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Witness Name: Andrew George Hayward
Statement No.: WITN08160100
Dated: 11/05/2023
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF: Andrew Hayward
I, Andrew George Hayward, will say as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. I am a former employee of Post Office Ltd. and held various positions within the
business over a 31year period, culminating in Senior Security Operations Manager
when I left the company in July 2015.
2. This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry (the
“Inquiry”) with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 06/04/2022 (the
“Request’).
BACKGROUND
3. I have been asked to set out my professional career whilst employed by Post
Office Ltd (“POL”) where I was employed.
4. Postman: 1984-1985: Delivery of mail
5. Post Office Counter clerk: 1985 — 1986: Operational duties, serving customers and
back-room duties.
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6. Supply Chain Manager: 1986 — 2000: Various operational and management roles
including cash, stock, coin, finance and culminating in Cash Centre manager,
Birmingham, with responsibility of end-to-end supply chain for services to Network
& external banking customers.
7. Security Team Leader/manager 2000 — 2008: Various roles within Physical crime
team including Security Advisor, Team Leader, and temporary Senior Security
Manager. Investigation, statement taking and interviews under PACE.
Responsibility of leading team of security managers to mitigate threat of external
crime against POL Network & Supply Chain.
8. Senior Security Fraud Risk Programme Manager 2008-2010: Responsible for a
range of fraud prevention programmes to mitigate fraud risks and losses. Senior
lead on fraud risk; communications plan, crime & offender profiling and product
fraud. Crime analysis; identification of merging patterns and trends.
9. Senior Security Operations Manager: 2010 — July 2015: Asset protection; Circa
11,500 Post Office Crown and branch network and CViT supply chain estate
operations. Management of operational fraud risk programmes, including
prevention and detection strategies to meet changing threats. Management of
fraud investigations, including criminal prosecutions, support of conduct &
contractual matters, conduct of investigations, including training and development.
External crime prevention activities to prevent, detect and mitigate threats,
including situational crime prevention methodologies. Manage and develop a team
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of direct reports and security managers to manage and mitigate fraud and external
crime risks. Critical threat, crisis management; kidnap, hostage and serious
incidents.
Law enforcement and Security Industry engagement. Senior Authorising Officer for
POCA Restraint and Confiscation Orders.
RECRUITMENT OF SPMS
10.In respect of the October 2008 Feasibility Report “RS1707 Agency Recruitment
Policy” (POL00005670), previous to this policy I was requested by the Head of
Security (John Scott / “JS”), to undertake a project to review security investigation
casework files to identify any mitigating factors in better identifying fraud. One of
the main findings and as noted in the report was that SPMs with 0-5 years' service
were more likely to commit fraud and secondly the POL recruitment process for
spmrs was not robustly managed. Enhanced credit checks and better management
of the recruitment process would help identify and mitigate fraud losses. I can
confirm that I left POL in July 2015 and enhanced processes had not been
introduced.
11.In respect of point 8/page 35 of POL00084977 I can confirm and as noted in
paragraph 10 above the previous review of casework identified a lack of robust
management of new SPMs. Enhanced credit checks would have identified risks at
an earlier stage. POL was unable to undertake these checks independently, with
the aim being to conduct checks in conjunction with a third-party supplier
(Callcredit) and the bank of Ireland. On leaving the business in July 2015 enhanced
processes had not been introduced.
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THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY TEAM AND THE POLICIES/PRACTICES IN PLACE
12.In respect of the period of time I worked in the security team, to the best of my
knowledge POL/Royal Mail had Direct Public Authority (DPA) status to enable them
to undertake criminal investigations. I had no direct involvement in the writing of
these policies, nor the practise or rationale of undertaking private prosecutions.
13.On leaving the business in July 2015 to the best of my knowledge POL were still
undertaking financial recovery where authorised, although this had been greatly
reduced due to the Horizon Integrity issues identified.
Policies governing the conduct of criminal investigations
14.In respect of Policies governing the conduct of criminal investigations by the
Security team and organisational structure I have no knowledge of the policies
mentioned’, other than Post Office Ltd Financial Investigation Policy (version 2,
February 2011) (POL00104853) and Post Office Ltd Anti-Fraud Policy (February
2011) (POL00104855). The aim was to reinforce the security team structure and
aims to the wider business and the fraud prevention approach adopted. This was
driven and directed by the Head of Security, JS.
15.In respect of the structure, security team had “Strands”, all reporting to the Head
of Security. These were; (i) Commercial-leading on POL products and services
such as credit card/banking etc. (ii) The Information Technology Team (IT), leading
on IT within the business(iii) The Operational team, leading on internal fraud,
external crime (robbery, burglary)(iv) The Physical team, leading on areas
including, alarms, buildings, vehicles (v) The Crime Risk/Admin team (re-named
1 POL00030578, POL00104812, POL00104806, POL00031004, POL00031003, POL00030580,
POL00030579, POL00026573, POL00031008, POL00104853, POL00104855, POL00030786,
POL00104929, POL00105226, POL00030602, POL00031005, POL00027863, POL00030902.
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Grapevine; date unknown), leading on risk analysis and administration matters for
the security team. I am not aware of any major changes to these teams during my
time in the security team. For the record I was never the Head of Security.
16.In respect of conducting criminal investigations (and the Inquiry’s question as to
who would determine how an investigation would be conducted), the policies and
procedures gave direction to this. The Head of Security had overall responsibility
for this.
17.1 have been asked about the role of the financial investigation unit. The aim was to
recover financial losses in line with the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. There were
financial levels adopted, from memory I believe a £15k threshold was the level set
for intervention, however I cannot confirm if this is still the case.
18.In respect of other teams within the Post Office being involved in criminal
investigations and prosecutions, the legal team gave overall direction and authority
to proceed in prosecutions. The Network and audit teams liaised with the security
team on investigations, providing supporting evidence and witness statements
where required and where prosecutions were not deemed appropriate, any
outcomes such as contractual matters would be passed to the Network teams as
they had the lead responsibilities for this.
19.In respect of legislation, policies, guidance and / or principles governing the
conduct of investigations conducted by the Security team during the period I
worked within it were directed by legislation, including the Police and Criminal
Investigation Act 2002(PACE), Regulation and Investigation Powers Act 2000
(RIPA), Criminal Procedures and Investigation Act 1996 and the Human Rights Act
1996 (HRA). Any changes would be directed by legislation. In respect of fraud there
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was a change of direction when the Head of Security (JS), came which still adhered
to the legislation but adopted a fraud risk approach, aimed at prevention and
detection of crime against POL.
20.In respect of dealing with complaints regarding an investigation, the initial point of
contact would be to the line manager, thereafter, raised to the wider business
helpline.
21.In respect of supervision the investigation manager reported to his/her line
manager who had oversight of the individual cases, which were reviewed on an
ongoing/monthly basis. Overarching this was a monthly review undertaken by the
senior security fraud team and Head of Security of investigation casefiles.
22.In respect of POLs approach to suspected fraud, losses were identified via planned
audits undertaken by the Network teams. Depending on the type or amount of loss,
this would be dealt with either by the Network team as a contractual matter or by
the security team as a criminal investigation. The security team would also conduct
analysis under fraud risk programmes to identify potential fraud and/or losses.
23.In respect of POLs policy and practice regarding investigation and prosecution of
Crown Office employees differing from the policy and practice regarding
investigation and prosecution of SPMs, from a security perspective there was no
difference in dealing with as a criminal investigation, which to the best of my
knowledge did not change during my time.
24.In respect of POL00104900 I am not aware that this had any impact on either
business as they operated and were directed by legislation processes as noted in
framework documents.
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25.In respect of the rationale behind the development of a Post Office specific
“Conduct of Criminal Investigations Policy” in 2013 I did not undertake this and
have no recollection of any contribution to this policy.
26.In respect of the draft “Post Office Fraud and Loss Prevention Policy” from 2013 at
POL00038603 I am not aware if this was finalised or approved.
27.In respect of the document entitled “Security Team Objectives 2013 — 2014” dated
April 2013 at POL00105025 my understanding is that the loss reduction board was
the business wide committee to oversee all activities undertaken by the whole
business and the loss reduction programmes were individual activities undertaken
by specific teams to support this. From a security team perspective, the fraud risk
programmes would have fed into this to enable activities and financial benefits to
be tracked.
How and when the Security team became involved in an investigation
28.In respect of the circumstances in which an auditor would be sent to conduct an
audit at a Post Office branch to the best of my understanding there would be two
specific circumstances. Firstly, the Network Audit teams conducted planned yearly
audits at branches. Secondly, if the security or associated
Conformance/Compliance/Cash management teams identified branches that were
deemed a risk due to analysis, then an audit would be requested.
29.In respect of the document “Condensed Guide for Audit Attendance” (version 2,
October 2008) (POL00084813) to the best of my understanding an investigator
would attend an audit of a branch or after an audit has been conducted if there was
a loss identified. I have no recollection on the specific amounts of loss. If in
attendance the investigator's role would be to ensure all evidence is secured in
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accordance with PACE and where required arrange and/or conduct interviews
under PACE.
30.In respect of a shortfall being identified during an audit of a branch, the level of loss
would dictate who the auditor reported that shortfall or discrepancy to. I believe the
auditor would report it to the Helpline within the Network. Losses would also be
reported to the Security Administration team.
3
.In respect to the documents POL00104929 and POL00105226 and Appendix 1 to
POL00104825 where a shortfall was identified following an audit of a SPM’s
branch: i) The amount or type of loss would determine whether an investigation
into potential criminality was to be conducted by the Security team or the case was
taken forwards as a debt recovery matter by the Financial Services Centre and /
or the relevant legal team. This would be agreed between the Network and security
team. I am not aware that this process changed during the period I worked within
the Security team. ii) The SPM’s local contract manager would have input into this
decision-making process in conjunction with his/her line manager and/or the
security team. I am not aware that this changed during the period I worked within
the Security team iii) Given the timescales since I left POL, I cannot recollect the
triggers / criteria for raising a fraud case following the identification of a shortfall /
discrepancy in a SPM’s branch. To the best of my knowledge the triggers / criteria
for raising a theft or false accounting case were not different and did not change.
32.In respect of the memo dated 15 December 2009 sent by myself and Dave Posnett
to the Security team (POL00104825), given the timescale (2009 to current), to the
best of my knowledge, the rationale for conducting cash verification exercises in
all branches “(except Crowns)” ahead of the migration to Horizon online was that
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in terms of historical fraud loss data, branches would have been deemed a higher
risk than Crown managed branches. I have no knowledge of the impact of this
requirement and the migration to Horizon online more broadly on the work of the
Fraud team. In respect of Appendix 2 within POLO0104825 regarding the three
levels of officer status for members of the Security team due to the timescale (2009
to present) I have no recollection on the decision-making process and impacts on
the fraud team, other than level 1 managers had greater experience in investigation
matters.
Involvement of the Security team in the suspension process
33.In respect of the suspension process, the documents at POL00104809 and
POL00105231 refer to Royal Mail not POL. To the best of my knowledge if a
shortfall was discovered by an audit then the security team would discuss with the
line manager or the contracts manager who if deemed appropriate would
undertake the suspension. The process would not differ between branches or
Crown staff.
The process followed by Security team investigators when conducting a criminal
investigation following the identification of a shortfall
34.In respect of conducting criminal investigations following a shortfall, from my
understanding the document POL00105223 was written to support investigators in
the full process in gathering evidence to support the investigating officer in a
specific POL case. Previous to this the Royal Mail documents were written to cover
both Royal Mail and POL investigations, but did not detail the specific elements
covered by POL. All Royal Mail and POL cases did not differ in reference to
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adhering to the legislative framework set out in the documents noted at footnote 1
of this statement.
Decisions about prosecution and criminal enforcement proceedings
35.1 have considered a number of policies identified by the Inquiry’. In respect of the
policies referred to I have no recollection of involvement in the development of the
policies. All Royal Mail documents would have been written by Royal Mail
employees. The POL documents would have been updated to reflect POL following
the separation of the two businesses. The POL prosecution policy was written to
protect the business and its employees and agents from criminal activity and set
out the legislative framework to follow in conducting any investigations. I am not
aware of any specific changes to this during my service in the security team.
Decisions on whether to raise a case would be taken between the relevant parties
involved (such as contracts or line managers), with any decisions on prosecution
and/or confiscation proceedings decided by the Criminal Law team in conjunction
with external lawyers (Cartwright King).
Training, instructions and guidance to investigators within the Security team
36.In respect of training, all investigators undertook in-house training carried out by
previously trained security managers. This involved all aspects of legislature
appropriate to investigations, sections of PACE appropriate to interviewing and
searches. Training was also undertaken in conjunction with Police Law
enforcement (such as searches). Following training all investigators were subject
to an exam with a pass rate set. I am unable to recollect the specific pass rate.
2 POLO0030659, POL00030800, POL00031011, POL00030580, POL00031008, POL00030598,
POL00030685, POL00031034, POL00104929, POL00105226, POL00030602, POL00030686 and
POL00030811.
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Following this all investigators were supported by experienced investigators on an
ongoing basis.
37.1 have considered a number of documents identified by the Inquiry®. In respect of
the documents referred to in this section to the best of my knowledge the
documents would have been referred to as part of the training modules for
investigators which in summary would have included the specifics of how to
undertake tape recorded interviews, how to take and manage witness statements,
guidelines to follow during an investigation, how to conduct an interview with key
points to cover for a criminal investigation in relation to the theft act, how to fully
manage a case file investigation, correct procedures to follow in gaining evidence,
including evidence from third parties such as Fujitsu data and an understanding of
disclosure, dealing with defence solicitors, complaints, report writing and the
decision making process for criminal investigations. From a personal perspective I
was trained over 20 years ago and I have no further detailed knowledge of this
area.
Analysing Horizon data and requesting ARQ data from Fujitsu
38.1 have been asked to consider POL00105223 and POL00105213. In respect to
analysing Horizon data this was not within my specific remit and was undertaken
by other members of the security team. I have no detailed knowledge on this and
am unable to assist with this or the date of the document POL00105213.
3 Appendix 2 of POL00104825, POL00104805, POL00104932, POL00104944, POL00104945,
POL00104948, POL00104953, POL00104952, POL00104986, POL00104989, POL00105002,
POL00105008 and POL00105099 and, separately, POL00104818, POL00104836, POL0014867,
POL00104859, POL00104861, POL00104875, POL00105225 and, separately, POLO0104827,
POL00104826 and, separately, POL00104828, POL00104849 and, separately, POL00104891,
POL00104848 and POL00104893 and, separately, POL00104881 and POL00104879.
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39.1 have been asked to consider POL00004708 (which concerns Barkham PO). In
respect to the SPM in question, the matter was dealt with by other members of the
security team and as such I have no recollection or knowledge regarding this
particular case.
Cases against SPMS
40.1 have been provided with a list of cases‘. In respect of the cases noted regarding
criminal cases I did not have any direct dealing with any of these cases and cannot
recollect anything. I am not aware that I had any role as an investigator in
prosecutions relating to the public inquiry. Looking back at the time I had no
concerns with criminal cases of which I was involved.
Challenges to the integrity of Horizon
41.In respect of challenges to the integrity of Horizon that came to light this was not
within my remit and was dealt with by the Information Security team.
Involvement in work/reviews relating to Fraud and in-branch losses
42.\In respect of the Fraud Forum, this was set up to ensure that all appropriate internal
stakeholders were ‘joined-up’ with the approach to fraud risks within the business,
with the aims being on prevention and detection of risks within the POL portfolio of
products and services. This included Security, Product and Branch Accounting
(P&BA), Cash Management and Network teams. Previous to this there was more
of an individual team approach. From a security perspective analysis was
undertaken by the team in conjunction with other forum teams on identified risk
4 Nichola Arch, Susan Hazzleton, Lisa Brennan, David Yates, Carl Page, David Blakey, Tahir Mahmood,
Oyeteju Adedayo, Hughie Thomas, Suzanne Palmer, Janet Skinner, Jo Hamilton, Pauline Stonehouse,
Susan Rudkin, Julian Wilson, Peter Holmes, Seema Misra, Allison Henderson, Alison Hall, Joan Bailey,
Lynette Hutchings, Grant Allen, Khayyam Ishaq, Angela Sefton and Ann Neild.
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areas (such as cash losses, accounting/product irregularities). Planned
programme activities were then undertaken, including audits, conformance visits,
investigations where required, with report/result findings reported upwards to
relevant stakeholders within the business for information and further action where
deemed necessary.
43.In respect of the involvement in reducing cash losses and fraud reduction my
involvement centred around fraud risk programmes (such as cash losses
POL00085769). Having identified the respective risks to the business activities
were agreed with various stakeholders as set out in paragraph 42 above. In
relation to the report undertaken reference POL00042081, my only input to this
was to provide information on current activities undertaken by the security team,
primarily from a fraud perspective. I am not aware if any of the recommendations
were progressed following this report. POLO0105041 referred to actions from a
security Operations lead team meeting of which I was a member. Activities such as
fraud risk programmes were noted in this document for onward activity as noted in
paragraph 42 above.
The Security team’s role in relation to debt recovery
44.In respect of documents POL00084977, POL00084996, POLO00085008 and
POL00085009 both my role and the Security team’s role in relation to recovery of
debt from current and former SPMs was to deploy the fraud risk programmes to
identify, prevent, investigate and where required recover assets though criminal
prosecutions and financial recovery. My recollection of the 2009 review into agent
debt was that the current security fraud risk and investigation activities fed into the
wider business activities on sub postmaster debt to identify future and enhanced
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processes to better manage this. I provided information to this from the security
team, with the report and overall ownership being led by the Network Back Office
Efficiency Programme. The fraud risk programmes and investigations continued as
part of this wider review
45.In respect of the document POL00038367 relating to Fraud Investigation and
prevention, my recollection was that the business was greatly reducing headcount
(including members of the security team), and was looking to explore additional
means of debt recovery other than criminal investigations/prosecutions. Whilst
notwithstanding the need to continue with investigations as set out in the
document, it was suggested that other areas of recovery could be explored,
including contractual and civil actions.
46.In respect of the document POL00091483 my recollection is that the branch
support programme was looking at business wide cost reductions and as a
stakeholder the security team played a role in this. As I left the business in July
2015, other than the ongoing fraud risk activities, investigations and the enhanced
credit check vetting project I do not believe I had further involvement and cannot
provide further information on this matter.
Knowledge of bugs, errors and defects in the Horizon system
47. In respect of POL00095547 I was made aware of issues raised regarding Horizon
Integrity, although I had no direct involvement in dealing with these matters from
an operational/IT perspective. This was being led by other teams within the
business. With regards to the Security team, updates were provided via the Head
of Security (JS), in summary these being that the Horizon Integrity issues were
being reviewed. From an investigation perspective we were instructed by JS that
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any investigation case files that were subject to Horizon integrity challenges be
passed to the Criminal Law Team/Cartwright King for review and decision on
progression. JS also requested that All case files were passed to himself for
personal review. I cannot recollect specific cases in relation to this.
48.In respect of section 6 of the “Post Office Ltd - Security Policy: Accounting losses
policy for agency branches” (version 1, February 2003) at POLO0086845) and the
same section in the “Post Office Ltd - Security Policy: Liability for losses policy (for
agency branches)” (version 1.7, September 2003) (POL00088867), the suggestion
that system faults with Horizon were “very rare” corresponded with my
understanding of the position in 2003.
Post Office Investigations
49.1 have been asked about my involvement in any investigations carried out by the
POL into the integrity of Horizon and / or the investigation, advice or reports into
the Horizon IT system or its impact on prosecutions that were carried out by the
following (my answer follows each category):
a. Second Sight; No involvement.
b. Cartwright King; Communication to transfer files for comment/authorisation.
c. Simon Clark (of Cartwright King); No involvement.
d. Brian Altman KC; No involvement.
e. Jonathan Swift KC; No involvement
f. The Bates & Others Group Litigation. No involvement.
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50.In respect of any other matters, I do not wish to bring anything further to the
attention of the Chair of the Inquiry.
Statement of Truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true:
Dated: 11 May 2023
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Index to First Witness Statement of Andrew George Hayward
No. I URN Document description Control No.
4 POL00005670 POL Agency Recruitment Policy Feasibility I VISO0006738
Report, version 2
2 POL00084977 Post Office, Former SPM End to End Debt I POL-0082035
Review v.0.5
3 POL00030578 S02 Royal Mail Group Criminal Investiga- I POL-0027060
tion and Prosecution Policy December
2007
4 POL00104812 “Royal Mail Group Ltd Criminal Investiga- I POL-0080444
tion and Prosecution Policy"
5 POL00104806 Royal Mail Group Security - Procedures POL-0080438
and Standards: Standards of behaviour
and complaints procedure No.10-X v2
6 POL00031004 RMG Policy - Crime and Investigation (S2) I POL-0027486
- version 3.0
7 POL00031003 Royal Mail Group Crime and Investigation I POL-0027485
Policy v1.1 October 2009
8 POL00030580 Post Office Ltd - Security Policy: Fraud In- I POL-0027062
vestigation and Prosecution Policy v2
9 POL00030579 Post Office Ltd Financial Investigation Pol- I POL-0027061
icy, May 2010
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10 I POLO0026573 RMG Proceedures & Standards - Proceeds I POL-0023214
of Crime Act 2002 & Financial Investiga-
tions doc 9.1 V1
11 I POL00031008 RMG Ltd Criminal Investigation and Prose- I POL-0027490
cution Policy v1.1 November 2010
12 I POL00104853 Post Office's Financial Investigation Policy I POL-0080485
13 I POLO0104855 Post Office Ltd. Anti-Fraud Policy POL-0080487
14 I POL00030786 Royal Mail Group Policy - Crime and Inves- I POL-0027268
tigation (S2) v3 effective from April 2011,
owner Tony March, Group Security Direc-
tor
15 I POL00104929 “Post Office Limited: Internal Protocol for POL-0080561
Criminal Investigation and Enforcement
(with flowchart)"
16 I POL00105226 Undated Appendix 1 - POL Criminal Inves- I POL-0080851
tigations and Enforcement Procedure
(flowchart)
17 I POL00030602 POL: Criminal Enforcement and Prosecu- I POL-0027084
tion Policy
18 I POLO0031005 Conduct of Criminal Investigation Policy for I POL-0027487
the Post Office. (Version 0.2)
19 I POL00027863 Conduct of Criminal Investigations Policy POL-0024504
v0.3
20 I POL00030902 Final Draft of the Post Office Conduct of POL-0027384
Criminal Investigation Policy
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21 =I POL00104900 Undated 'Separation Project - Criminal In- I POL-0080532
vestigations Policy for Post Office Ltd’
22 I POL00038603 Post Office Fraud and Loss Prevention POL-0027914
Policy v0.1 Draft
23 I POLO0105025 Security Team Objectives (2013 - 2014) POL-0080657
24 I POL00084813 Condensed Guide For Audit Attendance POL-0081871
25 I POL00104825 Update from Dave Posnett and Andy Hay- I POL-0080457
ward re Horizon Online Cash Verification-
Fraud Impact
26 I POL00104809 Royal Mail Group Security — Procedures POL-0080441
and Standards: Suspension from duty
No.6-X v1
27 =I POLO0105231 Royal Mail Internal Information Criminal In- I POL-0080856
vestigation Team: Suspension from Duty
v1
28 I POLO0105223 Security Operations Casework Review POL-0080848
29 I POL00030659 Post Office Internal Prosecution Policy POL-0027141
(Dishonesty), Andrew Wilson December
1997
30 I POL00030800 RMG Policy - Prosecution (S3) Version 3.0 I POL-0027282
31 I POLO0031011 RMG Prosecution Policy (undated) V2.1 POL-0027493
32 I POL00030598 Royal Mail Prosecution Decision Proce- POL-0027080
dure
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33 I POLO00030685 Royal mail Group Prosecution Policy, v3.0, I POL-0027167
April 2011 - Rob Wilson (Head of Criminal
Law Team)
34 I POL00031034 Post Office Prosecution Policy V1 POL-0027516
35 I POL00030686 Post Office Prosecution Policy England POL-0027168
and Wales (effective from 1/11/13, review
1/11/14)
36 I POL00030811 Post Office Limited Prosecution Policy for I POL-0027293
England and Wales v1
37 I POL00105213 Fraud Risk Security Pro-forma — Guide to I POL-0080838
Obtaining Reports from Horizon - undated
38 I POLO0004708 Email from Jason G Collins to Mark VIS00005776
Dinsdale and others, RE FW: ARQ re-
quests- Barkham Post Office 212939
39 I POLO0104805 Royal Mail Group: Evidence and Witness POL-0080437
Statements “E” Learning
40 I POL00104932 Post Office Security Team Key Skills Data- I POL-0080564
base
41 I POL00104944 Internal POL Email chain re: Security POL-0080576
Team Skills Database
42 I POLO0104945 Internal POL Email Chain re: Technical POL-0080577
Skills of POL Security Team
43 I POL00104948 POL document collating responses to que- I POL-0080580
ries about technical skills of Security Team
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44 I POL00104953 Internal POL email re: Security Team Skills I POL-0080585
Database
45 I POL00104952 Updated Key Skills Database for Post Of- I POL-0080584
fice Security Team
46 I POLO0104986 Internal POL email re: learning and devel- I POL-0080618
opment
47 I POL00104989 POL Security People Plan Workstream: POL-0080621
Advanced Development
48 I POL00105002 Internal POL email chain re: training and POL-0080634
development of Security Team
49 I POL00105008 Training and Development Record of Andy I POL-0080640
Hayward
50 I POL00105099 Security Manager — Training & Induction POL-0080729
Timetable
51 I POL00104818 Royal Mail Group Security Investigation POL-0080450
Circular 5-2008
52 I POL00104836 Royal Mail Group Security — Procedures & I POL-0080468
Standards — Written records of tape-rec-
orded interviews 8.3 v5
53 I POL00104859 Appendix 1 to P&S 7.4 Interviewing sus- POL-0080491
pects on tape quick reference guide Eng-
land and Wales doc 7.4 v1
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54
POL00104861
Appendix 4 to P&S 7.4 — Interviewing sus-
pects using notes of interview quick refer-
ence guide — England and Wales doc 7.4
v1
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POL-0080493
55
POL00104875
“Royal Mail Internal Information Criminal
Investigation Team: Written Record of
Tape-Recorded Interviews" v1
POL-0080507
56
POL00105225
Post Office: A guide to interviewing
POL-0080850
57
POL00104827
Royal Mail Group Security Procedures &
Standards: Witness Statements P&S Doc
5.4 v2
POL-0080459
58
POL00104826
Royal Mail Group Security Procedures &
Standards: Appendix 2 to P&S 5.4 — Man-
aging the witness and structure & contents
of witness statements v1
POL-0080458
59
POL00104828
Royal Mail Group Security Procedures &
Standards: Searching No. 7-X v5
POL-0080460
60
POL00104849
Royal Mail Group Security Procedures &
Standards: Searching doc 7.5 v6
POL-0080481
61
POL00104891
Royal Mail Group Security Procedures &
Standards: Appendix 1 to P&S 5.4 — Rules
& Continuity of Evidence v1
POL-0080523
62
POL00104848
Royal Mail Group Security Procedures &
Standards: Appendix 1 to P&S 9.5 Disclo-
sure of Unused Material & The Criminal
POL-0080480
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Procedure & Investigations Act 1996. Ver-
sion 1.
WITNO8160100
WITN08160100
63
POL00104893
Appendix 7 to 7.4 — Dealing with Defence
Solicitors & Complaints by Suspects v1
POL-0080525
64
POL00104881
"Royal Mail Internal Information Criminal
Investigation Team: Guide to the prepara-
tion of suspect offender reports, England,
Wales and Northern Ireland" v1
POL-0080513
65
POL00104879
Appendix 1 to 8.2 Suspect Offender Re-
ports, Preamble Guide England, Wales
and Northern Ireland v1
POL-0080511
66
POL00085769
Business Loss Programme Board ONCH —
Cash Loss deficiencies
POL-0082827
67
POL00042081
Detica and BAE Systems: Driving business
benefits through the consolidation of data
review - Post Office Fraud Solution
POL-0038563
68
POL00105041
Minutes of Security Operations Lead Team
Meeting
POL-0080673
69
POL00084996
POL Back Office Efficiency Programme,
Presentation on Debt Review Output
POL-0082054
70
POL00085008
Back Office Efficiency Programme Debt
Review, Work Management Tools Terms
of Reference
POL-0082066
Page 23 of 24
WITNO8160100
WITN08160100
71 I POLO0085009 Back Office Efficiency Programme Debt POL-0082067
Review, Work Management Tools Terms
of Reference
72 I POL00038367 Getting Started V.1.1 Guide POL-0035302
73 I POL00091483 Post Office Branch Support Programme - POL-0091046
Work Stream Meeting Presentation Slides
74 I POLO0095547 Email from Doug Brown to Andy Hayward, I POL-0095130
Sue Richardson, Alison Bolsover and oth-
ers re: Scope of declarations
75 I POLO0086845 Post Office Ltd Security Policy: Accounting I POL-0083903
Losses Policy for Agency Branches
76 I POL00088867 Post Office Ltd: Liability for Losses Policy I POL-0085925
for agency branches v2.0 January 2004
Page 24 of 24