S2) - version 3.0
POL-0027486
POL00031003
Royal Mail Group Crime and
Investigation Policy v1.1
October 2009
POL-0027485
POL00084977
Post Office, Former SPM End
to End Debt Review v.0.5
POL-0082035
POL00030580
Post Office Ltd - Security
Policy: Fraud Investigation and
Prosecution Policy v2
POL-0027062
POL00030579
Post Office Ltd Financial
Investigation Policy, May 2010
POL-0027061
POL00026573
RMG Procedures & Standards
- Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
& Financial Investigations doc
911
POL-0023214
10.
POL00104857
Royal Mail Group Security
Procedures & Standards:
Initiating Investigations doc 2.1
POL-0080489
11.
POL00031008
RMG Ltd Criminal
Investigation and Prosecution
Policy v1.1 November 2010
POL-0027490
12.
POL00104853
Post Office's Financial
Investigation Policy
POL-0080485
13.
POL00104855
Post Office Ltd. Anti-Fraud
Policy
POL-0080487
Page 68 of 78
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WITNO08150100
14.
POL00030786
Royal Mail Group Policy -
Crime and Investigation (S2)
v3 effective from April 2011,
owner Tony March, Group
Security Director
POL-0027268
15.
POL00104929
Post Office Limited: Internal
Protocol for Criminal
Investigation and Enforcement
(with flowchart)
POL-0080561
16.
POL00105226
Undated Appendix 1 - POL
Criminal Investigations and
Enforcement Procedure
(flowchart)
POL-0080851
17.
POL00030602
POL: Criminal Enforcement
and Prosecution Policy
POL-0027084
18.
POL00031005
Conduct of Criminal
Investigation Policy for the
Post Office. (Version 0.2)
POL-0027487
19.
POL00027863
Conduct of Criminal
Investigations Policy v0.3
POL-0024504
20.
POL00030902
Final Draft of the Post Office
Conduct of Criminal
Investigation Policy
POL-0027384
21.
POL00084989
POL Financial Investigation
Unit Business Process
Documentation - Security &
Investigation Debt Process
text
POL-0082047
22.
POL00121639
Post Office "Financial
Investigations Partnership for
Recovery Presentation" by
Ged Harbinson and Graham
Ward
POL-0127901
23.
POL00121640
Financial Investigations
Partnership for Recovery
Presentation on Compliance
POL-0127902
24.
POL00104747
Investigation Policy: Casework
Management (England &
Wales) v1.0
POL-0080387
25.
POL00104777
Investigation Policy: Casework
Management (England &
Wales) v4.0
POL-0080417
26.
POL00121569
Post Office Investigation team
- compliance - Guide to the
Preparation and Layout of
POL-0127832
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WITNO08150100
Investigation Red Label Case
Files - Offender reports &
Discipline reports.
21:
POL00121570
POL Investigation Team
Compliance - Guide to the
Preparation and Layout of
Investigation Red Label Case
Files prepared by Ged
Harbinson
POL-0127833
28.
POL00121582
Post Office Ltd Investigation
Team Compliance Guide to the
Preparation and Layout of
Investigation Non-Red Label
Case Files
POL-0127845
29.
POL00121581
Post Office Ltd Investigation
Team Compliance Guide to the
Preparation and Layout of
Investigation Non-Red Label
Case Files. Case File Reports
and Case Closure Report
POL-0127844
30.
POLO0118104
Appendix 6 - Identification
codes (undated - date taken
from parent email)
ViS00012693
31.
POL00047756
Memo from J A McFarlane to
Investigation Team Post Office
Limited re: Regina v Tahir
Mahmood, Birmingham Crown
Court Sentence - 12th
December 2005 Case No:
0506/0061
POL-0044235
32.
POL00047799
Letter from Ged Harbinson,
Investigation Manager Post
Office Ltd to Lloyds Bank PLC,
Court Production Order Unit.
POL-0044278
33.
POL00047817
Letter from Ged Harbinson
Investigation Manager Post
Office Ltd to Susan at Land
Registry Coventry.
POL-0044296
34.
POL00047825
Tahir Mahmood case study:
Letter from Ged Harbinson to
Courtney Weston at Allied
Dunbar RE: DPA section 29 -
investigation proceeds of
crime - request for policy
holder and payment details
POL-0044304
35.
POL00047838
Letter from Ged Harbinson to
Churchill Insurance FAO.
Counter Fraud Services re:
POL-0044317
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WITNO08150100
DATA Protection Act 1998
Section 29.
36.
POL00044858
Request for financial details of
Tahir Mahmood from Inland
Revenue.
POL-0041337
37.
POL00047840
Confidential Enquiry from Ged
Harbinson, Post Office
Investigation Manager to Pat
Calouri Intelligence Office
Counter Fraud Services
Churchill Court MP30.
POL-0044319
38.
POL00047841
Letter from Ged Harbinson to
Lloyds Bank PLC re: Your Ref:
30929900969160 Our ref:
POLTD/0506/0061
POL-0044320
39.
POL00047826
Tahir Mahmood case study:
Letter from Ged Harbinson to
Sharon Mcintyre at Scottish
Widows REL DPA section 29 -
investigation of proceeds of
crime - request for policy
holder and payment details for
account
POL-0044305
40.
POL00048180
Hughie Noel Thomas Case
Study: Internal PO Memo from
J A McFarlane to Ged
Harbinson requesting whether
they are proceeding with
confiscation in R v Hughie. -
Re Regine v Hughie Noel
Thomas
POL-0044659
41.
POL00048229
Letter from Phil Taylor to
Investigation Team Post Office
Limited and Diane Matthews re
Regina v Hughie Noel
Thomas, Caernarfon Crown
Court. POLTD/0506/0401.
POL-0044708
42.
POL00049024
Memo from Juliet McFarlane to
Ged Harbinson re Regina v
Hughie Noel Thomas.
POLTD/0506/0401.
POL-0045503
43.
POLO0069056_007
Email chain from Ged
Harbinson to Clive Burton -
attached Letter from
Insolvency Service to POL re
Hughie Noel Thomas -
Gaerwen PO (Branch Code
160/604) POLTD/05/06/0401.
POL-0065535_007
Page 71 of 78
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44.
POL00044917
Email from Mick F Matthews to
Ged Harbinson, cc'd Paul
Dann, Clive Burton and others
re: HUGHIE NOEL THOMAS -
SUSPENDED POSTMASTER
GAERWEN POST OFFICE -
BRANCH CODE: 160/604Q
POL-0041396
45.
POL00047903
Letter from Graham Brander,
Investigation Manager to Ged
Harbinson, Investigation Team
Compliance Manager.
POL-0044382
46.
POL00047945
Compliance Case Review
Report from Ged Harbinson to
Graham Brander.
POL-0044424
47.
POL00048309
Memo from Juliet McFarlane to
Investigations Team Post
Office Limited, re Royal Mail
Group plc v Josephine
Hamilton Aldershot
Magistrates Court.
POLTD/0506/0685.
POL-0044788
48.
POL00048454
Memo from J McFarlane to
Investigation Team Post Office
Limited, RE: service of
committal papers (R v.
Hamilton)
POL-0044933
49.
POL00049083
Email from Graham Brander to
Jennifer Andrews, Juliet
McFarlane, Dave Pardoe and
others re: Fw: Hamilton
POL-0045562
50.
POL00049154
Josephine Hamilton Case
Study: Memo from Juliet
McFarlane to POL
Investigation Team and others
re: Regina v Josephine
Hamilton (South Warnborough)
Winchester Crown Court
Mention - 19th November 2007
(POLTD/0506/0685)
POL-0045633
51.
POL00044388
Josephine Hamilton case
study: Memorandum from Miss
J A McFarlane to Investigation
Team Post Office Limited, cc
Graham Brander, Ged
Harbinson and Dave Pardoe
RE: R v Josephine Hamilton
POL-0040867
Page 72 of 78
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WITNO08150100
mentions hearing 19/11/2007 -
update after hearing
52.
POL00049168
Email from Graham Brander to
Juliet McFarlane, Ged
Harbinson and Paul Dawkins
tre Josephine Hamilton.
POLTD/0506/0685.
POL-0045647
53.
POL00049025
Email from Graham Brander to
Nigel Allen re Case Closure
Reporting South Wamborough.
POL-0045504
54.
POL00049535
Josephine Hamilton case
study: [Internal Memo from
Ged Harbinson to Dave
Pardoe re: Investigation Ref: -
POLTD/506/0685 - OFFICE
South Warnborough /
SUSPECT NAME Josephine
Hamilton]
POL-0046014
55.
POL00052733
Josephine Hamilton Case
Study: Memo from Phil Taylor
to POL Investigation Team Re
Regina v Josephine Hamilton -
Winchester Crown Court 4th
February 2008
POL-0049212
56.
POL00113278
Approved Judgment between
Josephine Hamilton & Others
and Post Office Limited
POL-0110657
57.
POL00049061
Janet Skinner case study:
Memo from Juliet McFarlane to
Investigation Team POL cc
Geb Harbinson re R v Janet
Louise Skinner Confiscation
Hearing - enclosing
confiscation order and minute
POL-0045540
58.
POL00049840
Memo from Ms McFarlane to
Fraud Team Post Office Ltd re
R v Janet Louise Skinner
POL-0046319
59.
POL00049916
Janet Skinner: [Memo from
J.A. McFarlane to Fraud Team
Post Office Limited cc: Ged
Harbinson re: Regina v Janet
Louise Skinner Hull Icrown
Court - Case No:
POLTD/0607/0108]
POL-0046395
60.
POL00049946
Memorandum from Juliet
McFarlane to Fraud Team Post
Office Limited cc Ged
Harbinson. Re: "Regina v
POL-0046425
Page 73 of 78
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WITNO08150100
Janet Louise Skinner Hull
Crown Court - 26th August
2008 Case No:
POLTD/0607/0108".
61.
POL00049976
Memorandum from Juliet
McFarlane to Fraud Team Post
Office Limited cc Ged
Harbinson. Re: "Regina v
Janet Louise Skinner Hull
Crown Court - 26th August
2008 Case No:
POLTD/0507/0108".
POL-0046455
62.
POL00050022
Memorandum from Juliet
McFarlane to Fraud Team Post
Office Limited cc Ged
Harbinson. Re: "Regina v
Janet Louise Skinner Hull
Crown Court - 29th August
2008 Case No:
POLTD/0607/0108".
POL-0046501
63.
POL00050392
Letter from Jarnail Singh,
Senior Lawyer to Fraud Team
Post Office Limited c.c. Ged
Harbinson re: POST OFFICE
LIMITED v SEEMA MISRA
POL-0046871
64.
POL00050040
Susan Rudkin case study:
[Witness statement of Gerald
Harbinson in support of an
application for a restraint
order]
POL-0046519
65.
POL00046485
Investigation report in re to
theft/money laundering in re to
Susan Jane Rudkin
POL-0042964
66.
POL00124636
Memo from Debbie Helszajn to
Fraud Team Post Office
Limited, RE: Regina V Susan
Rudkin, Case No.
POLTD/0809/0101, plea
before venue
POL-0130917
67.
POL00046555
Email from Mike Wilcox to Paul
X Williams re Case Closure
Reporting for Susan Rudkin
POL-0043034
68.
POL00124632
Memo from Rob Wilson to
Fraud Team Post Office
Limited, cc Mike Wilcox, Ged
Harbinson and Press Office
RE: Regina v Susan Jane
Rudkin, Report on Final
POL-0130913
Page 74 of 78
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Result, Case No:
POLTD/0809/0101
69.
POL00124651
Susan Rudkin Crim Case
Study - Letter from Ged
Harbinson to Jarnail Singh re
RUDKIN and Confiscation
(section 16 (3)statement
under POCA 2002
POL-0130932
70.
POL00124659
Susan Rudkin Criminal Case
Study: Statement of
Information relevant in
accordance with section 16 (3)
of POCA 2002 - Rv Susan
Jane Rudkin, prepared by
Gerald Owen Harbinson
POL-0130940
71.
POL00124653
Criminal Case Study: Susan
Rudkin - Post Office Ltd Land
Registry Check Form for 118 —
120 High Street, IBSTOCK,
Leicester LE67 6LJ
POL-0130934
72.
POL00124660
Susan Rudkin Case Study -
Restraint Order Prohibiting
Disposal of assets in the
Matter of Susan Jane Rudkin
POL-0130941
73.
POL00124641
Memo from Jarnail Singh to
Fraud Team Post Office
Limited cc Mike Wilcox, Ged
Harbinson and Graham Ward
re R v Susan Rudkin -
Confiscation Order made
POL-0130922
74.
POL00061322
Email chain from Ged
Harbinson to Mike Wilcox cc
Graham Brander re: Fw:
Ibstock Sub Post Office (re
Restraint)
POL-0057801
75.
POL00046513
Email from Ged Harbinson to
Jamail Singh regarding
POLTD/0809/0101 Susan
Rudkin
POL-0042992
76.
POL00051248
Memo from Debbie Helszajn to
Fraud Team Post Office
Limited c.c. Mike Wilcox, Ged
Harbison and Press Office RE:
R v Rudkin (Guilty Plea to theft
on 23 March 2009)
POL-0047727
th
POL00051371
Letter from John H. Dove. to
Mr. J. Singh re: Regina - v -
Susan Jane Rudkin.
POL-0047850
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78.
POL00052343
Susan Rudkin case study: note
of hearing - confiscation order
and compensation order
POL-0048822
79.
POL00051446
Email from Ged Harbinson to
Jarnail Singh re confiscation
timetable Susan Rudkin
POL-0047925
80.
POL00051792
Email from Ged Harbinson to
Jarnail Singh, Mike Wilcox.
Re: Regina v Susan Jane
Rudkin
POL-0048271
81.
POL00051800
Letter from Jarnail Singh to
Fraud Team Post Office Ltd re:
R -v- SUSAN JANE RUDKIN
POL-0048279
82.
POL00052022
POST OFFICE LTD
CONFIDENTIAL;
INVESTIGATION,
PERSONNEL, Memo from
Jarnail Singh to Ged
Harbinson Re: RUDKIN and
Confiscation (section 16 (3)
statement under POCA 2002.
POL-0048501
83.
POL00052072
Letter from Jarnail Singh to
Post Office Security c.c. Mike
Wilcox and others re: REGINA
v SUSAN JANE RUDKIN
POL-0048551
84.
POL00052308
Email from Marilyn Benjamin
to Angela May on behalf of
Clerks Re: R v Susan Jane
Rudkin hearing.
POL-0048787
85.
POL00052349
Memo Letter from Jarnail
Singh to Mike Wilcox, Graham
Ward and Ged Harbinson. Re:
Regina v Susan Jane Rudkin
Stafford Crown Court
Confiscation Proceedings
under the Proceeds of crime
act - 19th August 2009
POL-0048828
86.
POL00053389
Email from Rob Wilson to Paul
Williams re Ibstock 223 227
solicitors letter
POL-0049868
87.
POL00054182
Memo from Jarnail Singh to
Post Office Security and Ged
Harbinson re: REGINA v
SUSAN JANE RUDKIN
STAFFORD CROWN COURT
SATISFACTION OF
CONFISCATION ORDER
POL-0050661
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88.
POL00055170
Email chain from Marilyn
Benjamin to Jarnail A Singh re:
FW: Regina v Susan Jane
Rudkin
POL-0051649
89.
POL00119142
POST OFFICE LTD
CONFIDENTIAL:
INVESTIGATION Julian Wilson
POL-0119061
90.
POL00064718_001
Graham Ward's witness
statement in support of an
application for a restraint order
(Section 41 Proceeds of Crime
Act 2002) against Julian
Wilson.
POL-0061197_001
91.
POL00051185
Report into antecedents of Mr
Julian Wilson, including details
of property owned.
POL-0047664
92.
POL00050726
Julian Wilson case study:
Email from Graham C Ward to
Jarnail A Singh, RE: FW: Post
Office Ltd v Julian Wilson
POL-0047205
93.
POL00050878
Letter from Jarnail Singh to
Fraud Team Post Office
Limited, Re: Post Office
Limited v Julian Wilson
POL-0047357
94.
POL00051720
Letter from Jarnail Singh to
Fraud Team Post Office
Limited c.c. Gary Thomas and
others re: REGINA v JULIAN
WILSON
POL-0048199
95.
POL00119150
Memo from Jarnail Singh to
Fraud Team Post Office
Limited cc Gary Thomas,
Graham Ward, and another re
Regina v Julian Wilson -
Enclosing counsel's advice
and copies of other documents
lodged with the Court
POL-0119069
96.
POL00052047
Letter from Jarnail Singh to
Fraud Team Post Office
Limited c.c. Graham Ward and
others re: REGINA v JULIAN
WILSON
POL-0048526
97.
POL00064718_001
Graham Ward's witness
statement in support of an
application for a restraint order
(Section 41 Proceeds of Crime
Act 2002) against Julian
Wilson.
POL-0061197_001
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98.
POL00051356
Letter from Jarnail Singh to
Fraud Team Post Office
Limited re: POST OFFICE
LIMITED v JULIAN WILSON
AND KAREN WILSON
POL-0047835
99.
POL00050817
Peter Holmes case study:
Email from Ged Harbinson to
Intelligence Transactions and
Criminal Intelligence, RE:
Intelligence Check Request
POL-0047296
100.
POL00050819
Email from Ged Harbinson to
Intelligence transactions and
criminal intelligence, RE:
Authorising checks of Peter
Holmes
POL-0047298
101.
POL00052429
Memo from J A McFarlane to
Post Office Security, RE: Rv
Peter Anthony Holmes,
Newcastle Upon Tyne Crown
Court, Mention, W/L W/C 14th
Sept 2009
POL-0048908
102.
POL00054543
Email from Andrew Daley to
John Breeden re Holmes
POL-0051022
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