8 November 2023 – Teresa Williamson
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(10.00 am)
Mr Stevens: Good morning, sir, can you hear and see me?
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, I can, thank you.
Mr Stevens: Thank you. If I may call Mrs Williamson.
Teresa Williamson
TERESA MARY WILLIAMSON (affirmed).
Questioned by Mr Stevens
Mr Stevens: Mrs Williamson, as you know, my name is Sam Stevens and I ask questions on behalf of the Inquiry. Can I ask you to state your full name, please.
Teresa Williamson: My name is Teresa Mary Williamson.
Mr Stevens: In front of you there should be a bundle of documents.
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: If I can ask you – I think it’s the smaller bundle in this case – to turn to that and you should see in one of the first tabs a copy of your witness statement?
Teresa Williamson: That is correct.
Mr Stevens: Thank you for giving that written statement to the Inquiry and for giving oral evidence today. Can I just check with you that that is a statement dated 15 August 2023 running to 36 pages?
Teresa Williamson: Yes, the statement is 34 pages and then there’s two other pages of index.
Mr Stevens: Yes. On page 34 there should be your signature?
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: Are the contents of that statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
Teresa Williamson: There’s just one thing I do wish to correct.
Mr Stevens: Yes?
Teresa Williamson: When I was reading the statements and exhibits last night, I realised that the person who actually made the decision on prosecution, there was one for each business and I think it was the person called the National Investigation Officer for the Post Office Limited. In the past, it had been the Retail or the Area Managers but, by the time, I think, this case was being dealt with, I think there was one person making the decisions on prosecutions within each business, so I think that was not quite correct when I made that statement, but I just misremembered that.
Mr Stevens: I see. So, subject to that correction, the remainder of the statement is true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
Teresa Williamson: Absolutely.
Mr Stevens: For the purpose of the record, that statement is WITN08680100. That statement now stands as your evidence to the Inquiry. I am going to ask you some questions about it. The first one is just a point for clarification. You’re now Mrs Teresa Williamson.
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: At the time your last name was Berridge; is that correct?
Teresa Williamson: Yes, that’s correct, that was my professional name as a solicitor but I now use my married name.
Mr Stevens: Starting then, with your career history. You qualified as a solicitor in 1990 –
Teresa Williamson: That’s correct.
Mr Stevens: – and on qualification you worked for a solicitors firm practising criminal law?
Teresa Williamson: Yes, I did.
Mr Stevens: In your statement, you say that your caseload was almost exclusively involved defending individuals who had been accused of criminal offences.
Teresa Williamson: (The witness nodded)
Mr Stevens: You go on to say that you had a very small number of private prosecutions relating to obvious dogs.
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: In terms of private prosecutions, when you say a very small number, how many are we talking: less than ten, fewer than ten?
Teresa Williamson: Yeah, fewer than ten. It’s one or two, I think.
Mr Stevens: When you were prosecuting those cases, did you advise on charging decisions?
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: When you were advising on charging decisions, would you apply the Code for Crown Prosecutors?
Teresa Williamson: Those were completely private prosecutions. I must admit, I don’t think I did, when I was doing those private prosecutions, apply the Code for Crown Prosecutors. But all the cases I dealt with at Royal Mail as a prosecutor, I did apply the Code for Crown Prosecutors, yes.
Mr Stevens: We’ll come to that now. You joined the Post Office in 1992?
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: So two years after qualifying?
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: You say that your role involved prosecuting cases. Was the prosecution of criminal cases your soul area of responsibility or did you have other casework as well?
Teresa Williamson: I did a little bit of advice work, yes.
Mr Stevens: Advising on what matters?
Teresa Williamson: Like criminal type issues, yes.
Mr Stevens: So very much within the Criminal Law Team and focused on criminal practice?
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: You say in your statement that, at the time of joining, there were around ten lawyers in the Criminal Law Team. Of those, how many would be working on prosecutions against subpostmasters for theft, false accounting or similar offences?
Teresa Williamson: When I first started working at the Post Office, all lawyers in the Criminal Law Team, apart from the Assistant Director, later called the Head of the Department, the team leader, everyone would prosecute a mixture of cases. So some would be Royal Mail cases, some Post Office Limited cases and some might be Parcelforce or cash handling and distribution. So it was a real mix at the beginning, although later I think it changed to people tended to do more of one kind of case.
Mr Stevens: When you said everyone except what became the team leader –
Teresa Williamson: Yeah.
Mr Stevens: – when you joined, you were referring there to Roger Williams?
Teresa Williamson: No, I think I was about Mike Heath, who was the Assistant Director, the head of the Criminal Law Team.
Mr Stevens: So do you recall what Roger Williams’ job title was?
Teresa Williamson: So he was the principal lawyer and, yeah, I think when I first joined, he was doing a mixture of cases, yes.
Mr Stevens: Mike Heath, you said – sorry, could you just repeat his job title?
Teresa Williamson: Mike Heath was the assistant director and he oversaw, he managed the team. I don’t know whether he had any of his own caseload. He might have had the more serious cases but I think more managerial role, and higher level advice work on criminal law.
Mr Stevens: When you joined, your job title was lawyer.
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: You became senior lawyer or promoted to senior lawyer –
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: – in ‘95/’96?
Teresa Williamson: Yeah.
Mr Stevens: Roughly how many lawyers and senior lawyers were there as a proportion within the team?
Teresa Williamson: So when I first joined the Criminal Law Team I think I was the only lawyer. Everybody else was a senior lawyer. And then when I became a senior lawyer, from time to time I think we did have article clerks came and joined us in the team and, at some stage, also, there was a junior lawyer came and joined us in the team. But, sorry, I can’t remember the dates.
Mr Stevens: In terms of the title “senior lawyer” did that simply reflect that you’d been at the business for a period of time or was it a substantive promotion?
Teresa Williamson: It was a substantive promotion. I remember that, in the run-up to me becoming a senior lawyer, I was purposely given cases, more challenging cases, so that I could prove that I could deal with more challenging cases on my own.
Mr Stevens: When you say more challenging cases, can you recall what type of challenging – or why they were more challenging?
Teresa Williamson: I guess either because there was more paperwork or because financially there was more involved. So one case I particularly remember was a case where I think 500,000 was involved, but that was more of a Royal Mail case. It was someone trying to undercut the – sort of like the Royal Mail and the universal service provision, so it’s a more complicated case and I remember dealing with that in the run-up to becoming a senior lawyer. That’s a case that – evidencing that could deal with more.
Mr Stevens: So in terms of your line management, you say you reported into Roger Williams initially –
Teresa Williamson: Initially.
Mr Stevens: – and then that became Rob Wilson later?
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: Did Roger Williams and/or Rob Wilson report into Mike Heath?
Teresa Williamson: They did and, in fact, many ways we all reported in to Mike Heath but they would have been the people who would have done, say, for example, my appraisal, they would have been the people that I went to first if I had any issues in cases.
Mr Stevens: Can you recall to whom Mike Heath reported?
Teresa Williamson: So initially he reported to – well, he did – or the way throughout – reporting to “the solicitor” to the Post Office, and when I first joined it was a man and, I’m really sorry, I can’t remember his name. But, after a period of time, it was a woman called Catherine Churchard.
Mr Stevens: To what extent did the solicitor to the Post Office have involvement with the day-to-day running of the Criminal Law Team?
Teresa Williamson: So Catherine Churchard?
Mr Stevens: Yes.
Teresa Williamson: Very little. It was Mike Heath who was in charge of his team. You really only had dealings with Catherine Churchard – in fact, actually nice dealings, I remember when I got pregnant I got a present, but I didn’t really have much dealings with her at all.
Mr Stevens: When you were promoted to be a senior lawyer in ‘95 or ‘96, you say at that stage the level of supervision over your work would have been minimal?
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: Can you expand on that: to what extent was it supervised?
Teresa Williamson: When files came in from the Investigators, they always went through the desk of the team leader or had been the Assistant Director, and he would have allocated cases or, if he had wanted to – I don’t know whether he did or not, whether he had ever had a look in cases just to see things were going properly.
Mr Stevens: You say at that time you took over a supervisory role. How many people did you supervise?
Teresa Williamson: In total, three: two trainee solicitors, article clerks and one junior lawyer, but at different times.
Mr Stevens: The article clerks and the junior solicitors, would they have their on caseload?
Teresa Williamson: Yes. Well, I don’t think the article clerks did. The junior lawyer did but I don’t think the article clerk did. I think she worked more like one of the junior legal executives helping with more administrative things or doing specific tasks on the case.
Mr Stevens: Would a junior lawyer ever, for example, give charging advice independently without supervision by you?
Teresa Williamson: So the junior lawyer, if I’d been supervising them at the time and I hadn’t been there, they would have had to run it through another lawyer in the team, a senior lawyer in the team, yes.
Mr Stevens: So we know that ‘95/’96, you said beforehand that they started – you had a variety of work of all different types of cases.
Teresa Williamson: Mm.
Mr Stevens: By ‘95/’96, were you noticing that you were getting more of a particular type of case and, if so, what type?
Teresa Williamson: So not so much ‘95/’96. ‘95/’96, I think it was still a wide variety of cases but it was after I returned from maternity leave. Later on, I can’t remember exactly when it happened, that we got more restricted cases, more towards the 2000s, I think.
Mr Stevens: When you say more restricted with the cases, what type of cases were you getting more regularly at that point?
Teresa Williamson: I think – I can’t remember which cases I was mainly allocated to but I think I did get a fair few Post Office Limited cases, yes.
Mr Stevens: How regularly would you have a case against a subpostmaster for charges of theft or false accounting?
Teresa Williamson: And that’s something I really can’t remember. I really cannot remember the number of the cases I had, the names of the defendants or the issues in the cases. I can only comment on what I’ve seen. It’s just so long ago.
Mr Stevens: Well, we are going to, in due course, turn to look at one of those. But, before we do, a few more general questions. You refer in your statement to there being a slight reduction in staff numbers.
Teresa Williamson: Mm.
Mr Stevens: We refer to ten lawyers at the start and I think, by the time you left, that you say roughly eight lawyers?
Teresa Williamson: Yeah.
Mr Stevens: So are we talking simply a reduction of two or –
Teresa Williamson: In fact, when I was thinking about it last night I was trying to remember the order in which people left. So there were two rounds of redundancies. I think at the first round of redundancies Mike Heath left. I think also – I can’t remember whether both Joyce Gibson and Nicola Knight went or whether they went on two separate redundancy rounds. Tony Brentnall retired and went to Canada.
But I can’t remember quite the order that people left and whether some people left after I joined the Employment Team, but all I can say, it did reduce, but I can’t remember the numbers and when.
Mr Stevens: A reduction in numbers over time. Do you recall whether the amount of work that the Criminal Law Team were expected to deal with, whether that increased or decreased over the same period?
Teresa Williamson: To me, it felt about the same.
Mr Stevens: Are you aware as to whether the size of the Investigative Team in the Security Department, whether that grew or shrank at the same time?
Teresa Williamson: They also had a round of redundancies so it was voluntary redundancies and I think a fair few investigators went on the first round of voluntary redundancies, yes. So it was a – I get – I seem to recall that both the Criminal Law Team and the Investigations Team were shrinking, and the business was happy with that.
Mr Stevens: I want to just briefly look at the working environment. In your statement – we don’t need to go there but, for the record, it’s firstly paragraph 18 – you say:
“Aside from supervision of the articled clerk and more junior lawyer, each member of the team tended to work autonomously on their cases and there was generally very little collaboration.”
You go on to say at paragraph 13 of your statement that the team regularly went for lunch together but that was to have social conversations –
Teresa Williamson: Mm.
Mr Stevens: – not to talk about the cases. So this doesn’t sound like it was a case of a personality clash within the department; is that fair?
Teresa Williamson: Yeah.
Mr Stevens: You hesitated to answer?
Teresa Williamson: Yeah, I did hesitate, didn’t I? I don’t think I was the most popular person in the team. I’ll accept that.
Mr Stevens: So when you say people working autonomously, was that that you didn’t speak to other people about your cases: were you aware of other people speaking about their cases to each other within the department?
Teresa Williamson: Not really. I mean, I do recall that it was all very autonomous and I guess partly because we were dealing with different cases. I think also because I think, once you are a senior lawyer, you wanted to appear that you could deal with your own cases and didn’t have to keep asking for help. It just wasn’t a collaborative team and the reason I say that, when I moved to the Employment Law Team, it was much more collaborative.
Mr Stevens: For example, in, say, the Criminal Law Team and say there’s number of people prosecuting subpostmasters for, let’s just say theft in this case, and let’s focus after Horizon –
Teresa Williamson: Mm, did you say after Horizon?
Mr Stevens: After Horizon, yes.
Teresa Williamson: Okay.
Mr Stevens: The source of evidence is very similar, in that it comes from the same computer system.
Teresa Williamson: Mm.
Mr Stevens: The ways of working and the practices are similar or the same, should be the same –
Teresa Williamson: Mm-hm.
Mr Stevens: – because it’s in the same company. To what extent do you think it’s surprising that, when there were those similarities, people didn’t communicate or discuss how they approached other cases to try to share learning?
Teresa Williamson: It is surprising but that’s how it was.
Mr Stevens: Do you know why?
Teresa Williamson: Do I know why? It was just the nature of the organisation, I think.
Mr Stevens: Do you think that was caused by the way you were managed?
Teresa Williamson: Possibly.
Mr Stevens: How would you describe the management style of – well, let’s start with Mr Heath.
Teresa Williamson: Mm.
Mr Stevens: How would you describe his management style?
Teresa Williamson: He was a lot more collaborative. You really felt that you could go in and ask him anything.
Mr Stevens: Who took over from Mr Heath?
Teresa Williamson: Rob Wilson.
Mr Stevens: Rob Wilson?
Teresa Williamson: Yeah.
Mr Stevens: How did things change when Rob Wilson took over?
Teresa Williamson: He was a quieter, more private, more reserved person. It didn’t feel quite so much an open door to go into his office.
Mr Stevens: Do you think that more broadly affected the level of collaboration within the team or not?
Teresa Williamson: Certainly as far as I was concerned, yes.
Mr Stevens: On reflection, do you think it would have been helpful if the team had been more collaborative or –
Teresa Williamson: Absolutely.
Mr Stevens: Why?
Teresa Williamson: Well, I’ve worked in other organisations and I’ve been a more senior leader in other organisations and I realise that collaboration and facilitation adds to the strength of a team, and you can achieve far more when you collaborate. But that’s with the benefit of hindsight, looking back to how things were.
Mr Stevens: We’re talking here purely within the Criminal Law Team, to what extent were you aware, within Post Office, of any sources of advice or support for IT issues?
Teresa Williamson: So, what, if we had IT problems ourselves?
Mr Stevens: Let me rephrase that. If a case threw up an issue with the a computer error or an IT issue, were there any resources of which you were aware in the Post Office itself that you could use for assistance or to discuss the matter with?
Teresa Williamson: Okay, so if it had come up in one of my Post Office cases, I’d have gone back to the Investigator and asked him to get a statement from the relevant person, yes.
Mr Stevens: So you would have left that for the Investigator and you yourself wouldn’t have approached –
Teresa Williamson: Absolutely because it was the Investigators who gathered the evidence, and then the Criminal Law Team advised on the evidence, and then the National Investigation Manager made the final decision on whether there should be a prosecutor. So there was a very clear delineation between who did what.
Mr Stevens: I want to move now to look at the slight difference in role you had because before you were in private practice in a solicitor’s firm –
Teresa Williamson: Yeah.
Mr Stevens: – and one thing is you went from mostly defence to solely prosecution?
Teresa Williamson: Yeah.
Mr Stevens: Secondly, you became an in-house solicitor –
Teresa Williamson: Yeah.
Mr Stevens: – where your employer was also your client?
Teresa Williamson: Yeah.
Mr Stevens: Presumably as an in-house solicitor, you accepted you still had your ordinary duties to the court –
Teresa Williamson: 100 per cent, yes.
Mr Stevens: – and to act with independence and integrity?
Teresa Williamson: Absolutely.
Mr Stevens: To what extent, if at all, did you find it was more difficult to comply with those duties as an in-house solicitor?
Teresa Williamson: I thought it was easier, actually. It’s very hard as a defence solicitor sometimes, when clients were trying to get you to – they might tell you one thing and then they wanted to put forward a different case. In some ways, it was much more challenging as a defence solicitor because I trusted that, within the Post Office, if I ask for evidence to be obtained, that it would be obtained. I trusted that if there was unused material to be disclosed, that that would be provided to me by the Investigator.
So I thought, at the time, until I read the article in the Computer Weekly, that it was easier.
Mr Stevens: Well, let’s just go out of order a bit because you’ve raised this. You say that’s what you thought at the time?
Teresa Williamson: Yeah.
Mr Stevens: What are your reflections now?
Teresa Williamson: Looking back, knowing what I know now since I read the article in Computer Weekly and also reading the judgments in the Bates case and the Hamilton case, I realise that there was a lot of material that wasn’t disclosed to me and things that I should have known about I didn’t know about. And that makes me angry and sad.
Mr Stevens: Can you explain why that makes you angry?
Teresa Williamson: Because we should have been told these things. So, for example, I understand there were discussions at board level about the reliability of the Horizon system, and that was not filtered down to the Criminal Law Team.
Mr Stevens: If it had been filtered down, speaking purely for yourself, what do you think you would have done differently?
Teresa Williamson: Well, if I’d known that the system was not operating properly, I would have insisted that the relevant statements were obtained from Fujitsu to explain how the system, what was working, or if it wasn’t working properly, in what respects it wasn’t working properly.
Mr Stevens: That statement, would you have done anything in respect of documentation?
Teresa Williamson: In what sense?
Mr Stevens: Sorry, so you would have obtained statements from Fujitsu. Would you have looked for any or asked the investigators to look for any further documents relating –
Teresa Williamson: Absolutely, yes. Definitely.
Mr Stevens: Did you ever feel at any point under pressure from Investigators to pursue a prosecution?
Teresa Williamson: The main one I can think of was a case prior to Horizon where there was an issue in relation to unused material, and I sent off the Investigator to go and search a big warehouse looking for paid orders. There was pushback from him in that case and, in fact, we did actually have to withdraw that case. So that’s the case that I remember where there was the biggest pushback but that’s a pre-Horizon case.
Mr Stevens: From what you said, that was withdrawn, that case?
Teresa Williamson: That case had to be withdrawn and, if I’d ever had any Horizon cases where there was that sort of issue, where I felt there was unused material available that was not being disclosed and there was either a refusal to disclose it or I was being told it couldn’t be found and they weren’t going to withdraw the case, I wouldn’t have stood for that.
Mr Stevens: Staying on the subject of acting as an in-house solicitor, I want to talk about instructions. That phrase can be used in two ways. Firstly, a lay client can give instructions to a solicitor and, secondly, a solicitor can pass on those instructions to counsel?
Teresa Williamson: Yeah.
Mr Stevens: As a solicitor in the Criminal Law Team, did you ever provide instructions to act where you made the decision on the behalf of the Post Office as a lay client?
Teresa Williamson: No.
Mr Stevens: We’ve already covered in your evidence, actually, who made the charging decisions, so I don’t need to take you to there. We can move on instead to some of the processes. When you joined, and focusing purely on cases against subpostmasters here for theft and false accounting, obviously when you joined, such cases wouldn’t have relied on Horizon data because that didn’t come until later.
Teresa Williamson: Yeah.
Mr Stevens: Can you just summarise briefly what accounting data was used in those cases prior to the introduction of Horizon?
Teresa Williamson: Gosh, I’ve got to – what type of case are you talking about? There were so many different types of cases.
Mr Stevens: If it was a subpostmaster who is alleged to have stolen cash from the Post Office, a similar case to R v Brennan, which we’ll come to shortly, that type of case.
Teresa Williamson: Okay. So I guess the starting point would probably be – usually it’s an audit had taken place at the sub post office or the branch post office – and I am really trying to remember a long way back now. It’s really hard to remember. There would often be paperwork, statements and exhibits from the DSS Paid Order Unit in Lisahally; there would be statements from the officers, the Investigating Officers; there would be the record of tape recorded interview; if the person had voluntarily agreed to be searched, whether anything had been found on them; if anything had been found anywhere in the office in an untoward place.
Mr Stevens: In terms of accounting records?
Teresa Williamson: Oh, accounting records.
Mr Stevens: The cash account by the –
Teresa Williamson: Yeah, there’d be a cash account from the – for the sub post office, and with the – the documents that used to get sent off to Paid Order Unit in Lisahally, I’m trying to remember what kind of documentation went with it. I can’t remember the name of the form but I’m sure there was a form, probably a handwritten form that went with the documents to Lisahally.
Mr Stevens: To what extent did the investigation focus on, pre-Horizon, trying to establish where alleged stolen funds had gone, so whether to the subpostmaster or otherwise?
Teresa Williamson: Well, I think in all cases, pre and post, there’d be – if the – the problem was that people couldn’t be seared unless the police were involved, unless they voluntarily agreed to. So if they voluntarily agreed to be searched or the police were involved, the person might be searched, also their handbag or something like that. There was often questions asked about their accounts, their bank accounts, or things like that. It just depended on the case. It’s such a general question, it’s really hard to answer.
Mr Stevens: Let me ask one last general question though, which may be hard to answer but we’ll see. Before the implementation of Horizon, if a discrepancy had been identified leading to an investigation, can you recall to what extent, if at all, or with what regularity, subpostmasters would say that any alleged discrepancy wasn’t due to dishonesty but due to errors in the accounting documentation?
Teresa Williamson: I think it happened before Horizon and it happened after Horizon.
Mr Stevens: Do you recall if there was a change in frequency of those issues being raised?
Teresa Williamson: No, I can’t recall.
Mr Stevens: Can we turn to your witness statement, please. It’s page 7, paragraph 19 – sorry, the wrong page.
Page 6 – thank you – paragraph 19, you set out or summarise ten steps that you say were typically involved in a prosecution – or your involvement, I should say, sorry. The first is reviewing the case file, and the final sentence says:
“On reviewing the file, my focus would have been on considering the strength of the evidence in the case in accordance with the evidential test in the Code for Crown Prosecutors which was used by the Criminal Team to assess whether a case met the threshold or prosecution or not.”
Teresa Williamson: Mm.
Mr Stevens: Do you recall what, if any, guidance there was available to you when you joined the Post Office on applying the Code for Crown Prosecutors?
Teresa Williamson: I just remember that we always applied the Code for Crown Prosecutors and we all had a copy of the Code for Crown Prosecutors, and I always used it when I was thinking about cases.
Mr Stevens: What was your understanding of the evidential stage of the Full Code Test?
Teresa Williamson: Right. So the starting point: is there sufficient evidence to afford a realistic prospect of conviction? So that is whether there’d be more than a 50 per cent chance of success, so there’d be enough evidence on each of the individual aspects of a crime, so the actus reus and the mens rea, to afford a realistic prospect of conviction.
Mr Stevens: Could we turn the page now, please, to step 3 and this is where you’re talking about drafting a written advice to a Regional or Area Manager. We spoke on how that may be someone different at different points.
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: But you drafted the opinion on why a prosecution is or is not appropriate in accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors, with a particular focus on whether there is a realistic prospect of conviction.
Teresa Williamson: Mm.
Mr Stevens: Why was there a particular focus on that aspect, on the first stage?
Teresa Williamson: Because, if the criminal lawyer didn’t advise there was sufficient evidence to afford a realistic prospect of conviction, unless further evidence was obtained, the case would fall, then it wouldn’t go any further.
Mr Stevens: You say:
“If I advised that there was a realistic prospect of conviction, I would have also included my opinion on the likelihood of success in this advice, along with the relevant charges and a summary of facts to be served on the defence. If I advised that there was not a reasonable prospect of conviction, the case would have been brought to a close at this stage.”
You say you were only providing an opinion.
Teresa Williamson: Mm.
Mr Stevens: To what extent would you have offered an opinion on the public interest aspect of the test?
Teresa Williamson: So that came second. So there were – so, first of all, we’d advise whether there’s sufficient evidence to afford a realistic prospect of conviction. Then, if there was sufficient evidence to afford a realistic prospect of conviction, you would possibly advise on the likelihood of success. So whether there was a low prospect of success, so more than 50 per cent but not particularly high, or a moderate or a high prospect of success.
And then, in relevant cases, say for example, you know, maybe it was a really old accused person who was maybe, I don’t know, 85, something like that, and it was a maybe a small amount that had been stolen, then you might be advising whether it was in the public interest to prosecute such an old person, or if it’s a very young person who maybe was working as an assistant – or maybe a young postman, maybe, who had stolen some mail but maybe they’d only stolen one letter and they were very young, they’d only just started, again, that might be in the public interest for not prosecuting.
Mr Stevens: It sounds like there what you’re describing is you would proffer advice if it appeared, on the face of the case, that there were –
Teresa Williamson: Yeah.
Mr Stevens: – countervailing factors –
Teresa Williamson: Yeah.
Mr Stevens: – that suggested that a prosecution wasn’t in the public interest?
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: So was the default position that you wouldn’t advise on the public interest unless, on the face of the case, there was such countervailing factors?
Teresa Williamson: Yes, I think that’s correct, yes.
Mr Stevens: In the case of a subpostmaster accused dishonesty, of theft, what, aside from the factors you set out there, were there any others that you may take into consideration which would tend or point away from a prosecution in the public interest?
Teresa Williamson: I think I would often, if it’s one where I felt a bit uncomfortable about recommending prosecution, I would read through the Code for Crown Prosecutors and see whether there were any factors discussed there that might tend away from recommending a prosecution.
Mr Stevens: To what extent – just trying to clarify this point on the prospects of success, of say one that’s 55 per cent and one that’s 70 per cent, to what extent did the variation in prospect of success there factor in to the public interest stage of the test, as you applied it?
Teresa Williamson: Less so.
Mr Stevens: Please can we bring up a document. It’s POL00030659.
It’s a document titled “Post Office Internal Prosecution Policy (Dishonesty)”, and it’s dated December 1997. Under heading 2, it says:
“There is no single statement of current policy but it can be summed up as normally to prosecute all breaches of the criminal law by employees which affect the Post Office and which involve dishonesty.”
Was that a fair reflection of – do you think that’s an accurate reflection of what the policy was up to December ‘97?
Teresa Williamson: I’m struggling to read with the glare. Can you point me to the paper version, please?
Mr Stevens: Of course, yes. It should be in the bundle, the smaller – no, sorry the larger bundle at E4, it would be right at the back of that. I think the last document within it.
Teresa Williamson: Thank you. That’s better. Right:
“There is no single statement of current policy …”
(The witness read to herself)
Teresa Williamson: My reading of that is that the Code for Crown Prosecutors is still overarching. So if there was insufficient evidence to afford a realistic prospect of conviction it wouldn’t be prosecuted. It was only if there was sufficient evidence to afford a realistic prospect of conviction, then you were moving onto the next stage, would you look at this.
So I – because this is a document not written by a lawyer; this is a document written by the Head of Investigations, Andrew Wilson, who is not a lawyer. So he’s not articulating the Code for Crown Prosecutors, but I would always have read this through the lens of the Code for Crown Prosecutors. So that would, in effect, trump this document.
Mr Stevens: Do you think the way you worked –
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: – do you know if that’s similar to how other people in the team worked or not?
Teresa Williamson: I think when I was there in 2002/2003, that would have been the way people would have worked and, if they didn’t, I’d have been shocked and disappointed with them.
Mr Stevens: The point that there was no single statement of current policy before, was it – from your evidence, is it that – the sort of single policy, in practice, was simply to apply the Code for Crown Prosecutors?
Teresa Williamson: Certainly in the Criminal Law Team, when we were advising on the evidence, it would have been to apply the Code for Crown Prosecutors. This document, I think – I’m not quite sure who the audience for the document was meant to be but my reading of it was that it was almost like trying to find more cases where the public interest would have applied, so it’s more about not prosecuting everybody.
So, for example about – there’s a lot of talk about Royal Mail cases and wilful delay. I think it’s much more aimed at that and having fewer prosecutions rather than more prosecutions.
Mr Stevens: Do you have any recollection of what led to this policy being –
Teresa Williamson: No, that’s what I don’t know so I don’t know why it was drafted. Because it’s a Security and Investigations Team document, Andrew Wilson. I know he says that lawyers have reviewed it. I suspect that would have been Mike Heath, the Assistant Director. But I don’t know who the target audience was for but I don’t think the target audience was necessarily so much lawyers as people within the business. Maybe, I don’t know, possibly, the people making the decision whether to prosecute or not. But I don’t know. I’m guessing.
Mr Stevens: As I say, for the purposes of your practice, you were led by the Code for Crown Prosecutors?
Teresa Williamson: Absolutely. That came first, always.
Mr Stevens: Your evidence earlier was that you didn’t speak much about practice with – or collaborate with other people so whilst you don’t – you’ve no reason to believe that other prosecutors – sorry, I’ll rephrase that – other lawyers in the Criminal Law Team used this document rather than the Code, you don’t have firsthand knowledge of that?
Teresa Williamson: I don’t have firsthand knowledge and that doesn’t sound right. You know, it was always the Code for Crown Prosecutors came first and we all had copies of it. So I can’t see why that, in anyone’s mind, would trump the Code for Crown Prosecutors.
Mr Stevens: That document can come down, thank you.
Moving, then, to the introduction of Horizon, you say in your statement that you likely became aware of Horizon as something has been introduced in either the late ’90s or early 2000s.
Teresa Williamson: Mm-hm.
Mr Stevens: You say you didn’t give it a lot of thought at the time and you also say that – we don’t need to go there but at page 12, at the top of your statement, you say:
“I knew it was a computerised bookkeeping system designed to assist subpostmasters with the processing of various payments and also balancing on a weekly basis.”
That broad understanding, can you recall where that came from?
Teresa Williamson: Sorry, no.
Mr Stevens: Previously, the cash account before Horizon was prepared by the subpostmaster –
Teresa Williamson: (The witness nodded)
Mr Stevens: – and the record of transactions, so the data from which the cash account was drawn, that was created and kept by the subpostmaster as well; do you agree with that?
Teresa Williamson: Or, say, for example, if it was in the branch office, different people might have prepared different bits of it. I think that’s what happened in – no, that’s a Horizon case, no. But it might have been assistants prepared certain transaction records, yeah.
Mr Stevens: Yeah, but for a subpostmaster in an agency branch –
Teresa Williamson: On their own.
Mr Stevens: – on their own, they maintain a record of transactions and they’re responsible for creating the accounting documents?
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: So if there’s any queries about the integrity of the record of transactions or how the cash account was put together – I appreciate there’s the privilege against self-incrimination, but question – the subpostmaster could be asked questions about how the transactions were kept and how the cash account was created?
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: With Horizon, Horizon stored the transactions itself –
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: – and Horizon created the new cash account?
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: So do you accept that the provenance of the data, the accounting data upon which prosecutions against subpostmasters for theft, the provenance of the data on which those were based, fundamentally changed with the introduction of Horizon?
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: The integrity of that data depended on the computer or Horizon rather than the subpostmaster?
Teresa Williamson: (The witness nodded)
I’m not answering, I’m thinking. Could you ask me the question again because my concentration has gone.
Mr Stevens: The integrity of the data depended on the computer, namely Horizon, rather than how the SPM stored the records or totted up the account?
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: So with that substantial change, do you recall any discussion within the Criminal Law Team about how the introduction of Horizon would affect prosecutions to subpostmasters when Horizon was introduced?
Teresa Williamson: There probably was but I cannot remember any specifics.
Mr Stevens: As a lawyer, had you worked – prior to Horizon, had you worked on any cases which involved relying on data produced by a computer to prove a fact?
Teresa Williamson: I remember a defence case where I had, involving a bookie – bookies.
Mr Stevens: So do you recall now the terms of the now repealed Section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act?
Teresa Williamson: Please remind me. It’s a long time ago.
Mr Stevens: So Section 69 – I’m paraphrasing here, but set out that, in order for a document produced by a computer to be admitted as evidence of a fact stated therein, the prosecution had to prove, amongst other things, that there were no reasonable grounds for believing that the statement was inaccurate because of improper use of the computer, or that at all material times the computer was operating properly –
Teresa Williamson: Mm.
Mr Stevens: – or there was another exception for it, if it wasn’t operating properly. Were you aware that the Post Office made submissions to the Law Commission on the proposal to repeal Section 69?
Teresa Williamson: When was that? What year?
Mr Stevens: It would have been in the – I think it’s – the late ’90s and I’ll get a specific date for you but it’s the late ’90s.
Teresa Williamson: Late ’90s?
Mr Stevens: Mm.
Teresa Williamson: I don’t know. I can’t remember, I’m sorry.
Mr Stevens: Would you remember if you’d been involved with that?
Teresa Williamson: I really don’t know. Sorry.
Mr Stevens: Do you accept that, if the Post Office had been aware of any concerns as to the integrity of Horizon data, that should have been disclosed to subpostmasters in cases where the data relied on was generated by Horizon?
Teresa Williamson: Absolutely.
Mr Stevens: Could we please bring up page 12 of your statement. Looking at the end of paragraph 26, you say:
“I recall that at the time the system was being rolled out, there was a general message within the organisation that it was a sophisticated and high-quality technology.”
Do you remember where that message came from?
Teresa Williamson: No.
Mr Stevens: The Inquiry has heard a significant amount of evidence about the difficulties faced in the rollout of the Horizon IT System from 1999 and 2000 and onwards. Were you aware of any of those difficulties?
Teresa Williamson: No.
Mr Stevens: You say in your statement that you always assumed that Horizon was reliable and was never given any reason to doubt the accuracy of the technology. You say, paragraph 28:
“I did not ever think to question the accuracy of the technology to properly understand the mechanics of the system.”
What was the basis for your reassurance, your assurance that the system was accurate?
Teresa Williamson: I can’t remember now. I guess because I personally don’t think I’d had any cases where there were any issues with the system working properly and I wasn’t aware of any cases others might have had. So I just assumed that it was working properly.
Mr Stevens: Can you recall anyone in the Criminal Law Team standing back and saying “Well, hang on, our prosecutions are now going to rely on data from this system; we need to satisfy ourselves that it’s accurate and that it produces reliable data”?
Teresa Williamson: No, I don’t remember that.
Mr Stevens: Why do you think no one asked that question within the team?
Teresa Williamson: I really don’t know. I’ve got no recollection of that.
Mr Stevens: We’ve discussed that the introduction of Horizon would lead to significant changes to the way in which prosecutions were brought. Can you recall any change – so I asked you earlier about whether there was a discussion of how prosecutions would change.
Teresa Williamson: Mm-hm.
Mr Stevens: In practice, do you recall any change in the way to which prosecutions were brought against subpostmasters for theft or false accounting, such as the type of evidence that was relied on?
Teresa Williamson: There were different schedules that would have been run off the Horizon system that became part of the evidence, yes.
Mr Stevens: Do you recall ever being involved in a case post-Horizon where the defendant alleged that the data was inaccurate – sorry, the data produced by Horizon was inaccurate?
Teresa Williamson: No, I don’t recall that.
Mr Stevens: Were you aware at all of Post Office’s contractual rights to data or information held by initially ICL Pathway or Fujitsu to support prosecutions?
Teresa Williamson: I do know that the Post Office had the right to get that information and the reason I know that, when the agreement was being negotiated, I did have a very small dealing, I think through one of my colleagues in the corporate or commercial team, of strongly recommending that there should be a clause within the agreement, saying that Post Office Legal Services or the Investigators could get access to statements and data without having to pay lots of additional money.
So I saw a very small part of – I think it was either a draft agreement or a service level agreement about that. But I didn’t see the whole agreement because it was dealt very much within who needed to know what and that was through a colleague in the Company and Commercial Team.
Mr Stevens: Can you recall the name of that colleague?
Teresa Williamson: No.
Mr Stevens: Do you recall roughly when that was?
Teresa Williamson: It would have been about the time that the agreement was being – when it was being negotiated.
Mr Stevens: You were, at that point, a senior lawyer?
Teresa Williamson: I was, yeah.
Mr Stevens: Were you the only person consulted in respect of those contractual matters in the team?
Teresa Williamson: I don’t know. But I was the person who was asked about that particular clause.
Mr Stevens: Your advice, as you said, was to ensure that data could be obtained –
Teresa Williamson: Yeah.
Mr Stevens: – without significant cost?
Teresa Williamson: Absolutely.
Mr Stevens: Did you see the final version of the agreed clause?
Teresa Williamson: I don’t know if I did or not.
Mr Stevens: So when you came to prosecute cases or when you advised on prosecutions later, was your work in understanding that you could have obtained such that from Fujitsu if necessary?
Teresa Williamson: Absolutely, 100 per cent.
Mr Stevens: Was that common knowledge within the Criminal Law Team.
Teresa Williamson: I think so, yeah. I’d be surprised if it wasn’t.
Mr Stevens: To what type of data did you understand you could access?
Teresa Williamson: I got them to draft it very broadly, so that there was anything that could ever come up in the course of a criminal prosecution. I wasn’t thinking about any particular type of data. I just wanted to – the Post Office had an open-ended way of doing this, because I couldn’t probably conceive the kind of cases at that stage that would come up in.
Mr Stevens: The Inquiry has heard evidence about audit data called ARQ data?
Teresa Williamson: Mm.
Mr Stevens: Were you aware of that type of data at the time you were involved in prosecution?
Teresa Williamson: No, I only found out about ARQ data either through reading the Computer Weekly article in 2009 or one of the cases, either the Bates case or the Hamilton case.
Mr Stevens: So presumably you didn’t obviously use this data in any of the prosecutions in which you were involved?
Teresa Williamson: No, because I didn’t know it existed until 2009.
Mr Stevens: Why do you think – as a lawyer who’d advised on to what types of data the Post Office should be entitled, can you explain or proffer a reason as to why you weren’t aware of the available of ARQ data?
Teresa Williamson: I didn’t I so I knew the types of data that – I just said everything. I requested it broadly because I didn’t know what the data was and I just wanted it to be belt and braces, that we could get anything we needed, even though I didn’t know what type of things it might be needed for. That’s just being careful, trying to get the best for your organisation.
Mr Stevens: I want to just quickly deal with training. You say that there was training available for lawyers in the Criminal Law Team but that you weren’t initially able to attend it?
Teresa Williamson: Mm.
Mr Stevens: Do you remember who in your team was responsible for overseeing your training or professional development?
Teresa Williamson: I guess two things. I think, in relation to getting your – I think it was CPD points in those days, you were personally responsible for ensuring you had all your CPD points or more. In relation to your sort of like personal development in a more general way, which could be wider than just getting your CPD points, that was between you and your team leader, your manager, and that’s something that would be looked at at appraisal time.
Mr Stevens: We know in your case you didn’t have the Horizon training?
Teresa Williamson: Yeah.
Mr Stevens: But can you recall whether or not that training was intended to be compulsory for members of the Criminal Law Team?
Teresa Williamson: I think it’s one of those things that was intended to be compulsory, if you were there, but, if you were not there for any reason, obviously it couldn’t be compulsory. And the Post Office wasn’t the kind of horrible employer that said, if that training was on that date but your child was sick or it’s a day you’re meant to be looking after your child, that you had to attend on that day. I just hoped that it would be reorganised later but I don’t remember attending it.
Mr Stevens: Do you consider it problematic to have received no training on Horizon but to then advise on prosecutions in which Horizon data was the source of evidence?
Teresa Williamson: If I’d had any opportunity to attend the Horizon training, I would have. But I can’t remember why I couldn’t. I remember feeling peeved that I couldn’t because it wasn’t on a day I could. But I’d have wanted to and I was never the kind of person who avoided training. In fact, I even went on courses on Saturdays. So I’m the kind of person who loves training and sees the benefit of it. So, if I could, I would and, sadly, I couldn’t for whatever reason. I can’t remember.
Mr Stevens: Sir, I think that’s a good time to pause, actually, before we move on to the case study.
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, by all means. Is 15 minutes sufficient for everyone?
Mr Stevens: Yes, sir, thank you.
Sir Wyn Williams: So, well, I make it 11.01 so just after 11.15, Mr Stevens, yes.
Mr Stevens: Thank you, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Fine.
(11.01 am)
(A short break)
(11.17 am)
Mr Stevens: Good morning, sir, can you see and hear me?
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, I can, thank you.
Mr Stevens: Thank you. I said we were going to go on to the case study, there’s just one point I want to clarify. In your evidence this morning, or earlier this morning, you said, “I understand there were discussions at board level about the reliability of Horizon”?
Teresa Williamson: Mm-hm.
Mr Stevens: Can I ask, when did you become aware of that?
Teresa Williamson: I think I found that out through one of the cases. I think it was either the Bates case or the Hamilton case, the transcripts.
Mr Stevens: But just to confirm, your evidence is at the time?
Teresa Williamson: Definitely at the time I did not know.
Mr Stevens: I want to turn, then, to the case study of R v Brennan. Lisa Brennan is a Core Participant in these proceedings and the Inquiry is examining it as – this prosecution as a case study. It’s the first time that the Inquiry will look at this case study and I want to turn first to the judgment of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division in the case of R v Hamilton, when Ms Brennan’s conviction was quashed. Please can I turn to POL00113278. It’s in your bundle at B36. Please can we turn to page 59, paragraph 286.
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: To introduce the case, I’m going to read a substantial portion of this, it says:
“On 4 September 2003, in the Crown Court at Liverpool before His Honour Judge Phipps and a jury, Lisa Brennan (who had become a [Post Office] counter clerk when she was 16 years old) was convicted on 27 counts of theft representing a shortfall of £3,482.40. She was acquitted on five further counts. On 6 September 2003, she was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment suspended for two years. On 11 May 2004, her appeal against conviction (on the basis of inconsistent verdicts) was dismissed. As a result of the proceedings against her, she was forced to file for bankruptcy.
“[Post Office] decided to pursue criminal charges against Ms Brennan in relation to events in 2001 – close in time to the rollout of Horizon. According to the limited available documentation, the prosecution case was that when she paid out cash for allowance and benefit vouchers, she removed more cash than was permitted by the voucher and kept the difference herself. The evidence of theft depended on the difference between the amount Horizon showed had been entered onto the system and the lesser amount of the voucher.
“Ms Brennan admitted the discrepancies. She said that they were errors on her part because of problems at home and pressures of work. She denied theft and said she did not know what had happened to the money.
“[Post Office] accepts that this was an unexplained shortfall case and that evidence from Horizon was essential to Ms Brennan’s case. Her explanation was that she must have made keystroke errors when entering voucher amounts onto Horizon. The prosecution did not consider whether a bug, error or defect could have affected this process. There is nothing to indicate that any ARQ data was obtained at the time of the criminal proceedings. There was no evidence to corroborate the Horizon evidence. The issue at trial was dishonesty but there was insufficient proof of an appropriation.”
It goes on to say that the Post Office had conceded that the prosecution was unfair for Ground 1 abuse but the Court of Appeal Criminal Division found that it was also an affront to justice, Ground 2 abuse, and public interest required the Court of Appeal to mark the latter conclusion. So the appeal was – sorry, the conviction was quashed on the basis of both Ground 1 and Ground 2 abuses.
Before I turn to look at the case, is there anything you – any reflections you have or thoughts you had arising from the decision in Hamilton.
Teresa Williamson: I think the decision was right. I’d like to take this opportunity to apologise to Lisa Brennan for being any part in the prosecution of her and for the harm it clearly has caused her, and that I’m really pleased that her conviction has been overturned, and I hope she gets the compensation she deserves. But I really didn’t know that the system was unreliable at the time that I had any part in her prosecution. But I’m still really sorry.
Mr Stevens: I want to start by looking at some of the evidence that was before the court and, if we could bring up your witness statement at paragraph 38, please. It’s page 18. So you set out at paragraph 38 what you received as a case file to do, I think, step 1, the initial review. You refer to – we don’t need to go to all these – but the memorandum by Steve Bradshaw. As we are introducing this case, can you just explain who Steve Bradshaw was?
Teresa Williamson: So Steve Bradshaw was the investigating officer in the case.
Mr Stevens: We then have Steve Bradshaw’s summary of investigation, an antecedents form, and then we have summaries of the interview and there’s two references there to which we’ll turn in a moment. If we can go over the page, please, you say:
“It was not uncommon for further summaries of the interviews to be created on the request of either the prosecution or the defence. An administrator in the Security and Investigations Team would typically listen to the tape and produce a new summary clarifying the point in question. [You] cannot recall exactly which version of these documents [you] would have reviewed in this file”, and you refer to the documents we’ll turn to in a moment.
You go on to say that a full transcript may have been available but it’s unlikely to have been provided with the case file at the time.
Teresa Williamson: Correct.
Mr Stevens: I want to start first with the full transcript – or, as it’s been put in there, the full transcript. Can we please bring up POL00047320, and that’s tab B1 in your bundle. At the top we see this is the “Record of Tape Recorded Interview”. It runs to 25 pages. This is the document I understand you say was the full transcript?
Teresa Williamson: I think so, yes. It looks like full transcript.
Mr Stevens: In metadata that has been provided by the Post Office, so data that – as to how it’s saved on an electronic document, it states that this document name was “tape transcript.1”, with the date of the document being 18 June 2002. So some – if that is accurate, some five days after the interview.
Teresa Williamson: That sounds correct. I can’t argue with that.
Mr Stevens: Can we bring up, please, POL00047322, and that’s B2 in your bundle. This document at the top says, “Summary Record of Tape Recorded Interview”. Are you familiar with this – you’re familiar with this type of document?
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: Can you just explain in summary terms how you – how the summary record of a tape recorded interview would fit into your work in reviewing the case?
Teresa Williamson: I would review whichever version of the document was in the file when the Investigator sent it to me, and what I can’t say is which version of the interview was in the file when it came to me.
Mr Stevens: This document runs to 12 pages.
Teresa Williamson: Mm-hm.
Mr Stevens: Again, in metadata provided by the Post Office, it states that the file title is “Summary Tape Transcript.1.doc” with a date of 19 June 2002. So if that’s accurate, does it seem fair to say that a transcript was made initially on 18 June and then this summary record was produced shortly afterwards?
Teresa Williamson: I really don’t know. I think the only person who can answer that question would probably be Steve Bradshaw.
Mr Stevens: That was going to be my next question: it would be Steve Bradshaw who produced this?
Teresa Williamson: I think so, or someone in their admin team. I can’t remember now whether the Investigation Officer provided – prepared any versions of the summary or whether it was all done by one of their admin people. I really don’t know what was happening at that time.
Mr Stevens: Please can we bring up POL00047521 and that’s B31 in your bundle. This is another “Summary Record of Tape Recorded Interview”, the other one to which you’ve referred. It’s shorter, at 10 pages; do you agree?
Teresa Williamson: I can count – 1, 2 – 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Yes, it’s a 10-page summary, yes.
Mr Stevens: The metadata provided by the Post Office states that the file title is “amended.summary of tape transcript 1”, with a date of 22 July 2003?
Teresa Williamson: If you tell me, yes. This means nothing to me. All I can say is I can see the three different versions of the summary of tape record interview. I don’t know which one was prepared first and in which order. All I can say is that I would have looked at the one that was in the file when I came to advise on the file, but I can give you no explanations why – which ones were prepared first and why. I haven’t got enough information to help you on that.
Mr Stevens: That document can come down for the time being.
If we assume the timeline is accurate, that timeline is accurate, and we have a summary of interview done on 19 June and then there’s an amended summary done on 22 July in the run-up to the trial, can you think of any reason why there would be a need for an amended transcript of interview in the run-up to trial – sorry, amended summary of interview in the run-up to trial?
Teresa Williamson: Usually how it worked was you’d have the shorter summary of tape record interview when you first have the file and then, frequently, the lawyer in the Criminal Law Team or certainly myself, if I felt that there was not something covered in the summary, I might go back to the investigator and say “Elaborate on this point”. Sometimes it might be prosecution counsel would ask for fuller versions and sometimes it came from the defence. But it was not uncommon for there to be different versions and I really don’t know – I can’t talk about the timeline as to the production of these summaries. I think you really have to ask Steve Bradshaw that.
Mr Stevens: Please could we look at POL00047502. It’s B19 in your bundle. This is a list of exhibits. If we could go to the bottom, please. Thank you.
Number 37, SB/12, so that’s an exhibit to Stephen Bradshaw’s statement; would you agree?
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: It says, “Typed copy of interview”.
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: Do you know – well, firstly can you recollect which – whether a summary would have been put forward to court or the full transcript would have been put forward?
Teresa Williamson: I really don’t know. If I could see the full bundle of exhibits, I’d be able to help you on that. I don’t know whether Steve Bradshaw’s statement helps. Does it say how many pages were in his summary?
Mr Stevens: We can – if you – if we take down that document. Unfortunately, we’re going to have to bring up two documents at the same time. It’s POL00047506, and that’s B23 in your bundle, and if, at the same time, we could have POL00047507. Just bear with us a moment while those documents are shown.
I’ll introduce this document whilst we’re waiting for the second page. This is an unsigned statement of Stephen Bradshaw, dated 3 March. We see on the right, that’s the first page of it. We see on left there’s another page. It appears to run together, so we see Ms Brennan explained the procedure, if an error was made, the reversal process to rectify this mistake was also explained. She did clarify if she’d paid out the amount indicated on the Horizon screen or the amount of the voucher.
At the very bottom of the – in your bundle B24, on our screens the left-hand side, POL00047507, it says that a typed copy of the interview is produced as exhibit TB/12. So that’s what –
Teresa Williamson: Exhibit SB/12. Yes, that’s his exhibit, yes.
Mr Stevens: Exhibit, yes. So you asked to see the statement?
Teresa Williamson: Yes, thank you, yes.
Mr Stevens: So we can see that.
Teresa Williamson: So he’s not saying how many pages and which version of the summary he is producing.
Mr Stevens: In terms of normal practice in the Post Office, what would you expect to be relied on the – or filed in court, the full transcript or a summary?
Teresa Williamson: It depends whether the defence had agreed a summary of tape recorded interview and, if that was agreed and a transcript wasn’t necessary – because sometimes there are things in a full transcript that both sides don’t want mentioned. So it really would depend on the case. But in terms of fairness, if the defendant wanted the whole transcript to be put in the exhibit bundle, that’s what I’d expect and, if I felt that was relevant, that’s what I’d expect.
Mr Stevens: So when you looked at these summaries, or when you had the charging decision to make, how often would you yourself request the full interview transcript, rather than the summary?
Teresa Williamson: I really can’t remember how many times I did, but I’m sure there were occasions that I did.
Mr Stevens: Would you be concerned if there was a material discrepancy between the summary prepared by an Investigator and the full transcript?
Teresa Williamson: Definitely.
Mr Stevens: Can we look at both of the summaries. I want to just compare the summaries first. So if we can again have two documents up at the same time, it’s POL00047521 and POL00047322, and it’s B31 and B2 in your bundle. If we can, please, turn to page 7 on the one ending 21, please.
Teresa Williamson: Is that B2 or –
Mr Stevens: I’m so sorry. Yes, if you can turn to page 7 in – it might be easier actually, if you remove the document from the second tab and held it next to – in B2.
Teresa Williamson: So you want me to have B31 out of the file, yes?
Mr Stevens: B31 and B2. So you can compare them together. If you can’t see them on the screen in front of you.
Teresa Williamson: Yeah, happy with that, and page 7 of which one?
Mr Stevens: So the document ending 21, if you could turn to page 7 of that, please and the document ending 22, please could we turn to page 8. So in the document ending 21, which is on the right of our screens in the hearing, if we could highlight the time counter tapes at 31.00, please. Thank you. Now, this is from the amended document and we see it says, “SB” is Mr Bradshaw:
“But don’t you think a clerk with 13 years’ experience it’s a bit … No, there’s an explanation. I’ll show you this … it’s a printout … you know the pensions go through Lisahally”, and it goes on.
In 31.00, on 22 on the left, we see there’s more text there.
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: “But don’t you think a clerk with 13 years’ experience, it’s a bit … No, there’s an explanation. I don’t think it’s just being careless and pressing the wrong key twice. It’s happening too often. I’ll show you this … it’s a printout … you know the pensions go through Lisahally to be checked and [sealed off] …”
If we look at 32.00, again, on 22 – sorry, on the left side of our screens, 22, at point in time 32.00. Mr Bradshaw is reported as saying:
“It’s not careless.”
Over the page, in the amended version at 21, the reference to Mr Bradshaw saying, “It’s not careless” isn’t there; do you accept that?
Teresa Williamson: I can see they are two different versions, yeah.
Mr Stevens: If we can turn into – we’re there, sorry. It says – actually, we can leave that there, actually.
Can I ask you this: why would those references to – well, can you think of a reason why those references to Mr Bradshaw saying “It’s not careless” be excluded from the amended interview script?
Teresa Williamson: I really can’t answer for the different versions of the tape recorded interview produced by Steve Bradshaw or the Investigation Team and I don’t know which ones that I would have seen and when, nor can I tell from what I’ve seen today which one would have been in the bundle of exhibits. But, personally, I would have expected the full version to be in the bundle of exhibits.
Mr Stevens: Do you think you would have had any involvement in – sorry, you can’t answer whether you would have given – you were involved in these actual amendments?
Teresa Williamson: I really don’t know.
Mr Stevens: If you’d been approached and asked to approve those amendments, would you have?
Teresa Williamson: Only if it was going from the shorter summary to the longer summary. I would not have approved it going the other way from the longer summary to the shorter summary. That’s not the way it usually worked. It was usually the officer trying to get away with doing the shortest summary as possible, and Legal Services coming back and saying there’s much more that should go in here.
But because I haven’t got all my advices and all the paperwork, I can’t see whether it was me who picked him up on that or whether there was some kind of quality and control within the Investigation Team. I really can’t answer that. I don’t know.
Mr Stevens: We’ll move on, then, from that. Can we leave up POL00047322, that’s B2, and can we also bring up POL00047320, which is B1, in your bundle.
Thank you. So just for the record, in the hearing room we have POL00047322 on the left and the POL00047320 on the right. On POL00047322, the left document, please can we turn to page 2. At 9.00, it says:
“It was explained to Ms Brennan why we were at the office. She was asked to explain how she would pay out a pension and allowance voucher. She demonstrated that she had the knowledge to pay out correctly and she could explain the procedure when rectifying any mistakes.”
Please can we go to page 7 on the document on the right, POL00047320 – actually, sorry, page 6, if we can start there. Thank you.
It starts at 9.00 with a discussion of annual leave and Mr Bradshaw’s recorded as saying:
“As I said to you earlier we want to talk about some pension and allowance discrepancies. Because other people have to listen to the tape can you just go through how you would pay a normal pension voucher out.”
If you can go over the page, please. Thank you. At 11.00, Mr Bradshaw says:
“Say when you’ve done this you’ve made a mistake and you [don’t] know you’ve put the wrong amount in, you may have put 2 dockets instead of 1 and you’re paying out … the machine’s showing £200 but you’ve only got £100 but the machine’s telling you to pay £200, is there a way of correcting that mistake?”
There’s a reply:
“Bin it and get the book back off them.”
Mr Bradshaw goes on to say – well, he gives an explanation of a procedure. Ms Brennan questions that and says:
“What do you mean?”
Mr Bradshaw says:
“Reversals. Do you know how to do a reversal?”
If we go over the page, please. Ms Brennan says:
“Oh yeah. What do you mean, if you’re checking the dockets and the dockets are wrong.”
Mr Bradshaw:
“Yeah, to see if the dockets are wrong. When you check your dockets and you find that one is wrong, the wrong amount …”
Ms Brennan says, “Yeah.”
Mr Bradshaw:
“… that you paid and you haven’t got … it’s gone in the machine, how would you correct that so you …”
Ms Brennan said:
“Er … go to reversals.”
Mr Bradshaw says:
“Do you know how to do a reversal?
Ms Brennan’s reply is:
“I think so, yeah. I presume I do, if I didn’t, I’d just ask someone.”
Mr Bradshaw:
“Yeah. Have you ever done one?”
Ms Brennan:
“I dunno. Probably.”
Do you think the summary fairly reflects what is said in the interview when it’s summarised by saying that Ms Brennan demonstrated that she had the knowledge to pay out correctly and she could explain the procedure when rectifying any mistakes?
Teresa Williamson: No, no.
Mr Stevens: Why wasn’t that picked up on?
Teresa Williamson: As I keep saying, I don’t know which version of the summary that I had before me when I gave the various advices and I don’t know which version of the summary made it into the exhibit-bundle. I really don’t know which versions I’ve seen and which versions I saw at which stage, and which versions made it into the exhibit bundle. I really can’t say. I don’t know.
This 20 – what, 25/26 version is obviously the better version and I would have hoped that that was the one that was put before the courts. I’m pretty sure it would have been.
Mr Stevens: Assuming the chronology, which I said earlier, that there’s a full transcript on 18 June, longer summary on 19 June 2002, and then an amended summary on 22 July 2003, in the run-up to trial, if that chronology is right, does that tell you about which one may have been more likely to –
Teresa Williamson: I’m sorry, I really cannot answer these questions. I really don’t know. The only person who would know is Steve Bradshaw.
Mr Stevens: Let’s look at the reliance on Horizon data then. Please can we look at your witness statement at paragraph 39 onwards – page 19, sorry.
That’s perfect, thank you. Let’s actually look at paragraph 40. You say:
“On review of the file, I would have noticed that the only direct evidence of a pension fraud was contained in the Horizon data discrepancies. As explained above, I had no reason to doubt the accuracy of these discrepancies.”
You go on to say:
“… initially, I did not think there was enough evidence to support the explanation for these discrepancies being that Ms Brennan had intentionally carried out a fraud.”
You set out your concerns in a memorandum to Stephen Bradshaw –
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: – which we don’t need to turn to because you say in your witness evidence at 41 that, in the memorandum, you did not request any details about whether Horizon was operating accurately:
“… because I assumed it was and Ms Brennan had not questioned the accuracy of the data in her interview. If she had, or if I had any reason to doubt the Horizon system, I would have asked for the accuracy of the data to be checked in addition to the other points raised.”
Is it fair to say, then, in order for Post Office – or in a case you were advising on, in order for you to advise the Post Office to investigate the accuracy or reliability of Horizon, it was up to the subpostmaster to raise whether the data was accurate or not?
Teresa Williamson: If I had a whiff that the system was not working reliably, I would have requested that evidence. One of the ways I might have got a whiff there was a potential issue would have been the defendant raising it as an issue. I don’t think I’d had any cases where it had been an issue, so I believed it was working properly.
Ms Brennan didn’t raise it as an issue in her interview because, if she had, I would have requested that. In any event, when it came to my advice of I think it was 13 November, I’m pretty sure that I did ask for a statement saying whether the system was operating properly and I’ve asked repeatedly for a copy of that memorandum and it’s not been disclosed to me.
Mr Stevens: Well, let’s look at that. It starts – I think it starts at paragraph 58 of your statement, page 25, please. You say:
“My advice would have included any further steps that could be carried out by investigators to improve the likelihood of conviction. For example, it appears, from question 20.3 of the Request, that I requested a witness statement confirming the accuracy of the Horizon data.”
You say something similar at paragraph 70, page 29. You say:
“In his memorandum [you’re referring to Mr Bradshaw here] dated 14 March 2003, Steve Bradshaw says ‘Concerning point 4 of your memo dated 13 November 2002. I have spoken to Sonia Cassidy at Lisahally in Northern Ireland. She informs me that this type of statement [is] not normally done and the matter has been discussed previously with Colin Justice’. I believe he is essentially saying that it has not been possible to have a witness statement drafted by a representative of the Department of Social Security … confirming the accuracy of the Horizon data, as I requested in my 13 November 2002 memorandum.”
The Department of Social Security, their involvement, as I understand it but tell me if I’m wrong, is that they would take the data from Horizon and compare it to vouchers that had been sent to them, pension vouchers, and notice if there was a discrepancy, and that’s what started the investigation.
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: But they were not responsible for the Horizon IT System; that was Fujitsu.
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: So do you accept that this point here, requesting a witness statement from the Department of Social Security, wasn’t relevant to the accuracy of the Horizon data or its reliability?
Teresa Williamson: Firstly, I’m not sure whether I just said, broadly, a statement confirming the accuracy of the Horizon data and any respects in which it was not working properly. I don’t know whether I said that or whether I specifically asked for a statement from Lisahally. I know that there is this reference here that Sonia Cassidy, having had a conversation with Colin Justice, that’s reported back by Steve Bradshaw.
But the way I looked at it was something that I would have got advice from counsel on because I’m pretty sure that post-committal, when I did my instructions to counsel to advise on the evidence in the case, if there was any evidence that I had asked the investigating officer for that he hadn’t submitted, I would have tried to get a second opinion from counsel to say, “Do we need a statement confirming the accuracy of the evidence?” And I don’t know, because I can’t see my instructions to counsel or even see my memo from 13 November, whether there was any conversation as to the best place to get that statement.
So I would love to see my memo of 13 November. I would also love to see my instructions to counsel to advise on the evidence and I would also love to see any attendance notes about the conference with counsel up in Liverpool, which I didn’t attend.
Mr Stevens: We know that there wasn’t evidence led on the integrity of the Horizon data?
Teresa Williamson: Yeah.
Mr Stevens: Your evidence is that you’d no reason to believe that there was –
Teresa Williamson: Any problems.
Mr Stevens: – any problems with it. You say that Ms Brennan didn’t raise any issues with it.
Teresa Williamson: Mm.
Mr Stevens: You’ve referred to this example here with Lisahally about whether – you know, approaching the Department of Social Security. Is your evidence that you think you likely would have sought further evidence on the accuracy of the Horizon?
Teresa Williamson: If counsel thought it was necessary.
Mr Stevens: So your evidence is that you would have asked counsel’s advice?
Teresa Williamson: Yes, definitely. Because what I did, I know that I always did, when I was doing my instructions to counsel to advise on the evidence, I would look at my original advice to the Investigating Officer and I would see whether he’d ticked all the boxes that I’d asked him to. If he hadn’t ticked all the boxes that I’d asked him to and it was something that I still personally thought was necessary, I’d get a second opinion from counsel so then I could come back to the Officer and say, “Well, counsel agrees with me, we do need this statement so please go and get it”.
Mr Stevens: We have in incomplete document base, we know that.
Teresa Williamson: We do.
Mr Stevens: On the documents you’ve seen, can you point to anything where you say, to an Investigator or otherwise, “We need evidence on the accuracy of the Horizon IT System”?
Teresa Williamson: No, because I haven’t been given the complete set of documents and my solicitors have asked for further documentation and specifically asked for these kinds of things –
Mr Stevens: Yes.
Teresa Williamson: – and they’ve not been disclosed.
Mr Stevens: But your evidence is you think –
Teresa Williamson: I’m pretty sure because that’s how I worked. I’m a real belt-and-braces girl and I’m the kind of person who would check what I originally asked for, what the investigator has provided and, if there’s any question mark, any doubt, I would have got a second opinion from counsel, and I do remember that’s how I worked. I’m quite systematic and meticulous.
Sir Wyn Williams: Just so I’m clear about this, Mrs Williamson, the way I read your paragraph 58 is that, although the documentation before you, as everyone accepts, is incomplete, your conclusion is that you did ask for a statement “confirming the accuracy of the Horizon data”.
Teresa Williamson: Yes, sir, but I don’t know whether I asked for it from Fujitsu or from Lisahally when I initially advised on 13 November.
Sir Wyn Williams: But I’d be right in thinking that you did ask for that evidence –
Teresa Williamson: Definitely.
Sir Wyn Williams: – and, so far as we can tell, it was not forthcoming; is that fair?
Teresa Williamson: It looks like it wasn’t forthcoming because there is this comment on that memo from Steve Bradshaw referring to a comment – a conversation between Sonia Cassidy and Colin Justice, to which I wasn’t party to, but I would have –
Sir Wyn Williams: Can I just –
Teresa Williamson: Sorry.
Sir Wyn Williams: On your evidence you have reached the conclusion that you did ask for the evidence and your conclusion is, based on what you have seen, that it probably wasn’t provided. Now, we can ask Mr Bradshaw about this as well. But have I fairly summarised your evidence?
Teresa Williamson: I think so, yes.
Sir Wyn Williams: Fine. Thank you.
Mr Stevens: There’s one further document I’d like to take you to on this issue. It’s in the witness list. It’s in your bundle at B21. It’s POL00047504, and page 2, please. Thank you. Witness 10 is Denise Johnston, Paid Order Unit 28 Temple Road, Lisahally, County Derry.
So it seems that you did eventually obtain some evidence from Lisahally?
Teresa Williamson: Lots of evidence from Lisahally because a lot of these witnesses are from Lisahally, all these civil servants, they are from Lisahally, particularly all the ones with Northern Ireland addresses and postcodes. And if you look at the list of exhibits, a lot of the exhibits in the cases are Lisahally producing – I think they call them 205A schedules. So if you look at all those – certainly all the 205A schedules are produced by Lisahally. I think the P2311(b)s may also be produced by Lisahally. I’m just looking at the initials of the witnesses.
Mr Stevens: We can bring it up on screen it’s POL00047502.
Teresa Williamson: Yes, so looking at all those P2311(b)s, they’re all produced by Lisahally. Mainly, by it looks like someone called Gerard Moran, and someone with a GO initial who I can’t find on the witness list. Then VL, Valerie (unclear), again she’s a civil servant and I’m pretty sure she’s from Lisahally.
Mr Stevens: So your point you’re making is there’s number of witnesses who were from Lisahally dealing with other matters –
Teresa Williamson: Yes, who were producing, in effect, schedules that they’ve printed off from the Horizon system. Yes, I think all the first 23 documents on the list of exhibits are all things that Lisahally witnesses produced.
Mr Stevens: Thank you. That document can come down. Thank you.
Very briefly on disclosure, we only have draft disclosure statements in this case. You say you would have had a role to play in reviewing those.
Teresa Williamson: Yes.
Mr Stevens: Can you summarise what that was, please?
Teresa Williamson: So usually there were to be the schedule of non-sensitive unused material, a schedule of sensitive unused material, and the Investigating Officer’s report on the unused material. All those would have been sent to me at the time the committal papers were being prepared.
So what I would have done is, my first job would have been looking at the committal papers, looking at the statements and the exhibits, firstly to satisfy myself that there was a case to answer, to go to the Crown Court. Then, having looked at that, I would then look through the schedules that the officer had prepared to make sure he had included everything on it that I was aware of. So everything that wasn’t already a statement or an exhibit, and I would also, to make sure he’d done his job properly, I would also read through the investigation officer’s file to see whether there’s any references or any documents that have not been listed as exhibits or statements or unused material.
And then, if there was anything I was aware of, I’d go back to the officer and say, “Well, you know, it’s not listed, can I have a copy of it?” and make sure it gets listed on the right schedule.
And then my next job at committal would be is there anything that undermines the prosecution case or, with reference to the interview, anything that may assist the defence?
Mr Stevens: At the time, did you think it likely that Post Office held or had access to documents that would tend to support or disprove the – sorry, support or undermine the integrity and reliability of the Horizon IT System?
Teresa Williamson: No, I didn’t, otherwise I would have asked for them.
Mr Stevens: We discussed earlier your involvement in the advising on the contract, so that the Post Office had access to Fujitsu data.
Teresa Williamson: Mm.
Mr Stevens: You presumably thought that Fujitsu would have had documentation relevant to the integrity of the Horizon system?
Teresa Williamson: If necessary, yes, yes. So that’s why I originally asked for a statement about the – whether the system was operating properly. I don’t know whether I asked for it from the right place but that’s evidence that could have been obtained if necessary.
Mr Stevens: Did you make any enquiries as to whether there were documents held by Fujitsu or Post Office that tended to support or undermine the integrity of the Horizon IT System?
Teresa Williamson: No, because I didn’t think it was necessary in this case and I thought that’s something that the Investigation Officer would do, because they gather the evidence, we advised on the evidence on the basis of the material that they disclosed to us and the information that we had, and then, obviously, the Investigation Manager, National Investigation Manager, advised whether there should be a prosecution.
Mr Stevens: Your evidence earlier in respect of getting a statement on the accuracy of the system, my understanding of that is you thought it was important or it was an option to get a statement search as that.
Teresa Williamson: I wouldn’t have asked for it if I didn’t think it was necessary.
Mr Stevens: So why didn’t you do the same for documentation?
Teresa Williamson: Which documentation?
Mr Stevens: Documents – a documentation relevant to the accuracy of the Horizon IT System?
Teresa Williamson: Because I did – I’m pretty sure I would have asked counsel whether we needed a statement from anyone else to prove the accuracy of the system and I really – because I haven’t got the rest of the documents and I wasn’t at the conference with counsel, I can only assume it wasn’t thought necessary in this particular case.
Mr Stevens: So that’s a statement – whether a statement was necessary to prove it, but, in terms of Post Office and understanding the documents to which it had access, which may support or undermine the integrity of the Horizon IT System, what, if any, queries did you make as to what Post Office or Fujitsu held in respect of that documentation?
Teresa Williamson: If you’re asking me with the benefit of hindsight, with all the documents that I now know exist which I didn’t know existed until 2009, obviously I should have requested such a statement. But, at that time, back in 2002/2003, I didn’t know that such – well, (1) I didn’t know the system was unreliable and (2) I didn’t know all these various documents existed and could be produced because, if I did, I would have asked for them.
I really didn’t know. It’s one of those things where you don’t know what you don’t know.
Mr Stevens: I took you earlier to Mr Bradshaw’s draft statement.
Teresa Williamson: Mm.
Mr Stevens: There was a brief question on that. To what extent, if at all, would you have been involved in drafting those statements?
Teresa Williamson: No, the Investigation Officer drafted his own statements and he did the statements of the witnesses together with the witness.
Mr Stevens: Please can we turn to paragraph 81 of your statement. It’s page 32. You say that:
“It is also clear that there were more structural problems with the working culture at the Post Office that prevented the open and transparent sharing of information. It was very hierarchical and there was limited communication between the different strata of the organisation. Even the Criminal Law Team adopted a culture in which we typically kept our work to ourselves and did not communicate openly as a wider team. I think this undoubtedly played a part in ensuring that the issues with Horizon were obstructed for so long.”
You refer there to the more structural problems with the working culture at the Post Office, could you just expand on what those structural problems were?
Teresa Williamson: Okay, so I’ll start at the top, so say, for example, the Post Office Board. The Post Office Board, from what I’ve read in the various judgments, clearly knew there were problems with the Horizon system, and that information was not shared further down to the ordinary lawyers within the Criminal Law Team.
Then you look at other people high up within the Post Office, some of whom you may have heard from giving evidence – I don’t know because I haven’t been reading the evidence – but I can see from the various transcripts and summaries, and also from the 2009 Computer Weekly article, that there were people high up in the Post Office who did know things. And again, that was not shared with the Criminal Law Team.
Then I think about people within Legal Services as a whole. So, say, for example, people in the Company and Commercial Teams would not have shared information, unless it was necessary, with people in the Criminal Law Team. And then right at the bottom, in Legal Services, were the Criminal Law Team because, as usual, criminal lawyers are kind of looked down on by other lawyers within the department.
Very little was shared with us, unless they wanted our help on say, for example, me helping them with that little section of the agreement about being able to get statements and not being charged too much.
And then, with our own team, it just wasn’t something that happened. We didn’t sit down and have discussions on cases and general issues. It’s something that did happen in the Employment Law Team. We used to have a sort of like a weekly one-to-one on a Monday morning where people did raise cases and did raise issues, but that’s not something I remember happening in the Criminal Law Team. It was very different.
Mr Stevens: Thank you, sir. That concludes my questions. Unless you have any questions first, I can see if any of the Core Participants have any.
Sir Wyn Williams: No, I don’t have any.
Mr Stevens: It’s a nil return in here, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Right.
Well, I’d like to thank you very much, Mrs Williamson, for first of all making a detailed statement and, indeed, for pointing out that documentation in relation to aspects of your evidence is incomplete. I’m not saying that we will find that additional documentation, but we’ll certainly do our best to try to locate it if we can, even at this late stage.
I’d like to thank you too for answering all the questions that you have this morning.
So I think that concludes today’s proceedings, yes, Mr Stevens?
Mr Stevens: That’s correct, sir, and we’re back on Friday at 10.00.
Sir Wyn Williams: All right then. So I’ll see everyone then. Bye.
Mr Stevens: Thank you, sir.
(12.17 pm)
(The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am on Friday, 10 November)