WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
Witness Name: GLEN MORRIS
Statement No: WITN09170100
Dated: 02 October 2023
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF GLEN MORRIS
I, Glen Morris will say as follows:
1. I am a current employee of the Post Office and I hold the position of ‘Branch
Assurance Advisor.’ A previous job title for this position within the Post Office
was ‘Audit Inspector.’
2. This statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon Inquiry (the “Inquiry”)
with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 17 August 2023 (the
“Request”). The Request contains 58 questions, which I have addressed
below. I would like to flag that I have received legal assistance to produce this
statement from my solicitor, Mr lan Manners of Ashfords LLP. When seeking
to obtain assistance from Ashfords LLP, I was assisted by the Post Office with
the initial stage of confirming the availability of insurance coverage, to cover
the associated legal costs.
Page 1 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
3. I would like to note that the questions posed in the Request mainly centre
around the case of David Blakey, the events of which occurred almost 20 years
ago. It has therefore been difficult for me to recall precise details at times, due
to the passage of time. However, I have made this statement to the best of my
recollection and I have ensured to make it clear in instances where I cannot
remember something, or I have had to rely on a document provided.
Relevant background
4. I have been asked to set out a summary of my career and qualifications. I
started my career in the Post Office in 1983 at the age of 18, working on the
counter at Worksop. I stayed in this role for approximately 6 years until 1989,
following which I went on ‘Leave Reserve’. When on ‘Leave Reserve’ I was
posted in various Post Office roles in the Sheffield and Rotherham area. The
specific locations depended on where cover was required. For example, I
would be working in the return letter branch one week, within the finance team
the following week, a branch counter the next week etc. I cannot remember
what specific locations I worked at on a week by week basis during this period
as it changed constantly.
5. Around January 1995 I interviewed internally with the Post Office to become
an Audit Inspector. By this point I had worked under the Post Office umbrella
for 12 years and I had gained a lot of knowledge and experience of various
Post Office procedures. I was successful in obtaining the role and started my
Auditor career in February 1995. At the time of writing this statement I am still
currently employed in an Auditor position for the Post Office and I have
remained at the same level throughout.
Page 2 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
6. When I first became an Audit Inspector I was based in the Sheffield and
Rotherham area, along with 6 other Auditors. Due to the diminishing number
of Audit Inspectors employed by the Post Office over the years, the areas that
I am scheduled to cover has expanded over time. I am now considered to be
part of the ‘North team’ covering mainly areas within the North of England.
However, sometimes I will be scheduled to carry out audits in branches that
fall outside of this remit, including branches within Ireland, Scotland etc.
7. In terms of gaining the relevant training and experience, back when I first
became and Audit Inspector it was very much the case that you learned on the
job. I initially shadowed more experienced Auditors and assisted them with
carrying out scheduled audits. During that time audits were carried out at
branches almost every day, so I was able to gain the necessary skills and
experience quite quickly by shadowing more experienced Auditors. Whilst I
cannot remember precisely how I progressed from this shadowing role, I
believe that it is likely that after a few months my line manager at the time would
have received confirmation from the relevant colleagues that I had become
experienced enough to lead audits myself. I have had various line managers
over the years, so I cannot recall who this particular line manager would have
been.
8. I have been asked to set out what I understood the role of an Audit Inspector
to involve. Essentially, the core of the Audit Inspector role has remained
unchanged since I started and it involves carrying out asset verification. What
this means is that we count all cash and stock at a Post Office branch to check
Page 3 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
whether the amount that should be present at the branch is there. We also
carry out compliance checks, which mainly involves checking that the required
security measures are in place at the branch. There are a number of different
types of audit. The main ones are:
a. transfer audits - carried out when a new Subpostmaster (hereafter
referred to as “SPM"”) takes over a branch to verify that the cash and
stock being transferred matches central records.
b. closure audits - verifying that the assets being returned when a branch
closes matches what should be present at the branch.
c. risk audits — verifying assets where a potential risk such as excess cash
holdings is flagged.
d. robbery audits - verifying the remaining cash and stock to establish the
amount of cash and stock stolen from a branch.
9. When I first became an Audit Inspector, the Horizon IT system had not yet been
implemented. Therefore, in order to complete an audit we would be required to
work back manually to the to the previous week’s balance (adding receipts and
subtracting payments) to establish what assets should be present. This was
then compared to the actual assets on site. This involved working off hand
written paper records.
10.Since the introduction of the Horizon IT system, we no longer work off paper
records to determine what cash and stock should exist within a branch. Instead,
printouts are obtained via the Horizon system which include an printed
Page 4 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
reports from each stock unit. At the time of the matter involving David Blakey,
I believe the Horizon IT system had been in place for approximately 4 years.
11.Once an audit is complete, I report the findings in an audit report to the Retail
Line Manager. If any major discrepancies or shortfalls are discovered, I would
also report my findings to my Senior Auditor and Investigation/Security team.
At the time of the incident involving David Blakey, Craig Thompson was my
Senior Auditor, the Retail Line Manger was Jayne Kaye and the security team
contact was Paul Whitaker.
12.1 have been asked my views on the competence and professionalism of my
colleagues and managers. Throughout my career, I believe that my colleagues
and managers have been exceptionally professional and competent. Being an
Audit Inspector is a sought after position and I believe that you need a high
level of integrity and professionalism from the outset to be employed and
remain within the role. As far as I am concerned, the people I have worked with
have been highly competent and professional at all times and I would not have
stayed within an audit role for 28 years if I did not believe that to be the case.
The audit process and the policies/practices in place
13.Since I became an Audit Inspector in February 1995 there have been many
changes to the audit process and the policies and practices that relate to it. I
cannot remember every single change, nor the specific dates that such
changes were implemented as it is ever evolving. However, despite the
Page 5 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
number of changes that will have occurred over the past 28 years, the core of
the auditing process has remained the same. As it was back when I started,
the primary objective involves asset verification of stock and cash at branches,
the process of which I have set out in paragraph 8 above.
14.In terms of major changes to the processes, practices and policies, the
introduction of the Horizon IT system in around 2000 was considered a
significant development as it allowed the audit to utilise electronic records and
move away from a manual process.
15.Another significant change to the practice was the move from unannounced to
announced audits. When I first started my Auditor career, we would be
scheduled in to complete an audit at a particular branch and the branch would
have no knowledge of the visit. We would arrive first thing in the morning before
the branch opened and would explain to the postmaster why we were attending
and we would ask for access to all the cash and stock within the branch. We
would then complete the asset verification process. Nowadays, audit visits are
announced, but I cannot remember when this change was introduced.
16.Additionally, when I first became an Audit Inspector I believe that every post
office in the country would undergo an audit every two years at least. This is
not the case today as audit frequency is now based on an assessment of risk.
Again, I am unable to pinpoint the exact time that this change came into place.
Page 6 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
Recruitment and training of auditors
17. I have been asked to consider the following documents:
a. “Assurance Review - Recruitment (Vetting & Training)” (version 1.0, 27
October 2009) (POL00032698);
b. “Network auditing approach, methods and assurance” (2013)
(POL00086765);
c. “Training & Audit Advisor” (undated) (POL00088453);
d. “Audit Advisor” (undated) (POL00088557).
18. These are not documents I am familiar with and prior to receiving them from
the Inquiry, I cannot recall having had sight of them.
19.From my own knowledge, I am not aware if there are a variety of potential
routes by which you can be recruited as an Auditor for the Post Office. I have
always thought that you could only be recruited internally and only if you have
some counter experience, as some balancing experience is required.
20.In terms of the level of qualification and/or experience required I do not think
there was a specified minimum level required at the time I was recruited. You
just needed to have at least some counter experience to be considered for the
role.
21.When I was recruited as an Audit Inspector in 1995, I do not recall undergoing
a formal induction as such. Rather, I learned on the job by shadowing more
experienced colleagues, as I have described in paragraph 7 above.
Page 7 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
22. In terms of ongoing training, I do not recall any formal training days in the early
years of my Auditor career. The Audit Team would simply receive updates on
process changes as and when they occurred and I believe that this was
sufficient to ensure we understood what was required of us. Training has
become more formalised as the years have gone by.
23.1 believe that from the time I became an Audit Inspector to the present day,
auditors have always had the necessary training and experience required to
carry out their roles at the Post Office.
The planning and scheduling of audits
24.1 have been asked to consider the document “Audit Plan & Scheduling, Chapter
1 of the Audit Process Manual” (Version 8.0) (2010) (POL00084650). Again,
this is not a document I am familiar with and I have only considered it for the
first time when it was provided to me by the Inquiry.
25.From my recollection, when I first became an Audit Inspector all branches were
audited every two years at random, however, at some point in time the
scheduling process became more risk based. I do not know when random
audits were changed in favour of risk based audits, but there is now a network
monitoring team in place which identifies issues and raises red flags to trigger
an audit.
Page 8 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
26. Triggers for scheduling audits include, but are not limited to, robberies, risk,
branch transfers and branch closures.
27.As alluded to earlier in my statement, I believe that when I first started my
Auditor career, audits were scheduled on a weekly basis. There was often little
or no change to the weekly schedule. If on the rare occasion a visit to a branch
had to be cancelled last minute for any reason (for example, a robbery had
taken place at another branch which called for an urgent audit), then this could
easily be rescheduled without liaising with the branch in question, as audits
were unannounced at that time. As time has gone on and with audits now being
announced, the schedule has become more advanced and changes occur
more often.
28.1 have never been involved with the organisation or scheduling of audits.
29.1 have been asked to describe any enquiries or investigations conducted before
a branch visit is scheduled. It is important for the Inquiry to note that amount of
work done by an auditor prior to the branch visit has changed over the years.
From my recollection, early on in my audit career there was little to no enquires
prior to branch visits.
30.Nowadays information is more readily available and accessible through the
support and IT systems in place. As such, most potential issues within a branch
are identified earlier on in the process, meaning that an audit occurs further
down the line if it is considered to be necessary.
Page 9 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
31.1 have been asked to describe and explain any variation between the
scheduling of audits in respect of Crown Office branches and other branches.
I know that Crown Office branches undergo further internal audits, which I
comment briefly upon in paragraph 54 below, but I do not recall what the
difference is in terms of the frequency of scheduling of audits compared to
ordinary branches. I cannot comment beyond that as I have never been
responsible for scheduling any type of audit.
The Auditing Process
32.1 have been asked to consider the following documents:
a. “Audit Charter” (version 4.0, undated) (POL00083966);
b. “Performing a Branch Audit’, Chapter 3 of the Audit Process Manual
(version 5.1, May 2010) (POL00084801);
c. “Core & Outreach Audit Process”, Chapter 3a of the Audit Process
Manual (version 1.0, 27 May 2011) (POL00085534);
d. “Follow Up Audit Process”, Chapter 3b of the Audit Process Manual
(version 3.0, May 2015) (POL00087627);
e. “Performing a Cash Centre Audit”, Chapter 7 of the Audit Process
Manual (version 5.0, Aug 2016) (POL00088252):
f. “Quality Assurance”, Chapter 11 of the Audit Process Manual (version
5.0, Apr 2015) (POL00087672);
g. “Post Incident Auditing without Horizon”, Chapter 14 of the Audit Process
Manual (version 1.0, Nov 2006) (POL00084003);
Page 10 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
h. “Condensed Guide for Audit Attendance” (version 2, Oct 2008)
(POL00084813);
i. “Requirement of Network Field Support Advisors at audit, following
discovery of discrepancy” (version 1.0, Oct 2011) (POL00085652);
j. “Network auditing approach, methods and assurance” (2013)
(POL00086765);
k. “Training Guide: Compliance Audit Tool” (Sep 2015) (POL00087688);
I. “Training-Aide for Branch Asset Checking” (version 1.7, Nov 2014)
(POL00087716); and
m. “Terms of Reference Audits” (version 1, April 2015) (POL00087614).
33.1 note that these documents are concerned with various processes and
practices in place that relate to the Post Office Auditor role. I would like to flag
that apart from the first document in the list, “Audit Charter” (version 4.0,
undated) (POL00083966), all other documents appear to postdate the incident
involving Mr Blakey in 2004. As such, it does not seem that they would have
been implemented at the time.
34. In relation to the undated document (POL00083966), I cannot recall if this was
in operation at the time of the audit at Riby Square Branch in May 2004.
However, I would like to draw attention to section 2.2 of this document, where
the purpose and scope of the Auditor role is set out as follows:
“The Primary purpose of branch and cash centre audit activity is to provide a
independent assurance to Post Office Ltd that:-
Page 11 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
¢ Its assets exist at Post Office® branches and cash centres
e There is compliance to relevant policies, processes, regulations and
standards.”
35. The first bullet point in this description relates to the Auditor's role of asset
verification, which I have already set out in in Paragraph 8 above.
36.In terms of the second bullet point relating to compliance checks, I would like
to flag to the Inquiry that this action is completely separate to the asset
verification steps taken to complete an audit. Once an audit and the associated
reporting steps that follow have been completed, Auditors are then required to
ask the postmaster a checklist of questions which relate to security and
compliance. These include, but are not limited to, questions about keeping the
secure area closed, regular checking of security alarms, the level of cash kept
in safes etc.
37.1 would also like to draw attention to the following paragraph of section 2.2 of
document (POL00083966):
“The role is not an investigative one nor is its primary function to detect fraud.
The investigation of fraud is the responsibility of Post Office Ltd Security team.
While it is not a primary function of the audit team to detect fraud, it is not
uncommon for system contro! weaknesses to be exploited for fraudulent gain.
Where auditors identify or suspect fraud, processes exist to escalate the
matter.”
Page 12 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
38. This paragraph clarifies that where any discrepancies such as cash shortages
are found during an audit, it is not for the Audit Team to then further investigate
matters. Rather, we would be required to report it to the Investigation/Security
Team, who would then decide whether or not to take any further action. This
point is relevant to the actions I took in relation to the events that occurred
during the audit of Riby Square Branch in May 2004, the details of which I have
addressed later in this statement.
39. The final section of document (POL00083966) I would like to comment on is
“Section 4 — Code of Ethics”. Whilst I cannot directly remember this document
or this specific section I believe that I would have read it at the time it was
issued and I would have taken on board and understood the points raised in
relation to the Code of Ethics. In particular, I have always understood the
importance of confidentiality and conflicts of interest and have ensured to take
the relevant steps to avoid a breach of such. For example, whenever I have
been scheduled at a branch where I have previously worked on the counters
during my Leave Reserve role, I have raised this with my line manager to
double check that it would be appropriate for me to carry out the audit.
40.In terms of the information that I consider when completing an audit, this
remains the same on the day of the audit itself, despite what type of audit is
being undertaken. Essentially, I will consider the findings in the printouts
retrieved for each stock unit from the Horizon IT system, so the figures can be
compared to the total figures of all the cash and stock counted during the audit.
Page 13 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
I will also consider any extra information that a postmaster relays to me on the
day in relation to any figures. In the matter concerning Mr Blakey, this would
have been the information he provided regarding the shortfall.
41.The only time where the information I consider varies for different types of
audits is where background information is obtained prior to going to a branch.
For example, if a problem with stock at a branch triggers the requirement for
an audit, I may contact the stock team first to get some background information
before attending if I think it is necessary. However, I would not necessarily take
this step when excess cash in a branch triggers the need for an audit. Rather,
I would potentially review the branch’s previous cash declarations and cash
reports to obtain the relevant background information prior to attending.
42.As touched upon in paragraphs 37 and 38 of this statement, whenever I
discover a significant shortfall during an audit I will proceed to report this to the
Investigation/Security Team, as it is for them to then determine what steps to
take next. Before doing this, I always double check my figures first to make
sure that the shortfall discovered is correct. I may also consider various
documents that can be obtained through the Horizon IT system, such as the
transactions log, to see if a reason for the discrepancy can be identified.
However, I do not believe that these actions constitute “further investigation” —
they simply represent standard practice in order to verify my findings as part of
the audit process and in turn this might flag to the Investigation/Security Team
any information that may be considered helpful when they proceed with their
own enquiries.
Page 14 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
43.The point at which I would be prompted to notify the Investigation/Security
Team of a discrepancy differs depending on the circumstances. For example,
if I am told at the outset by a postmaster that a large cash shortfall is likely to
be discovered, as was the case involving Mr Blakey, then I will report this to
the Investigation/Security Team immediately and will further confirm the
specific figure once the audit is complete. However, if there is no admission by
the postmaster prior to the audit and a large cash shortfall is only discovered
after it is complete, I would first double check with the postmaster whether there
is any other cash or stock that the Audit Team have not been given access to,
and if not, I would then contact the Investigation/Security Team at this stage.
44.1 would like to point out to the Inquiry that as well as contacting the
Investigation/Security Team, I will also separately inform the Retail Line
Manager and the Audit Manager when any large shortfalls are discovered, to
make sure that all necessary people who require the information receive it.
45.1 would also like to flag that where any shortfall or discrepancy discovered after
an audit is minor, my audit report would then only go to the Retail Line Manager
and the Audit Manager. This is because a minor figure would not necessitate
the involvement of the Investigation/Security Team to carry out further
investigation.
Page 15 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
46.The level of discrepancy that is considered reportable to the
Investigation/Security Team has changed over the years, and I cannot
remember what the minimum figure would have been at the time of the Riby
Square audit in May 2004, however, the £60,000 cash shortfall initially reported
to me by Mr Blakey will have been well over the minimum figure at the time.
47.In the first few years of my Auditor career, it was common practice for Auditors
to ask SPMs to make good any discrepancies on the day of an audit.
Alternatively, we would request that it is made good at the point of the next
weekly balance check. If an SPM was unable to make good any discrepancy,
we would report this to our Area Manager who would then discuss matters with
the SPM further. Nowadays, no one asks SPMs to make good any
discrepancies. Instead they are settled to the SPM’s account. I am unable to
pinpoint from memory when this change came into force.
48.In terms of Auditors being given instructions on taking payment from SPMs, I
am unable to recall any specific scenarios in which this may have taken place.
However, I can vaguely recall occasions early on in my career where money
was deposited in the tills at a branch just after an audit had been completed to
make good a variance. A receipt would have been given and I imagine the
instructions for such steps would have been contained in the Auditor
instructions manual in place at the time.
Page 16 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
49. It has always been the case during my Auditor career that on the day of the
audit SPMs are permitted to provide their own information or undertake their
own investigation in relation to any shortfall discovered, if they so wish. For
example, if an SPM wishes to double check the total figures found by the
auditing team, we always allow this. SPMs would also be able to obtain their
own print outs from the Horizon IT system so they would be able to carry out
their own investigations into the cash and stock figures if they wished.
50.When I first began my Auditor career, we were able to ask SPMs why a
discrepancy exists, to give them an opportunity to provide further information.
However, we are no longer permitted to proactively seek this information. I
believe this is because it is considered more appropriate for this information to
be obtained by the Investigation/Security Team. I cannot recall when this
change to the process occurred.
51. In normal circumstances, an Audit Team will continuously communicate the
level of progress during an audit to the branch SPM. For example, once
we finish counting the first stock unit, we would update the SPM of our
findings in relation to the balance of that particular unit, before moving on to
the next. We would also inform the SPM when we are likely to finish the audit,
so they have an idea of when the branch can reopen. At the end of an
audit, we carry out a closure meeting to verbally discuss our findings,
which would also form the basis of our audit report. This was not the
case during the audit of the Riby Square Branch, as the Investigation/
Security Team got involved immediately and were on site at the branch
Page 17 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
by the time the audit was completed. I deal with the steps that were taken on
this day later in my statement.
52.An SPM is always able to raise any concerns to an Audit Team during an audit
by simply speaking to the team at the branch that day. If the concern needs to
be escalated, the Audit Team can call the Retail Line Manager to discuss the
issue and the Retail Line Manager will then consider what steps can be
followed.
53.Where the Horizon IT system cannot be accessed, it is still possible to conduct
a branch audit. First the relevant branch figures would have to be obtained
from the central accounting team at Chesterfield, then all cash and stock would
have to be transferred to a cash and stock centre for the balance to be counted
externally. If Chesterfield were not able to provide the relevant figures, it would
be for the Audit Team to first count the cash and stock at the branch (if
possible), list it and then send it to the cash and stock centre. The cash and
stock centre would then liaise with the accounting team at Chesterfield to marry
the figures up. These processes would often be implemented where a branch
had suffered damage from flooding or fire and is unsafe to visit or the Horizon
IT system is down. I note that further information about this can be found in the
following document provided: “Post Incident Auditing without Horizon”, Chapter
14 of the Audit Process Manual (version 1.0, Nov 2006) (POL00084003).
54.1 have been asked to describe and explain any variation between the audit
process in respect of Crown Office branches and other branches. The only
Page 18 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
variation I am aware of is that Crown Office Branches carry out extra internal
audits by their managers, as well as the external audits that the Post Office
Audit Team carry out. At a standard post office branch, audits are rarely carried
out internally. I have learned from document (POL00083966) that Crown Post
Office branches have to complete an annual certificate of compliance after
carrying out self-assessments. Whilst I was aware that self-assessments were
carried out, I was not aware that the results were then reported until reading
document (POL00083966).
55. I have been asked to consider the following documents:
a. “Audit Trail Functional Specification” (version 8.0, 18 October 2004)
(FUJ00001894); and
b. Global User Account (September 2016) (POL00002841).
56. The first document noted above sets out the types of reports that Auditors are
able to obtain from the Horizon IT system. It is important to note that over the
years, report types have been added and taken away from this list, but I cannot
specifically recall what specific documents and when. The second document
noted above sets out the basis by which Auditors are able to access the Global
User account on the Horizon IT system.
57.Other than providing the relevant kit, Fujitsu had no involvement in the audit
process. If there is a problem with the kit itself, for example, it has frozen, I
Page 19 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
would contact the national support centre to see if they could provide a
potential solution.
58.In terms of the information that an SPM can access, all information that
Auditors are able to access during an audit is also available to the SPM via
their Horizon User Profile.
59.My understanding of an Audit Global User Account is that it provides Auditors
special access to the Horizon IT system in order to settle discrepancies to the
Central Accounts Team at Chesterfield. Where a discrepancy is found at a
branch, I will log out of my Personal User Account and log in to the Global User
Account to remove the discrepancy from the Post Office account. This process
describes my main experience in using the Audit Global User Account, but I
am also aware that it may be used in situations where a Personal User Account
cannot be accessed.
60.1 cannot recall any specific measures in place in respect of Audit Global User
Accounts. I just know that the Global User Account should only be used in the
situations I have described in paragraph 59 above, and our Personal User
Accounts should be used for anything else. In addition, we now have to inform
an SPM that we are logging on to the Global User Account in order to remove
the discrepancy from the Post Office accounts, but I cannot remember the
specific date that this requirement came in to force
Page 20 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
Audit of Riby Square Branch and Prosecution of Mr David Charles Blakey
61.1 have been asked to set out my recollection of this case. I would like to reiterate
that as this incident occurred almost 20 years ago I do not have a precise and
clear recollection of the events and I have had to rely heavily on the following
documents produced to me:
a. My witness statement in the proceedings against Mr Blakey, dated 23
November 2004 (POL00044819);
b. the record of Mr Blakey's interviews on 13 May 2004 (POL00044830)
and (POL00044831); and
c. the offender report in respect of Mr Blakey (POL00044823).
62.1 would also like to note that the first time I have had sight of the documents
listed in ‘b’ and ‘c’ above was when they were produced to me for the Request.
63.1 first became involved in Mr Blakey’s case on the morning of 13 May 2004
when I attended Riby Square Branch to carry out the scheduled audit.
64.1 cannot remember if the audit of 13 May 2004 was a routine audit or if my line
manager had requested it to be scheduled but it appears from reading my
statement dated 23 November 2004 that it may have been the latter due to the
value of cash at branch reported. All I know is that it was scheduled for that
date and for 3 of us to attend. From reading my statement, it appears it was
scheduled in early May 2004.The decision to send 3 of us to complete the audit
Page 21 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
would have been based on the size of the branch and the number of customer
sessions on the Horizon IT system.
65.In terms of the process by which the audit was conducted on 13" May 2004,
as described in my statement, on the morning of 13'" May 2004 I attended the
Riby Square branch before it opened with my colleagues Christopher Taylor
and Lynne Eastwood. I would often carry out audits with Christopher and Lynne
and we all lived within close proximity to each other. As such, I believe that it
probably made sense for us to be grouped together to complete audits when
they were scheduled at branches in our local area.
66. Myself, Christopher and Lynne were all at the same Auditor level, but I took the
lead in the audit that day, with both Christopher and Lynne assisting me. This
is indicated by the fact that it was me who relayed the morning’s events by
telephone to the Senior Auditor, Retail Line Manager and Investigations/
Security Team and requested to Mr Blakey that he make a statement of the
information he told us about the shortfall.
67. There was no specific reason as to why I took the lead that day; we often took
it in turns and decided between ourselves. However, at that time it was me who
lived the closest to the Riby Square Branch out of all three of us, and I believe
that this may have influenced the decision for me to take the lead.
68. Upon arrival to the Riby Square Branch I spoke with David Blakey's wife, Gillian
Blakey, who I knew to be the SPM. I cannot remember what I specifically said
Page 22 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
to Mrs Blakey but it would have involved an explanation as to why we were
there and a request for her to present us with all the cash and stock present at
the branch so it could be included in the audit. I would have also explained that
the branch would need to remain closed that day until we had been able to
carry out the audit, but we would try our best to complete the audit as soon as
possible so that they could reopen. Of course in the end they were unable to
re-open that day due to the discrepancies found and the events that
subsequently followed.
69.As the Horizon IT system was implemented at the time of the Riby Square
audit, we would have first obtained printouts from each stock unit to retrieve
and consider the information of what cash, cheques, vouchers and stock
should exist in the branch, before then opening the safe and proceeding with
the asset verification process. I cannot remember precisely how many stock
units there were at the branch.
70.1 do remember that whilst we were waiting to obtain access to the office safe,
aman arrived to the branch and asked to speak to myself, Christopher and
Lynne. I later learned that this was David Blakey, Gillian Blakey's husband. I
cannot directly remember what Mr Blakey looked like or the exact discussion
that myself and my colleagues had with him, so I am entirely reliant on my
statement dated 23 November 2004. This states that “...Mr Blakey informed
us that we would find a shortage in the cash of around £60,000, and this was
due to, in his words, money going missing after a few months.”
Page 23 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
71.As per that statement, after Mr Blakey told me this information I asked him to
produce a short written statement about what he had told us. When he had
completed this, I do not recall speaking to Mr Blakey again that day.
72.1 believe that my request to Mr Blakey to make a statement would have
followed the phone calls I made to report the circumstances to Craig
Thompson, Senior Auditor, Jayne Kaye, Retail Line Manager and Paul
Whitaker from the Investigation Team. I believe that it would have been Paul
Whitaker who instructed me to ask Mr Blakey to make a statement.
73.After obtaining the statement from Mr Blakey, I do recall that myself,
Christopher and Lynne continued to carry out the audit until Jayne Kaye, Paul
Whitaker and his colleague Helen Dickinson arrived. I cannot remember the
precise discussions that I had with Ms Kaye, Mr Whitaker and Ms Dickinson
when they arrived, but as per my statement dated 23 November 2004 I believe
it involved a breakdown of the day’s events to that point and a hand over of the
statement completed by Mr Blakey, before they then left us to compete the
audit.
74.1 cannot recall where Ms Kaye, Mr Whitaker and Ms Dickinson went after they
left us to finish the audit, but from reading the record of Mr Blakey's interviews
on 13 May 2004 in documents (POL00044830) and (POL00044831), I can see
that it was to carry out an interview with Mr Blakey. I confirm that I had no
involvement in carrying out this interview and until these documents were
produced to me with the Request, I had no knowledge of what was discussed.
Page 24 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
75.1 do not recall from direct memory the precise shortage we discovered following
the completion of the audit at the Riby Square branch on 13 May 2004. I
therefore rely entirely on my witness statement dated 23 November 2004
which gives a total figure of £64,434.12.
76. Following the completion of the audit, I produced an audit report and provided
it to the Retail Line Manager, Ms Kaye. I believe that I would have also provided
it to the Investigation/Security Team, due to the total shortfall figure that was
found.
77.Whilst I cannot remember my exact thoughts at the time, from an asset
verification standpoint I do not believe that I would have been overly concerned
about the total shortage discovered, as it was close to the £60,000 figure that
Mr Blakey had informed us about prior to starting the audit. If Mr Blakey had
not informed us about the shortage beforehand, or he had stated it to be much
lower than £60,000, then I probably would have been more concerned.
78.The concern about any potential misconduct was not an aspect for the Audit
Team to consider and I do not recall having any particular view on this.
79.1 do not think that I would have considered the size of the shortage to be
unusual, as by this point in my career I had come across several large
shortages at different branches following the many audits I had completed over
the years.
Page 25 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
80.After reporting to the Senior Auditor, the Retail Line Manager and the
Investigation/Security Team on the day what Mr Blakey had told us about the
shortfall and then obtaining a short written statement from Mr Blakey as
instructed, I did not undertake any further investigation to ascertain the cause
of the shortfall. As explained earlier in this statement, it did not fall upon the
Audit Team to carry out any further investigation, as this is a responsibility that
lies with the Investigation/Security Team.
8
=
.I have been asked whether or not ARQ logs were sought by the Post Office
from Fujitsu in this case. I do not know what ARQ logs are and this is not
something which formed part of the audit process.
82.1 do not know whose decision it was to suspend Mr Blakey following the events
on 13 May 2004. I believe that it could have been the decision of the Retail
Line Manager.
83. Aside from Mr Blakey's case, I have not been involved in any other proceedings
against SPMs, their managers or assistants, or Post Office employees
involving shortfalls shown by the Horizon IT system.
84.Beyond my actions on the day of the audit (as described above), my only other
involvement in the case of Mr Blakey was to produce my witness statement
dated 23 November 2004. I believe that it was Paul Whitaker who asked me
to produce this.
Page 26 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
85.1 believe that the only person that I would have had contact with when drafting
my statement dated 23" November 2004 was Paul Whitaker, however, I cannot
remember how the drafting came about. My assumption is that it was
completed during a meeting to go through events with Mr Whitaker.
86.When I was asked to produce the statement, I remember thinking that the
situation must be serious and that it was likely that some form of action was
being taken against Mr Blakey. However, I had no discussion with any counsel
or legal representatives for the Post Office about my role as a witness in the
case and I had no idea if it was civil or criminal action being considered.
87.1 have been asked what my view is of how the prosecution was conducted by
Post Office Limited. I cannot provide any view as to this I have no knowledge
of the steps and processes that were taken by the Post Office in this
prosecution.
88. After I provided my statement on 23 November 2004, I heard nothing further
in the case of Mr Blakey. I do not recall being contacted to assist any further in
the run up to the decision to charge him, nor was I asked to attend court or give
evidence in his proceedings or informed of the outcome of such proceedings.
I did not know anything about the case, including how MrBlakey pleaded or
what his sentence was until I heard from the Inquiry on17" August 2023.
Page 27 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
89.1 have been asked to consider the Judgment of the Court of Appeal in
Josephine Hamilton & Others v Post Office Limited [2021] EWCA Crim
(particularly paragraphs 347 to 352) at (POL00113278), and to provide my
reflections on the investigation that was done in Mr Blakey's case. I would like
to emphasise to the Inquiry that I do not feel that I can offer any valuable
reflection on this as I am unfamiliar with how an investigation is carried out by
the investigations team and what actions are considered appropriate or not.
Auditors are not involved in the investigation process.
General
90. By the time of the audit of Riby Square in May 2004, I cannot ever recall a
challenge to the Horizon IT system being raised. I cannot recall when I first
heard about any potential issues with Horizon, but I can recall that we were
reassured by the Post Office regarding the integrity the Horizon IT system.
9
=
.I_am unable to comment on whether the Post Office carried out sufficient
investigation into bugs, errors and defects in Horizon, nor as to whether
information regarding bugs, errors and defects in Horizon was sufficiently
passed to the Post Office by Fujitsu. I simply have no knowledge in relation to
this. All I can say is that if bugs, errors and defect were discovered and known
about by the Post Office then I believe that the Audit Team should have been
informed about this.
92.1 believe that matters concerning information passed between the Post Office
Limited and Fujitsu about bugs and defects with the Horizon IT system, and
Page 28 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
investigations carried out by the Post Office into the same, are more relevant
to the Post Office Investigation/Security or Legal teams.
93.Other than what I have already provided in my statement above, I have no
further reflections on these matters, or on any other matters that are relevant
to the Inquiry’s Term of Reference.
94. There are also no other matters that I wish to bring to the attention of the Chair
of the Inquiry.
Page 29 of 32
Index to First Witness Statement of GLEN MORRIS.
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
URN
Document
Description
Control Number
POL00032698
“Assurance Review - Recruitment
(Vetting & Training)” (version 1.0, 27
October 2009)
POL-0029633
POLO0086765
“Network auditing approach, methods
and assurance” (2013)
POL-0083823
POL00088453
“Training & Audit Advisor” (undated)
POL-0085511
POL00088557
“Audit Advisor” (undated)
POL-0085615
POLO0084650
“Audit Plan & Scheduling, Chapter 1 of
the Audit Process Manual” (Version
8.0) (2010)
POL-0081708
POLO0083966
“Audit Charter” (version 4.0, undated)
POL-0081024
POL00084801
“Performing a Branch Audit’, Chapter 3
of the Audit Process Manual (version
5.1, May 2010)
POL-0081859
POL00085534
“Core & Outreach Audit Process”,
Chapter 3a of the Audit Process
Manual (version 1.0, 27 May 2011)
POL-0082592
POL00087627
“Follow Up Audit Process”, Chapter 3b
of the Audit Process Manual (version
3.0, May 2015)
POL-0084685
10.
POL00088252
“Performing a Cash Centre Audit”,
Chapter 7 of the Audit Process Manual
(version 5.0, Aug 2016)
POL-0085310
Page 30 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
11.
POL00087672
“Quality Assurance”, Chapter 11 of the
Audit Process Manual (version 5.0, Apr
2015)
POL-0084730
12.
POL00084003
“Post Incident Auditing without
Horizon”, Chapter 14 of the Audit
Process Manual (version 1.0, Nov
2006)
POL-0081061
13.
POL00084813
“Condensed Guide for Audit
Attendance” (version 2, Oct 2008)
POL-0081871
14.
POLO0085652
“Requirement of Network Field Support
Advisors at audit, following discovery
of discrepancy” (version 1.0, Oct 2011)
POL-0082710
15.
POLO0086765
“Network auditing approach, methods
and assurance” (2013)
POL-0083823
16.
POL00087688
“Training Guide: Compliance Audit
Tool” (Sep 2015)
POL-0084746
17.
POL00087716
“Training-Aide for Branch Asset
Checking” (version 1.7, Nov 2014)
POL-0084774
18.
POL00087614
“Terms of Reference Audits” (version
1, April 2015)
POL-0084672
19.
FUJ00001894
“Audit Trail Functional Specification”
(version 8.0, 18 October 2004)
POINQO008065F
20.
POL00002841
Global User Account (September
2016)
VIS00003855
21.
POL00044819
Witness statement of Glen Morris in
the proceedings against Mr Blakey,
dated 23 November 2004
POL-0041298
22.
POL00044830
Record of Mr Blakey’s interviews on 13
May 2004
POL-0041309
Page 31 of 32
WITNO9170100
WITNO9170100
23. I POL00044831 Record of Mr Blakey's interviews on 13 I po..o041310
May 2004
24. I POL00044823 Offender report in respect of Mr Blakey I po,-9041302
25. I POL00113278 Court of Appeal in Josephine Hamilton
& Others v Post Office Limited [2021]
EWCA Crim
POL-0110657
Page 32 of 32