10 October 2023 – Andrew Hayward
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(10.00 am)
Ms Price: Good morning, sir. Can you see and hear us?
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, I can, thank you.
Ms Price: May we please call Mr Hayward.
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes.
Andrew Hayward
ANDREW GEORGE HAYWARD (sworn).
Questioned by Ms Price
Ms Price: Could you confirm your full name, please, Mr Hayward.
Andrew Hayward: Andrew George Hayward.
Ms Price: You should have in front of you a hard copy of a witness statement in your name dated 11 May 2023. Have you got that?
Andrew Hayward: Correct.
Ms Price: If you can turn to page 16 of that, please. Do you have a copy there with a visible signature?
Andrew Hayward: No, I’ve got my copy, apologies.
Ms Price: Do you have a copy of your witness statement that is signed?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Is that your signature on page 16?
Andrew Hayward: It is.
Ms Price: Are there any corrections you wish to make to the statement?
Andrew Hayward: Only one, that latterly I sent via email regarding my position within the Security team towards the back end of my career.
Ms Price: Do you want to just clarify which part of the statement that is that you’re correcting?
Andrew Hayward: Yes, so on point 9, where I’m titled Senior Security Operations Manager, 2010 to July 2015, although that was the title, such was the structure within the Security team that there was a Head of Security and four/five, we call them strands, direct reports. I was never a permanent direct report. I had the opportunity to apply for the vacancy when it came up on a number of occasions, chose not to because of personal logistical and financial reasons.
However, I did agree to support the team by temporarily covering that vacancy, whilst a new incumbent was found. I don’t remember the exact date. It was around 2012.
Ms Price: Subject to that correction, are the contents of your statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: For the purposes of the transcript, the reference is WITN08160100. There is no need to display that now. Thank you for coming to the Inquiry to assist it in its work and for providing the statement that you have. As you know, I will be asking questions on behalf of the Inquiry.
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Today I’m going to be asking you about issues which arise in Phase 4 of the Inquiry, focusing on policy, procedure and practice of the Post Office in the investigation and prosecution of subpostmasters and their staff and the Post Office employees suspected of an offence.
You were with the Post Office for 31 years after you joined in 1984; is that right?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Initially as a postman delivering the mail?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: You became a counter clerk in 1985 –
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: – and a supply chain manager in 1986?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: You joined the Post Office Security Team in the year 2000 –
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: – and held various roles in the Physical Crime Team over an eight-year period from then; is that right?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: You became a Senior Security Fraud Risk Programme Manager in 2008 –
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: – a role you held for two years; is that right?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Finally, you were a Senior Security Operations Manager from 2010 to July 2015 when you left the Post Office?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: I use the word “a” because I think you’ve been clear in your correction you were not “the” Senior Security Operations Manager reporting to the Head of Security?
Andrew Hayward: No, I retained my Fraud Risk Programme Manager remit during that time.
Ms Price: Are we right to understand that the roles you held within the Physical Crime Team between the year 2000 and 2008 focused on external crime against the Post Office Network and supply chain, so did not cover investigation of Post Office employees or subpostmasters and their staff?
Andrew Hayward: Correct.
Ms Price: During this period, were you involved in any criminal investigations into the conduct of Post Office employees, subpostmasters or their staff?
Andrew Hayward: Not that I can recall.
Ms Price: The first Physical Crime Team role you had was that of Security Advisor and you were later a team leader and temporary Senior Security Manager; is that right?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: When you became a Security Advisor, did you have any prior experience in security, criminal law or investigation?
Andrew Hayward: No.
Ms Price: Was it common for Security team members to be drawn from other non-security areas of the business, rather than recruited externally for their security experience?
Andrew Hayward: I can only speak from my personal perspective, as in I was – I had the opportunity to join the Security team because of my experience in the cash centre, cash-in-transit environment. I cannot recall, given the timescales, those individuals that subsequently joined the Security team and where they came from. I know, in terms of my latter career, when I had obviously had been in the role a number of years, not only did we recruit from within the business, but also from external sources as well, ie ex-law enforcement, police officers.
There were times, I would add, that I think because of headcount reduction and people were without a role, that if an opportunity arose to join another team within the business, ie Security, then that’s where we would draw from, because they were within the business. But, in terms of names and numbers, I couldn’t give you those details.
Ms Price: You have listed in your statement, in relation to your Physical Crime Team roles: investigation, statement taking and interviews under PACE. Did you undertake these activities for the whole period you were in the Physical Crime Team from 2000 to 2008?
Andrew Hayward: I would say no.
Ms Price: Can you recall which part of that period you had those roles?
Andrew Hayward: Not in terms of the eight-year time period. I know it was probably the earlier days, so when I was initially trained in 2000, in terms of interviewing and searches, that I was one of a number of team members that would conduct interviews if there was a suspect offender.
As I became a team leader/managing other managers, there was less opportunity or requirement for me to undertake those interviews under PACE.
Ms Price: You say in your statement at paragraph 36 that:
“All Investigators undertook in-house training which was provided by previously trained Security Managers.”
Are you referring here to initial training for an investigator?
Andrew Hayward: Yes, so when one joined the Security team, there was a set of training over number of weeks in terms of interviewing and searches – that was the primary aim – and all Security managers undertook that training in-house. I do believe it was Royal Mail Security, because it was Group Security and Royal Mail Security Managers undertook – delivered that training.
Ms Price: Was this the type of training you received when you joined the Security team in the year 2000, that is in-house training provided by previously trained Security Managers?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Was the initial training provided to Investigators still being provided in-house by previously trained security managers when you left in 2015?
Andrew Hayward: I do believe so, yes.
Ms Price: Was the in-house training you received classroom-based learning?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: To the extent that you can recall now, what criminal investigation topics were covered on that training?
Andrew Hayward: Could you rephrase? I’m not quite sure I understand that.
Ms Price: When you first did your initial training in 2000, can you recall which criminal investigation topics were covered?
Andrew Hayward: If you mean regarding interviewing and searches – they were the primary two areas that the investigation team covered and that was where the training was centred around – everybody had a – volumes of manuals that referred to the elements of the legal world, in terms of fraud, robbery, burglary, and the meanings of those, and that was where the training was centred around.
The only addition to that was searches, which, to my recollection, were covered at police locations, sometimes with the support of police officers because it was quite a specific – and they had locations that were deemed suitable for training for searching.
Ms Price: You say in your statement that you were trained over 20 years ago. Are you referring to that initial training that you had when you first took on a Security team role in the year 2000?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: So is it right that you did not undertake any further training on criminal investigation after that initial training?
Andrew Hayward: No, the only additional that I can recall was when I became a Senior Manager in the latter part of my career. There was a requirement to undertake – as part of the Proceeds of Crime Act, there was a Senior Authorising Officer and formal external training was given to myself and other senior colleagues in that sphere.
Ms Price: You say in your statement that, following initial training, Investigators were supported by experienced Investigators on an ongoing basis. What form did that support take?
Andrew Hayward: From recollection, it was where, obviously one receives training in any sphere and in any role, and there is a time for that individual to undertake the physical activity. In the same way as when I was trained on the counter, one had six to seven weeks, I think, of classroom training. One was then put on the counter to serve customers but with what I would term a chaperone, somebody who was far more experienced, that would support the said individual over a period of time – the period of time I don’t recollect – but, in other words, they were supported to develop their skills.
Ms Price: Were the experienced Investigators offering this support ever trained externally?
Andrew Hayward: Not to my recollection, other than those that would have come in maybe from an external environment, ie law enforcement, but not within the business.
Ms Price: During your initial training when you joined the Physical Crime Team, did you receive any training on any aspect of criminal prosecutions?
Andrew Hayward: Other than the classroom training that I undertook? No.
Ms Price: Were you trained on the test which should be applied by a prosecutor when deciding whether to prosecute someone?
Andrew Hayward: Not to my recollection, no.
Ms Price: Were you ever given any training on the test which should be applied by a prosecutor when deciding whether to prosecute someone, whether in the Physical Crime Team or in your later roles?
Andrew Hayward: I believe in my later roles, when I temporarily stood in for the Head of the Department, I don’t recollect the exact details because of the timespan but there was a requirement to undertake that particular role. I don’t recall receiving any formal training, although there were other senior managers that had undertook that that I would have sought advice from. And my understanding is that this was a devolved responsibility from the Head of Security.
But, in terms of formal training, no, I did not receive.
Ms Price: Turning then to the role you had in 2008, that of Senior Security Fraud Risk Programme Manager, you were in this role for two years until 2010; could you please tell us what your role entailed?
Andrew Hayward: From 2008, when I was promoted into the role, there was a – I would say, a shift change, in terms of the new Head of Security that came in adopting more what I would term a risk-based approach, rather than one covers all. So there was very much a desire to – given the size of the Network, as well, circa 11,500 post offices, there was a requirement to look at analysis, data, obviously, and, rather than one sheet covers all, to look at the various levels of potential fraud in the various products and services and where one could make an impact.
So that wasn’t – it was more about protection and prevention than investigation/prosecution and that’s where my role developed over – because it was a role that didn’t exist and, therefore, the role developed over the coming years with other stakeholders within the business.
Ms Price: You say in your statement to the Inquiry at paragraph 8 that you were the senior lead on fraud risk. Did you have any experience of fraud risk when you took on the role?
Andrew Hayward: I had undertaken a degree, a master’s degree, as did a number of other Security Managers, which was based – although it was home based, it was via Leicester University, sponsored by the business and that was in security and risk management. So that was my only, let’s say, formal area to add value to this role.
Ms Price: In your statement, you also list crime and offender profiling, crime analysis and identification of “merging” – but I think that maybe was “emerging”, that should read –
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: – patterns or trends. Did you have any qualification or experience relevant to these areas when you took on the role?
Andrew Hayward: Not personally. The wider team – there was a crime risk team, which subsequently became the Grapevine team. There were individuals in there that were – delivered an analytical role. I’m not aware of those individuals’ qualifications. I do remember one individual, I can’t remember his surname, who had qualifications in analytical areas of work, but specifics I don’t recall.
Ms Price: Were you given any training for the role?
Andrew Hayward: Not in a formal sense.
Ms Price: Did you have any involvement in fraud investigations when you held this role?
Andrew Hayward: At a front line no, I don’t recall. That was undertaken by the then Security Managers/Investigators.
Ms Price: To whom did you report when you were in this role?
Andrew Hayward: The Head of the Department, Security Operations, which, over a period of time, was a number of individuals. Only did I report to the Head of Security through various lines of reporting, so where there was a central monthly meeting of the senior lead team, initially it was only the direct reports. It was then expanded latterly, in my career, to encompass the next level of Security, Senior Security Managers, within the team. So that group grew wider and, in terms of reporting actions, activities, results, and also linking into the wider businesses where I fed into that team.
Ms Price: So in that two-year period, I know you say who held the role changed, but can you remember who you were directly reporting to by name?
Andrew Hayward: I can’t on the 2008/10, the role continued through 2010 and onwards to 2015, the fraud risk role. So I can recollect – I’d be guessing, which I don’t really want to do, in terms of the 2008 and ‘10. With regards to other managers, I could name a couple that I reported to.
Ms Price: It was while you held this role that you were asked by the Head of Security at the time – and that was John Scott, wasn’t it –
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: – to undertake a project to review security investigation casework files to identify any mitigating factors in better preventing fraud and that’s something which you address at paragraph 10 of your statement to the Inquiry, isn’t it?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Can you tell us about what you describe in your statement as one of the main findings of this review, that subpostmasters with zero to five years’ service were more likely to commit fraud?
Andrew Hayward: To take a step back, I was – when I was given the role of Senior Fraud Risk Manager and subsequently completed my degree, one of my development areas that I saw, I was requested as I mention in my statement, by the Head of Security, John Scott, to undertake a review of what I would call end-to-end, so the application process through to the end of – or the termination of a contract, which didn’t just encompass the investigation element; it covered all aspects within the business.
The zero to five-year came out. I believe – I have not got the report nor seen it since I left the business but the report, which I had assistance in terms of pulling the data together, covered, I think, a year’s period, circa 250 cases, so the actual set of data was quite wide spanning, and one of those areas identified that particular comment there. I don’t have the percentage – there would have been a percentage levied to that in terms of a greater number. I don’t have those figures to hand because I don’t have the report nor do I know where it exists any longer but that was the reason for that particular comment.
Ms Price: What was the hypothesis for why this might be? What was the explanation being posited for that?
Andrew Hayward: On recollection and memory, it was also linked to the other part about the credit checking, enhanced vetting, because the – that I saw in terms of observations and research we undertook within the business, there was an application process for new potential subpostmasters. Within that, there were various elements in terms of checks, there was a business plan, et cetera, that were undertaken, but because of the investigations and also the financial recovery investigations, there were elements within those that we uncovered that, for example, if a potential new subpostmaster were to be successful, they would have submitted a business plan, financial affairs that they could take on the Post Office and what that looked like.
However, because the Post Office had not got the ability to go any deeper in terms of financial suitability, there were items where – or, rather, cases where, if a subpostmaster did not reveal they had other financial debt, let’s say, which was okay in one sense, but the Post Office was blind to it. So, therefore, if, as would a bank or a financial institution be able to understand the wider piece of an applicant, then that would possibly question the suitability of that person because the belief was that anybody who came into the business wanted to run a business, absolutely.
Ms Price: At the time, did anyone consider the relevance that someone with zero to five years’ service would be less familiar with the Horizon System than their longer serving counterparts?
Andrew Hayward: I don’t believe so, no.
Ms Price: You say in your statement that one of the things which was being considered at this point was enhanced credit checks and you’ve just referred to those. Can you explain the thinking behind that, as in what would that achieve?
Andrew Hayward: So, as I said previously, the Post Office did not carry out – once a subpostmaster was in place, an individual was in place, there were no further ongoing checks made in terms of the financial affairs of an individual. Throughout the – following the initial report – and I don’t recall the exact finite detail in terms of discussing the elements, but there was a – we came to discussion with the Bank of Ireland because the Post Office sought its financial services through the Bank of Ireland.
There was, further to that, the Banking and Financial Services arena, together with credit reference agencies, were in, what I discovered through the research, a closed user group. In other words, they were – it’s – they were able to use data, as they do now, in a proper manner.
There was another term called the “principles of reciprocity”, which was a bit of a mouthful, but what it meant was that was the guidelines that they were ruled to. Now, the Post Office sat outside of that because it was not a financial institution. However, there was very much a desire that, through the Bank of Ireland links, that it could, in whatever manner was deemed appropriate, undertake enhanced vetting, both pre and post-appointment.
I presented a paper, one calls it, a two-page document, to the board on the findings and the proposals which was given concurrence. I then proceeded, probably for the next year/18 months of various discussions with stakeholders – I don’t recall every single stakeholder but that was within and outside of the business – every step of the way there was very much a positive feedback.
So it wasn’t me, it was a number of stakeholders that came on board. Because of the sheer size of the business and probably the complexity of bringing this to the table, when I left the business in 2015, we hadn’t actually, for want of a better term, got it over the line or agreed a formal process. I do not know if it ever got there.
Ms Price: You refer at paragraph 11 of your statement to a document entitled “Former subpostmaster end-to-end debt review”, and this was dated December 2009. May we have that on screen, please. The reference is POL00084977. You say at paragraph 44 of your statement that both your role and the Security team’s role in relation to recovery of debt from former and current subpostmasters was to deploy the fraud risk programmes to identify, prevent, investigate and, where required, recover assets through criminal prosecutions and financial recovery.
In relation to this document, you say that in 2009 the current security fraud risk and investigation activities fed into the wider business activities on subpostmaster debt, to identify future and enhanced processes to better manage this. What information did you provide that fed into this report?
Andrew Hayward: I don’t remember the finer detail of that report, given the 2009. I am aware of the individual, Mr Greening, who worked out of Chesterfield. My recollection would have been the fraud risk activities, in terms of the programmes, would have fed into that, in terms of the areas of product that we were looking at, in terms of reducing losses, but also wider losses within the business, both in terms of fraud and external crime.
Ms Price: You say that the overall ownership of this review and report was led by the Network Back Office Efficiency Programme; is that right?
Andrew Hayward: That was my understanding, yes.
Ms Price: We can see that the front page of this report shows a person struggling to hold up the word “Debt” which is many times larger than the person depicted. Do you know who was responsible for selecting this image for the front of the report?
Andrew Hayward: No.
Ms Price: Could we turn, please, to page 2 of this document. We have here the “Introduction”, “Objectives” and “Scope”. Starting with the “Introduction”:
“As part of the Back Office Efficiency Programme a project was initiated in July 2009 to review and document all end-to-end former subpostmaster debt activities and processes within Post Office Limited.
“Objectives
“To reduce future debt.
“To improve debt recovery processes.
“To acquire consensus across key stakeholders on the short, medium and longer term initiatives to both reduce future debt and improve debt recovery processes.
“Scope
“Subpostmasters that are no longer agents with the Post Office, but still owe the monies in the form of debt to Post Office Limited.
“All key stakeholders involved in the e2e debt provides including: Product and Branch Accounting, Contract Advisors, Network Field Support, Security and Investigation, Human Resources, Network and Legal Services.”
The “Key Deliverables” underneath:
“High level process maps including current and future state where applicable.
“Project report including current state, issues and recommendations.
“[Thirdly] A ‘Results Chain’ identifying potential initiatives and their link to desired strategic outcomes.”
Could we go over the page, please, to the “Management Summary”, the first paragraph reads as follows:
“This study is part of a much wider review which includes current and former subpostmaster debt, Multiple Partner debt and Crown Office losses. The focus of this review is former subpostmaster debt. The objectives of this review are to reduce future debt and improve debt recovery processes.”
Going over the page, please, again, to the last paragraph of this “Management Summary”, please:
“There is wide recognition and agreement that all stakeholders currently involved in the existing process will play an active part in future activities to both reduce future debt and improve debt recovery processes.”
The stakeholders were set out in a little more detail at pages 5 to 7 of this report. Could we go, please, to page 5. We have here the “Network Field Support Team” and, further down the page, please, the “Product and Branch Accounting” team. Over the page, please, “Crime Risk (formerly Casework Team)” within the Security team; the “Investigation Team”, within the Security team.
Over the page again, please, the “Financial Investigation Unit”, in the Security team; the “Fraud Risk Team” within the Security team.
Over the page please, “Legal Services”, both civil law and criminal law. Further down the page, please, “Contract Management, Network”.
Over the page again, please. The last stakeholder is listed as “Human Resource”.
Would it be fair to say that the Post Office placed considerable emphasis on trying to prevent theft and fraud?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Is it right that debt recovery was a major focus, not just of your role in 2009 but also of the various teams that at the Post Office who were responsible for criminal investigations?
Andrew Hayward: As an observation, I would say yes.
Ms Price: The last role that you held before you left the Post Office – and you’ve explained that you were, as you put it, stepping into this role – the Senior Security Operations manager role, and you say you held this role from 2010 until 2015. Just to be clear, were you in that role for the whole period and stepping up to a more senior role at some points, or can you just clarify for us –
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: – what the period of time was?
Andrew Hayward: So my recollection of that was the job title changed, as titles changed within the business in various other teams. From my recollection, I was a Senior Fraud Risk Programme Manager from 2008 to 2015. That was my permanent role. The job title may have changed but my responsibilities remained pretty much the same.
It was during that period, as I mentioned earlier, when incumbents left the business and a new role was – a new position or applicant was sourced for that role did I agree in terms of supporting the team and the business to step into that role. As mentioned again, I don’t recall the exact dates in that timeline when I did.
I know one was around the 2012 area because one of the previous Heads of the Department had left and, whilst they were sourcing another suitable applicant, that was probably the longest time I stepped into that role. But I was still – and at one stage I did become the – a temporary Head of the Department, but it was only temporary. I then stepped back into my fraud risk role. I hope that makes that clear.
Ms Price: For the periods of time when you were not stepping into this role, who held that position?
Andrew Hayward: The two that I can remember, there was a gentleman called Mr Iain Murphy and then, following that, my last line manager was Mr Rob King. There were others before that but I would be guessing at individuals who had been in that role but I can’t categorically say, given the timeline, that they would have been my line manager at the time. So I do know names that were in the business but whether they were my direct line manager, I could not recall.
Ms Price: When you were in the role of Senior Security Operations Manager, who did you report to during that –
Andrew Hayward: John Scott, Head of Security.
Ms Price: You have described the fairly wide-ranging matters which fell within your remit when you were in this role in your statement at paragraph 9. If we could have that up on screen, please. The reference is WITN08160100 and it’s page 2 of that document, please, about two-thirds of the way down the page, paragraph 9.
So are we right to understand that the role involved, firstly, management of operational fraud risk programmes?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: What was the aim of the operational fraud risk programmes?
Andrew Hayward: That was where areas that had been identified in products and services and also in terms of the cash management arena, in terms of supplying cash to branches, through analysis of information to hand, were areas that were deemed at greater risk in terms of loss. And so, therefore, programmes were developed with other stakeholders within the business. So there was a unified approach which I didn’t feel was there before.
Ms Price: So was this a continuation of your role that you had held before 2010?
Andrew Hayward: I don’t believe it was formalised before I became a Senior Fraud Risk Manager. So because I wasn’t in that arena, in that area of work, I’m sure there were probably – each individual stakeholder might have been undertaking activities to recover monies, ie Product & Branch Accounting had a former subpostmaster debt to deal with but I was not aware of what they did and how they went about that.
But when I became Senior Fraud Risk, I don’t remember that moment in time, but because there were links, but I would call it not formalised links, that is where we developed that process for better management, so everybody understood what the other person was doing, and pool resource.
Ms Price: The second aspect of your role that you describe here is management of fraud investigations and you’ve listed number of things which this included: criminal prosecutions; support of conduct and contractual matters; and conduct of investigations, including training and development.
Just to be clear, in this role, were you conducting investigations yourself or managing those who conducted investigations?
Andrew Hayward: Managing those that conducted.
Ms Price: What was your role in relation to the training and development of those conducting investigations?
Andrew Hayward: From recollection, the initial, as we said earlier, training, was conducted by others. So that was when a person came into the Security team. Latterly, I don’t recollect dates and times, but there was a general desire to, as in all walks of one’s career, improve one’s professionalism. There were various activities undertaken to review the current, let’s say, investigation processes and support people in terms of their daily work routines, but also to improve their professionalism, in other words to continue meeting the challenges.
Now, I was one of a number of senior managers that – we had what was called – I think it was an advanced development programme or a development programme, which was there to try and support, let’s say, future people who wanted to improve themselves in the business and get on in the business, for want of a better word. But those are all – they were in-house but supported, to my recollection, in some cases, by external legal support, ie Cartwright King, who delivered a classroom training.
I don’t remember the details of that but it would have been around the investigation processes.
Ms Price: Do you remember when Cartwright King started providing that training?
Andrew Hayward: No.
Ms Price: What was your role in relation to criminal prosecutions?
Andrew Hayward: From recollection, I wasn’t directly involved in the investigation and case collation of a particular case. There were reviews in terms of ongoing cases and where they stood, both with team leaders and at a senior level, but I didn’t get involved directly in the cases because of the other operational functions that I undertook.
Ms Price: You refer in your statement, and this at the bottom of the page here, to:
“Manage and develop a team [if we can go over the page please] of direct reports and Security Managers to manage and mitigate fraud and external crime risks.”
Can you remember now who those direct reports were?
Andrew Hayward: Not in total. I can give you a couple of names that I remember managing and having associated with was – Dave Posnett was one; Helen Dickinson would have been another team leader; a gentleman, Andrew Daley, was also a team leader; Darryl Kennedy was a team leader; and, in Northern Ireland, Keith Gilchrist was also a team leader. Those were the names I can recollect at this moment in time.
Ms Price: The last part of your role, which you cover in this paragraph is being Senior Authorising Officer for POCA restraint and confiscation orders. What did this part of your role involve?
Andrew Hayward: So there were a number of senior security managers that – I think it was at the behest of the Head of Security, John Scott, required that we widen the pool of those able to become SAOs, Senior Authorising Officers. I recollect – I don’t recollect the exact time and date but we undertook formal training which I believe – I’ll stand corrected – was carried out by the NPIA, National Police Improvement Agency. I will stand corrected on that. That was an external course to enable us to carry out the duties of SAOs to support the Financial Investigators.
Ms Price: In relation to training for the various aspects of your last role with the Post Office, when you were stepping into this role, could we have on screen, please, POL00105008.
If we can have, please, the first tab there. Thank you. This appears to be a training and development record and request relating to you; is that right?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: At the time it was created, Rob King was listed as your line manager. Does that help you to date this document at all?
Andrew Hayward: On the basis that Mr King came into the business around 2012, I would say it is there or thereafter, possibly a number of months later but in and around that period of time.
Ms Price: There are a number of operational skills in the top box – sorry, operations skills. I just want to go through these, please.
“Network/Supply Chain Security Inspections”, can you just explain what that related to, please?
Andrew Hayward: That was where, because of my previous experience in the cash centre environment, there were a lot of procedural elements because of the high security environment, and my recollection of that is that we would, on an agreed time, conduct, basically, an audit of the said cash depot or cash processing centre to ensure the procedures and systems were in place to protect individuals in the business.
Ms Price: Then we have “PACE Interviewing”.
Andrew Hayward: So that was where I had undertook PACE training when I became a Security Manager.
Ms Price: Was that your initial training –
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: – in 2000?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: “Search Trained” underneath?
Andrew Hayward: The same as the one above.
Ms Price: So initial training in 2000?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Then we have “POCA 2002 – Financial Investigations”. Is that the training that you mentioned earlier?
Andrew Hayward: The SAO, yes, that would be my understanding, because I wasn’t trained in terms of the financial investigation side of it.
Ms Price: What does “Existing skill” here mean?
Andrew Hayward: On reading this, I would take it that it meant one either had a working knowledge or had been trained within that sphere.
Ms Price: Was it any part of the definition of existing skill that the person had had training in the area recently?
Andrew Hayward: Unless it had been delivered recently, no, there were no – looking at that, there were no dates and times attached to that.
Ms Price: So it just means the person had been trained at some point in the past?
Andrew Hayward: Correct.
Ms Price: Turning, please, to the Post Office’s role as an investigator and prosecutor, you say in your statement at paragraph 12 that you had no direct involvement in the practice or rationale of undertaking private prosecutions. But when you were in the Physical Crime Team, you conducted criminal investigations; is that right?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: When you were stepping into the role of Senior Security Operations Manager, your role involved management of fraud investigations, including criminal prosecutions. You had direct reports who were responsible for criminal investigations, which resulted in criminal prosecutions brought by the Post Office?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: I have some questions therefore about your understanding of the Post Office’s role, particularly as a prosecutor. Could we have, please, page 4 of Mr Hayward’s statement on screen, paragraph 12, thank you. You say here:
“In respect of the period of time I worked in the Security team, to the best of my knowledge POL/Royal Mail had Direct Public Authority (DPA) status to enable them to undertake criminal investigations.”
Who told you about this Direct Public Authority status?
Andrew Hayward: From memory, I believe that would have been something from documents previously undertaken by Royal Mail Corporate Security. I couldn’t remember an exact person or individual that had said that to me. It was just an understanding.
Ms Price: What did you understand this to mean?
Andrew Hayward: From my personal self, that the Post Office/Royal Mail was able to undertake prosecutions.
Ms Price: Are you aware now that when the Post Office reviewed the position in 2013, it was unable to identify any statutory basis for the Post Office bringing prosecutions and concluded that it did so in a purely private capacity?
Andrew Hayward: I didn’t know at the time but I have seen that in documentation since.
Ms Price: At any point that you had involvement in Post Office investigations and prosecutions, did you understand that the Post Office was unusual in that it was the alleged victim of the crimes it investigated, it investigated such suspected crimes itself and it decided whether to prosecute such suspected crimes itself?
Andrew Hayward: At the time I didn’t think it unusual, because it had already undertaken those activities for a number of years and continued to do so. So no, I didn’t.
Ms Price: At the time, were you conscious of the risks that may arise on account of the Post Office being simultaneously victim, investigator and prosecutor?
Andrew Hayward: I wasn’t at the time, no.
Ms Price: When you look at it now, do you see the risk that might attach, in particular, to the Post Office’s disclosure obligations as a prosecutor?
Andrew Hayward: I can understand your question, yes.
Ms Price: Or its use of expert evidence?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Were these risks ever discussed within the Security team, as far as you are aware?
Andrew Hayward: Not to my knowledge, no.
Ms Price: Were they acknowledged in any Post Office or Royal Mail policy that you have seen?
Andrew Hayward: No.
Ms Price: In your view, did those charged with investigations appreciate or understand this unusual position of the Post Office?
Andrew Hayward: I think it would be difficult for me to give a broadbrush – I could answer yes but each individual would have their own answer. So I guess I’m being asked to read into somebody’s mind, which I can’t do.
Ms Price: Did you consider, at the time you worked within the Security team, the extent to which prosecutions served the Post Office’s broader commercial interests, such as the reduction of debt and the increase of income?
Andrew Hayward: Could you just rephrase that, sorry? I didn’t –
Ms Price: When you were working in the Security team, did you consider at all the extent to which prosecutions were in the Post Office’s broader commercial interests, such as the reduction of debt and the increase of income?
Andrew Hayward: No.
Ms Price: I’d like to turn now, please, to criminal investigation and prosecution policies. When you first started in the Physical Crime Team in the year 2000, were you given a copy of any document setting out the Post Office prosecution policy?
Andrew Hayward: I don’t have recollection of it, given the 23-year time span. I recollect elements of training and I was always aware that there was a central hub for policies with regards to the specific training and documents referred to. They may well have been referred to in the training but I have no distinct recollection due to the longevity of time.
Ms Price: But do you recall covering the prosecution policy in your initial training in 2000?
Andrew Hayward: I don’t recall, no.
Ms Price: May we have on screen, please, the December 2007 “Royal Mail Group Limited Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Policy”. The reference is POL00030578. This is one of the policy documents relating to criminal investigations and prosecutions, to which you were referred by the Inquiry when you were asked to provide a witness statement.
You’ve listed this, among a number of documents, in the footnote to paragraph 14 of your statement. It is one of the documents you say in paragraph 14 that you have no knowledge of. To be clear, had you seen the policy document, which is on screen, before it was sent to you for the purposes of preparing your witness statement by the Inquiry?
Andrew Hayward: I don’t have a recollection of that document.
Ms Price: Can we look, please, at point 4 and page 4 of this document. It says here:
“This Policy is published on the Royal Mail Intranet site as policy No S2.”
When you worked within the Security team, did you have access to the Royal Mail intranet site?
Andrew Hayward: From recollection, yes. But specifics and detail, I don’t remember.
Ms Price: To the best of your recollection, was this policy drawn to your attention when you were in the role of Fraud Risk Programme Manager, a role you started in 2008?
Andrew Hayward: I would say no.
Ms Price: Taking some of the principles set out in this policy, starting with paragraph 3.1.4, please – that’s further up that page, thank you – under “Conduct of Investigations”, it says:
“The conduct, course and progress of an investigation will be a matter for the investigators as long as it is within the law, rules and priorities of the business. Investigators will ultimately report to the Director of Security with regard to the conduct of criminal investigations.”
It’s right, isn’t it, that this did not give any guidance to investigators about how they should conduct an investigation, did it?
Andrew Hayward: That particular document, no.
Ms Price: So the conduct of the investigation is up to them provided it is within the law. Some legislation is identified in this policy. So if we can go, please, to page 2, 3.2.2, we see:
“Evidence will be gathered and retained in accordance with the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (Section 23(1)) Code of Practice.”
Under 3.2.8, this is page 2, please, “Casework”:
“Investigations leading to potential prosecution will be reported in accordance with the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 … Code of Practice.”
There is no explanation here, is there, to what the requirements of the Act and the Code were, is there?
Andrew Hayward: Not in that document, no.
Ms Price: There is some suggestion that this detail might be contained elsewhere, going back to the section on “Deployment”, section 4 on page 4, please. The third paragraph in the box reads:
“Investigation Procedures and Standards relating to this policy are included in the induction and ongoing training courses and material provided to investigators. Any changes to the procedures and standards are notified to investigators via investigation circulars and communications.”
Does that accord with your recollection of how things worked at the relevant time you worked in the Security team?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: This relies though, doesn’t it, on the training materials accurately reflecting the requirements –
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: – and Investigators attending both initial and ongoing training –
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: – because the applicable provisions may change –
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: – and it relies on them being provided with information on any relevant updates?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Did that happen in practice?
Andrew Hayward: Due to their longevity of time, I cannot recall.
Ms Price: In relation to prosecution policy, page 2 again, please, at 3.1.6, “Prosecuting Criminals”:
“This policy supports the Code of Business Standards in normally prosecuting those who commit theft or fraud and where appropriate offences against the Postal Services Act 2000 Sections 83 and 84.
“Criminal investigations will be conducted in accordance with the procedures and to the standards required by legislation, case law and the courts.”
Stopping there, the heading here, and what follows, rather assumes, doesn’t it, that it has already been established that the person suspected of committing a crime is guilty of it, doesn’t it: they are a criminal, those who commit theft or fraud?
Andrew Hayward: The words would say that.
Ms Price: Was this the way that those being prosecuted by the Post Office were spoken about within the Security team?
Andrew Hayward: Not to my recollection, no.
Ms Price: Were cases of suspected theft or fraud normally prosecuted?
Andrew Hayward: From my experience and knowledge, no.
Ms Price: Can you elaborate on that?
Andrew Hayward: On average, my understanding was we had about 250 or more cases a year of which – I haven’t got the figures – around 40 to 50 cases were forwarded for prosecution.
Ms Price: Continuing with paragraph 3.6.1 (sic), the conduct of investigations is addressed again, and it says – sorry, 3.1.6:
“Criminal investigations will be conducted in accordance with the procedures and to the standards required by legislation, case law and the courts.”
Moving, then, to paragraph 3.2.9, this is page 3, on “Prosecution”. It’s that heading there, 3.2.9 “Prosecution”:
“Suspect offenders will be prosecuted where there is sufficient evidence and it is in the public interest in accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors. Decisions to prosecute in non-Crown Prosecution Services cases will be taken by nominated representatives in the business with consideration to the advice provided by the Royal Mail Group Criminal Law Team.”
In relation to the responsibility for deciding whether to prosecute an individual or not, we can see the position set out here is that the decision would be taken by nominated representatives in the business with consideration to the advice from the Criminal Law Team.
Before we turn to your understanding of the position, and you have addressed this in your statement, there are number of other policy documents addressing this issue which I’d like to take you to. The first is the “Royal Mail Group Prosecution Policy”, dated October 2009. The reference is POL00031011.
This is a document which was provided to you by the Inquiry when you were asked to provide a statement. It is referenced in a footnote to paragraph 35 of your statement. You say, in relation to this and the other documents there footnoted, that you have no recollection of involvement in the development of the policies. Had you seen this policy before it was sent to you by the Inquiry?
Andrew Hayward: I don’t have recollection of it. I may have but I have no recollection, given the time spans, again.
Ms Price: This is a document which was in force when you were in the role of Fraud Risk Programme Manager, this October 2009 document. We can take this relatively briefly. Going straight, please, to paragraph 5.1 under the heading “Prosecutorial Decisions”:
“The decision to prosecute Royal Mail investigations in England and Wales will be reached in agreement between the Human Resources Director for the affected business unit or his or her nominated representative, the nominated representative from the investigation team and the lawyer advising.”
Then paragraph 5.5:
“It is a requirement of the Royal Mail Group Conduct Code, fully outlined in paragraph 8.3 of the Royal Mail Group Crime and Investigation Policy, that in reaching decisions on conduct code actions the Human Resources Director or his or her representative must liaise with those handling any criminal investigation or prosecution. In the event of any disagreement with prosecution advice in England and Wales, or inconsistency between prosecution and conduct decisions anywhere in the United Kingdom, the Head of Criminal Law Team and the Head of the Investigation Team will consider the case and provide guidance and advice to ensure that Royal Mail maintains a consistent prosecution policy.”
So this policy is saying the decision is not made by any one person but, instead, a decision would be reached in agreement between three people reflecting input from Human Resources, the Investigation team and the Legal team.
Next, please, could we have the “Post Office Limited Fraud Investigation and Prosecution Policy”. The reference here is POL00030580. This is another policy which was provided to you by the Inquiry when you were asked to make a statement. It is referenced in the footnote to paragraph 14 of your statement as one of the documents you have no knowledge of.
Looking towards the bottom of the page, please, this appears to be version 2 of this document, right at the bottom, dated 4 April 2010. Had you seen this document before it was sent to you by the Inquiry?
Andrew Hayward: I may well have seen it, yes, but I don’t recollect the detail.
Ms Price: Turning, please, to page 4, section 4., under the heading “Prosecution”:
“England & Wales: Decisions to prosecute will be taken by nominated representatives in the business with consideration to the advice provided by the Royal Mail Group Criminal Law Team and where there is sufficient evidence and it is in the public interest.”
So here we have nominated representatives with consideration being given to advice from the Criminal Law Team. While we have this document on screen, could we look, please, also at section 3.1.3 – apologies, 3.13 – on page 3., on the “Conduct of Investigations”. There is this general statement:
“The conduct, course and progress of an investigation will be a matter for the investigators as long as it is within the law, rules and priorities of the business.”
Looking at paragraph 3.15, further down the page, there is some assistance with the procedures and standards investigations should comply with, and we see a reference here to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act at the end of the page. Then over the page, please, various other sources of legal powers, restrictions and guidelines.
But would you agree that there is no explanation in this document of what the requirements of these procedures and standards are?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: We come, then, to the “Royal Mail Group Limited Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Policy” issued in November 2010. That is POL00031008.
The substance of this policy is very similar to the earlier version dated December 2007. This document is also one which you say at paragraph 14 of your statement that you have no knowledge of. Like the December 2007 version, it is said at section 4 to be available on the Royal Mail intranet site. This is a policy that was issued in the year you took up the role of Senior Security Operations Manager or stepped into the role, if that was 2010.
Can we take it from the fact that you have no knowledge of this document that it was not provided to you at the time you were a Senior Security Operations Manager?
Andrew Hayward: In terms of knowledge, I would say recollection.
Ms Price: Were you conscious of this document, its existence, at the time you were stepping into the role?
Andrew Hayward: Not as such, no.
Ms Price: If we could turn, please, to paragraph 3.2.9 on page 3 of this document, the paragraph on “Prosecution”:
“Suspect offenders will be prosecuted where there is sufficient evidence and it is in the public interest in accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors. Decisions to prosecute in non-Crown Prosecution Services cases will be taken by nominated representatives in the business with consideration to the advice provided by the Royal Mail Group Criminal Law Team.”
So responsibility for the prosecution decision remains, it seems, with the nominated business representatives in the business, with consideration to the Criminal Law Team’s advice; would you agree?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Could we have next on screen, please, POL00030598. This is a “Royal Mail Security – Procedures & Standards” document entitled “Royal Mail Prosecution Decision Procedure”, and this is dated January 2011. Again, it was provided to you by the Inquiry when you were asked to provide a statement. It is referenced in a footnote to paragraph 35 of your statement and you say you’ve no recollection of involvement in the developed of it but had you seen it before it was sent to you by the Inquiry?
Andrew Hayward: I don’t recollect, no.
Ms Price: You don’t recollect whether you had seen it?
Andrew Hayward: Whether I’d seen it.
Ms Price: This document sets out “Royal Mail Prosecution Decision Procedure” as at January 2011. Under “Purpose”, we can see that this document relates to decisions about whether to prosecute Royal Mail and agency employees who have been subject to criminal investigation by Royal Mail Group investigators.
There is reference at 3.1 to paragraph 3.1.6 from a version of the “Royal Mail Group Limited Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Policy”. This appears to be referring to a different version of the policy to the two versions we have looked at today, as paragraph 3.1.6 is said to contain this sentence:
“Sanctions for criminal behaviour will be effective, proportionate and aimed to deter.”
Do you recall ever reading that sentence in a policy document that you saw when you were in the Security team?
Andrew Hayward: I don’t recall, no.
Ms Price: Do you recall any discussion in the Security team about the aim to deter of prosecution?
Andrew Hayward: No.
Ms Price: There’s then a reference at paragraph 3.2 to paragraph 3.2.9 of the “Royal Mail Group Limited Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Policy”, a paragraph which we have seen in the two versions we’ve looked at today. It is the paragraph providing for decisions to be taken by nominated business representatives in the business, with consideration to the advice provided by Royal Mail criminal lawyers.
The relevant representatives and the procedure for decision making are then set out under sections 4 and 5 of this document. Under paragraph 4.4, it says this:
“The Regional Human Resources Director, or in Post Office Limited cases the Senior Security Manager, Security Operations and in Parcelforce Worldwide the Head of HR Operations, will act as the ‘Decision Maker’ in authorising prosecutions or not. All Decision Makers will be familiar with the evidential and the public interest tests of the Code for Crown Prosecutors and make decisions accordingly.”
So, on the face of this document, the decision-maker in authorising prosecutions or not, for Post Office Limited cases, was the Senior Security Manager within Security Operations, based on advice from the Criminal Law Team. Is that the role which you were stepping into?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Can you recall who held this role in January 2011? Were you stepping into the role at that time or can’t you help on that?
Andrew Hayward: It could have been but I can’t recollect the exact time.
Ms Price: Could we, please, have on screen the next policy document, POL00030800. This is the “Royal Mail Group Policy Prosecution (S3)”, dated April 2011. This is another document provided to you by the Inquiry and referenced in a footnote to paragraph 35 of your statement. It was authored by Rob Wilson – do you remember Rob Wilson –
Andrew Hayward: The name, yes.
Ms Price: – as head of the Criminal Law Team. Had you seen this document before it was sent to you by the Inquiry?
Andrew Hayward: I may well have been but, again, I don’t recollect, given the timescales involved.
Ms Price: Under section 4, please, “Prosecutorial Decisions”, this is page 2, paragraph 4.1:
“The decision to prosecute Royal Mail Group investigation cases in England and Wales will be reached in agreement between the Human Resources Director for the affected business unit or his or her nominated representative, the nominated representative from the investigation team and the lawyer advising.”
So this document suggests, as the 2009 version of the “Royal Mail Group Prosecution Policy” did, that the decision was shared between three decision-makers: Human Resources, investigation team and lawyer advising.
Can we have on screen, please, POL00031004. This is the policy entitled “Royal Mail Group Policy Crime and Investigation (S2)”, which is also dated April 2011. Again, this is a policy provided to you by the Inquiry when you were asked to provide a statement. It is referenced the footnote to paragraph 14 as one of the documents you have no knowledge of. Just to be clear, had you seen this document before it was sent to you by the Inquiry?
Andrew Hayward: Again, as per the previous documents, I may well have had sight of it but I don’t recall it.
Ms Price: If we could go, please, to page 4 of this document, paragraph 4.7. We come to the decision to prosecute:
“Where an investigation in England and Wales led by Royal Mail Security investigators is judged by the relevant casework management function to have gathered sufficient evidence to warrant obtaining legal advice, the case will be submitted to the Royal Mail Legal Services Criminal Law Team where it will be assessed in accordance with the Royal Mail Group Prosecution Policy and a decision made on whether to prosecute.”
Whilst it’s not entirely clear, would you agree that this paragraph seems to suggest that a decision on whether to prosecute would be taken in the Royal Mail Legal Services Criminal Law Team?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: So this paragraph would seem to be inconsistent with the paragraph from the Royal Mail Prosecution Decision Procedure of January 2011, which said that the prosecution decision-maker for Post Office cases was the Senior Security Manager with Security Operations?
Andrew Hayward: Correct.
Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, POL00031034, the “Post Office Prosecution Policy”, dated 1 April 2012. The owner of this document is Jarnail Singh. Do you remember Jarnail Singh?
Andrew Hayward: I am aware, yes.
Ms Price: What was his role in relation to prosecutions?
Andrew Hayward: He was, my understanding, the Head of Criminal Law Team within Post Office.
Ms Price: This is another document which is referenced in a footnote to paragraph 35 of your statement. Had you seen this document before it was sent to you by the Inquiry?
Andrew Hayward: As with the other documents, I may well have had sight of it. I just don’t recollect, again.
Ms Price: “Prosecutorial Decisions” are addressed at paragraph 4.1 on page 2, please. Under “England & Wales”:
“The decision to prosecute Post Office investigations in England and Wales will be made by the Post Office Head of Security taking advice from Post Office Legal and HR as appropriate and relevant.”
So it seems there is a change here from decision-maker in Post Office cases being the Senior Security Manager, to being the Head of Security, with input from Legal and Human Resources; would you agree?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: There is one final document to look at on the responsibility for prosecutorial decisions. Could we have on screen, please, POL00030686. This is entitled “Post Office Prosecution Policy England and Wales”, and is dated 1 November 2013. It is authored by Simon Clarke of Cartwright King solicitors. If we could turn, please, to page 6., paragraphs 3.2 to 3.3:
“The decision as to whether to prosecute in any particular case, or to continue with any prosecution, will always be taken by Post Office Limited. In arriving at such a decision Post Office Limited will always apply the terms of this policy. Post Office Limited will never institute criminal proceedings against any person until competent legal advice has been provided by a properly qualified lawyer that such a course meets the terms of this Policy and the Code for Crown Prosecutors.
“The decision taker will be
“i. A qualified lawyer
“ii. Independent of any Post Office Limited department having a direct financial or other interest in prosecution.”
So by November 2013, as a matter of policy, the decision-maker needed to be a qualified lawyer who was independent of any Post Office Limited department, having a direct financial or other interest in prosecution; is that right?
Andrew Hayward: From the document, yes.
Ms Price: Having run through what the policy documents say about responsibility for prosecutorial decisions, can we look, please, at your evidence on the point. This is Mr Hayward’s statement, please, which is WITN08160100. It’s page 5 of that document, please, paragraph 18:
“In respect of other teams within the Post Office being involved in criminal investigations and prosecutions, the legal team gave overall direction and authority to proceed in prosecutions.”
Then on page 10, please, paragraph 35, about halfway down the paragraph you say:
“I am not aware of any specific changes to this during my service in the Security team.”
Pausing there, by “this”, are you referring to the Post Office Prosecution Policy?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: You go on:
“Decisions on whether to raise a case would be taken between the relevant parties involved (such as contracts or line managers), with any decisions on prosecution and/or confiscation proceedings decided by the Criminal Law Team in conjunction with external lawyers (Cartwright King).”
Does it remain your evidence that, regardless of what is written in the various policies, for the time you held roles within the Security team, 2000 to 2015, it was the Criminal Law Team who made the ultimate decision on whether an individual should be prosecuted?
Andrew Hayward: It would appear that from my comments, yes.
Ms Price: Well, I’m asking you what your evidence is.
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Does it remain your recollection that, in practice, that was the position?
Andrew Hayward: At the time, yes.
Ms Price: At which time?
Andrew Hayward: That I was involved in this.
Ms Price: Apologies, just to be clear. So you were in relevant roles in the Security team from the year 2000 –
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: – to 2015, and we’ve been through how those roles changed over that period –
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: – and you’re saying in your evidence at paragraph 35 that you’re not aware of any specific changes to the prosecution policy during your service in the Security team. You’re saying that it was the Criminal Law Team, in conjunction with external lawyers, Cartwright King, who made the ultimate decision on whether an individual should be prosecuted and I’m asking whether it remains your evidence that that was the position throughout that whole period or, having looked at the policies, is your evidence different on that?
Andrew Hayward: Having looked at these in detail with yourself, it would appear that was not the case.
Ms Price: Taking it back to the point at which you left the Physical Crime Team, so 2008 onwards, can you recall when Cartwright King started to become involved?
Andrew Hayward: I couldn’t, no.
Ms Price: Okay. Casting your mind back, before Cartwright King got involved, who was making the ultimate decision on prosecution?
Andrew Hayward: I can’t recall the exact specific, other than it would be either Legal Services in conjunction with the Head of Security or a nominated person.
Ms Price: Sir, unless you have any questions, might that be a convenient moment for the morning break?
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, certainly. Yes. That’s fine. So what time shall we resume?
Ms Price: 11.50, sir?
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, okay. Fine.
(11.29 am)
(A short break)
(11.50 am)
Ms Price: Hello, sir. Can you see and hear us?
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, thank you.
Ms Price: Can we have on screen, please, POL00010221.
Mr Hayward, this is an email chain dated 4 January 2010. The first email in the chain is from someone called Maureen Moors, and is timed at 15.50. What roles did Maureen Moors hold at this time, do you remember?
Andrew Hayward: She worked in the Administration team and Security.
Ms Price: Her email says:
“Andy,
“Please find attached files for the above case for your authority to proceed as per Legal Services advice regarding the above named.
“Regards.”
It appears there were a number of attachments to this email, if we can scroll down the page, please. So we can see “Offender Report”, two documents with references there following, a legal memo dated 24 December 2009 and a schedule of charges.
You reply to this email, if we go back up to the top, please, at 16.35, so 45 minutes after the email from Maureen Moors and you say:
“Authority granted.
“Regards,
“Andy.”
We have the offender report which was attached to Maureen Moors’ email. Could we have this on screen, please, it is POL00010214.
Could we have the last page of this document, please, page 7, at the bottom, please. This document is dated 9 December 2009. Going to the first page of this document, please, about two-thirds of the way down the page, we see your name as “Designated Prosecution Authority”, yes?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Your title is given as “Senior Security Manager”. Having seen the email we have just looked at and this document, do you think it is right that you were the decision-maker on whether to prosecute in this case?
Andrew Hayward: Given that information at the time, yes.
Ms Price: Was this is an instance of you stepping in to fill the role of the Senior Security Manager and taking on the job of making decisions on prosecutions where required during that time?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: What documents would you normally be provided with when considering whether to authorise a prosecution?
Andrew Hayward: From recollection, the previous document that you uploaded regarding the case itself and the details of the case, and the comments from Legal Services, the legal team on the prosecution, those are two specifics that I do recall because I’ve seen – I don’t recall the specific document regarding the office concerned and the individual, however I have seen a number of those that gave one the understanding of the case and also the criminal – the Criminal Law Team’s comments on that.
There may have been other attachments that one would look at and previous conversations that might have been had prior to that taking place but I don’t recall those documents.
Ms Price: Okay. As a matter of practice, did you read all of the documents you were sent or did you just read the legal memo before making a decision?
Andrew Hayward: No, I read the documents as well. So in terms of – specifically in terms of the report, I would have read that and I’m conscious of the timescale involved in that. However, from recollection, I would have, for example, when I did the senior authorising officer, as a type of example, I would have pre-conversations, I would be called by an individual to say, “This is coming” – you know, “This is coming your way, this is going to be emailed, it’s now progressed”, so that one was aware of what was coming one’s way.
And, certainly, with regards the report from – as you showed earlier, together with that, if there are other documents – I can’t recollect those specific documents but I wouldn’t have just looked at the Criminal Law Team’s comments and then just passed it on.
Ms Price: What test were you applying when you were deciding whether or not to authorise a prosecution?
Andrew Hayward: So I was aware of the testing in – to the best of my knowledge, in criminal law was, has an offence been committed and is it in the public interest? Those were always the two tests – primary tests that one considered.
Ms Price: Was any guidance available to you when you were making these decisions on the applicable test?
Andrew Hayward: In terms of the taking each case on its merit, I don’t recall, no.
Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, POL00010478. This is an email chain from the summer of 2010. We see an email from Maureen Moors timed at 15.30 on 30 June 2010 – it’s in the middle there – which uses the same wording as the last email seeking “your authority to proceed”. Your reply above is timed at 16.56 on 5 July 2010. You say:
“Maureen,
“Although no legal memo was attached to this I am working on the assumption that it has been recommended that I proceed to prosecution which, and if the case I agree with.
“Regards
“Andy.”
You appear to have been content to authorise prosecution in this case without consideration of the legal advice from the Criminal Law Team; is that right?
Andrew Hayward: From those notes, yes. Although I would have thought that I would have just subsequently seen the legal memo or seen it before because I would not normally make that kind of a decision, but that’s my recollection.
Ms Price: Was it therefore the fact of a recommendation from the Criminal Law Team that was important to you, rather than the substance of the advice?
Andrew Hayward: I think both counted.
Ms Price: In fairness to you, it appears that this case was further considered by Iain Murphy from the Security team in September 2010 with the benefit of a legal memo. Could we have on screen, please, POL00010488. We can see here that at 10.33, on 23 September 2010, Maureen Moors sends Mr Murphy number of documents to consider, including the offender report, an offender report follow-up, a legal memo and a schedule of proposed charges.
We see, scrolling up the page, please, that Mr Murphy, his email 23 September, 10.39, replies with the instruction to proceed six minutes later; is that right?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: May we have on screen, please, POL00047161. This is an email chain from May 2010 relating to the case of Allison Henderson. There is the same wording from Maureen Moors as in the other emails we’ve looked at, her email sent at 14.08 on 25 May 2010. Your reply comes at the top, 9.30 am on 26 May 2010.
This was another example, wasn’t it, of you granting your authority to proceed with prosecution?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: I don’t intend to take you through all the examples of you providing your authority to proceed but, to the best of your recollection, how regularly were you making prosecution decisions at this point: every month, every week?
Andrew Hayward: I have no firm recollection. If you want me to hazard an estimation, I would say it would be monthly. But it would be dependent on the number of cases at any one time, but I don’t have the statistics nor the facts to back that statement up.
Ms Price: Were you given any training before you took on this role of granting authority to proceed with prosecutions?
Andrew Hayward: From recollection, no.
Ms Price: Did you ever refuse to grant authority for a prosecution when the legal advice was that the prosecution test was met?
Andrew Hayward: From recollection, no.
Ms Price: Do you recall any occasion on which the legal advice was that the prosecution test was not met?
Andrew Hayward: I don’t remember.
Ms Price: Your role, when you were stepping into the role as a Senior Security Manager, involved recovering losses, didn’t it, in that you were involved in criminal enforcement proceedings?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Did you recognise at the time that you were, when making decisions on prosecutions, in essence, in the position of victim, acting as you were for the Post Office; investigator, in that it was your team conducting the criminal investigations; and prosecutor?
Andrew Hayward: I did not.
Ms Price: Do you feel comfortable with this now?
Andrew Hayward: I think in light of the evidence that you have clearly displayed, it would appear, with the benefit of hindsight that the various areas you said would now not be the norm but, at the time, I had no knowledge of that or understanding of that, that would question me at the time. Nor did anything thereafter, in terms of a prosecution proceeding by any prosecution or defence legal expert query this particular structure.
Ms Price: After you provided your authority for prosecution on the occasions that you did, did your involvement in a case continue?
Andrew Hayward: To my recollection, no.
Ms Price: Did you have any involvement in disclosure in relation to any prosecutions you authorised?
Andrew Hayward: Not to my memory or recollection.
Ms Price: We have looked at a number of Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Policies already. Would you agree, having had the opportunity to look at those policies, even if just in the preparation for your evidence today, that investigators would have found little assistance in the policies we’ve looked at relating to the substance of the legal requirements, relating to the conduct of criminal investigations.
Andrew Hayward: I think it depends on the individual concerned, ie the Investigator and, again, I don’t recollect the finer detail of the policies, et cetera, because of the time longevity of it and the number of policies. But I think Investigators, having been trained and how they sought to then review those documents, one would have to ask the individuals concerned, each specific Investigator.
Ms Price: Just in terms of on the face of the policies we’ve looked at on the screen this morning, would you agree that there wasn’t much assistance in those policies on the substance of the legal requirements, as opposed to the identification of the statute –
Andrew Hayward: In the ones displayed this morning, yes, that appears the case.
Ms Price: You have already given an explanation of the form of training which Investigators were provided with when they joined the Security team. I’d like to come now to the specific guidance which was provided to Investigators on the conduct of investigations, particularly in relation to their duties of full inquiry and disclosure when you held relevant roles within the Security team.
Could we have on screen, please, Mr Hayward’s statement to the Inquiry, WITN08160100, page 11, please, and paragraph 37. You say here you have considered a number of documents identified by the Inquiry, and these are listed at footnote 3 at the bottom of the page.
You go on:
“In respect of the documents referred to in this section, to the best of my knowledge the documents would have been referred to as part of the training modules for investigators which in summary would have included the specifics of how to undertake tape recorded interviews, how to take and manage witness statements, guidelines to follow during an investigation, how to conduct an interview with key points to cover for a criminal investigation in relation to the Theft Act, how to fully manage a case file investigation, correct procedures to follow in gaining evidence, including evidence from third parties such as Fujitsu data and an understanding of disclosure, dealing with defence solicitors, complaints, report writing and the decision making process for criminal investigations.”
You say at the end:
“From a personal perspective I was trained over 20 years ago and I have no further detailed knowledge of this area.”
One of the documents to which you were referred by the Inquiry and which is listed at this footnote 3 of your statement, is document reference POL00104848. Could we have that on screen, please. This is a “Royal Mail Group Security – Procedures & Standards” document, entitled “Appendix 1 to P&S 9.5 Disclosure of Unused Material & the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996”. It is dated July 2010. Had you read this document before it was sent to you by the Inquiry?
Andrew Hayward: I don’t have recollection of that document.
Ms Price: In general terms, how were Investigators made aware of documents like this, other than during initial training?
Andrew Hayward: From memory, my understanding would be that because there were links between the Royal Mail Group Security and Post Office, when they were both linked and separated, that the policy writer or amender would contact or email the – a document to the admin team, and then that would be – I can’t think of the word – transferred to the relevant parties, ie Investigators, so they were aware of any changes that were happening, or any updates to.
Ms Price: Starting, please, with paragraph 1.1 in this document, about halfway down the page:
“The legislative basis for disclosure of unused material is the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 2003. A Code of Practice is issued in accordance with Section 23(1) of the CPIA 1996. Investigators must comply with the current version of the CoP, which came into effect on 4 April 2005 and can be found embedded below.”
We see there a pdf image, don’t we, of a document embedded below?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: So this document was drawing attention to the need for Investigators to comply with the Code of Practice to the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and embedded that Code into this document.
Looking, please, at page 2 at the top of the page under “Definitions and Terminology”, paragraph 2.1 defines an “Investigator”:
“An Investigator is a person involved in the conduct of a criminal investigation involving any part of our Business. All Investigators have a responsibility for carrying out the duties imposed on them under the CP&I Act 2005 CoP. The main responsibility of Investigator(s) is to ensure that any relevant material is retained and that records of such material are maintained.”
Paragraph 2.2 defines a “Disclosure Officer”:
“Disclosure Officer is the person responsible for examining material retained during an investigation and revealing ‘relevant material’ to the Prosecutor (CLT). In most Royal Mail Group cases the lead Investigator and the Disclosure Officer will be the same person. As such, within these Procedures & Standards the responsibilities of the Disclosure Officer will be undertaken by the lead investigator. (Should a Disclosure Officer be allocated in a large and complex case then both they and the lead Investigator should consult the CP&I Act 2005 CoP to ensure they are fully aware of their responsibilities.)”
Pausing there, the prosecutor is identified here as being CLT; is that the Criminal Law Team?
Andrew Hayward: My understanding, yes.
Ms Price: Do you understand this to be referring to the team conducting the prosecution or the person deciding whether or not someone should be prosecuted?
Andrew Hayward: If you bear with me two minutes. From reading that, I would have said the Criminal Law Team.
Ms Price: In terms of the role that the Criminal Law Team was playing, do you understand that to mean that the Criminal Law Team was making a decision on whether someone should be prosecuted or conducting the prosecution?
Andrew Hayward: Making a decision.
Ms Price: There is, on the face of things, a tension here, isn’t there, between what is said in this document and the 2010 policies we looked at earlier, so namely the Post Office Limited Fraud Investigation and Prosecution Policy, dated 4 April 2010, and the Royal Mail Group Limited Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Policy issued in November 2010?
Both of those documents stated that the decision on whether to prosecute lay with nominated business representatives in the business with consideration to the Criminal Law Team’s legal advice, didn’t it?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Picking up on the second sentence in paragraph 2.2 in this document, when you first took on the role of a Senior Security Operations Manager, did you understand the position to be that the lead investigator was also the disclosure officer?
Andrew Hayward: From memory yes, but I can’t recollect fully the specifics, but yes.
Ms Price: Moving down to about halfway down the page, under the heading “Duties for Investigators (& Disclosure Officers)”, paragraph 3.1 says this:
“The Investigator must inform the Prosecutor (normally the Criminal Law Team) as soon as practicable if they have any material which weakens the case against the accused. The Act envisaged that some disclosure may have been made before the statutory duty to disclose arises.”
Then at 3.2, we have this:
“Reasonable Lines of Inquiry. Investigators must pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether these point towards or away from the suspect. What is reasonable in each case will depend on the particular circumstances. For example, where material is held on a computer, it is a matter for the Investigator to decide which material on the computer it is reasonable to enquire into and in what manner.”
What did – or do, if you can’t recall what you thought at the time – you understand the reference to “material held on the a computer” to be referring to?
Andrew Hayward: On the basis of those comments there, I would have either said it was Horizon and/or other systems within the Post Office because there were other systems that held data. I’m not au fait, at this current moment in time, with what those systems were but it would be computer systems held by Post Office.
Ms Price: So individual investigators were, on the face of this policy document, left to decide on a case-to-case basis what material held on a computer should be enquired into and in what manner. Do you recall there being any overarching policy on this at this stage?
Andrew Hayward: No, I don’t.
Ms Price: The remainder of section 3 in this document provides guidance on the duties applying to Investigators and Disclosure Officers, including setting out the disclosure test – over the page, please – at paragraph 3.8.
Going over the page, please, we can see a number of topics being addressed: “Prosecutor (CLT) Guidelines”, at section 4; about halfway down the page “Prosecution Advocates Guidelines” at section 5; towards the bottom of the page, “Guidance on Completion of the Schedule of Non-Sensitive, Unused Material”.
Over the page again, please, about two-thirds of the way down the page: “Guidance on Completion of the Schedule of Sensitive Unused Material”, at section 7.
Over the page again, please, about halfway down: “Guidance on the completion of the Disclosure Officer’s Report”, at section 8; and towards the bottom of the page we have section 9, “Items not unusually scheduled on the GS006C or GS006D”, those are the schedules of non-sensitive and sensitive materials, aren’t they, those references?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Just before we leave this document, looking, please, at paragraph 9.1, under this heading, it says this:
“Offender reports and correspondence with the Prosecutor (CLT) is usually regarded as subject to legal privilege, and should not appear on any schedule. However if the contents contain relevant material that is not recorded elsewhere then there will be a need to reveal the information in some format.”
So this is recognising, isn’t it, that relevant material in an offender report, which would usually be regarded as legally privileged, must be revealed in some format if it is not recorded elsewhere?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: That document can come down now, please.
Having looked through some of the detail of that document, does it help you with whether you think you saw that document at the time you were in the Security team?
Andrew Hayward: No, as such, because of – again, I’ll recollect, I may – a number of these documents I would have more than likely have had sight of in my roles. However, can I recollect those? No, I can’t, given the timescales.
Ms Price: This is one of the documents that you said at paragraph 37 of your statement to the Inquiry that would have been referred to as part of the training modules for investigators. Just to be clear, do you mean in their initial training?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: What do you mean when you say “documents like this would have been referred to”? Do you mean trainees would have been directed where to find the document or that the substance would have been covered in training?
Andrew Hayward: I think, given the amounts of documents involved, they would have been referred to. But, again, I can’t recollect the specific documents that may well have been discussed during training and those that were referred to.
Ms Price: Can you recall whether there was any training provided for Investigators, who were not new to the Security team, on the requirements of the Code which were summarised in this 2010 document we’ve just been looked at?
Andrew Hayward: Sorry, could you repeat the question, please?
Ms Price: Can you recall whether there was any training provided for Investigators, who were not new – so new investigators would have had initial training –
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: – but those who were already established in the role, was any training provided for them on the requirements of the Code that was summarised in this 2010 document?
Andrew Hayward: I’m not aware from my perspective of any formal training would have taken place, other than the comment previous as to how each team devolved that information. But I don’t recall any specific formal training, from my perspective.
Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, POL00121680. Starting, please, towards the bottom of the first page of this document, this is an email from Mick F Matthews to you and Iain Murphy, dated 6 September 2010. The subject is “Committal Papers”.
Going over the page, please, we see the sign-off from Mick Matthews. He was, at the time, an Investigation Procedures and Standards Manager with Royal Mail Letters Security. Do you remember Mick Matthews?
Andrew Hayward: Not well but I’ve heard of the name.
Ms Price: Do you remember Iain Murphy?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: What role was Iain Murphy in at the time of this email chain, so September 2010?
Andrew Hayward: He would have been one of the direct reports, Senior Security Operations Managers – Manager.
Ms Price: Could we go back to the bottom of the first page of this document, please. The email is entitled “Committal Papers”, as we’ve seen and reads as follows:
“Ian/Andy
“I have developed Procedures & Standards in respect of Committal Papers and this has been agreed by the Criminal Law Team. Accordingly, the P&S and relevant forms are associated with this email. Arrangements are in hand to publish the documents on SharePoint and the GSD.”
Just pausing there, can you just explain what “SharePoint and the GSD”, what this was referring to?
Andrew Hayward: The “GSD”, I would hazard a guess it was Group Security Directorate, but that’s my stab at that and SharePoint was a name where, by its name, shared documents within the team.
Ms Price: Who had access within the Security team to SharePoint?
Andrew Hayward: It would have been the Security team.
Ms Price: So all individuals within the Security team?
Andrew Hayward: I couldn’t categorically say which members, certainly the Investigators.
Ms Price: Going on:
“A presentation has been delivered to RML & PFWW …”
Is that Royal Mail Letters and Parcelforce Worldwide?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: “… Investigators as they do not get the same number of committals as Investigators in PO Limited so you may wish to merely forward this to your Investigators for their information in respect of the procedures and amended forms.”
Do you recall receiving this email, as you sit here now?
Andrew Hayward: No. Clearly my name is on there and I wouldn’t – obviously, I accept that I have received it. Do I remember it, no.
Ms Price: There were a number of attachments to Mr Matthews’ email. One of these was a procedures and standards document relating to the requirements for committal papers and he also attached a PowerPoint presentation on committal papers, which appears to be the presentation he was referring to in that email.
Could we have this on screen, please. The reference is POL00124232. We can see there the title of the presentation, on the first page, “Procedures & Standards Work Time Learning Session Committal/Trial Papers”. Over the page, please, to page 2, we see “Committal Papers” are defined:
“Elects a trial at either the Magistrates or Crown Court, or
“Is committed to stand trial at the Crown Court prior to entering a plea
“Submitted 21 days in advance.”
Page 3, please. We see here the contents of the presentation are set out. At the bottom we see there “Non-Sensitive Unused”, with the code for that form.
Over the page, please, “Sensitive Unused”, the code for that form; “Disclosure Officer’s Report”, and the code for that form.
If we can turn, please, to page 10 of this document, we see there there’s the title “Unused Material & CP&I Act 1996”, and we see there that the presentation appears to have covered some of the headings we’ve looked at in the Appendix 1 document, so the “Investigator/Disclosure Office” – that maybe meant to be “Officer” – Retain, Record, Reveal”:
“Prosecutor
“Disclosure if meets the ‘Disclosure test’
“CLT & Prosecution Advocates Duties.”
Over the page, please. We see the forms for revealing relevant material being referenced and those are the non-sensitive material, sensitive material and Disclosure Officer’s report.
On the next page, page 12 of this document, there is some bullet points on unused non-sensitive material.
The next page, page 13, please, there are some bullet points on unused sensitive material.
Over the page, again, please, page 14, there is an explanation of the “Disclosure Officer’s Report”:
“Used to identify to the CLT material which the Investigator believes meets the ‘Disclosure Test’.
“Secondly to certify that the Investigator has revealed all relevant material to the CLT.”
Then, finally, in this document, please, the next page, page 15, some bullet points on items not recorded on the schedules of non-sensitive or sensitive material. Included at the top:
“Items subject to Legal Privilege.”
You say you don’t recall receiving this email at the time but do you recall any discussions at all on whether there should be a presentation for Post Office investigators, akin to the type of presentation that was being given to the Royal Mail Letters and Parcelforce Worldwide Investigators?
Andrew Hayward: I don’t, with regard to that specific presentation, have knowledge of if and what was then delivered by Post Office.
Ms Price: If we can have that email back on screen, please, the reference is POL00121680.
We can see the response to Mick Matthews from Iain Murphy in the middle of the page, please:
“Mick – many thanks.
“Gents …”
There are some other people that have been added to the copy list there:
“Please see attached for your information/consideration, et cetera.
“Regards,
“Ian.”
Then looking further up the page again, we can see this is picked up by Andrew Daley who sends the emails to date to a number of individuals and it seems, doesn’t it, that you fall off the circulation list at this point?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Can you help us with what roles the people who received this last email held? Were they Investigators or Managers?
Andrew Hayward: A combination of both. So where I referred to earlier this morning, regarding Security team leaders, one can only remember one – names at the time of being asked the question, a couple of those names there, ie Mr Jason Collins, was also a team leader at some stage. Mr Paul Southin was an Investigator but also a Financial Investigator later on in his career. The rest, as I look at them now on screen, were Investigator.
Ms Price: Mr Matthews, in his original email, suggested that a presentation had been delivered to RLM and PFWW Investigators as they did not get the number of committals as Investigators in the Post Office. Was that how Post Office Investigators were viewed within the Royal Mail Group: as being experienced in investigations which proceeded to court?
Andrew Hayward: From a personal viewpoint, no. Some of the ex – looking at some of the names previously, some of the Investigators that were within the same sphere of Royal Mail Post Office when the business separated went to Royal Mail. However, they had sat within the Post Office side of investigations so one would deem they were experienced in Post Office and subsequently Royal Mail. So there was a wide-ranging level of experience in the team but certainly not separating the two with that particular comment.
Ms Price: It may follow from the answers you’ve already given but do you recall whether any presentation was provided to Post Office Investigators?
Andrew Hayward: I don’t – apologies. I don’t recall those. Certainly, if there was one – and I note there from the comment from Mr Daley that he’s – I wouldn’t say jumping the gun but keen to get something delivered. My normal experience of anything that would be delivered of significance, it would capture all of the team, so that all people were aware. In what format that would be delivered could vary but I’m not, in terms of this particular document, aware of what was proceeded with, given the – again, the timescales involved.
Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, Mr Hayward’s witness statement which is WITN08160100 at paragraph 34, which is page 9 of this document.
You say here, about halfway down – actually, let’s read it all for the context:
“In respect of conducting criminal investigations following a shortfall, from my understanding the document POL00105223 was written to support investigators in the full process in gathering evidence to support the investigating officer in a specific POL case. Previous to this the Royal Mail documents were written to cover both Royal Mail and POL investigations, but did not detail the specific elements covered by POL. All Royal Mail and POL cases did not differ in reference to adhering to the legislative framework set out in the documents noted at footnote 1 of this statement.”
Might there have been a problem, therefore, that the policies and procedures and standards documents produced by Royal Mail Group before separation were simply not specific enough to the work being done by Post Office Security team Investigators to give meaningful guidance?
Andrew Hayward: From a legislative purpose, I would probably err on no because legislation that covers all fields of an investigation. Without specific reference to any detail, one could say Post Office and its computer systems would not be used in Royal Mail sphere. So, therefore, it may not cover those elements but I was not versed nor experienced enough to – the people who wrote these documents, I think, was more – wherewithal – catch-all, if that makes sense. So not specific to Post Office operations.
Ms Price: Moving, please, to Security team investigation casework compliance, could we have on screen, please, POL00120956. This is an email from Dave Posnett to a long list of individuals and to the Post Office Security email address. It is dated 15 June 2012. Have you had a chance to look at this document before giving evidence today?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Do you recall the introduction of compliance checks on investigation case files within the Security team?
Andrew Hayward: Not in specific detail but, as – I’m sure if you bring it up, I can maybe recollect.
Ms Price: But do you recall compliance checks being introduced?
Andrew Hayward: Yes, but not in the – with regards to how that progressed, that was, from my understanding, down more to the team leaders to manage.
Ms Price: Looking then at the top email:
“All,
“Just a little reminder that the compliance on green jacket/offender files will recommence in July. I associate the email and attachments I sent out a month or two ago for reference.”
Just to be clear, you’re one of the recipients here, aren’t you, on this email list?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: We can then see below the email which had been sent a month or two before:
“All,
“The compliance checks on submitted offender interview case files will continue in 2012/2013. Associated are all the supporting documents needed, which have been amended where appropriate. I suggest these are referred to when you have time and/or when submitting an offender interview case file. Some salient points and changes are summarised as follows, to take effect immediately where applicable …”
The salient points and changes are set out below. We need not go through all of those but, going down to the third bullet point from the bottom, please:
“The Discipline Report template has been changed. Superfluous information for Contract Managers (eg Identification Code, HR printout at Appendix C, etc) has been removed. Also, areas of previous contention or concern (such as ‘To be prosecuted by’, ‘Designate Prosecution Authority’, etc) has been removed. This is a disciplinary report and no decisions have been made regarding any prosecution.”
Then we have below:
“The aim will again be to conduct a minimum of 2 compliance checks per individual and attain a 90% average score across the team by year end. For info, the average score last year was 92.16%.
“Compliance checks will be lapsed for now and recommence at the beginning of July. This will facilitate the arrival of new recruits and any associated training, but will also provide some flexibility in managing workloads for those impacted in the next couple of months. Casework will still continue to monitor the reporting timescales to ensure we meet our stakeholder obligations.”
So we can see there, can’t we, that some changes have been made to the applicable compliance documents and we’ve looked at some of those.
Attached to Mr Posnett’s email was a zip file, if we can scroll a bit further up, please. You see there, “Attachment: Compliance 2012-2013.zip”. So a zip file of compliance documents representing the latest versions at that point. One of the documents was a document entitled “Guide to the Preparation and Layout of Investigation Red Label Case Files, Offender Reports and Discipline Reports”. Could we have that on screen, please, the reference is POL00038452.
Before we turn to the detail of this document, could you just explain, please, what you understood the difference to be between an offender report and a discipline report?
Andrew Hayward: From recollection, the offender report would be to do with any potential suspect offender and/or any proceedings in the criminal element. The discipline report was more towards either the network teams, ie the contracts manager, which held the contract with the subpostmaster, or, in terms of a Crown branch, it would be to the line management, as Crowns were run and owned by the Post Office itself.
Ms Price: The contents for the document start at page 2 at the bottom, please. looking over the page, please. Thank you. We see there “1. Offender report”, so this was the section dealing with the offender report.
Looking, please, at the heading for item 1.24 further down the page, please, the heading is “Details of failures in security, supervision, procedures and product integrity”.
Going, please, to the bottom of page 4 of this document, we see the structure for an offender report set out. So starting there, “Offender report”. Over the page, please, and we see there an indication that an identification Code is required, and in brackets we see “Numbers 1 to 7 only”.
We will come back to the requirements relating to the identification of an identification code but could we go, please, first to the substance of the heading we saw at item 1.24. This is on page 9. Further down the page, please, “Details of failures in security, supervision, procedures and product integrity”. It reads as follows:
“This must be a comprehensive list of all identified failures in security, supervision, procedures and product integrity it must be highlighted [in] bold in the report. Where the Security Manager concludes that there are no failures in security, supervision, procedures and product integrity a statement to this effect should be made and highlighted in bold.
“The ‘Procedural failings’ form (within the ‘All In One Case Raise’ spreadsheet) should also be completed within 48 hours of interview and circulated to relevant stakeholders. One of the Stakeholders is Crime Risk, who are responsible for capturing emerge crime tends and/or prevalent failings that contribute to fraud within the business.”
Going now, please, to the guidance on discipline report, further down this page. We can see here that there is no reference to an identification code on the template for the discipline report set out here, is there?
Andrew Hayward: No.
Ms Price: Turning, please, to page 11 of this document, paragraph 2.15, we have there the same heading we saw at paragraph 1.24 relating to the offender report. Paragraph 2.15 reads as follows:
“This must be a comprehensive list of all failures in security, supervision, procedures and product integrity it must be highlighted in bold in the report. Where the Security Manager concludes that there are no failures a statement to this effect should be made and highlighted in bold.”
Underneath:
“Significant failures that may affect the successful likelihood of any criminal action and/or cause significant damage to the business must be confined, solely, to the confidential offender report. Care must be exercised when including failures within the Discipline Report as obviously this is disclosed to the suspect offender and may have ramifications on both the criminal elements of the enquiry, as well as being potentially damaging to the reputation or security of the business. If you are in any doubt as to the appropriateness of inclusion or exclusion you must discuss with your Team Leader.”
Reading this now, do you see any problem with what it says at paragraph 2.15?
Andrew Hayward: Other than it mentions “not including certain information”, if that’s what you mean, that’s the conflict I would look at there, having just read that.
Ms Price: Well, it’s saying, isn’t it, that if there are facts and matters which undermine the prospects of success, they must be confined solely to the confidential offender report. So isn’t this essentially saying that, if there are facts which support the suspect’s defence or which undermine the allegation against him, this must be kept confidential?
Andrew Hayward: It would appear to read that way, yes.
Ms Price: Do you recall reading this at the time you were in the Security team?
Andrew Hayward: As per previous, I may well have read it but I don’t have recollection, given the number of documents we’ve already alluded to.
Ms Price: Would you agree that this instruction is, on its face, inconsistent with the requirements of the CP&I Act relating to disclosure?
Andrew Hayward: It appears to be, on the facts of that statement there, yes.
Ms Price: Because unless the information is collected together or recorded elsewhere, it may be lost, rather than properly disclosed to the defence?
Andrew Hayward: Excuse me, I was just reading it again. From that, I read that the – certain information would still be in the offender report but not in the discipline report. That’s my understanding of that, if you’re asking that question and, therefore, it would be evident in the offender report.
Ms Price: The offender report, as we’ve seen, is a legally privileged document, isn’t it –
Andrew Hayward: Right, yes.
Ms Price: – and therefore wouldn’t be disclosed?
Andrew Hayward: Apologies, yes.
Ms Price: So unless that information is recorded elsewhere …
Andrew Hayward: Yes, I understand that.
Ms Price: Do you recall ever reviewing the compliance documents that were circulated on the email you received?
Andrew Hayward: From recollection again, I would have, as with a number of documents, had an oversight or viewed to possibly made a comment to the issuer of those documents. But the specifics of any document I couldn’t comment on.
Ms Price: I’d like to turn, please, to another document which was contained in the compliance zip file sent to you by Mr Posnett in 2012. This was also contained in an earlier compliance zip file circulated by the Security team. It is the document entitled “Identification Codes”, at POL00118104, if we could have that on screen, please.
Had you seen this document before it was sent to you by the Inquiry for the purposes of preparing your statement?
Andrew Hayward: I don’t recollect that specific document, no.
Ms Price: Does it follow that you can’t assist with who might have drafted this document?
Andrew Hayward: The only comment I would make is, when I undertook my training, I was aware of identification codes, as part of one’s training, however with reference to that specific document, which clearly is offensive, racist and inappropriate, I would not know the author of that document.
Ms Price: Before we look at the content of that document, what training did you have on identification codes and their use by Post Office Investigators?
Andrew Hayward: With regards to identification codes, it’s my recollection from numerous years ago, was that it formed part of an investigation case file that was not only Post Office but Royal Mail, as it was a corporate security. Again, where that emanated from, I don’t know. I can’t recollect in terms of the reasons why, other than it was part of the case file construction.
Ms Price: So the instruction was to record an identification code?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Sir Wyn Williams: Was this training your training, ie back in about 2000, or was this in the additional training you got when you were looking at recovering monies via confiscation orders, et cetera?
Andrew Hayward: Excuse me, sir, it was on my initial training, my recollection.
Sir Wyn Williams: So a document like this goes back to the time of your initial training?
Andrew Hayward: It could do but I have no recollection of that specific document, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: No, no, but let me be clear: you do have a recollection of being trained in what are called identification codes –
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Sir Wyn Williams: – when you were initially trained?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Sir Wyn Williams: I presume that – but you tell me if I’m wrong – that that training related to a document which then existed.
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Sir Wyn Williams: So that my question is, a document of this type, dealing with identification codes, existed from about 2000?
Andrew Hayward: I would guess probably earlier, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Earlier, all right. Fine.
Ms Price: Did you ever complete an offender report, as they were called, where you had to enter an identification code?
Andrew Hayward: From the cases, and mine were primarily the physical side of the business, I would have said yes, but I don’t recall the specifics of those particular cases.
Ms Price: Do you recall looking at a document for reference to determine which code you needed to put into the report?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: There are, in this document, seven identification codes. We see identification code 1, you’ll see that “White Skinned European Types” are defined by a country. So white people are presumed to be British and British people are assumed to be white, aren’t they?
Andrew Hayward: If that’s how it’s termed in the document.
Ms Price: Identification code 2, again, the document mixes up skin colour with nationality, doesn’t it?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Identification code 3, is that language which was in use in the Post Office and Royal Mail when you worked for it?
Andrew Hayward: I’m not aware, as I say, of that document.
Ms Price: Do you recall that term ever being used –
Andrew Hayward: No.
Ms Price: – in a spoken format?
Andrew Hayward: Absolutely not.
Ms Price: You see identification code 5. This relates to “Chinese/Japanese Types”. It includes people who are “Siamese”, Siam having become Thailand in 1939.
Identification code 6, “Arabian/Egyptian Types”, are referred to in contrast to identification code 3, and seem to have come from North African countries.
Is it your evidence that you don’t recall seeing this document?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: But, as far as you’re aware, until you left the Post Office in 2015, were Investigators in the Security team being directed to enter an identification code onto the offender report?
Andrew Hayward: I don’t recall it specifically but, if it was on the – as you alluded to earlier, on one of the documents, ID codes were there, then that would have been included.
Ms Price: There was a review of Post Office investigation forms which took place towards the end of 2012, wasn’t there?
Andrew Hayward: Yes, but I’m not aware specifically.
Ms Price: I think you’ve been fairly recently provided with an email on the subject which was sent to you in December 2012. Could we have that on screen, please. The reference is POL00118289. This is email is from Dave Posnett to Rob King, Jarnail Singh and yourself, copied to others, dated 18 December 2012. Dave Posnett says this:
“All,
“Myself and Graham have now reviewed all POL investigation forms (now with POL headings, removal of RMG text and new version numbers added).
“Associated is a zip file containing:
“Live Forms and an Index (those which we think are still relevant and applicable to the Investigator).
“Obsolete Forms and an Index (those which we think are now irrelevant but will be retained for future use if deemed relevant).
“Rob/Andy/Jarnail – As per the Working Group agreement, could I ask that you examine the Live Forms and Obsolete Forms and sanction what we have done.
“Any disagreements or other comments should be fed back to me.”
First of all, what was the Working Group Agreement which Mr Posnett was referring to?
Andrew Hayward: Unfortunately, I have no recollection of that term.
Ms Price: Do you recall this review of Post Office investigation forms now?
Andrew Hayward: I remember the forms because of the separation and they were always – as previous documents have shown, were Royal Mail Group. There was a desire/requirement that, as we were a separate business, that the documents were headed and referenced “Post Office Only”.
Ms Price: We have the indices referred to by Mr Posnett, starting, please, with the index to the “Live Forms”, the ones which were considered still relevant and applicable to the investigation. The reference is POL00118377.
If we can just scroll through this document, please, we can see it is three pages long and it contains a list of forms, all of which appear to have a reference number, don’t they?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: You’ve had an opportunity to look through the indices before giving your evidence, albeit I think quite recently. The identification codes document is not listed on this index, is it, ie the live forms index?
Andrew Hayward: No.
Ms Price: Can we look, please, to the index to the “Obsolete Forms”, referred to by Mr Posnett, the reference is POL00118290. We see the title there: “Index to GS OBSOLETE Investigation Forms”.
Again, this is a three-page document listing investigation forms, which all have a form reference number. Could we just scroll through it, please. The identification codes document does not appear on this index either, does it?
Andrew Hayward: No.
Ms Price: Would the identification codes document have been classed as a form for the purposes of this review?
Andrew Hayward: I couldn’t comment on that. I don’t know.
Ms Price: When this review was being conducted, as far as you can recall, did anyone raise the identification codes document as being one which should be made obsolete or, at the very least, amended?
Andrew Hayward: No.
Ms Price: Sir, unless you have any questions on this part of the questioning, that may be a convenient moment to take lunch.
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, certainly. So 2.00?
Ms Price: Yes, sir, thank you.
Sir Wyn Williams: Fine.
(1.00 pm)
(The Short Adjournment)
(1.59 pm)
Ms Price: Good afternoon, sir. Can you see and hear us?
Sir Wyn Williams: Thank you. I can, yes.
Ms Price: Mr Hayward, I would like to move, please, to the question of your understanding of the Horizon System and Horizon System data. The Horizon IT System was introduced in the year 2000, by which time you had joined the Security team, hadn’t you?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Do you recall being aware of Horizon’s introduction?
Andrew Hayward: In my early years in the Security team, no, because my focus, as previously stated this morning was from the physical side, the cash centre/cash-in-transit operation. So I may have had an awareness but not a great recollection or dealings with the Horizon System.
Ms Price: Does it follow from this that you weren’t given any briefing or training relating to the Horizon System when you first joined the Security team?
Andrew Hayward: No.
Ms Price: When did you first become aware of the role which the Horizon System played in the investigation of discrepancies between the accounts and the physical holdings of cash and stock?
Andrew Hayward: I couldn’t specify a particular moment in time because between 2000 and 2008 I was undertaking various tasks. It would probably be to the latter time of that period, as noted in my witness statement, towards the back end of 2008.
Ms Price: Did you ever have any briefing or training on the operation of the Horizon System?
Andrew Hayward: No.
Ms Price: At any point before your departure from the Post Office, were you briefed on how the Horizon System and its audit data might be interrogated to inform investigation of subpostmasters and others?
Andrew Hayward: From recollection, I had what I would term was an overview. So in terms of how the system operated, how information was derived from the various sources, that would form part of the fraud risk programme activity but I would state that there are those individuals that sat beneath me or reported that were far more experienced in those fields and, therefore, one didn’t get involved in the finer detail.
Ms Price: You have said at paragraph 38 of your statement to the Inquiry that analysing Horizon data was not within your specific remit and was undertaken by other members of the Security team. Is that what you mean by others with greater experience?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Price: Were you ever involved in requesting data from Fujitsu?
Andrew Hayward: Not personally, no.
Ms Price: At the time you worked in the Security team, did you understand what Audit Record Query data was?
Andrew Hayward: I was aware of the terminology but not the specifics of actually requesting it myself.
Ms Price: To your knowledge, was there any other type of material or evidence which was obtained by the Security team in relation to prosecutions where an apparent shortfall had been identified, apart from that ARQ data?
Andrew Hayward: I was aware that there were other areas that could be interrogated. With regards to specific recollection, I can’t. There was one system, Credence but, again, I don’t have specific great knowledge of that. But there are other areas that because – the Post Office operated a number of systems, Horizon being the main one for the counter, but there are other data-capturing areas. But again, through the fraud risk and fraud forum activities, they were brought to the table by other parties.
Ms Price: It’s right, isn’t it, that when the Criminal Law Team provided advice on prosecution – and you saw a number of instances of those legal memos, didn’t you, when you were authorising prosecutions – that they would request confirmation of whether there was any material which might reasonably be capable of undermining the prosecution case or assisting the defence case, which had not already been disclosed? Do you remember that paragraph in the legal memos you were looking at?
Andrew Hayward: I have a vague recollection, yes.
Ms Price: In practice, once the legal team had advised that there was sufficient evidence for a prosecution, did the Security team carry out any further inquiries or investigations?
Andrew Hayward: Unless requested to do so, not to my knowledge.
Ms Price: So unless the Legal team requested you to do further inquiries or investigations, was the Security team position that it was now for the Legal team to deal with?
Andrew Hayward: That was my understanding.
Ms Price: In relation to the occasions on which you authorised prosecutions, did you ever direct that further inquiries or investigations be carried out by your team after you received the request for authority to proceed?
Andrew Hayward: Not that I can recall, no.
Ms Price: It may follow from your earlier answers but were you ever trained on how to interpret or interrogate data attained from Fujitsu?
Andrew Hayward: Not in detail, no.
Ms Price: When you say “not in detail” –
Andrew Hayward: So I wasn’t experienced in terms of looking at the data and being able to analyse it. There are those that did that in the first instance.
Ms Price: As far as you were aware, were there people within your team, that is Security team Investigators, who did have the level of technical skill to analyse the Fujitsu data?
Andrew Hayward: I would – my observation was that the Investigators would have that availability, yes.
Ms Price: Were you aware at any time that there were bugs, errors or defects in the Horizon System that could affect balancing and could, therefore, create accounting discrepancies?
Andrew Hayward: From a personal perspective, I was never made aware, in my time, that there were bugs in the system. When there were challenges, it was the information technology, IT, teams that, in the initial instances, would investigate or the comment that was – often came back was that any system, whatever walk of life, has issues that are fixed but there were no – what one would term and came out later – bugs that would affect the work undertaken.
Ms Price: To the extent that there were system issues with Horizon, which meant that subpostmasters found balancing difficult, do you think it would have been helpful for all those teams we saw listed as stakeholders, in the “Former subpostmaster End-to-end debt review”, that long list, to have been made aware of that?
Andrew Hayward: With the benefit of hindsight, yes.
Ms Price: You say at paragraph 41 of your statement to the Inquiry that challenges to the integrity of Horizon were not within your remit and were dealt with by the Information Security team but you were aware of some such challenges when they came to light, weren’t you, because you were involved in some correspondence about them?
Andrew Hayward: Yes. So, by that statement there, I mean that, in terms of leading on the Horizon integrity issues, the Information Security team led on that. They would have made requests, as I’ve noted in one of the bundle emails, that information would have been requested to the Investigations team – or the Operations team, rather, for information regarding any specific request for information, and that would have been given to an individual to make that request available.
Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, POL00106867. This is a lengthy email chain and the last email, which we can see here is on page 1, 3 March 2010. Could we go, please, to the last page in this document, page 28, to the first email in the chain, please. Scrolling down a little bit please.
This is an email from Andrew Daley to Jason Collins and Graham Brander and it’s copied to you, and it reads as follows:
“Jason/Graham.
“Andy called me and asked whether you guys, (Graham, if FIU have any cases in dispute/new issues that could affect your case) could put together some stats on these cases where the accused’s defence was/is that the Horizon data is unreliable for any amount of reasons given by the accused.
“This should be sent to Iain within the next few days. Iain will need as much information as possible.
“Regards,
“Andrew.”
Is the “Andy” there you? You’re copied in to this email?
Andrew Hayward: On the basis of those comments, there, I would say, yes.
Ms Price: Do you recall this request?
Andrew Hayward: Not in specific terms, no.
Ms Price: Looking at the date on this email here, does it assist you with when you first became aware of challenges to the integrity of Horizon?
Andrew Hayward: In specific date terms, no, but obviously the date there in 2010, I would have been aware, by nature of the email content.
Ms Price: Going, please, to page 1 of this document again, this is an email from Rob Wilson to Dave Posnett and Doug Evans and copied to you, among others. Have you had a chance to read this email ahead of giving your evidence? It is one of the, I’m afraid, many documents that came to you in fairly recent times?
Andrew Hayward: I would have read it. Whether I could digest and fully soak in all of the information is open to question, given the time permitted.
Ms Price: This email relates to whether an internal investigation into the integrity of Horizon would be disclosable in criminal proceedings, where Horizon data was relied upon. It sets out Rob Wilson’s view in relation to this. Did you have or express any views on this issue as a result of being copied into this email, as far as you are aware?
Andrew Hayward: As far as I’m aware, no.
Ms Price: You have addressed your involvement in issues regarding Horizon integrity further at paragraph 47 of your statement to the Inquiry. Could we have this on screen, please, Mr Hayward’s statement which is WITN – page 14, please, scrolling a little further down, please, to paragraph 47.
You’re referring to a document there where you were made aware of issues raised regarding Horizon integrity:
“… although I had no direct involvement in dealing with these matters from an operational/IT perspective. This was being led by other teams within the business. With regards to the Security team, updates were provided via the Head of Security (JS) …”
Is that John Scott?
Andrew Hayward: It is.
Ms Price: “… in summary these being that the Horizon integrity issues were being reviewed. From an investigation perspective, we were instructed by JS that any investigation case files that were subject to Horizon integrity challenges be passed to the Criminal Law Team/Cartwright King for review and decision on progression. JS also requested that All case files were passed to himself for personal review. I cannot recollect specific cases in relation to this.”
You have been provided with a number of emails ahead of giving your evidence which show that you were copied in on a number of email chains about challenges to the integrity of the Horizon System and you also appear to have attended at least one of the regular Horizon calls in August 2013. Has sight of these additional documents changed your evidence as set out in this paragraph at all?
Andrew Hayward: No.
Ms Price: You say that updates on Horizon integrity were provided via the Head of Security, John Scott. From an investigation perspective, you say that you were instructed by John Scott that any investigation case files subject of Horizon integrity challenges be passed to the Criminal Law Team/Cartwright King but also that John Scott requested that all case files be passed to him for personal review. Was this all case files or just those that relied on Horizon data?
Andrew Hayward: On recollection, I do believe, although he would himself confirm this, that we – he saw all case files.
Ms Price: Mr Hayward, we’re coming to the end of the questions which I have for you. The last topic I wish to ask you about is the working environment within the Security team. What was it like, working in the Security team?
Andrew Hayward: Mindful of the Inquiry, any walk of life, one’s job can be said to be testing, stressful, on occasions. From a personal viewpoint, I had a long career in the Post Office. I don’t want – it’s not about me, this Inquiry but the Security team was a very testing environment by nature of the work, not just from a fraud perspective but also from the physical side, because it was a 24/7 role, it didn’t mean we worked 24/7, but burglars don’t operate 9 to 5 so we operated around all times of day and night. It was an interesting role.
In the latter part of my career, I would say in the last couple of years, it became a very testing, toxic environment within the Security team. There was a very much for me, a command and control operation that worked. One, again, from a personal perspective, didn’t challenge, if you did, it was probably frowned upon. That’s a very broadbrush set of statements to make, but that’s from a personal perspective.
Ms Price: Had you had any concerns about the way that the Security team operated, would you have felt able to raise them?
Andrew Hayward: Not in terms of anything to do with Horizon integrity issues. That probably wasn’t the means of my comments there. It was more about the way the Security team in general was run. My term “command and control” certainly came to the front more. One was always very conscious for one’s career, and I mean that very, very pointedly because, if one raised certain challenge, you were very wary of where that would take you.
So, again, that is a broadbrush statement but I’m very conscious of individuals. So …
Ms Price: Where was this coming from?
Andrew Hayward: For me, personally, from the Head of Security, John Scott.
Ms Price: Sir, those are all the questions I have for Mr Hayward. Do you have questions?
Sir Wyn Williams: Well, not at the moment. Are there questions from anyone else?
Ms Price: There are questions from Ms Page.
Sir Wyn Williams: Right. Okay, let’s hear those first, anyway.
Questioned by Ms Page
Ms Page: Mr Hayward, I appear for a number of subpostmasters in this Inquiry. What I’d like to ask about is the information that was collected from the forms that you were taken to in the zip files, because we saw a reference to the fact that information was put together for fraud risk purposes and that was obviously your responsibility for a period of time, wasn’t it?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Page: So, presumably, those various forms that were used and the data that was collected on them was collated for the purposes of analysing fraud risk?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Ms Page: So, presumably, that also would have included the information about identification codes?
Andrew Hayward: That was never evident in any of the information that we collected.
Ms Page: So are you saying that, although you collated other evidence of information, data, and so forth, from those forms, there was never any evidence collated from the ID codes documents?
Andrew Hayward: No, the evidence – for reference, in answer to your question, was if a particular product or service that was offered by the Post Office was subject to an activity, so for example, postage labels, then information on branches and the levels of turnover of said item or product, that was the information that was gathered for analysis purposes and various activities thereafter.
Ms Page: When you were an Investigator yourself and you were gathering information about identification, what did you do it with reference to?
Andrew Hayward: I don’t have particular knowledge nor recollection of those particular ID codes. As I stated previously, it was within a number of areas to collect information. What happened to that thereafter, I do not know and I’ve no recollection of.
Ms Page: What number would you have used if you were investigating somebody who was white?
Andrew Hayward: Based on what I’ve seen, it would be an ID code 1.
Ms Page: So how did you know that?
Andrew Hayward: Because I’ve seen it on this screen.
Ms Page: How did you know it at the time?
Andrew Hayward: I can’t recollect some years ago.
Ms Page: Is your lack of recollection of the ID codes convenient, Mr Hayward?
Andrew Hayward: No, it isn’t. Absolutely not.
Ms Page: Thank you. Those are my questions.
Sir Wyn Williams: Anyone else?
Ms Price: No, sir, I think that’s it from Core Participant questions.
Questioned by Sir Wyn Williams
Sir Wyn Williams: There’s just one line of short questions I want to ask, Mr Haywood, to make sure that I’m understanding, really, the oral evidence you gave.
Before the morning break, I think it was, counsel asked you whether it was normal for investigations of alleged criminal activity to result in criminal prosecutions. All right?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Sir Wyn Williams: That may not be precisely how she put it but I think that was the purport of what she had to say. You said, “No”, which perhaps wasn’t the answer that she or even I was expecting. But, be that as it may for the moment, you then went on to say that there might be – I’m not holding you to these figures, so please understand that – say, 250 investigations in one year but only 50 prosecutions. All right?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Sir Wyn Williams: You made it clear that that was an estimate and not precise. What I want to understand is were you then talking about the complete number of investigations in a year and the complete number of prosecutions in a year, as best you could, or were you confining your answers to investigations about fraud in branches or theft in branches and those which ended up in prosecutions?
Am I making myself clear?
Andrew Hayward: Yes, sir. In reply to that, I would say, from my recollection, the 250 cases, circa, were investigation case files that were opened. I couldn’t give you the specific details of X-number of fraud cases versus other primarily, and that the –
Sir Wyn Williams: You were – just to shortcut it you were trying to estimate the whole number of investigations of whatever type of criminality in one year?
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Sir Wyn Williams: Similarly, in relation to prosecutions, were you attempting to assess the number of prosecutions in one year of whatever type or was that more confined to fraud/theft in branches –
Andrew Hayward: That would be the –
Sir Wyn Williams: – and I’ll tell you, there’s a reason for that. But we’ve been told in various – with various degrees of purported accuracy that, over the period between 2000 and 2013, there were approximately 700 people who may have been wrongly convicted of theft, false accounting. We’re still to investigate that more fully, so please understand that.
Andrew Hayward: Absolutely.
Sir Wyn Williams: But that, as it happens, would equate to about 50 a year, if you averaged it out, sort of thing.
Andrew Hayward: Yes.
Sir Wyn Williams: Again, I wanted to be clear what you were describing to me.
Andrew Hayward: So, sir, again, my understanding was, of those 50, that covered the whole piece, in terms of investigations, rather than the categorisation of where those investigations commenced.
Sir Wyn Williams: Right. I’m with you. Thank you very much.
The Witness: Thank you.
Sir Wyn Williams: Right. Well, thank you very much for your witness statement and thank you for answering a good many questions today. I’m grateful to you.
The Witness: Thank you.
Sir Wyn Williams: So that’s it for today, Ms Price?
Ms Price: Yes, sir, commencing again at 10.00 tomorrow.
Sir Wyn Williams: With?
Ms Price: With John Scott, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: I must have heard Mr Scott’s name on very many occasions today and momentarily it went out of my head, so thank you very much.
Ms Price: Thank you, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: See you in the morning.
(2.25 pm)
(The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)