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Witness Name:
Gary Thomas
Statement No.: WITN09160100
Dated: 04/10/2023
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF GARY THOMAS
I, Gary Thomas, will say as follows...
This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry (the
“Inquiry”) with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 23rd August 2023
(the “Request’). I am responding below to all the questions set out in the annex
supplied to me on the date of the request on the 23 August.
INTRODUCTION
1. lam a former employee of Post Office Ltd and held the various positions of
Counter Clerk, Assistant Manager, Branch Manager, Security Manager and
Fraud Investigator and Field Change Advisor amongst other short-term roles
between September 1985 and September 2017, when I then left the business
after 32 years loyal service. My qualifications and training were all undertaken
through internal training initially as a Counter Clerk following on to Branch
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Manager Courses and included my Security and PACE training when I joined
the Security Team from around 2000 as I recall.
BACKGROUND
2.
I became a Fraud Investigator / Security Manager around 2000 as I recall
following an internal application and a recommendation from my Line Manager
at the time, Mr Andrew Thomson. At that time, I was the Post Office Branch
Manager in Southampton Crown Post Office and after I had lost both my
parents in the space of 9 months, there was a vacancy in Security being
advertised. Andrew Thomson felt I had the necessary experience and expertise
to do well within this type of role and it was based in Bournemouth closer to my
home. I therefore applied and underwent a fairly complex set of Interviews
before being offered the role of Post Office Security Manager. This
subsequently resulted in a residential training course lasting around 3 weeks as
I recall and to be trained in various competencies including PACE 1984 Codes
of Practice, Interviewing Under Caution, Voluntary Searching of Home, Person
and Vehicles along with completion of notebook entries and the retention and
storing of exhibits to name but a few I can now try to remember, some 23 plus
years ago.
My initial Line Manager was Mr Geoff Hall, the Security Area Team Leader. I
subsequently had a number of other Team Managers as I recall over the years
I was in the team, including Tony Utting, Andy Hayward, Dave Posnett and
Jason Collins. All of these Area Managers reported to the various National
Heads Of Security with the first I recall being Mr Tony Marsh whom I had little
direct contact with but felt he was however very competent and respected.
There was also Mr Phil Gerrish who again was excellent and very
approachable and then my final Head of Security before I left was Mr John
Scott.
. During my time in the Security / Fraud Team, I found all of my colleagues and
Direct Line Managers (Area Team Leaders) to be both competent, professional
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and approachable. I did not necessarily feel the same or hold the respect of all
of the Security Senior Managers in my final last few years within the team and
before I left. The reason I say this is the firsthand experience I witnessed with
the treatment of Security Team colleagues and managers in the last few years I
worked there. They appeared to not welcome any challenges or questions
raised from team members with regards to any decisions or changes they
made or planned to introduce. I can’t give specific examples of these now but
recall personally how they would introduce unreasonable working practices and
work locations for team members. For example, I lived in Bournemouth and
worked from either home or an office base for probably around 9/10 years as
did my colleagues Graham Brander in Southampton and Mike Wilcox in
Plymouth. I also around 2009 possibly shared an office with Lester Chine now
living in Bournemouth. We were all told we then all had to work out of Swindon
Stock Centre as a Hub at least 3 days a week when there appeared no valid or
sensible reason. This was to be at our own time travelling and at our own
expense for fuel. Mike Wilcox in Plymouth who was in the Security Team for
well over 12 years at the time could clearly not do the 300 mile a day round trip
in his own time after say an 8 or 9 hour day and at his own expense. He
subsequently felt he had no option other than to leave the business after nearly
40 years service, when to everyone else it was a kind of constructive dismissal
situation. This is just one example of several as to why I say this now.
. The Security Manager / Fraud Investigator roles were as above and generally
covering both positions which were the same in many aspects but just held a
different title, is my only considered difference. Although the Security Manager
Role was later more related to external crime, with attacks on staff for example
delivering cash and stock or where a burglary or robbery had taken place at an
Office.
. With regards to disciplinary matters these were always dealt with by the Post
Office Contracts Manager towards Subpostmasters and with regards to
Counter Clerks / Branch Managers, this was dealt with by the Post Office
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Counters Area Managers. I can confirm that on occasions I was asked to
advise Postmasters that they may have been precautionary suspended on
behalf of their Contracts Manager pending further information and subject to a
meeting or interview with that said person.
7. My role was to interview individuals who were Post Office employees, either
direct Crown Office Staff or via their Subpostmaster Contract, who were
suspected or who had admitted to committing a criminal offence or to ascertain
the facts surrounding an enquiry. Individuals were either interviewed voluntarily
where I would advise them of their legal rights and the Post Office Friend rule
for any interview, or unless they were arrested by the Police, the Police would
do all this before transporting them to the local Police Station for the
subsequent Interview. I would have still conducted the Interview at a Police
Station as we were a well-known recognised interviewing authority with the
Police similar to that of the Benefits Agency / DWP Security Teams.
8. I would always give disclosure to any Legal Representative who was present in
either suspected criminal or voluntary interviews. Should any case proceed to
court, the Post Office Legal Services Team or any Legal Representative
instructed by the Post Office would deal with any disclosure.
9. This is the same with any litigation case strategy. This would have been the
Post Office Legal Team’s role as I can recall.
10. My liaising with other Post Office departments would have been varied
depending on who was interviewed. This would include my Line Manager,
Security Casework Managers, Post Office Contracts / Area Managers,
Postmaster Federation Reps, Financial Recovery Investigators in later years
when the Proceeds of Crime Act was introduced. There was also the Post
Office Helpline, Auditor's and there may have been several others, but these
were the frequent ones I still recall.
11.1 have considered the following documents:
vi.
vii.
viii.
xi.
xii.
xiii.
xiv.
XV.
xvi.
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Casework Management Policy (version 1.0, March 2000) ([POL00104747])
and (version 4.0, October 2002) ([POL00104777));
Rules and Standards Policy (version 2.0, October 2000) ([POL00104754)]);
“Investigation Procedures Policy (version 2.0, January 2001)
([POL00030687));
Disclosure Of Unused Material, Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act
1996 Codes of Practice Policy (version 1.0, May 2001) ([POL00104762));
"Royal Mail Group Ltd Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Policy" (1
December 2007) ([POL00030578], which appears to be substantially the
same as the policy of the same date with a variation on the title at
[POL00104812)) (see, in particular, section 3);
“Royal Mail Group Security - Procedures & Standards - Standards of
Behaviour and Complaints Procedure" (version 2, October 2007)
([POL00104806));
"Royal Mail Group Crime and Investigation (S2)" (version 3.0, September
2008) ([POL00031004})
"Royal Mail Group Crime and Investigation Policy" (version 1.1, October
2009) ([POL00031003));
"Post Office Ltd - Security Policy - Fraud Investigation and Prosecution
Policy" (version 2, 4 April 2010) ([POL00030580));
"Post Office Ltd Financial Investigation Policy" (4 May 2010)
([POL00039965)):
"Royal Mail Group Security - Procedures & Standards - The Proceeds of
Crime Act 2002 & Financial Investigations" (version 1, September 2010)
([POL00026573});
"Royal Mail Group Security - Procedures & Standards - Initiating
Investigations" (September 2010) ([POL00104857)):
“Royal Mail Group Ltd Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Policy"
(version 1.1, November 2010) ([POL00031008));
Post Office Ltd Financial Investigation Policy (version 2, February 2011)
([POL00104853});
Post Office Ltd Anti-Fraud Policy (February 2011) ([POL00104855));
"Royal Mail Group Policy Crime and Investigation S2" (version 3.0, April
2011) ([POL00030786)):
xvii.
xviii.
xix.
XX.
xxi.
xxii.
xxiii.
Xxiv.
12.
13.
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“Post Office Ltd PNC Security Operating Procedures” (August 2012)
([POL00105229)}) (in which you are named at page 3);
"Post Office Limited: Internal Protocol for Criminal Investigation and
Enforcement (with flowchart)", (October 2012) ([POL00104929));
"Undated Appendix 1 - POL Criminal Investigations and Enforcement
Procedure (flowchart)", (October 2012) ([POL00105226));
The undated document entitled “POL — Enforcement & Prosecution Policy”,
which appears to include comments from you following review of a policy
draft ([POL00104968});
"Post Office Limited: Criminal Enforcement and Prosecution Policy"
(undated) ([POL00030602));
"Conduct of Criminal Investigations Policy" (version 0.2, 29 August 2013)
([POL00031005));
"Conduct of Criminal Investigations Policy" (version 3, 10 February 2014)
([POL00027863));
"Conduct of Criminal Investigations Policy" (September 2018)
([POL00030902)).
In respect of all the numerous documents I have accessed, I can say a few look
familiar, a few were more Royal Mail specific and some documents I have
never seen or recall as I had already possibly left the Security Team when they
were produced and / or circulated.
The Security / Fraud Team structure as I remember was made up of The Head
of Security - Tony Marsh 2000, Phil Gerrish, Tony Utting (temporary) Dave
Pardoe (temporary) and John Scott. The other Senior Security Managers had
specific titles like Policy and Standards Manager, Head of Financial
Investigations, Senior Casework and Compliance Manager and Fraud Risk
Manager. I have no recollection of all their specific titles, but other senior
managers I recall included John Bigley and Dave Pardoe who I think we're
maybe Senior Fraud Strand Leaders to name but two on my departure. Below
the Senior Managers were the Fraud Regional Area Team Manager Roles,
which when I joined included maybe around 7 regions or more, but by my
departure from the team there were just two with Northern England and
Southern England (North / South) teams. The significant changes over my time
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in the team was the move from around 40-50 plus Security / Fraud Managers
working to about 7-8 Area Managers and this was eventually cut to about 16
Security / Fraud Managers working to two just Area Managers. In addition to
these were Financial Investigators. As I remember, there were maybe 3
Financial Investigator positions including a Team Leader. There was also The
Casework / Compliance Manager and their support team members. There was
also towards the end of my time, a Fujitsu Liaison Officer - Mark Dinsdale and
then Jane Owen, who you could request any Horizon ARQ Data to be
downloaded via Fujitsu to sometimes assist with a case. There were other
support type staff based in Croydon on my joining in 2000 and who were later
based in Salford when I left the team. I am sure there were many other roles I
could possibly confirm, but at this time cannot recall specifically the job or titles.
14.1 played no role in the development or content of the above policies at point 11
but would have been possibly advised by the ones that directly involved my role
and that were to be followed at the time whilst I was in the Team.
15.Any legislation, policies or guidance governing the conduct of investigations, or
any relevant changes, would have been communicated if relevant in the
policies like shown at point 11, but I personally had no authority or involvement
in their content or any changes as far as I can remember.
16.1 had no involvement in investigation policies pre or post POL separation.
17.1 have no recollection of any specific complaints about the conduct of an
investigation by myself in the Security team, but my Line Manager would have
been my first contact point should there have been any made against me or my
colleagues. And I can only assume this would have been the same depending
on whatever level the complaint was directed at. Again, complaints could have
been made at the Contract Manager's disciplinary interview or via the Security
Team / Helpline etc or even at court I guess and again I am sure this would
have been escalated and been brought to the specific individual's attention by
their line manager through some disciplinary aspect.
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18. The supervision of criminal investigation conducted by Security Managers was
carried out by both the Area Team Manager (Line Manager) and the Casework
Manager / Compliance Manager through various means including being at
some interviews, as well as daily phone calls, our monthly 1-1 meetings, and
monthly Team Meetings for every case to be updated upon. The Casework
Manager followed a case paper compliance check to ensure every case was
subjected to the same levels of standards, care and procedural check for
consistency in work quality.
19. In respect of the Post Office policy and practice regarding investigations and
prosecution of Crown Office employees, this was the same as for
Subpostmasters as far as I was concerned. The only thing that changed in my
opinion was the actual number of audits carried out at the Crown Offices
seemed to reduce over the years, as the staffing numbers reduced within
audits as it had also done within the Security Team. These were all subjected
to cutbacks for Post Office Ltd, overhead and bottom-line costs. The Post
Office’s focus on Crown Office losses for Branch Manager's was another factor
that meant the Security Team had to prioritise their enquiries around the offices
with the consistently worst or highest losses to the business including the worst
Crown Office’s.
Audit and Investigation
20.1 have considered the document “Condensed Guide for Audit Attendance”
(version 2, October 2008) (POL00104821). An investigator would sometimes
attend an audit if they had been allocated a case and had actually instigated or
requested the audit was carried out if there was a possible suspect offender.
This could either be the Postmaster or potentially a member of their staff.
Occasionally, a routine audit may have been conducted as possibly a request
to return any identified excess cash held on hand at a branch that had not been
forthcoming or returned, suspecting maybe the cash was not on hand for them
to do this. If on the audit a substantial shortfall was identified by the auditors, or
an admission made to them, then an investigator may have been contacted
21
22.
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about their availability to attend depending on the location, time and
circumstances. The investigators’ role on attendance was always to await any
final outcome result of the audit that was also communicated at that point to the
Contracts Manager. The auditor would ask if there was any explanation for any
discrepancy discovered and compare the physical cash on hand to the
declared cash made the previous night at the Post Office branch, as well as
check all the stock. If any admission was made to the auditor either upon arrival
or during the audit, they would write this down and ask the person admitting
this to sign that this was a true reflection of what they had said. Any
investigators in attendance after this would then show their identity and
introduce themselves and explain the reason for their attendance. Depending
on the specific situation their line manager (Area Team Manager) would be
advised, the next steps would then be decided. There could have been a
reasonable explanation, or the case could have resulted in a caution and then
they would be advised of their Legal Rights / Post Office Friend Rule etc. It
could be a request for voluntary searches or not, again depending on the
circumstances before a possible interview. However, every case would not
necessarily be the same circumstances, so this is not a definitive answer.
. Security / Fraud Investigators line managers or further up the Security Seniority
chain, determined whether an investigation into potential criminality was
conducted by the Security Team, or if the case was to be taken forwards as a
debt recovery matter by the Financial Investigators or the relevant legal team.
Any debt identified would be reported and the recovery of Post Office funds
missing was always considered a business priority. If the Financial Recoveries
Manager or above felt that voluntary repayment was not apparent or likely, I
would assume they would then decide if they were to pursue the financial
recovery processes. Financial recoveries through court orders etc only became
apparent following the introduction of the Proceeds of Crime Act and the
introduction and training of the specialist Post Office Financial Recovery
Managers.
Where the branch was run by a SPM, the SPM'’s local contract manager did
have input into this in some ways as they would be immediately informed, but
they dealt entirely with their Contractual Employment decision. If they re-
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instated a Postmaster following their fact-finding interview, or if they had a
reasonable explanation or reason for the shortfall including reimbursing, as per
their contractual obligation, then no financial investigation would take place.
23.1 have no idea of any specific criteria or triggers, or if these changed whilst I
was in the team, for raising a fraud case following the identification of a shortfall
or discrepancy in a branch. I am not sure if the triggers or criteria for raising a
theft or false accounting case are different and if so, what they were.
Documents I have been referred to have possible indications of say £5,000 and
later £15,000 as triggers but, this may have been in respect of financial
recovery triggers more than raising an actual case, so I am not entirely sure
and unable to answer this.
The process followed by Security team investigators when conducting a
criminal investigation following the identification of a shortfall at an audit
24. Once a decision was made to conduct a suspected criminal investigation, the
next steps process depended upon each case and if the investigator was
present at the audit or not. If I was present once the decision was made, I
would explain my position and show my identification and explain their legal
rights and Post Office Friend rule. If I was not present, then my contact would
often be either by telephone or by a letter if this wasn’t possible but again
explaining the same Legal Rights and Post Office Friend rule. Case papers
would be raised, and the necessary stakeholders advised that a case was
apparent. Subsequently, evidence would be gathered usually at the audit and
possible searches conducted. Then a PACE taped Interview would be
conducted and then summarised unless full transcripts were later requested. A
full Suspect Offender report along with a separate discipline report that was
sent to the Contracts Manager would be produced and copied to the line
manager for checking before submission to the Casework Manager for Legal
recommendation and the usual compliance checks.
Decisions about prosecution and criminal enforcement proceedings
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25. Following an initial investigation, the case papers would be forwarded to the
Post Office Legal Team via the Casework Manager for any recommendation or
possible charges and then the decision of whether prosecution was considered
appropriate would be advised. Any decision agreed would be filtered back to
the investigator via the Casework Manager and their Line Manager, with advice
on any necessary statements or evidence considered to proceed. I am unsure
if they themselves obtained or needed authority from their Senior Security
Manager also.
26. During my time within the Security Team, the Contracts Manager only dealt
with the Subpostmasters employment contract and had no input into any
prosecution decision making.
27.1 have no idea of any test applied by those making prosecution or charging
decisions. I always believed the decision was only made if there was sufficient
evidence to suggest beyond reasonable doubt that a criminal offence had been
committed by the individual.
28.A written advice with suggested charges was added to the Casework file with
any recommendation from the Post Office Legal Team and then an authority to
proceed or otherwise was made from the Casework / Team Manager possibly
on the Senior Manager's authority.
29.In respect of this any restraint decision on assets identified, this was made by
the trained Financial Investigator, and this was decided on if a benefit from
crime was clear I would suggest. This only happened when the Proceeds of
Crime Act was introduced as I recall.
30.1 am unable to answer as to who decided whether criminal enforcement
proceedings should be pursued and what factors did they consider when
making decisions around this, other than I would again assume the Financial
Investigation Team possibly on authority of The Head Of Security.
Training, instructions and guidance to investigators within the Security team
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31.1 have been asked what instructions, guidance and / or training were given to
investigators within the Security team about the following topics and how was
this provided:
i. interviewing a SPM / SPM’s assistant / Crown Office employee who was
suspected of a criminal offence;
ii. taking witness statements in the course of an investigation;
iii. I conducting searches in the course of an investigation;
iv. the duty on an investigator to investigate a case fully;
v. obtaining evidence in the course of an investigation;
vi. I whether and in what circumstances evidence should be sought from third
parties who might hold relevant evidence and, in particular, Fujitsu, where
shortfalls were identified in branch;
vii. an investigator's disclosure obligations;
viii. drafting investigation reports to enable a decision to be made about the
future conduct of a case.
32. With respect to all points listed above, I was given initial training on my
appointment as I recall over around 3 weeks at a residential training location
covering all these aspects. We were supplied with reference books and files for
covering all these subjects and were tested to ensure we passed the necessary
level of competence to conduct Pace 1984 Codes of Practice Interviewing
techniques along with all these other areas. My recollection of point vi) above
as to whether and in what circumstances evidence should be sought from third
parties who might hold relevant evidence and, in particular, Fujitsu, where
shortfalls were identified in branch was often through discussions with the
Legal Team / Casework Manager & Line Manager (Team Leader), was that any
request for Fujitsu data was only when this became available to us and
dependent on the type of investigation being undertaken, if considered
appropriate and thought able to assist that particular enquiry. Requests were
not necessarily requested in every case, as not always deemed necessary if
admissions were made and clearly there was also no reason for me or
colleagues to doubt the Horizon System had these confirmed bugs, errors or
defects as it has been stated now during this inquiry.
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33.1 have reviewed the Casework Management document at [POL00104747]
(version 1.0, March 2000) and [POL00104777] (version 4.0, October 2002);
David Posnett’s email to me and others dated 23 May 2011 at [POL001 18096]
and the documents [POL00118108], [POL00118109], [POL00118101],
[POL00118102], [POL00118103], [POL00118104], [POL00118105],
[POL00118106] and [POL00118107];
34.1 would have no reason to doubt that I would have been provided with both the
2000 or 2002 version of the Casework Management document when I held
relevant roles within the Security Team.
35.My understanding by the instructions / guidance given in second, third and
fourth bullet points on page 2 of the 2000 version and the first, second and third
bullet points on page 2 of the 2002 version (in particular whether I understood
this to be relevant to Post Office’ disclosure obligations in relation to information
about Horizon bugs, errors and defects); was that upon my submission of the
case papers the Casework Manager / Legal Team would check the content of
the discipline report to ensure it had just the discipline aspect covered. With
regards to Horizon bugs, errors or defects I was totally unaware that any such
things existed as I am confident were all of my colleagues at the time, so there
would have been no occasion I would have disclosed this as I had absolutely
no idea whatsoever it was relevant. In fact, I am now so angry and livid to have
been made aware of these facts more recently and since leaving the Post
Office back in 2017.
36.My recollection of compliance checks and their purpose was to ensure a high
consistency of standards across all casework paper submissions by all team
members and to give a consistent approach in all files. These checks were
carried out by the Casework Manager against a tick list 100% score as seen at
page 1 of document (POL00118108).
37. The documents were in my opinion a kind of training aid to assist me and my
colleagues in a consistent approach in raising standards and in checking I had
covered the 100-point score areas prior to submitting my case papers.
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38. The suite of compliance documents at the time was to ensure consistency and
raise quality standards and were monitored and used as part of our line
managers appraisal process.
39.1 did not have any role in the development, management or amendment other
than to use this if required as an aid for casework submission.
40.My understanding under paragraph 2.15 on page 10 of the document entitled
“Guide to the Preparation and Layout of Investigation Red Label Case Files —
Offender reports & Discipline reports” ([POL00118101], attached to David
Posnett’s email of 23 May 2011) and how this related to the Offender Report
template (at [POL00118102], attached to David Posnett’s email of 23 May
2011, was to advise of any identified failures in security as shown as the
second from last point on document (POL00118102) after copy reports and
tape summary. This could include, but is not exhaustive to, shared or known
Horizon Logon codes and passwords, the sharing of date stamps, keys left in
safes, parcel hatch left open, security doors propped open, high levels of cash
held in counter tills or excess cash held at the office etc. Basically, any known
or identified breaches or failures in security. Clearly any Horizon bugs, errors or
defects were not known.
41.During my time within the Security Team, I was not aware of any known or
suspected Horizon Bugs, errors or defects and as stated previously and I am
very angry to have been now made aware this was known.
42.1 can state I had absolutely no involvement in the drafting of the document
entitled “Identification Codes” at [POL00118104] attached to Dave Posnetts
email dated 23 May 2011. Sorry I have absolutely no idea as to who did.
43.1 don't recall the document entitled “Identification Codes” or even viewing it or
some of the other documents attached in the email if I'm honest. The
documents attached in the email were suggested to mainly assist the new
people we recruited into the team recently in 2011. I was at this time of around
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11 years’ experience and had always followed the Police Identification codes
contained within PACE. I therefore knew that mostly I had dealt with an IC1
suspect but would refer to PACE if unsure.
44. It was my understanding that we all actually usually asked the individuals to
describe themselves and assign their own belief on identification codes. The
codes were mainly only used in cases we submitted upon any successful
prosecution on to an NPA001/002 document. This was standing for Non-Police
Agency as any criminal offence proved and charged this would need to be
added to the PNC (Police National Computer Database) to ensure any known
offence was correctly recorded on the said individual.
Analysing Horizon data, requesting ARQ data from Fujitsu and relationship
with Fujitsu
45.When I held relevant roles within the Security team, I have no specific
examples of analysis being done by Security team investigators of Horizon data
when a SPM/ SPM’s manager(s) or assistant(s) / Crown Office employee(s)
attributed a shortfall to a problem with Horizon. But if there were any
employees that suggested this was the case, I would have asked them initially
what steps they had taken to report this fact. What examples they had actually
discovered on Horizon to claim this and had they reported this at their earliest
opportunity to say the Post Office Helpdesk, their Contracts Manager or the
possibility of requesting some further training assistance or even an audit for
example. If I had any ARQ Horizon Data available to me either before any
interview or requested this subsequently after I would have spent time viewing
and assessing any such claim they made by looking for any potential issue. If I
had found any evidence this would have been communicated and obviously
disclosed but I never did. I was also unaware that any Horizon System issues
could be attributed to a shortfall other than human error / mistakes or
wrongdoing and had there been such issues assume they would have been
more apparent across the many thousands if not all Post Offices Horizon
locations.
46.1 have no idea of the Contractual requirements on Fujitsu other than it was my
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understanding that there was an agreed number with regards to requests per
year for ARQ Data and it was not an infinitive number of requests that could be
made.
47.As above, along with all my colleagues, I understand we knew there was a limit
but I have no idea what that was or any cost amounts incurred for any requests
made over and above that agreed limit.
48.1 have no idea as to any changes to the contractual requirements on Fujitsu, as
I understood them to be (including in respect of the ability of POL to obtain
audit data, the type of data and the quality and completeness of the data), nor
to any limits on the number of ARQ requests which would be covered without
additional charges and how requests above the limits were dealt with / charged.
49.Nor do I have any idea of any changes as between Legacy Horizon and
Horizon Online and maybe I had already left the team when this happened.
50.My role would be to request any data covering specific time scales for the
periods of suspect offending on the case enquiry I had been allocated and
dealing with. I can't recall if this was either via email or possibly completion of a
kind of ARQ request form sent to Mark Dinsdale or Jane Owen in Salford.
51.Either my line manager, the casework manager or the ARQ requesting Fujitsu
Liaison Manager decided whether to authorise an ARQ request.
52. It is my recollection that ARQ requests would be made to or received via either
Penny Thomas or Andy Dunks at Fujitsu via Mark Dinsdale / Jane Owen.
53.Data was presented by Fujitsu in the form of a CD Rom or sometimes
numerous CD Rom’s depending on the actual time frames and amounts of data
requested. Should the Horizon Data be used in evidence, then a Witness
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Statement or Statements would be obtained from the person producing and
supplying the data. This as I recall was a kind of standard statement on each
occasion other than the Office details and the ARQ no’s produced being
changed. The expert Witness Statement if proceeding to Court was as I was
reminded of in the documents by a Gareth Jenkins at Fujitsu.
54.1 have no recollection of ever seeing any of these documents listed here:
i. The document entitled “Conducting Audit Data Extractions at CSR”
dated 4 May 2000 at [POL00029169];
ii. IThe document entitled “Conducting Audit Data Extractions at Live”
dated 27 November 2001 at [FUJ00152176];
iii. The versions of the document entitled “Management of the Litigation
Support Service” dated 27 October 2009 ([FUJ00152212]), 14
February 2012 ([FUJ00152220]) and 23 April 2012 ((FUJ00152225)),
as well as the version marked “withdrawn” at [FUJ00152235];
iv. The versions of the document entitled “Audit Data Extraction Process”
dated 13 September 2010 ({FUJ00152216]), 1 March 2011
([FUJ00152218]), 14 February 2012 ([FUJ00152221]), 3 September
2014 ([FUJ00152226]) and 4 September 2014 ([FUJ00152228));
v. The document entitled “Security Management Service: Service
Description” (SVM/SDM/SD/0017) dated 24 August 2006
([FUJ00002033]), 31 December 2008 ([FUJ00080107]), 15 October
2010 ([FUJ00002264]), 25 November 2013 ([FUJ00088868}]), 4
December 2013 ([FUJ00002555)), 4 April 2014 ([POL00002572]) and
19 February 2016 ([POL00002666)]) (in all versions see, in particular,
paragraph 2.4).
55.1 never recall any of my cases suggesting where a shortfall had been identified
and the relevant SPM / SPM’s manager(s) or assistant(s) / Crown Office
employee(s) attributed the shortfall to problems with Horizon, that ARQ data
requested from Fujitsu was requested as a matter of course. This was the
case at Astwood Bank as far as I recall. It was my belief and that of my
colleagues I would guess that shortfalls could not actually be attributed to
Horizon as there was no knowledge or evidence to suggest there was anything
wrong with the system. We even had and used expert witnesses with
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statements from Fujitsu to corroborate this.
56.Where ARQ data was obtained from Fujitsu, in circumstances where a shortfall
had been identified and the relevant SPM was attributing the shortfall to
problems with Horizon, as there was no known bugs, errors or defects known
and certainly no evidence from Fujitsu to suggest there was anything wrong
with the system then I would assume the data would be unlikely or not have
been provided.
57.As you can see at (FUJ00156221) the email trail the Security Managers / Fraud
Investigators had no official direct contact with Fujitsu as this was done via
Mark Dinsdale as our Fujitsu contact that was later to be Jane Owen. As I
recall, the two main people I would have received ARQ Data from was via
either a Penny Thomas or Andy Dunks. They would produce a witness
statement along the lines of these extracts being requested and supplied but
their so-called expert witness statement for court came from a Gareth Jenkins
at Fujitsu.
58.1 have considered [FUJ00122938] and [FUJ00122939]. The processes in
place for investigators contacting Fujitsu engineers, was:
(a) Investigators would make any Fujitsu requests for ARQ Horizon Data or
(b) statements needed through the Post Office point of contact at the time I
recall being Mark Dinsdale then Jane Owen.
(b) I have no real idea why it was “against the process for investigators to
approach Fujitsu engineers directly” other than them being contacted by
numerous team members rather than say one point of contact within the
Post Office Security Team to request all.
(c) Jane Owen was the Post Office / Fujitsu point of contact to make
requests for ARQ Data and I think she replaced Mark Dinsdale who
previously did this.
(d) I have no idea, in what circumstances would the usual process not be
followed unless in periods of say annual leave or sickness when a substitute
person may cover their role I guess.
(e) I would very rarely have direct contact with engineers/technicians from
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Fujitsu, although I did have some contact probably via email. I am sure
regarding receipt of ARQ data or possibly requests for witness statements.
This may have happened say 2/3 times a year at a guess with Penny
Thomas or Andy Dunks and maybe once maybe twice in my whole time in
the team with regards to Gareth Jenkins if he was the expert witness at
court.
59.1 understood Gareth Jenkins was the Fujitsu expert witness to supply a
statement and give evidence in court about the accuracy, robustness and
reliability of the Horizon Data and Horizon System.
60. I cannot comment further as to what extent did I consider him to be acting as an
expert witness, just on the advice of the Post Office Senior Security Team and
Legal Team and I can’t answer any further.
Relationship with others
61.My main involvement was with the Post Office Legal Services Team more so
than with Cartwright King Solicitors whom I think took over just prior to me
leaving the team. They would, I guess, be forwarded our casework for sight and
advise on possible charges and statements required in much the same way as
had been the case with the Post Office Legal Team previously. I have no
recollection of any specific names at Cartwright King and my only interaction
with them would have been by email or possibly telephone.
62. My only involvement or interaction with the National Federation of
Subpostmasters would be if the local representative acted at interview as a
Post Office Friend. The only person I recall, as I met with him on a good few
occasions, was Mr Mark Baker. If I needed to, I would sometimes contact Mark
if a Postmaster did not know their local representative to see if he had a point
of contact to help me and the Postmaster and I felt I got along with Mark Baker
very well.
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Prosecution of Mr Julian Wilson — Astwood Bank Post Office
63.1 have reviewed the following documents:
i) The stakeholder notification [POL00047065]
ii) The event capture form [POL00118275]
iii) The financial investigation case closure report [POL00119127]
iv) The financial investigation events log [POL00044749]
v) The new case raised report [POL00119137]
vi) The investigation report [POL00044803]
vii) I The suspect offender report [POL00119221]
viii) The case timeline [POL00114696]
ix) The case closure report [POL00114739]
Initial investigation
In answering the questions below, I have reviewed the following documents:
i) The draft audit report [POL00050062]
ii) The Record of Tape Recorded Interview dated 15 September 2008
at [POL00050140] (part 1) and [POL00050128] (part 2);
64.1 remember the office name of Astwood Bank, the Postmaster’s name of Julian
Wilson and that voluntary searches of the home and car were carried out prior
to the interview with Mr Wilson at his Solicitors Office on the 15th September
2008. I can now recall from the document (POL00044803) that his solicitor was
not a specialist in the criminal law field and I asked if he was sure he did not
want to seek this kind of Legal Advice and if he was still happy to proceed with
his interview at Astwood Law. Mr Wilson confirmed he was aware of this but
wanted to still proceed. Other than this I have assisted my recollection now with
the available documents, reports and tape summaries etc at Points 37 & 38
including [POL00044803] previously mentioned and [POL00050140 and
POL00050128]. I have to say whilst being assisted by the Investigation Report
document [POL00044803] I have found within my own report a typo error with
regards to the date of the interview. It actually took place on Monday 15th
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September 2008 at Astwood Law but I had stated the 11th September 2008 in
my report which was the day the audit took place not the interview. My
apologies for the error and hopefully this was identified at the time the papers
were submitted or accepted as an error. I have also seen that it appears the
report [POL00044803] was dated the 2 December 2008. This appears to be
somewhat outside the submission case papers time scales and compliance
time and I cannot be certain, but I am thinking maybe I was absent from work
following the interview. This may have been sickness I’m thinking or even a
holiday and then sickness, but I cannot be sure. I am not sure if my own
personnel HR papers would clarify this if still available and I have now tried to
obtain these by emailing the Post Office and asking the Solicitor if they may still
be available of course. I will also see if my GP has any NHS records as I know I
was off at one time ! i The reason I am considering
this a possibility is the date on the report, and also as the taped summaries I
viewed at [POL00050140] and [POL00050128] as I feel they could have been
prepared by someone other than myself. They clearly appear accurate and a
true account of the interview, but the layout and font used etc does not look
necessarily like the way I would have summarised my own tapes at that time.
We did at times as I recall use a company who would offer the tape summary
support facility with the tapes, but I can’t be specific when and whom. Again, if
in absence they may also have been done again by my second officer or even
my line manager if my workload was excessive at the time ,but I can’t be sure
some 15 plus years ago now.
65.1 first became involved in Mr Wilson's case following his admission to the
Auditors on the day of the 11 September 2008 that they would find a large
shortage and cash missing that he had been falsely accounting for over a
period of around 5 years. They subsequently confirmed the shortage on the
day and obtained a signed declaration from Mr Wilson that this was the case.
This can also be confirmed in the document [POL00050062].
66.I was the lead Fraud Investigator / Security Manager allocated to this case.
67.On the arrival of the Auditors Mr Wilson advised them that they would find a
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shortage of over £27,000 that had occurred over a period of about 5 years. The
audit result confirmed this, and Mr Wilson was precautionarily suspended on
the authority of his Contracts Manager Glen Chester.
68.1 would have had no involvement in this decision although it may have been the
auditors who advised Mr Wilson of the decision by his Contracts Manager
Glenn Chester unless he had spoken to Mr Wilson on the phone.
69. This would have been my line manager at the time following the notification of
the shortfall found by the auditors or via the Contracts Manager by the creation
of a case file allocated to myself.
70.1 would have spoken to Mr Wilson on the phone advising him of his Legal
Rights and that of the Post Office Friend rule. I would have explained that I
would like to conduct a Voluntary Interview with him and would he also consent
to any voluntary search of his home and maybe a vehicle. Mr Wilson agreed to
the searches and said he was going to take Legal Advice and gave me the
contact details of his Solicitor at Astwood Law and that he would have his
Postmaster Federation Rep present acting as his Post Office Friend.
7
=
. The evidence that was shown to Mr Wilson at the interview would have been
listed within my suspect offender report the document [POL00044803]
(previously mentioned) and would have included the completion of the GS001
and GS003 forms advising Mr Wilson of his Legal Rights and Post Office
Friend option. I would also have shown Mr Wilson and confirmed it was him
that signed the statement of what he had informed the auditors on their arrival.
Also, the Event Log Balancing printout and a selection of Branch Trading
Statements that Mr Wilson confirmed to be false declared accounts that he was
responsible for and he had completed. Also, I think the tape summaries
mentioned the bank statements we seized at the voluntary search being
discussed in some detail with Mr Wilson and the Solicitor.
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72.My only observations and response to the paragraphs 40 to 42 by Mrs Wilson
at [WITN1680100] is as follows. Mrs Wilson mentions being a Police Officer for
3 years and the voluntary search of both the home and car was exactly that,
voluntary and agreed to by Mr Wilson at the time and therefore clearly no police
warrant or their involvement was necessary as I would have expected Mrs
Wilson may have known. The voluntary search forms were completed and duly
signed by Mr Wilson with regards financial items seized. At Paragraph 41 Mrs
Wilson mentions something about some kind of markings she had made on the
bank statements we had seized as part of the search and then stated we had
clearly not looked at them. Firstly, I would add these were looked at and were
actually discussed with Mr Wilson and the Solicitor during the Taped Interviews
as can be seen in documents [POL00050140] and [POL00050128] (previously
mentioned). Secondly, I do find the fact Mrs Wilson stated she had made any
such markings on their financial documents prior to the voluntary search that
day somewhat unusual. At point 42 Mrs Wilson states that her husband told her
later that the investigators had said he had been doing false accounting, but it
was in fact her husband Mr Wilson, who had clearly already admitted to doing
this to the auditors on their arrival on the day of the audit and that he had in fact
been doing false accounting for at least 5 years. He confirmed this again to
Graham Brander and myself during the taped interview and in the presence of
his Astwood Law legal representative and the Post Office Friend. We did listen
to what Mr Wilson was saying but asked him why he had not brought his so-
called issues and concerns being Horizon or otherwise to anyone's attention for
over 5 plus years. He did mention a couple of previous line managers but
stated he had not mentioned the extent as to what was happening or the
amount of the said losses. He had no specific examples of how it was the
Horizon System responsible, and I had no reason at that time to doubt the
Horizon System without any evidence or examples. Mr Wilson was clearly not
charged either at that point as we are again not the Police and had to seek our
own Legal Teams Advice. He was however later subject to a summons through
the post to appear at court. I can confirm that yes, The Post Office had always
looked for any forms of voluntary repayment under the terms of a
Subpostmasters Contract and in this case with no repayment forthcoming that
is why I assume a Financial Investigation recovery case was set up within that
part of the team.
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73. The further evidence I was gathering was that I was looking to confirm what Mr
Wilson stated, in that this had been going on for around 5 years. I was looking
for evidence of potential phone calls to the Post Office Helpline stating he felt
he had Horizon issues or otherwise. If not then calls to his Contracts Manager's
maybe for help or assistance with maybe further training help or why it
appeared his office was regularly haemorrhaging these kinds of losses on what
appeared from him to be most weeks. He did mention two previous Contracts
Managers he had mentioned Horizon concerns to after his first audit was found
to be accurate after his initial 6 months at Astwood Bank. I can’t recall now but
imagine I would have tried to corroborate this after the interview by seeing if
they were maybe still working within the business and had recollection or if any
actual record was made at Contract Manager level. Sorry I can’t recall what
other checks would have been done. We asked Mr Wilson if he had any
concerns over his staff stealing from him each week and he said he only had
one other staff member who had worked there 20 plus years and while a
possibility he did not think this was the case from my recollection.
74. The Contract Manager Glenn Chester and Post Office Helpline with recorded
call logs from Mr Wilson's office at Astwood Bank assisted with the
investigation. Basically, all the witnesses whose statements are within the case
file.
75. Following the interview my investigation report along with the interview taped
summaries would have been submitted for Legal Advice. This would have been
done as Mr Wilson had admitted to False Accounting over 5 years but not theft.
Any prosecution decision was only decided upon by our Post Office Solicitors
Legal Team and on authority of a Senior Security Manager.
76.1 have considered page 3 of [POL00044803] In relation to my comment that
“The period of offending in this case could not be fully established” that meant
just that. Mr Wilson admitted to the auditors and me and Mr Brander at the
interview that he had been producing false trading statements every month by
inflating the cash on hand and declaring an incorrect amount from around 2003
to September 2008 (5 years) when he was audited. He could not recall or be
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specific about the exact date he first did this and produced the first false
account other than during 2003 so the exact date to date period of offending
could therefore not be fully established.
77.1 had no involvement in the decision to charge Mr Wilson, this would have been
the Post Office Legal Team.
78.1 would have completed and submitted the Charges to Court for summons
following advice from the Post Office Legal Team.
79. There was no direct involvement of the Police as Mr Wilson was not under
arrest and had consented to both voluntary searches and a voluntary interview
with his solicitors at Astwood Law. I would have submitted the Non Police
Agencies forms NPA001/NPA002 following charges as per our obligation with
Police to ensure their PNC was fully updated.
80.1 would have completed the document [POL00119211]. As I recall all questions
in all cases for NPAO01/NPA002 completion were asked of the person following
the interview if they were happy to assist. It was therefore fairly standard
practice to complete these Antecedents / NPA forms and was therefore
answers of how the person best described their appearance along with all the
other questions for its completion. For example an IC1 was stated in PACE as -
White-skinned European: English, Scottish, Welsh, French, German, Swedish,
Norwegian, Polish, Russia. I would have asked Mr Wilson if he felt that best
describes himself or anyone with whom I was completing this document.
81.1 have reviewed the following correspondence:
i. Graham Brander’s witness statement in support of an application for a
restraint order, dated 16 December 2008 [POL00064718_ 001];
ii. I The memo from Terry Crowther dated 5 December 2008 [POL00047012];
iii. I The email from Graham Ward to you and Jarnail Singh in respect of a
restraint order, dated 17 December 2008 [POL00050524);
iv. The memo dated 6 January 2009 [POL00044806);
vi.
vii.
viii.
xi.
xii.
xiii.
xiv.
XV.
xvi.
xvii.
xviii.
xix.
XX.
Xxi.
xxii.
xxiii.
xxiv.
XXV.
The memo dated 9 January 2009 [POL00050665];
The letter from you to Redditch Magistrates’ Court, dated 13 January 2009
[POL00064127];
The summons, dated 13 January 2009 [POL00047084);
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The letter from Richard Nelson solicitors to Jarnail Singh, dated 14 January
2009 [POL00050695);
The memo dated 16 January 2009 [POL00047018];
The letter from you to Jarnail Singh, dated 21 January 2009
[POL00050733};
The email from you dated 23 January 2009 [POL00050763];
The memo dated 10 March 2009 [POL00047020);
Your letter dated 17 March 2009 enclosing the committal bundle
[POL00119090);
Memo 2 April 2009 [POL00119197];
The letter from Richard Nelson Solicitors dated 14 May 2009, with
handwritten comments at [POL00051920);
The letter from Jarnail Singh to Richard Nelson Solicitors dated 19 May
2009 at [UKGI00012555];
Jarnail Singh’s memo to the Fraud Team dated 28 May 2009 at
[POL00051720).
Counsel's Brief endorsed following the hearing on 15 June 2009 at
[POL00051459);
John H. Dove's letter to Jarnail Singh dated 17 June 2009 at
[POL00051936];
The memo dated 18 June 2009 [POL00051945];
The memo dated 5 August 2009 [POL00064718_004];
The memo from Andy Hayward to Graham Ward dated 17 December 2009
at [POL00044810):
The memo dated 11 January 2010 [POL00119126];
Memo dated 14 February 2011 [POL00119129];
The email chains in respect of the restraint order [POL00114710] and
[POL00114730].
82.1 have also reviewed the following documents:
Notification of proceedings to police [POL00119140] and [POL00119211];
vi.
vii.
viii.
xi.
xii.
xiii.
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The information in respect of the hearing on 4 March 2009 [POL00119119];
Counsel's endorsed copy of the Indictment at [POL00044800];
Your witness statement dated 12 March 2009 [POL00044778];
Counsel's Advice dated 22 May 2009 at [POL00044751] and the draft Case
Summary at [POL00044809];
The basis of plea dated 15 June 2009 at [POL00051915);
Schedule of non-sensitive unused material [POL00119095);
Schedule of sensitive [POL00119096];
Disclosure officer's report [POL00119097];
List of witnesses [POL00119098];
Antecedents [POL00119103];
Notification of disposal to police [POL00119214];
The confiscation order dated 17 December 2009 at [POL00053703].
83.1 was the Lead Investigator / Interview Officer in this case.
84. The statement from me is requested if the Post Office Legal Team / Senior
Manager decides upon a Prosecution in any particular case. It would obviously
state the Lead and second interviewing officer along with the lead auditor on
the day and possibly the contracts managers, Fujitsu personnel if ARQ Horizon
Data was used etc. Therefore, the Post Office Legal Team would have asked
me to provide a statement.
85.1 can only recall from viewing the tape summaries attached, of any references
made by Mr Wilson relating to the Horizon IT system and some Federation
Document being circulated. I did not feel there was any significance as I had no
doubts whatsoever regarding the Horizon System.
86.1 would have given a full disclosure to Mr Wilson’s Legal Representative prior to
the interview so he could advise his client fully. Prosecution type disclosure I
assume would have been advised and given by the Legal Team instructed.
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87.In relation to my standard memo to the Legal Team at [POL00050733] where I
stated, “the total monies missing that amounted to £27,811.98 have not been
recovered”, I was not concerned at all but purely stating the facts for the Legal
Team that the monies identified as missing at the audit shortage and agreed by
Mr Wilson were still outstanding. At that stage on completion of my memo there
were no funds recovered and so this would now be a matter the Contracts
Manager covered during any disciplinary interview or subsequently through the
Post Office Security Recoveries / Financial Investigator Team.
88.Without sight of the GS018 document covering TIC’s I can only assume it was
covering either a selection or all of the numerous Weekly / Monthly Trading
Statements declared false over the suggested 5 year period admitted to by Mr
Julian Wilson.
89. The document from Anthony Vines at [POL00044751] appears to be his advice
I can only assume prior to a first court appearance or PCMH (Plea & Case
Management Hearing). This would be reporting back to the Post Office
Solicitors regarding any potential further evidence that may be needed. This
advice is likely to have been sent to the Legal Team and subsequently added
to the Case papers.
90.The request made by Mr Wilson's solicitors dated the 14 May 2009 appears to
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have only been sent to our own counsel Anthony Vines as per his advice at
[POL00044751] (previously mentioned) and would not have been something I
would have immediate sight of or any knowledge as to what steps were taken.
.Re [POL00051936]. I was not consulted on the basis of the plea put forward.
These decisions were only made at Legal or Senior Manager level not by
myself. Recoveries were advised to me when they were received but I have no
recollection of any intentions of how other than the interview responses given
by Mr Wilson. Again, I have no idea about any basis of plea as this would have
again been through Jarnail Singh I guess and via Anthony Vines counsel and
both Legal Representatives.
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92.1 had no involvement in the financial investigation and enforcement
proceedings on this case.
93.In relation to the application of a restraint order, I have no idea who decided
this, but I would suggest a Financial Investigator on the authority by the Head
of Security.
94.1 did not attend court for these proceedings as far as I recall.
95.With regards to the [POL00113278] document in particular paragraphs 175 -
178 I am clearly very angry and upset myself, that like Mr Wilson I was also told
like in in paragraph 176 “There Was Nothing Wrong With Horizon” this was a
message that myself and as far as I am aware all my colleagues were clearly
also led to believe as can be seen by my own email chain I sent to the Post
Office Managing Director after this came to light to about my own feelings at
document [POL00113304]. Although yes, Mr Wilson admitted to False
Accounting for 5 years at interview had I had any inkling there were any such
bugs or errors possible within Horizon then this data would obviously have
been requested as a matter of course. With the losses attributed to my
understanding that they could only be down to Mr Wilson or maybe his
assistant this was why no theft charge could be established and the false
accounting was obviously openly admitted to when the auditors arrived. If this
data is now still available, I would welcome the inquiry requesting this
information to support the fact Mrs Wilson wants to prove her husband's
innocence and maybe these so called BED’s (Bugs / Errors / Defects) as they
appear to be referred to could be looked at to help Mrs Wilson finally prove her
husband's innocence. Clearly the fact the Post Office hid the knowledge of
these bugs, errors or defects has impacted on many individuals and brought
into question the investigations myself and my colleagues tried to lead to the
best of our ability with what was made aware of to us at the time. My anger and
upset now to any subsequent injustice case is difficult to live with.
POL v Lynette Hutchings
96. I have reviewed the following documents:
i) The handwritten note at [POL00046065];
ii) The Audit Report dated 31 March 2011 at [POL00056292];
iii) The Record of Tape-Recorded Interview dated 20 April 2011 at
[POL00056417] (part 1), [POL00044505] (part 2), [POL00046625] (part 3);
iv) The Investigation Report dated 5 May 2011 at [POL00046706);
v) Jarnail Singh’s memo dated 17 June 2011 at [POL00046626];
vi) The memo from Graham Brander to Jarnail Singh dated 9 December 2011
at [POL00046628};
vii) The Advice and Proposed Charge drafted by Martin Smith of Cartwright
King at [POL00057362];
viii) The list of witnesses at [POL00046099];
ix) The witness statement of Nigel Allen dated 22 September 2011 at
[POL00057026] (page 1) and [POL00044533] (page 2);
x) The witness statement of Adam Shaw dated 20 September 2011 at
[POL00056955] (page 1) and [POL00046120] (page 2);
xi) The witness statement of Sarah Juliff dated 21 September 2011 at
[POL00056987];
xii) The unsigned witness statement of Louise Sheridan dated 24 November
2011 at [POL00057245] (page 1) and [POL00044534] (pages 2 and 3) and
exhibit LS/1 at [POL00054806);
xiii)The witness statement of Andrew Paul Dunks dated 12 July 2011 at
[POL00056659] and exhibit APD0O1 at [POL00046047];
xiv) The witness statement of David Dixon dated 22 September 2011 at
[POL00057001]:
xv) Your witness statement dated 11 August 2011 at [POL00056742];
xvi) The unsigned witness statement of Graham Brander dated 25
November 2011 at [POL00057267] (page 1) and [POL00044535] (pages 2 to
7);
xvii) The list of exhibits at [POL00046100].
97.1 must honestly confess to no real recollection of this case other than the
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assisted documents produced at Point 95 and paragraph 91 above.
98.1 would refer specifically to the Help Desk witness Louise Sheridan and her
exhibit (LS/1) at [POL00054806] and the Tape Recorded Interview regarding
the consistently increased £50 notes entries at point 74 (iii) [POL00056417],
[POL00044505] and [POL00046625]. As can be seen Lynette Hutchings went
“NO COMMENT?’ throughout the interview when her opportunity to give an
explanation was there as well as to the consistent £50 Note increases shown or
if she had any other concerns. My involvement came from a request from my
colleague Graham Brander as to my availability to assist him as second officer
at interview and my role was to be the second officer at the interview.
99.1 had no involvement in relation to the reason and decision to interview as this
was the case of my colleague Graham Brander.
100. The evidence shown in the interview would have been described in the
interview taped summaries at [POL00056417], [POL00044505] and
[POL00046625] (previously mentioned) and exhibited within any witness
statements obtained by Graham Brander.
101. [had no involvement in the decision to charge. — this would have been the
Legal Team / Solicitors at the time on authority of Senior Security Manager.
102. Graham Brander would have asked me to provide a witness statement.
103. Iwas not aware, at any time that I was involved, of any allegations made by
Ms Hutchings relating to the reliability of the Horizon IT system as she went
“NO COMMENT?’ in the entire interview when her opportunity was then to give
a reason or explanation or to raise any concerns or specific examples. This
may have been seen and included in the prepared statement.
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104. I have considered the handwritten documents at [POL00046095] and
[POL00046096] and Counsel's attendance note dated 30 July 2012 at
[POL00058132] (which appears to have been sent under cover of the email
dated 30 August 2012 at [POL00058252] and the email at [POL00058153)]). I
have no previous sight or knowledge of any of these documents as they would
only have been seen by Graham Brander the lead officer in this case.
105. I am unable to comment accurately as this was my colleague Graham
Brander’s case. The paragraphs 267 to 272 of [POL00113278] have been
read. However, with 33 calls made to the Business Helpline Lynette Hutchings
apparently only mentioned twice about losses and gains issues which was why
I have referred to that specific exhibit L/S1. She stated that advice at POL was
difficult to access and unreliable and yet clearly, she had made at least 33 calls
to the Helpline, so I am unsure as to what difficulty she was therefore
describing. I would imagine but can’t say that ARQ data if received would have
been viewed and used at the interview especially with regards to showing these
£50 Notes shown to be increasing consistently but maybe my colleague could
assist on this further. Then finally at the interview when she had the perfect
opportunity to air and raise any or all of these apparent long term ongoing
issues fully, she chose to use her right to go “No Comment”. It states that ARQ
data was requested but unknown if received. The only other point I find slightly
worrying or surprising is that I think in her evidence she mentioned issues
occurring at her previous Post Office where she was the Subpostmistress and
had substantial losses. I guess she must have put this cash in out of her own
money and yet surprisingly after doing this and if she believed the Horizon
System to be the cause she still decided to purchase another Post Office. I
have no further points to add on this case as this was led by Graham Brander.
POL v Susan Rudkin
106. I have reviewed the following documents:
i. The Audit Report, dated 21 August 2008 [POL00046550]
ii, IThe handwritten notes at [POL00045243] and [POL00045246];
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ii. The Record of Tape-Recorded Interview of 20 August 2008 at
[POL00050026);
iv. The suspect offender report [POL00050123];
v. The Investigation Report dated 2 September 2008 at [POL00046485]
vi. The Antecedents form for Susan Rudkin dated 2 September 2008 at
[POL00046576];
vii. Jarnail Singh’s memo to the Fraud Team dated 3 October 2008 at
[POL00046488};
viii. I The Schedule of Charges at [POL00045220];
ix. David Pardoe’s email to the Fraud Team dated 7 October 2008 at
[POL00050347];
x. The memo from Mike Wilcox to Jarnail Singh dated 29 January 2009 at
[POL00046505);
xi. Jarnail Singh’s memo to the Fraud Team dated 6 February 2009 at
[POL00046506);
xii. I The memo from Debbie Helszajn to the Fraud Team dated 26 March 2009 at
[POL00051256];
xiii. The memo from Rob Wilson to the Fraud Team dated 6 May 2009 at
[POL00051420).
107. I was involved in this case as I was the second officer assisting Mike
Wilcox, the lead officer in this case. The Investigation Report at
[POL00046485] and Tape Summary at [POL00050026] best cover the full and
detailed account of Mr Wilcox’s case and includes, the evidence that Legal
Representation as in every case was offered and covered by the completion of
the GS001 Legal Rights Form on tape. This was always explained fully, signed
and contained within the case papers and part of the evidence. It can also be
seen that Mr Wilcox agreed to allow her son (Dale) to sit in on the interview to
act as her friend for moral support.
108. From the document [POL00046485] (previously mentioned) it appears I
was actually with Mike Wilcox on Wednesday 20th August 2008 when he was
assigned this case by Colin Price (Temp Area Team Manager) and we were
diverted to Ibstock Post Office where I was to assist him as his second officer
at an interview with Susan Rudkin following the audit result.
WITNO9160100
WITNO9160100
109. This was Mike Wilcox’s case, so I had no involvement in the initial
investigation that was raised following an audit shortage on the day and an
admission to the auditors by Susan Rudkin that she was solely responsible.
110. The decision to charge and prosecute would have been the current Team
Leader but from the report at [POL00046485] (previously mentioned) it would
appear it was Colin Price who was quite likely covering as the Temporary Area
Team Leader.
111. The evidence shown to Mrs Rudkin was that which was shown during the
interview [POL00050026] and that was subsequently exhibited as part of the
evidence by Mike Wilcox.
112. [had no involvement in the decision to charge or prosecute. I would also
have no involvement in this as in any of my own cases as this would be
advised by the Post Office Legal Team / Solicitors at the time.
113. As far as I recall I was not aware, at any time that I was involved, of any
allegations made by Ms Rudkin relating to the reliability of the Horizon IT
system and she didn’t suggest this at the interview as I could see or recall. In
fact she had actually said she had taken physical cash from the Post Office and
paid this into her own Business Bank Account (Lloyds I think) to cover
numerous financial shortfalls and bills etc following a previous robbery at the
branch and she did this without her husbands or the staff's knowledge.
114. I have no reason to doubt that the investigation was again conducted in the
correct way by my colleague Mike Wilcox and with the knowledge and evidence
he relied upon to be 100% accurate as far as we were aware at that time.
115. The fact there were many many thousands of Horizon terminals in operation
WITNO9160100
WITNO9160100
across several thousand Post Offices causing no issues or errors indicated that
these were as had been historically the minority cases of possible misconduct
and there were absolutely no Horizon integrity issues whatsoever. All
investigators had no reason to doubt the Horizon system with absolutely no
knowledge of these bugs, errors or defects ever existed.
116. Ihad absolutely no knowledge or awareness that any bugs, errors or
defects existed in Horizon.
117. As above, I was unaware any existed so would have no idea if Fujitsu
passed any such information to Post Office Ltd and if they ever did it certainly
was not passed to me or my colleagues.
118. I wasa loyal, honest and trusted member of staff and I am clearly very
angry and upset that my employer of 32 years, if known, never advised anyone
that these so-called bugs, errors or defects existed in the Horizon system. In
my opinion at whatever level, especially Senior Manager's level if any
knowledge or doubts existed this should have been brought to absolutely
everyone's attention immediately including staff and Postmasters. It would then
have been included as a reason that could undermine any case under
disclosure.
119. The [POL00113304] document (previously mentioned) is now clearly
interesting for me. You can see that even after leaving the Post Office back in
2017, I was still under the impression, clearly wrongly, that Horizon was 100%
accurate. When the Horizon Inquiry started, and cases went to the High Court
etc I was still none the wiser. However, when the press and television
subsequently released details of possible Managing Directors, Chairman &
Senior Managers knowing these existed, I was mortified and extremely angry.
Then when cases in the High Court became successful, I was even more angry
as not so much as an apology was received from the Post Office. As you can
hopefully see so much from the initial email, I sent it to Nick Read in 2021. I
have clearly not seen these internal email chain responses until now which do
WITNO9160100
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make interesting reading. Again, compensation worries appear to be their
primary focus and yes whilst I do think this would also be appropriate to staff
clearly affected all I really wanted was some form of an apology and
explanation. I'm more than happy to give that apology now myself to any
Postmasters who were 100% proven to be unfairly prosecuted.
120. If anyone in the Post Office Senior Team were aware of these possible bugs
/ errors or defects within Horizon, they did not communicate this and any
correctly identified or proven miscarriages of justice by the Post Office should
be both quashed and compensated in my opinion.
Statement of Truth
I believe the content of this statement to be
true.
Signed:
Dated: 4th October 2023
WITNO9160100
WITNO9160100
Document Description
URN
Control Number
Casework Management Policy
(version 1.0, March 2000)
POL00104747
POL-0080387
Casework Management Policy
(version 4.0, October 2002)
POL00104777
POL-0080417
Rules and Standards Policy
(version 2.0, October 2000)
POL00104754
POL-0080394
“Investigation Procedures
Policy (version 2.0, January
2001)
POL00030687
POL-0027169
Disclosure Of Unused Material,
Criminal Procedures and
Investigations Act 1996 Codes
of Practice Policy (version 1.0,
May 2001)
POL00104762
POL-0080402
"Royal Mail Group Ltd Criminal
Investigation and Prosecution
Policy" (1 December 2007)
POL00030578
POL00104812
POL-0027060
POL-0080444
“Royal Mail Group Security -
Procedures & Standards -
Standards of Behaviour and
Complaints Procedure"
(version 2, October 2007)
POL00104806
POL-0080438
"Royal Mail Group Crime and
Investigation (S2)" (version
3.0, September 2008)
POL00031004
POL-0027486
“Royal Mail Group Security -
Procedures & Standards - The
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 &
Financial Investigations"
(version 1, September 2010)
POL00026573
POL-0023214
“Royal Mail Group Security -
Procedures & Standards - The
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 &
Financial Investigations"
(version 1, September 2010)
POL00026573
POL-0023214
“Royal Mail Group Security -
Procedures & Standards -
Initiating Investigations"
(September 2010)
POL00104857
POL-0080489
WITNO9160100
WITNO9160100
"Royal Mail Group Ltd Criminal
Investigation and Prosecution
Policy" (version 1.1, November
2010)
POL00031008
POL-0027490
Post Office Ltd Financial
Investigation Policy (version 2,
February 2011)
POL00104853
POL-0080485
Post Office Ltd Anti-Fraud
Policy (February 2011)
POL00104855
POL-0080487
“Royal Mail Group Policy
Crime and Investigation S2"
(version 3.0, April 2011)
POL00030786
POL-0027268
“Post Office Ltd PNC Security
Operating Procedures” (August
2012)
POL00105229
POL-0080854
"Post Office Limited: Internal
Protocol for Criminal
Investigation and Enforcement
(with flowchart)", (October
2012)
POL00104929
POL-0080561
"Undated Appendix 1 - POL
Criminal Investigations and
Enforcement Procedure
(flowchart)", (October 2012)
POL00105226
POL-0080851
The undated document entitled
“POL — Enforcement &
Prosecution Policy”, which
appears to include comments
from you following review of a
policy draft
POL00104968
POL-0080600
"Post Office Limited: Criminal
Enforcement and Prosecution
Policy" (undated)
POL00030602
POL-0027084
"Conduct of Criminal
Investigations Policy" (version
0.2, 29 August 2013)
POL00031005
POL-0027487
"Conduct of Criminal
Investigations Policy" (version
3, 10 February 2014)
POL00027863
POL-0024504
"Conduct of Criminal
Investigations Policy"
(September 2018)
POL00030902
POL-0027384
WITNO9160100
WITNO9160100
“Condensed Guide for Audit POL00104821 POL-0080453
Attendance’ (version 2,
October 2008)
David Posnett’s email dated 23 I POL00118096 VIS00012685
May 2011
The documents contained POL00118108 VIS00012697
within the attached compliance I POL00118109 VIS00012698
zip file on this email POL00118103 VIS00012692
POL00118105 VIS00012694
POL00118106 VIS00012695
POL00118107 VIS00012696
“Guide to the Preparation and I POL00118101 VIS00012690
Layout of Investigation Red
Label Case Files — Offender
reports & Discipline reports”
Offender Report template POL00118102 VIS00012691
“Identification Codes” POL00118104 VIS00012693
“Conducting Audit Data POL00029169 POL-0025651
Extractions at CSR” dated 4
May 2000
“Conducting Audit Data FUJ00152176 POINQ0158370F
Extractions at Live” dated 27
November 2001
“Management of the Litigation I FUJ00152212 POINQ0158406F
Support Service” dated 27
October 2009
“Management of the Litigation I FUJ00152220 POINQ0158414F
Support Service” dated 14
February 2012
“Management of the Litigation I FUJ00152225 POINQ0158419F
Support Service” dated 23 April
2012
“Management of the Litigation I FUJ00152235 POINQ0158429F
Support Service” version
marked “withdrawn”
“Audit Data Extraction FUJ00152216 POINQ0158410F
Process” dated 13 September
2010
“Audit Data Extraction FUJ00152218 POINQ0158412F
Process” dated 1 March 2011
WITNO9160100
WITNO9160100
“Audit Data Extraction
Process” dated 14 February
2012
FUJ00152221
POINQ0158415F
“Audit Data Extraction
Process” dated 3 September
2014
FUJ00152226
POINQ0158420F
“Audit Data Extraction
Process” dated 4 September
2014
FUJ00152228
POINQ0158422F
“Security Management
Service: Service Description”
(SVM/SDM/SD/0017) dated 24
August 2006
FUJ00002033
POINQ0008204F
“Security Management
Service: Service Description”
(SVM/SDM/SD/0017) dated 31
December 2008
FUJ00080107
POINQ0086278F
“Security Management
Service: Service Description”
(SVM/SDM/SD/0017) dated 15
October 2010
FUJ00002264
POINQ0008435F
“Security Management
Service: Service Description”
(SVM/SDM/SD/0017) dated 25
November 2013
FUJ00088868
POINQ0095039F
“Security Management
Service: Service Description”
(SVM/SDM/SD/0017) dated 4
December 2013
FUJ00002555
POINQ0008726F
“Security Management
Service: Service Description”
(SVM/SDM/SD/0017) dated 4
April 2014
POL00002572
VIS00003586
“Security Management
Service: Service Description”
(SVM/SDM/SD/0017) dated 19
February 2016
POL00002666
VIS00003680
Email thread from Penny
Thomas to Gareth Jenkins RE:
FW: Horizon/ Post Office
Systems dated 17 September
2010
FUJ00156221
POINQ0162415F
WITNO9160100
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Email from Penny Thomas to FUJ00122938 POINQ0129152F
Gareth Jenkins re: Report —
Rinkfield dated 12 August 2008
Gareth Jenkins comments on I FUJ00122939 POINQ0129153F
Rinkfield Report dated 11
August 2008
The stakeholder notification POL00047065 POL-0043544
The event capture form POL00118275 POL-0118417
The financial investigation case I POL00119127 POL-0119046
closure report
The financial investigation POL00044749 POL-0041228
events log
The new case raised report POL00119137 POL-0119056
The investigation report POL00044803 POL-0041282
The suspect offender report POL00119221 POL-0119140
The case timeline POL00114696 POL-0113797
The case closure report POL00114739 POL-0113840
The draft audit report POL00050062 POL-0046541
The Record of Tape Recorded
Interview dated 15 September
2008 part 1 POL00050140 POL-0046619
part 2 POL00050128 POL-0046607
Karen Wilson witness WITN01680100 WITN01680100
statement dated 11 January
2022
Julian Wilson case study - POL00044803 POL-0041282
OFFENCE: Audit Shortage -
Cash Loss £27,811.98
Corporate Security Criminal
Law Team report from Gary
Thomas dated 2 December
2008
Graham Brander’s witness
statement in support of an
application for a restraint order,
dated 16 December 2008
POL00064718_001
POL-0061197_001
The memo from Terry
Crowther dated 5 December
2008
POL00047012
POL-0043491
WITNO9160100
WITNO9160100
The email from Graham Ward
to you and Jarnail Singh in
respect of a restraint order,
dated 17 December 2008
POL00050524
POL-0047003
The memo dated 6 January
2009
POL00044806
POL-0041285
The memo dated 9 January
2009
POL00050665
POL-0047144
The letter from you to Redditch
Magistrates’ Court, dated 13
January 2009
POL00064127
POL-0060606
The summons, dated 13
January 2009
POL00047084
POL-0043563
The letter from Richard Nelson
solicitors to Jarnail Singh,
dated 14 January 2009
POL00050695
POL-0047174
The memo dated 16 January
2009
POL00047018
POL-0043497
The letter from you to Jarnail
Singh, dated 21 January 2009
POL00050733
POL-0047212
The email from you dated 23
January 2009
POL00050763
POL-0047242
The memo dated 10 March
2009
POL00047020
POL-0043499
Your letter dated 17 March
2009 enclosing the committal
bundle
POL00119090
POL-0119009
Memo 2 April 2009
POL00119197
POL-0119116
The letter from Richard Nelson
Solicitors dated 14 May 2009,
with handwritten comments
POL00051920
POL-0048399
The letter from Jarnail Singh to
Richard Nelson Solicitors
dated 19 May 2009
UKGI00012555
UKGI023351-001
Jarnail Singh’s memo to the
Fraud Team dated 28 May
2009 at
POL00051720
POL-0048199
WITNO9160100
WITN09160100
Counsel's Brief endorsed POL00051459 POL-0047938
following the hearing on 15
June 2009
John H. Dove's letter to Jarnail I POL00051936 POL-0048415
Singh dated 17 June 2009
The memo dated 18 June 2009 I POL00051945 POL-0048424
The memo dated 5 August POL00064718_004 POL-0061197_004
2009
The memo from Andy Hayward I POL00044810 POL-0041289
to Graham Ward dated 17
December 2009
The memo dated 11 January I POL00119126 POL-0119045
2010
Memo dated 14 February 2011 I POL00119129 POL-0119048
The email chains in respect of I POL00114710 and POL-0113811
the restraint order POL00114730 POL-0113831
Notification of proceedings to POL00119140 and POL-0119059
police POL00119211 POL-0119130
The information in respect of POL00119119 POL-0119038
the hearing on 4 March 2009
Counsel's endorsed copy of POL00044800 POL-0041279
the Indictment
Your witness statement dated I POL00044778 POL-0041257
12 March 2009
Counsel's Advice dated 22 POL00044751 POL-0041230
May 2009
Draft Case Summary POL00044809 POL-0041288
The basis of plea dated 15 POL00051915 POL-0048394
June 2009
Schedule of non-sensitive POL00119095 POL-0119014
unused material
Schedule of sensitive POL00119096 POL-0119015
Disclosure officer’s report POL00119097 POL-0119016
List of witnesses POL00119098 POL-0119017
Antecedents POL00119103 POL-0119022
WITNO9160100
WITNO9160100
Notification of disposal to POL00119214 POL-0119133
police
The confiscation order dated POL00053703 POL-0050182
17 December 2009
Judgment of the Court of POL00113278 POL-0110657
Appeal in Josephine Hamilton
& Others v Post Office Limited
[2021] EWCA Crim 577
The handwritten note dated 1 POL00046065 POL-0042544
January 2011
The Audit Report dated 31 POL00056292 POL-0052771
March 2011
The Record of Tape Recorded
Interview dated 20 April 2011
part 1 POL00056417 POL-0052896
part 2 POL00044505 POL-0040984
part 3 POL00046625 POL-0043104
The Investigation Report dated I POL00046706 POL-0043185
5 May 2011
Jarnail Singh’s memo dated 17 I POL00046626 POL-0043105
June 2011
The memo from Graham POL00046628 POL-0043107
Brander to Jarnail Singh dated
9 December 2011
The Advice and Proposed POL00057362 POL-0053841
Charge drafted by Martin Smith
of Cartwright King 4 January
2012
The list of witnesses POL00046099 POL-0042578
The witness statement of Nigel
Allen dated 22 September
2011 page 1 POL00057026 POL-0053505
page 2 POL00044533 POL-0041012
The witness statement of
Adam Shaw dated 20
September 2011 page 1 POL00056955 POL-0053434
page 2 POL00046120 POL-0042599
The witness statement of POL00056987 POL-0053466
Sarah Juliff dated 21
September 2011
WITNO9160100
WITNO9160100
The unsigned witness
statement of Louise Sheridan
dated 24 November 2011 at POL00057245 POL-0053724
page 1 POL00044534 POL-0041013
pages 2 POL00054806 POL-0051285
3 exhibit LS/1
The list of exhibits POL00046100 POL-0042579
The witness statement of POL00056659 POL-0053138
Andrew Paul Dunks dated 12
July 2011 POL00046047 POL-0042526
and exhibit APDO1
The witness statement of POL00057001 POL-0053480
David Dixon dated 22
September 2011
Your witness statement dated I POL00056742 POL-0053221
11 August 2011
The unsigned witness POL00057267 POL-0053746
statement of Graham Brander
dated 25 November 2011 -
page 1 POL00044535 POL-0041014
and pages 2 to 7
Handwritten note on Reginav I POL00046095 POL-0042574
Lynette Jane Hutchings 1 April
2011
Handwritten notes on Regina v I POL00046096 POL-0042575
Lynette Jane Hutchings: basis
of plea 30 July 2012
Counsel's attendance note POL00058132 POL-0054611
dated 30 July 2012
Email dated 30 August 2012 POL00058252 POL-0054731
Email at 31 July 2012 POL00058153 POL-0054632
The Audit Report, dated 21 POL00046550 POL-0043029
August 2008
The handwritten notes 20 POL00045243 POL-0041722
August 2008
The Record of Tape Recorded I POL00050026 POL-0046505
Interview of 20 August 2008
The Investigation Report dated I POL00046485 POL-0042964
2 September 2008
WITNO9160100
WITNO9160100
The Antecedents form for
Susan Rudkin dated 2
September 2008
POL00046576
POL-0043055
Jarnail Singh’s memo to the
Fraud Team dated 3 October
2008
POL00046488
POL-0042967
The Schedule of Charges
POL00045220
POL-0041699
David Pardoe’s email to the
Fraud Team dated 7 October
2008
POL00050347
POL-0046826
The memo from Mike Wilcox to
Jarnail Singh dated 29 January
2009
POL00046505
POL-0042984
Jarnail Singh’s memo to the
Fraud Team dated 6 February
2009
POL00046506
POL-0042985
The memo from Debbie
Helszajn to the Fraud Team
dated 26 March 2009
POL00051256
POL-0047735
The memo from Rob Wilson to
the Fraud Team dated 6 May
2009
POL00051420
POL-0047899
Email from Stuart Lill to Declan
Salter, Avene Regan and
Others RE Former Investigator
email to Nick Read Update
dated 16 July 2021
POL00113304
POL-0110682