26 January 2024 – Suzanne Winter
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(10.29 am)
Ms Price: Good morning, sir, can you see and hear us?
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, I can, thank you very much.
Witness statement of James McLernon adduced
Ms Price: Sir, before we turn to Ms Winter’s evidence, could I deal, please, with the witness statement of James McLernon, who is a Principal Public Prosecutor in the High Court and International Section of the Public Prosecution Service in Northern Ireland. For the transcript, his statement can be found at WITN10280100. There is no need to bring that up on screen but I can confirm, sir, that that witness statement has been disclosed to Core Participants.
Mr McLernon’s evidence is relevant predominantly to Phase 4 but the final three paragraphs are relevant to Phase 5 of the Inquiry. For the purposes of Phase 4, can I please indicate that paragraphs 1 to 30 are to be treated as read into the Inquiry’s record, although I do not intend to read the contents of those paragraphs out now. As a result, this evidence may be taken into account by you in due course, even though it has not been subject of oral evidence during Phase 4.
As for the remaining paragraphs in Mr McLernon’s witness statement, namely paragraphs 31 to 33, these will either be the subject of oral evidence or read into the record in Phase 5. I should also confirm that this witness statement will be published in its entirety on the Inquiry’s website after today’s hearing.
Sir Wyn Williams: Thank you very much.
Ms Price: May we proceed, then, please, to call Ms Winter.
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, of course.
Ms Price: As you know, sir, Ms Winter appears remotely following your grant of permission for her to do so.
Suzanne Winter
SUZANNE WINTER (sworn).
Questioned by Ms Price
Ms Price: Good morning, Ms Winter. Thank you for appearing this morning to assist the Inquiry in its work. As you know, I will be asking you questions on behalf of the Inquiry. You should have hard copy of a witness statement in your name, dated 2 January 2024, in front of you; do you have that?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, I have.
Ms Price: Could you turn, please, to page 40 of that statement?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Do you have a copy with a visible signature?
Suzanne Winter: I have.
Ms Price: Is that your signature?
Suzanne Winter: It is.
Ms Price: Are the contents of your statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
Suzanne Winter: They are.
Ms Price: For the purposes of the transcript, the reference for Ms Winter’s statement is WITN10400100. Ms Winter, I will not be asking you about every aspect of the witness statement you have provided, which will be published on the Inquiry website in due course. I will instead be asking you about certain specific issues which are addressed in it.
Suzanne Winter: That’s right. That’s okay.
Ms Price: Starting, please, with the roles you have held with the Post Office, you started work as a counter assistant in a sub post office in Randalstown in Northern Ireland in 1973; is that right?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: In 1976 you gained employment in a Crown Office branch working on the counter?
Suzanne Winter: That’s right.
Ms Price: After two years you progressed to a Secure Area role; is that right?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Then you held various roles over a period, including an Auditor role and a Sales Manager role; is that right?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Until, in around 1997 or 1998, you were successful in applying for a role with the Royal Mail Security team as an Investigator; is that right?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, it would have been maybe just slightly before then but yes.
Ms Price: You say slightly before. In your statement you said 1997 or 1998. Do you think it was a little earlier?
Suzanne Winter: That’s right. No, you’re right.
Ms Price: Is it right that that role involved detecting external offences against Royal Mail rather than investigating suspected offences committed internally by Royal Mail agents or employees?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, it was Royal Mail and it was investigating theft in the post or birthday cards.
Ms Price: You then moved in 2001, after a business reorganisation, to Post Office Limited based in Belfast as an Investigations Manager in the Post Office Security Team; is that right?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: At that stage, is it right that your role was limited to investigations of internal suspected offences against the Post Office?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: But, after a further reorganisation of the business, your role expanded also to cover physical security, robberies, burglaries, and the like; is that right?
Suzanne Winter: That’s right.
Ms Price: You do not provide a date for this change to your role in the statement. We have heard from another witness that the expansion of the Investigator role to include physical security occurred as a result of a reorganisation which took place in around 2011. Does that sound about right to you or not?
Suzanne Winter: That would have been about right, yes.
Ms Price: Is it right that you remained in the Investigation Team until you left the Post Office in December 2014, having taken voluntary redundancy?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Were you based in Northern Ireland for the whole of your career with the Post Office?
Suzanne Winter: I was.
Ms Price: I would like to turn, please, to your Investigator training. Should we take it from the career history set out in your statement that you did not have any experience of criminal investigation or criminal law when you first became a Royal Mail Investigator?
Suzanne Winter: That’s right.
Ms Price: In terms of the initial training that you had when you became a Royal Mail Investigator, you say at paragraph 8 of your statement that you were given three weeks of training in the Royal Mail training school in Milton Keynes; is that right?
Suzanne Winter: That’s right.
Ms Price: Which you say covered all aspects of the role, including witness statement taking, analysing data, interviewing suspects, PACE, risk assessments and surveillance. When you refer to analysing data, what kind of data do you mean, bearing in mind this is the initial training in ‘97 or ‘98?
Suzanne Winter: With Royal Mail Investigation, you would be analysing data of lost mail, customers that have reported losing mail during the course of its – in the Royal Mail centre; you would be looking at access records, who has access to mail, absence records; and you would be following from the time that the letter or the item was posted until it disappeared.
Ms Price: You also received training when you moved to become an Investigator with the Post Office in 2001, didn’t you?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: You say at paragraph 9 of your statement that training was at the training college in Milton Keynes and also lasted three weeks?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: In addition to the topics you identified from your Royal Mail training, you say in your statement that the training in 2001 covered working on the Horizon system?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Can you help with what the training on working on the Horizon system consisted of, please?
Suzanne Winter: I remember getting Horizon training whenever we were on the training course and also whenever I came back to Belfast. I sat in – my office was beside the training school and I arranged for me to sit in whenever subpostmasters were being trained for me to sit in with the school and be trained as well.
Ms Price: So your training was on using the Horizon system; is that right?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: As opposed to analysing any data from that system?
Suzanne Winter: That’s right.
Ms Price: You refer at paragraph 9 of your statement to the 2001 training, including data analysis. What sort of data were you trained to analyse on that initial three-week training?
Suzanne Winter: On the initial three-week training that was really actually maybe using the system. I did more analytic work whenever I came back to Belfast and in the training school, and that’s whenever I did some more of analysis because I was with the trainers and they would answer my queries or explain to me how to read the data that you’re getting from the system.
Ms Price: What were you taught to look for in the data?
Suzanne Winter: In the data, you would look for whenever cash declarations are made, you would look for user IDs, you would look for the transactions that the customers have said had taken place and you would be taught on the different codes within the Horizon system.
Ms Price: What was the purpose of the data analysis you were being taught about?
Suzanne Winter: Really it was to learn how the system worked and, for instance, how one transaction can be different and shown differently on the computer system as another transaction. You could see how Branch Trading Statements were done at the end of the accounting week.
Ms Price: Were you taught how to look in Horizon data for errors made by the system?
Suzanne Winter: No.
Ms Price: Were you trained on the audit data which was available on request from Fujitsu, over and above the data which was available to be printed from a counter in branch?
Suzanne Winter: You could read to it a certain extent. Did you mean the ARQ, the data?
Ms Price: Yes. I am asking though, in terms of your training, whether you were trained on that audit data, the ARQ request data from Fujitsu?
Suzanne Winter: Not on that training.
Ms Price: Were you trained later on that?
Suzanne Winter: Later, as you worked within the office and worked with Horizon, you came aware of some data that would be on it but in no way would I be an expert on it.
Ms Price: Were you given any guidance at your initial training in 2001 on the circumstances in which audit data should be requested from Fujitsu?
Suzanne Winter: In that initial training, no. You were not told how to get any information from Fujitsu, because you were told that the system was 100 per cent reliable.
Ms Price: Who told you that, that the system was 100 per cent reliable?
Suzanne Winter: Whenever you were at the training college.
Ms Price: You have referred in your statement to being told on initial training that the system was completely reliable. So focusing for now in 2001, who was delivering that message then?
Suzanne Winter: That would have been the training school in Milton Keynes.
Ms Price: Were these Royal Mail trainers?
Suzanne Winter: Post Office.
Ms Price: Post Office trainers. Was there anyone from Fujitsu at that initial training delivering that message?
Suzanne Winter: No.
Ms Price: When you had your training on the Horizon system, was there anyone from Fujitsu delivering that message that Horizon was completely reliable?
Suzanne Winter: No.
Ms Price: Another topic you list as having been covered in 2001 was full disclosure. Did the training on this include you being told that, where you were the Lead Investigator in a case, you would also usually be the Disclosure Officer in the case?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Were you made aware that this was a distinct role, held over and above your role as an Investigator, which carried with it distinct duties?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Do you recall being told what those distinct duties on a Disclosure Officer were?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Do you recall being told about the duties and responsibilities on Investigators and Disclosure Officers under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and its associated Codes of Practice?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Do you recall being told about the duty on all Investigators to pursue all reasonable lines of investigation, whether they led towards or away from the guilty of the suspect?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, I do recall.
Ms Price: Do you recall being told about the duty to record, retain and review all material collected or generated during an investigation so that it could be considered for disclosure?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Do you recall being told of the need to draw any unused material capable of undermining the prosecution case or assisting the defence case to the attention of the reviewing lawyer?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, I do.
Ms Price: Were you made aware that the duty to follow lines of inquiry, which led away as well as towards the guilt of a suspect, extended to material in the hands of a third party, for example Fujitsu?
Suzanne Winter: Sorry, could you repeat that question again?
Ms Price: Of course. So the duty to follow lines of inquiry which led away from as well as towards the guilt of a suspect, were you told that that duty extended to material in the hands of a third party, for example, Fujitsu?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Was any part of the training delivered in 2001 delivered by lawyers, as opposed to Post Office trainers?
Suzanne Winter: In 2001, yes, there was training in Milton Keynes by lawyers.
Ms Price: Which aspects of the training were delivered by lawyers?
Suzanne Winter: It was Post Office lawyers and it was with regard to committal papers going to court, and attending court, and the legal side of the system.
Ms Price: Was that the Criminal Law Team from Royal Mail?
Suzanne Winter: It was.
Ms Price: You travelled to Milton Keynes for your Royal Mail and Post Office Investigator training. Did this training covering the criminal law or procedure in Northern Ireland at all?
Suzanne Winter: I would have to say not really.
Ms Price: Is it right that you attended search training both when you became an Investigator with Royal Mail and when you became a Post Office Investigator in 2001?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, I did.
Ms Price: That was provided by Thames Valley Police on both occasions?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, it was.
Ms Price: What were you told on that training about the basis for the Post Office conducting searches as part of their investigations?
Suzanne Winter: For conducting a search, you needed to have sufficient people doing the search: you had a notetaker, you had the person that was – maybe two people doing the search. So after an incident in 2000, where one of the Post Office Investigators was shot and killed, we had to have an additional person during the search for health and safety.
Ms Price: In terms of the basis for conducting searches, though, what were you told about the grounds on which the Post Office could search premises, for example?
Suzanne Winter: You could only search premises with the person’s permission. It was a voluntary search, the same as for a vehicle.
Ms Price: Is it right that after your training in 2001 you were mentored by – you refer to him as Les Thorpe – for six months, and he was your line manager?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, that’s right.
Ms Price: Did he give you any guidance on lines of inquiry or disclosure while he was mentoring you?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, he did.
Ms Price: What did he tell you?
Suzanne Winter: He had been an Investigator, I think, for some time and Les would have mentored me to ensure that you completed the relevant documents, that you were putting forward all evidence that you had and that the different enquiries that you possibly had to make to make sure you had done the job as best you could.
Ms Price: At paragraph 27 of your statement, you refer to there being subsequent workshops and refresher training after your initial training, when there were significant changes to legislation, or working arrangements within the Casework Team. How often did workshops or refresher training take place; can you recall?
Suzanne Winter: I don’t recall a lot of workshops/refresher training. You’re maybe talking maybe once every six months or – I don’t recall a lot of it. It would be if there was some changes, perhaps, within the policies.
Ms Price: Do you recall who provided this training?
Suzanne Winter: The training was usually done by, possibly, Senior Managers, whenever you went to a workshop.
Ms Price: Can you recall an example of a significant change to legislation that prompted a workshop or refresher training?
Suzanne Winter: I’m sorry, I can’t recall.
Ms Price: Was there any Northern Irish specific training given to you, as an Investigator, by the Post Office?
Suzanne Winter: No.
Ms Price: Turning, please, to policy and guidance, how would you access Northern Irish legislation or Codes of Practice if you needed to refer to them?
Suzanne Winter: I would have liaised with the police.
Ms Price: Could we have paragraph 15 of Ms Winter’s statement on screen, please. It is page 11 of WITN10400100. Page 11, please. Scrolling down, please, to paragraph 15, you say here:
“Any legislation, policies or guidance governing the conduct of investigations conducted by the Security Team during my period of working within that team, if relevant, would have been communicated usually by Policy and Standards or the Casework Team. From my recollection a different caution was issued in Northern Ireland and the Police and Criminal Codes of Practice in Northern Ireland were followed rather than their England and Wales equivalent. The correct routines for [Northern Ireland] were applied. Different, [Northern Ireland] specific, forms would also be used when conducting a formal interview.”
Was this communication of legislation, policy or guidance communication of new or amended legislation, policy or guidance?
Suzanne Winter: This was our guidance for Northern Ireland. Whenever I went to the training college, they would have been training everyone on England and Wales, and then usually, as an afterthought, they would have said, “Oh by the way, it’s a different (unclear) within Northern Ireland, you have to use different forms in Northern Ireland”, so my job was always to make sure that those correct forms were used.
Ms Price: What was the method of communication by Policy and Standards or the Casework Team?
Suzanne Winter: With the Policy and Standards, they would have issued new policies and, again, it most likely would have had above it “This applies to England and Wales”, and then usually at the bottom paragraph it would maybe say – for Scottish law there would be one line and for Northern Ireland law another line, so sometimes, usually, you had to go and look in Policy and Standards where – you could get it on the computer, Policy and Standards but I usually always checked again with the police.
Ms Price: In a more practical sense, how were these documents sent to you or were they simply on the system?
Suzanne Winter: They would be sent to you as the policies changed, and maybe would be discussed, depending on what the policy was, whenever you were having a team meeting. But then you were told they would be on the – on the computer where you could go into the program and look at the new policies.
Ms Price: Was that something that all Investigators had access to?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Taking an example of a policy document covering investigation procedures specific to Northern Ireland, could we have on screen, please, POL00039952. This document is dated November 2002 and appears to be an appendix to an investigation policy applicable to investigations in Northern Ireland. The title is “Notes of interview, Northern Ireland”.
Did you recognise this document when it was sent to you by the Inquiry?
Suzanne Winter: I do recognise that document.
Ms Price: Is that the sort of document which would be sent to you by Policy and Standards or Casework?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, paragraph 28 of Ms Winter’s statement. It is page 17 of that statement. At paragraph 28 you say this:
“To assist with Northern Ireland law, I would have taken advice from PSNI …”
Is that Police Service Northern Ireland?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: “… or PPS.”
Is that the Public Prosecution Service?
Suzanne Winter: That’s right.
Ms Price: “There would be circumstances where information would be sought from third parties who might hold relevant evidence where shortfalls were identified in branch, eg the Paid Order Unit. In [Northern Ireland] the various departments were relatively small and we maintained close contact.”
First of all, when you refer to the various departments, do you mean the PSNI and the PPS?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, that would be for the Northern Ireland law.
Ms Price: So the various departments that were relatively small and you maintained close contact with, that was departments within the PSNI and the PPS?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, that’s right.
Ms Price: How small were the departments you were dealing with?
Suzanne Winter: The PSNI would have been the fraud branch in Belfast and the PPS was The Crown Prosecution office in Belfast.
Ms Price: In terms of the size of your own team, you say in paragraph 9 of your statement that, although you had the grade of a manager, you did not have anyone working to you, so you were effectively a one-person department. Was it the case that, throughout the time you were a Post Office Investigator in Northern Ireland, you were a one-person department, or did that change?
Suzanne Winter: No, it was always a one-person department. You didn’t have staff. It was just a title.
Ms Price: Should we take it from this and this paragraph here, 28, that any specific guidance you needed on Northern Irish law or procedure came from the Police Service Northern Ireland or the Public Prosecution Service, rather than the Post Office?
Suzanne Winter: Mainly from the police and from the Crown Prosecution Service. There was a few cases where I was maybe involved in England, and that would have come underneath the Post Office Criminal Law Team.
Ms Price: The reference here to third parties who might hold relevant evidence, you give an example of the Paid Order Unit; what was that?
Suzanne Winter: The Paid Order Unit was a unit in Lisahally in Derry, Londonderry, and it’s where paid pension foils were sent from all the post offices, and they were accumulated in the Paid Order Unit in Lisahally.
Ms Price: You don’t list there Fujitsu as a third party who might hold relevant evidence where shortfalls were identified. Is that because Fujitsu did not spring to mind as someone you would approach in those circumstances?
Suzanne Winter: Not in those circumstances and I never had direct contact with Fujitsu, whereas the likes of the Paid Order Unit, I had direct contact.
Ms Price: I’d like to turn, please, to your role as an Investigator. Could we go to page 5 of this statement, please. Towards the bottom of the page, paragraph 11. About three lines down, you say:
“As an Investigator my role was to interview Post Office employees and agents who were suspected of, or had admitted to, committing a criminal offence and to ascertain the facts in the inquiry.”
You deal with an Investigator’s involvement when a branch was being audited at paragraph 20 of your statement, that’s page 13, please. Four lines up from the bottom there, you say:
“The Investigator’s role on attendance would be to introduce themselves, their Second Officer and the Audit Team. They would explain why they were visiting the office, issue a caution, advise the person of their legal rights and Post Office Friend Rule, make a notebook entry recording that. The Investigator would remain on site and await the final outcome of the audit and report to the Contracts Manager and to the line manager. If there was no reasonable explanation for a loss identified the Investigator would remind the person they were still under caution and invite them for a formal interview.”
In terms of how a suspicion of the commission of a criminal offence was established, so as to prompt formal interview, was it the case that anyone experiencing an unexplained shortfall in a branch was considered a suspect?
Suzanne Winter: No.
Ms Price: So that’s not what you mean when you say “When there was no reasonable explanation for a loss identified, the Investigator would remind the person they were still under caution and invite them for a formal interview”?
Suzanne Winter: Not everyone would be asked. It would not be everyone that you would ask to send for an interview. It would depend on the outcome of the audit.
Ms Price: But if there was an apparent shortfall and it was unexplained, in the sense that no reasonable explanation had been given, it seems to be your evidence here that that prompts suspicion –
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: – suspicion that prompts a formal interview; is that right?
Suzanne Winter: That would prompt, and the interview is voluntary.
Ms Price: You have said in your evidence this morning that you were aware of the obligation on an Investigator to pursue lines of inquiry pointing away from, as well as towards, the guilt of a suspect. Did you ever consider that that obligation required you to get to the bottom of a shortfall or an apparent shortfall, in other words to pinpoint the point at which loss occurred, and to demonstrate an actual loss?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Did you always do that, try to get to the bottom of a shortfall and pinpoint an actual loss?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, I absolutely did.
Ms Price: So, as far as you’re concerned, in all your cases you established an actual loss; is that what you’re telling us?
Suzanne Winter: No, not establish an actual loss. I would have done my best, to the best of my ability, to establish where this loss happened and how it happened and to explain where it had gone.
Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, POL00105025. This is document is the individualised objectives for Security Team members for 2013 to 2014. The objectives for you are set out at pages 136 to 139. Could we have page 136 on screen first, please. We can see here your name and the first two boxes on this page refer to core behaviours. Then over the page to 137, please. This objective is set out:
“To ensure a robust approach to fraud loss recovery with a return rate of 65%.
“Activity to include:
“Ensure that evidence opportunities are maximised through stakeholder engagement, technical elements of enquiries are effectively deployed – [searches persons/premises]
“Ensuring full engagement with FIs …”
Is that Financial Investigators?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: “… and police contacts, optimising POCA powers to achieve maximum possible recovery (eg monetary recovery/asset recognition).
“Ensure all intervention measures are adopted to recover stolen funds.”
Is it right that, as an Investigator, you were set a target for the recovery of money from those who were being investigated?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, that 65 per cent rate was for fraud loss recovery. The senior team in the Security were always trying to get as much money back as they possibly could. 65 per cent was for fraud loss.
Whenever – just to explain, whenever an investigation starts, it’s two pronged. You have the criminal investigation, which I would have investigated in Northern Ireland, and then you would have had the Contracts team. Now, with the criminal investigation, I would have performed my duties to look into all the loss, conduct the inquiry and you are always asking – we were told every time you interview someone, you had to ask them could they repay the money?
If at that stage the criminal investigation is not going any further, that is closed down. But the Contracts team, they remain continuing and they will ask for the money back. So you will have a situation where I’ve investigated a case but it hasn’t gone for prosecution, but it’s the Contracts team that are asking for the money back.
Ms Price: The target was, by this point, 65 per cent. Had there been a different, lower target in earlier years; do you recall?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, I do believe there was and it was maybe the last three or four years, there was more pressure put on everyone by the senior team to increase this figure.
Ms Price: Do you recall the reason for the increase?
Suzanne Winter: I don’t think they gave a particular reason to us, as a Security Team. We just felt there was more pressure put on you. You have to understand also that all of these objectives, that 65 per cent was just a small part of what you had to achieve: you were targeted in everything that you did, you were marked on everything that you did and you were spoken with at the end of every month if you were not meeting the standards that they required.
Ms Price: Did those standards include there being a certain number of investigations or level of investigations that you were pursuing?
Suzanne Winter: No, because you couldn’t – it just depended on the information that you’d got or investigations. In Northern Ireland, you could maybe just have two investigations going or you might have five investigations going. That would – you had no control over that, over that figure. You didn’t have any control over that.
Ms Price: Was your – I’m sorry, please go ahead.
Suzanne Winter: I could be investigating a case and it’s not criminal, I feel there’s no information there, there isn’t sufficient information to say it was any criminal activity, so then that would go straight back to the Contracts team and they would then be involved. I would have no involvement. They were completely two different areas: Contracts and Criminal Investigations.
Ms Price: Was your performance measured, at least in part, against your recovery target, and here that being 65 per cent?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: What happened if you didn’t meet that target?
Suzanne Winter: You – you just didn’t meet that target. You would maybe be trying to increase your figures on other parts of the objectives where you are being proactive in educating people on having good security within their post office and making sure they have all their procedures in place.
Ms Price: Was meeting this target rewarded in any way by the Post Office?
Suzanne Winter: I don’t think it was. You were given a mark, it was like an appraisal mark and, depending on how well you had done in these objectives, you were marked from 1 up to 5.
Ms Price: Was this a target which was set for all Post Office Investigators?
Suzanne Winter: Yes. I believe it was. I would not have seen – those objectives that you’re showing on the screen were my own personal objectives and, once you were given them, then they were most likely put on the computer, as you’ve done here today, and we could see then everybody else’s. But, I mean, I didn’t go looking to see “Oh what is everybody else doing?” I was just concerned with what I had been targeted to.
Ms Price: Do you think that this target ever influenced the conduct of investigations you were charged with?
Suzanne Winter: No.
Ms Price: Looking, please, to the first bullet point in that box, what did it mean in practice to maximise evidence opportunities?
Suzanne Winter: You ensured that any evidence that you had, that was available, that you had been sure to go down that road of every enquiry to make sure all the stakeholders – you’d spoken to the stakeholders, you knew what was involved and that you hadn’t left really any stone unturned.
Ms Price: Thank you. That document can come down now, please.
Being a one-person department, what supervision was there over your cases?
Suzanne Winter: I would have had daily contact with – originally, it was Les Thorpe – with my manager. You ensured that you spoke with the each other at least every couple of days, and then you had one-to-one meetings every month. My line manager would have flown over to Belfast and we would have had one-to-one meetings. Then you would have had a team meeting. Team meetings, again, would have most likely been once a month, where I would have flown over to London or Manchester or Glasgow.
Ms Price: Did you discuss the issues which arose in your cases with other Investigators in other parts of the United Kingdom?
Suzanne Winter: No.
Ms Price: Do you think you would have benefited from the opportunity to be able to do so?
Suzanne Winter: I do.
Ms Price: Turning, please, to the process for criminal investigation and prosecution of Post Office agents, their staff and Post Office employees in Northern Ireland, could we have on screen, please, paragraph 23 of Ms Winter’s statement, that is page 15. You say here at paragraph 23:
“Following an investigation in Northern Ireland a suspect offender file would be prepared and forwarded to Head of Security for any recommendations. They would review the information available and make any decisions. The decision would be communicated to the Casework Manager and the file would then be returned to me.”
Pausing there, so is it right that, before a case would be put forward to the prosecution decision maker, the Head of Security had to sign off on that course?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: In Northern Ireland, was there any input into the decision on whether to refer a case to the prosecution decision maker from the Royal Mail, or later Post Office, Criminal Law Team?
Suzanne Winter: No.
Sir Wyn Williams: When you say, “Head of Security”, just so that I’m clear, do you mean by that the Head of the Security Team for the UK or do you mean someone in Northern Ireland?
Suzanne Winter: It would have been the Head of Security for the UK, I remember John Scott.
Sir Wyn Williams: Thank you, yes.
Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, paragraph 39 of Ms Winter’s statement, that is page 21. At paragraph 39 you say this:
“When I joined the Post Office Security Team there was no internal prosecution process in place as Northern Ireland has its own courts and system. As I had worked in Royal Mail Security previously and cases were handed to the police, a similar process was put in place for Post Office Investigations. I worked with the Post Office Security Team, Post Office Legal team, PSNI, [that’s Police Service Northern Ireland] and the Public Prosecution Office to develop and agree a Memorandum of Understanding on how to progress suspect offender files through the courts.”
The work you refer to here, to put in place a Memorandum of Understanding was that first done in 2001 when you first joined the Post Office Security Team?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: You refer here to the Public Prosecution Office. It is the Inquiry’s understanding that in 2001, criminal cases were prosecuted by the Department of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Public Prosecutions Service having been established later, in around 2005. Does that accord with your understanding?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, that would be right.
Ms Price: So is your reference here to the Public Prosecutions Office a reference to the Department of the Director of Public Prosecutions in 2001?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Can you help with how cases which were investigated by the Post Office in Northern Ireland were progressed to the DPP before you helped to put in place the process you have outlined here?
Suzanne Winter: There was no process in place whenever I took the post of an Investigator in Northern Ireland for prosecutions.
Ms Price: Who, from the Post Office Legal team, did you work with on the development of a Memorandum of Understanding?
Suzanne Winter: I didn’t work with anyone of the Post Office Legal team.
Ms Price: Well, you say here:
“I worked with the Post Office Security Team, Post Office Legal Team, PSNI and the Public Prosecution Office to develop and agree a Memorandum of Understanding …”
So I’m asking who from the Post Office Legal team you worked with to do that?
Suzanne Winter: I wouldn’t have actually worked with them; they would have been involved – whenever I say “worked with”, they would have been involved in my taking part in agreeing the Memorandum of Understanding, really just to let them know what was happening. They would not have given advice because it was for Northern Ireland law but it was to keep them posted and they were involved in what I was doing because I just couldn’t go and do whatever I wanted. I needed to let them know I was involved in this process.
Ms Price: I see. The Inquiry has been unable to locate a copy of any written Memorandum of Understanding dating to the time you joined the Post Office Security Team. Can you help with whether this Memorandum of Understanding was formally committed to a written agreement or whether it was instead agreed more informally?
Suzanne Winter: It had to be a written agreement because it was stated down how the file would be progressed and, before that written agreement was made, there was meetings with the police and with the Director of Public Prosecutions and with the a Senior Manager from the Post Office and myself. And then the Memorandum of Understanding was signed off by the Chief Superintendent and a copy was kept in Belfast of that Memorandum.
Ms Price: In terms of what was agreed and the process which was put in place, you deal with this at paragraph 41, which is on towards the bottom of this page of the statement. But you have also provided a slightly more detailed account at paragraph 23 of the statement, and I’d like to look at that, please.
Could we have page 15. We looked at the start of this paragraph earlier, picking up from five lines down:
“Once the Casework Manager authorised progression of the file I produced an Evidential Report and handed it to the PSNI. The PSNI would consider the material and discuss the Report with me, if any additional material would be required and how to set out and produce a prosecution file for progression to the Public Prosecution Service. This was the process put in place by me after I joint the Security Team.”
So this process required you to send an evidential report to the PSNI; is that right?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Then they would consider it and discuss with you any additional material required?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Did the investigation remain a Post Office investigation, even after an evidential report had been sent to the police?
Suzanne Winter: Once I had handed it into the police, the police then allocated the case to a police officer and then the police officer would have liaised with myself regarding any further information.
Ms Price: But, in terms of ownership, did that become a police investigation or did it remain a Post Office investigation?
Suzanne Winter: In a way, we both dealt with it. The police – they would have interviewed the person involved, as well. They then took it on as a police case. If they needed information or additional disclosure of what they wanted, they would have come back to me and asked for it.
Ms Price: Was this, therefore, the police advising the Post Office on what steps they needed to take for the case to be ready for presentation to the prosecution decision maker?
Suzanne Winter: Yes. The police looked through the file and, if they felt there was more information needed, or they guided me on how I should word certain documents, and how I should present the file, so as it was easily read by the Public Prosecution Service.
Ms Price: You’ve referred to the police asking for additional material. Did the PSNI ever recommend that you follow further lines of inquiry?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, they did.
Ms Price: Can you recall what type of further inquiries the PSNI recommended you make?
Suzanne Winter: With regard to – for instance, we mentioned the Paid Order Unit in Lisahally, they advised me with cases involving the people – you need statements from every person for continuity of evidence, you need to go to the beginning of the evidence and follow it through with your statements. So, sometimes, there was quite a lot of statements you needed to take from the Paid Order Unit.
With regard to Fujitsu, they always asked for a statement from Fujitsu to say that the Horizon was completely reliable, as what we had always been told.
Ms Price: We’ll come on to liaison with Fujitsu in Northern Ireland in due course but, in a case where the Horizon system was showing a shortfall in a branch, do you recall the PSNI ever saying that further evidence or enquiries needed to be made to evidence an actual loss suffered by the Post Office?
Suzanne Winter: I can’t recall because you’re trying to have all the evidence that you feel the police will need, but the police always asked for a statement. Because we were dealing with a computer, the police always said “You need to have a statement to say that this computer is working correctly and reliable”.
I have to say whenever I first put my first prosecution and I requested this statement from Fujitsu, you have to go through the Casework Team and I can recall, I feel, that they didn’t have such a statement, and it took me some time to get the statement through to say that Fujitsu were prepared to put all the information onto a statement.
Ms Price: Should we take the reference here to the Public Prosecution Service to be a reference to the DPP for the period pre the establishment of the PPS?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Who would produce the report for the DPP and later the PPS: you or the PSNI?
Suzanne Winter: The PSNI would have looked at the information I had given and that would go to the DPP, as well as a report from the police, because I am just putting forward the information. The police then look at that information and then they put it forward to the Public Prosecution Service, and it is the Public Prosecution Service or the DPP that authorised any prosecutions.
Ms Price: You say in the next line in this paragraph, after where we left off, after Security Team, that this process developed and changed over the years. Before we come on to the example you give here of a change to the process, I’d like to ask you, please, about a report of the Chief Inspector of Criminal Justice in Northern Ireland, from July 2008. Could we have this up on screen, please, the reference is POL00121607.
The quality of the front page is not terribly good but, if we turn to page 2 of this document, we can see the title more clearly, the title is “Royal Mail Group, An Inspection of the Royal Mail Group Crime Investigations Function”, it is dated July 2008.
Turning over the page, please, and there’s a blank page there, so one more page, please – apologies, if we can go to page 6, we have here the “Chief Inspector’s Foreword” and, scrolling down, please, this is signed by Kit Chivers, the Chief Inspector of Criminal Justice in Northern Ireland. There is a logo towards the bottom of the page, “Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland, a better justice system for all”; can you help with what body this logo is referring to?
Suzanne Winter: No.
Ms Price: Does it follow that you can’t assist with what its function was?
Suzanne Winter: Well, the criminal justice system was an independent inspectorate in Northern Ireland of the justice system, and to ensure that all standards are 100 per cent.
Ms Price: How does the Chief Inspector who wrote the foreword fit in with that?
Suzanne Winter: Well, in Northern Ireland anything involved with the criminal system, they’re always audited, and I think it was our time in Royal Mail and it was Royal Mail in Belfast – I remember the inspection and it was Royal Mail Investigators, Post Office Limited Investigators, and we had to produce all our case files and any information that the Auditor wished to see to ensure that we were meeting all the criteria that is needed to involve criminal cases.
Ms Price: Can we look, please, to page 15 of this document. Paragraph 1.10 says this:
“RMG conducts its own English and Welsh prosecutions according to the Code for Crown Prosecutors. In Scotland completed investigation files are forwarded to the Procurator Fiscal’s office and in NI complete investigation files are forwarded via the PSNI to the Public Prosecution Service. At the time of inspection fieldwork consultation with the PPS to enable RMG case files to be submitted directly to them was under way. A direct submission process would reduce the potential for delay in processing files.”
Do you recall there being a consultation with the PPS about direct submission of cases by the relevant investigation function within the Royal Mail Group and the PPS?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Going, then, to page 25 of this document, which deals specifically with Post Office Investigations. At paragraph 4.6, please, this says:
“Typical cases dealt with by RML Investigators …”
Is that Royal Mail Letters?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: “… included theft of post and criminal damage. The POL Investigator typically dealt with offences committed by PO employees against customer accounts. These investigations had been more complex in nature and had often involved elements of fraudulent behaviour or false accounting. Because the offences had been committed in Northern Ireland and were subject to different submission processes and legislation, the RMG Criminal Law Team had been unable to either provide advice nor decide on prosecution regarding these cases. The POL Investigator had access to advice regarding employment legislation if required. For PO criminal cases in [Northern Ireland] the internal prosecution decision rests with the Head of Security. Files had then been forwarded to the PSNI for onward transmission to the PPS. As previously raised in the report this is an overly complex submission system which increases the risk of delay. It would be helpful if the cases submitted in NI by the POL Investigator went through the same, less complex process as recommended for Royal Mail cases.”
Then in bold:
“Inspectors recommend that to improve efficiency and reduce the risk of delay, that Post Office Limited cases are submitted by a more direct method as recommended for RML cases.”
So we can see a recommendation was being made specifically for Post Office Investigations that cases should be submitted more directly to the PPS. Was this recommendation implemented following this report in July 2008?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, yes it was.
Ms Price: So this is a change to the process you set out in your statement. Can you recall when it changed and how?
Suzanne Winter: I think it took some time to bring in the changes and we then got a local solicitor in Belfast who then took my cases. Instead of them going directly to the police, my cases were then given to this solicitor in Belfast who then directed me in what – if we needed any extra evidence or if the file was correctly prepared and then it went from the solicitor to the PPS or the DPP.
Ms Price: Is that the example that you give in your witness statement of a change to the process?
Suzanne Winter: I think so. It was also a change within the police around the same time, where there was a major change in the police service in Northern Ireland and it meant that it was best for me to just go to a solicitor rather than get access in to the police.
Ms Price: The next paragraph of the report, paragraph 4.7, says this:
“There was only one POL Investigator for [Northern Ireland] but at the time of fieldwork two other investigators based in England and Scotland were being trained to deal with [Northern Ireland] cases to improve resilience and to provide support. Inspectors found that there was capacity within the existing RM Investigators in [Northern Ireland] to provide support and cover. There had been cases when the POL Investigator had assisted with RML investigations and this had been reciprocated informally.”
Then in bold, the recommendation:
“To improve resilience and support Inspectors recommend that RMG Security formalises a flexible approach to investigations so that local investigative staff can be shared across its business areas in [Northern Ireland] in response to demand.”
Were you the one Post Office Investigator being referred to here?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: How long had that been the case?
Suzanne Winter: How long had I been the one Post Office Investigator?
Ms Price: So you’d referred to yourself as being a one-person department before, we know you had input from your line manager, Mr Thorpe, but is it right that you were not only a one-person department but you were the only investigator in Northern Ireland for Post Office cases?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, I was the only person that investigated. There was another person that looked after the physical side, the physical security side, which would have been robberies, burglaries, and then, whenever they left, there was literally just me and I did all of the Security work. And then a few years before I left, an additional person was brought in to deal with the physical side but I was the main Investigator.
Ms Price: At the point in time when Mr Thorpe was your line manager, where was he based?
Suzanne Winter: I think Mr Thorpe – well, he was based in England. I’m not sure whereabouts but it was in England.
Ms Price: How many cases were you dealing with at any one time on average?
Suzanne Winter: It’s difficult to say on average. It just depended how the work came in. Sometimes you may have had just five cases, another time you could have had 12 cases. It just depended on what was actually happening.
Ms Price: Until the point where an additional person was provided, did you feel adequately supported in your role, being the only Investigator?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, I did, because Northern Ireland, to help you understand, Northern Ireland was completely different to the way everything worked in England. In Northern Ireland, everybody that’s involved that would speak to requiring information regarding a criminal investigation, I worked with on a daily basis. I had face-to-face contact with them. So I felt I had all the information right beside me on hand, without maybe having to go looking for any information. I worked in the same office as the Audit Team, the Contracts Manager, the Retail Line Manager. I had contact with the cash remittance department, put – Royal Mail Letters was down the corridor. So it was a totally different set-up as what was in England.
Ms Price: Sir, I’ve reached the end of a topic. Would that be a convenient time for a morning break?
Sir Wyn Williams: Certainly, yes, what time should we resume?
Ms Price: It’s 11.40 now, if we could come back at 11.55, please, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Certainly, thank you.
(11.40 am)
(A short break)
(11.55 am)
Ms Price: Hello, sir, can you see and hear us?
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, thank you, yes.
Ms Price: I’d like to move, please, Ms Winter, to the circumstances in which audit data was requested from Fujitsu. Could we have on screen, please, paragraph 34 of Ms Winter’s statement. It is page 19.
Do you say at paragraph 34, scrolling down a bit, please:
“When I held the position of Investigator/Fraud Risk Manager within the Security Team and any SPM/SPMs manager(s) or assistant(s)/Crown Office employees(s) attributed any discrepancy to the Horizon system, I would have asked them to give details of the problems and if the matter had been reported to the Helpdesk or their Area Manager. The matter would be raised with my line manager and Casework Manager and a decision would be made to request Horizon data to be reviewed for the period in question. From my recall Horizon transactions could be viewed on Credence but only a few months. An ARQ needed to be authorised if you needed to view further back than this.”
Pausing there, you pick up the question of when ARQ data was requested in the following paragraph over the page, that’s paragraph 35. Here you say this:
“I cannot recall for definite if an ARQ data was requested every time an SPM was attributing a shortfall to problems with Horizon. Horizon transactions could be viewed on Credence. If a case was going to progress for prosecution an ARQ was requested. There was only a certain number allowed to be requested each month from Fujitsu and you might have to wait until the following month.”
Whose decision was it whether or not to request ARQ data: the Investigator’s or that of their line manager or Casework Team?
Suzanne Winter: I think it would have been more the Casework Team or the line manager but, usually, everything went through the Casework Team.
Ms Price: So are you saying it was not the Investigator’s decision to make?
Suzanne Winter: I would request it. Quite often I would have requested information. Just to explain a little bit, at the start of my time as an Investigator, I don’t think there was certain information available from Fujitsu or I wasn’t aware of it, and then I realised there was Credence, and Credence would be – I could go on to my computer and look and see what any particular post office in the United Kingdom was doing or working at. But if you wanted to use any information on Credence, you needed an ARQ for a witness statement or for court. You couldn’t use information from Credence.
So if I wanted to use Credence, I could just go on that myself, but if you want an ARQ, you had to go through casework, you didn’t do it – you didn’t deal directly with Fujitsu and we were only allowed a certain amount of ARQs every month.
Ms Price: Are you saying in your evidence at paragraphs 34 and 35, the parts we’ve just looked at, that ARQ data was not sought in every case where someone being investigated was attributing a discrepancy to the Horizon system?
Suzanne Winter: No, the ARQ would have been requested. You may have had to wait until the following month but, if it was going to be an actual investigation, you would want the ARQ information.
Ms Price: Well, you’ve said at paragraph 35 here “I cannot recall for definite if an ARQ data was requested every time a subpostmaster was attributing a shortfall to problems with Horizon”; so are you now saying that you can recall?
Suzanne Winter: No, with my cases, my own cases, I cannot remember or recall. But that is what you would want to do.
Ms Price: Because you’d want to obtain the best data you could get, wouldn’t you, for each and every one of those cases, if someone was attributing a shortfall to problems with Horizon?
Suzanne Winter: Absolutely.
Ms Price: You referred in your statement to there only being a certain number of allowed requests from Fujitsu per month and you’ve just touched on that now. Did you mean by that there were only a certain number of allowed requests for which Post Office was not charged?
Suzanne Winter: I’m not sure. I don’t know about the charges. We were just told you can have only a certain amount of requests in the month. If they had reached that peak, then you would have to wait possibly the next month but, quite often, you were always pushing because it delayed your case.
Ms Price: Were you ever told you couldn’t have it, as opposed to needing to wait until the next month, because of the cap or limit on the numbers of requests allowed?
Suzanne Winter: No, I was never told I couldn’t have it. You may have had to wait but, again, I would have been pushing because I would have had perhaps the police pushing me, or the Public Prosecution Office pushing me. So you did your best and, quite often, they were good and maybe acceded and said, “Right, I’ll get that for you”. But on the odd occasion you’d have had to wait if you’d reached that limit for the month.
Ms Price: Are you referring now to what happened once a decision had been made that the case was going to progress for prosecution? You’ve just referred to requests from the police and the PPS.
Suzanne Winter: I’d have – I would have requested ARQs even before it went to prosecution but, if it had now reached the police or the PPS and they had decided we need some more information, then I would have requested it then, and that’s whenever you could have had a push. But if I was doing an investigation before it had even got to the police, I want to satisfy myself exactly what had been happening on the system. I would request an ARQ before it had even got to the police stage.
Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, paragraph 29 of this statement, it’s page 17. You say here:
“With regard to Fujitsu, I cannot recall if data would be requested in all cases of cash shortfalls as we had been assured by Fujitsu that the Horizon system was completely reliable. These assurances were given from Senior Managers at meetings and during Horizon training.”
The Horizon training we covered earlier and my question to you then was whether anyone from Fujitsu was sending that message. But, just to be clear, the Horizon training you’re talking about here, is that that initial Horizon training or was that a message that was repeated at future training sessions you attended?
Suzanne Winter: It was a message that was repeated constantly.
Ms Price: How was that message repeated constantly?
Suzanne Winter: If you were over at conference or perhaps where there was large team meetings, Senior Managers would have been saying about – maybe something about Fujitsu and how the system would be reliable. Whenever you went with – even the Horizon trainers would have been told the system is 100 per cent reliable.
Ms Price: Which –
Suzanne Winter: Sorry, the Post Office emphasised – I’m just – it’s – as you start to talk about something, you start to recall. The Post Office always emphasised Fujitsu said that the system was reliable.
Ms Price: Which Senior Managers gave you assurances that the Horizon system was completely reliable?
Suzanne Winter: I’m sorry, I can’t put names but it would have been – it would have been higher up whenever you were at conference. They would have had maybe Security – the Head of Security on speaking and maybe other Executives, and that – this is where it would come from. It would come from upper level.
Ms Price: Can you remember who any of those other Executives were?
Suzanne Winter: I would say I would only be guessing because my last Security Manager was John Scott and he was Head of Security. I vaguely remember maybe somebody from Fujitsu giving us a talk at one of our conferences and saying again that the computer system was reliable.
Ms Price: Looking back at the wording of the first two sentences of paragraph 29 that we’ve just looked at, are you saying here that the assurances given to you about the complete reliability of the Horizon system had a direct impact on the decision making on whether or not to obtain ARQ data in cash shortfall cases?
Suzanne Winter: Sorry, I’m going to ask you to repeat that again, please.
Ms Price: So we can re-read them, the first two sentences at 29. You say:
“With regard to Fujitsu I cannot recall if data would be requested in all cases of cash shortfalls as we had been assured by Fujitsu that the Horizon system was completely reliable.”
So just that first sentence there, you seem to be linking the request for data and the decision as to whether that would happen to the assurance given by Fujitsu that the Horizon system was completely reliable. So I am asking whether this had a direct impact, these assurances, on the decision making, on whether or not to obtain ARQ data in cash shortfall cases?
Suzanne Winter: I would say it did because they were assuring us that this computer system was reliable. But assurances were all well and good until you’re actually taking a prosecution. And, there again, I have to say this is where in Northern Ireland we asked for a statement from Fujitsu to say that this system was completely reliable.
So, yes, there was times, depending on the shortfall, depending on the investigation, that you may have not got that information from Fujitsu. It would depend –
Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please – I’m sorry, I interrupted.
Suzanne Winter: That’s okay. It would depend on the case that you’re dealing with.
Ms Price: If we could have on screen, please, paragraph 71 of Ms Winter’s statement. That’s page 37. In this paragraph you address the relevance of a challenge to the integrity of the Horizon system in one case to other ongoing or future cases. Going over the page, please, seven lines down, you say:
“I understand now that if Horizon recorded a different transaction to the one the SPM entered then this could cause an error but if there was a consistent pattern and none of the patterns showed that there was an underpayment and so the cash showed an excess then it causes a concern. The concern and error did not prove illegal activity but the SPM would need to provide an explanation.”
When you were an Investigator, was there a presumption of dishonesty where the loss could not be explained?
Suzanne Winter: No.
Ms Price: How would an agent or an employee of the Post Office be expected to explain or prove that they had not stolen or caused the loss?
Suzanne Winter: Well, this particular paragraph that you’ve raised, this was in answer to the two cases that I have been involved in.
Ms Price: Well, this is under a heading of “General”, in response to a question about the relevance of a challenge to the integrity of the Horizon system in one case to other ongoing or future cases. You do make reference earlier on in this paragraph to the two cases, which we’ll come on to, of Alan McLaughlin and Maureen McKelvey but this sentence here seems to relate to your understanding now as to what was possible in terms of errors on the system and I’m asking you if this reflects a presumption of dishonesty and an expectation that a subpostmaster would have to explain where there was a concern, as you put it.
Suzanne Winter: Yes, it would depend on what the discrepancies were, yes, they would have to explain. With regard to the Horizon system, what I know now, I most likely would have acted in a different way then but, yes, you’re wanting to go down all avenues of concern and you would be asking the subpostmaster to explain, if they can offer an explanation for any underpayment or excess. I’m sorry, that’s the only way I can sort of explain it to you.
Ms Price: Do you recognise, looking at the wording you have used here, that this logic is the wrong way round: you are expecting someone who had experienced a shortfall to prove that they have not stolen the money or caused the loss, rather than the question being: could an actual loss be proved?
Suzanne Winter: No, I don’t see that. I’m sorry.
Ms Price: You say at paragraph 36 of your statement that you do not recall if the ARQ data was provided to the SPM as a matter of course. You say this would be a decision made by the PPS. This would, of course, rely on that data having been provided to them, wouldn’t it?
Suzanne Winter: Sorry, repeat the question, please?
Ms Price: Well, we can go back and have a look at the paragraph, if you’d like. It’s paragraph 36, page 20, please. So you’re dealing here with the situation where ARQ data has been obtained from Fujitsu. You say:
“I do not recall if the ARQ data was provided to the SPM as a matter of course. This would be a decision made by the PPS.”
Suzanne Winter: Yes. If the case had gone to the PPS, they would usually advise for that data to be produced.
Ms Price: But in a situation where you said you sometimes obtained ARQ data before that point in time, so assuming you’ve obtained it in your investigation, before you are referring the case to the PPS, in that situation, the PPS can only make a decision as to disclosure or not of the ARQ data if it’s provided to them; that’s right, isn’t it?
Suzanne Winter: That’s right.
Ms Price: What did you typically include in your evidential report sent to the PSNI?
Suzanne Winter: There would have been – you include everything, whenever you go to the police. You have – you would have notebook entries, you would have any evidence that you have regarding branch trading statements, cash declarations, all of your investigative notes, you would have anything to do with the sub post office, how they had claimed any over reaches or shortages.
You would have contacted the cash remittance people to see what money was delivered to the office; you’d have looked at calls to the Helpdesk, calls to Horizon; you’d have looked at past records; you’d have spoken with Contracts Manager to see if there had been any issues with the office; you would have asked the Retail Line if they’d had any issues with the office; you’d have looked at previous audit reports to see how the office had been running.
So all that information would have been within your file to the police.
Ms Price: Were there guidelines or a checklist to assist you in preparing the evidential report?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, there was guidelines on how you had to prepare the evidential report so that it was easily understood by whoever was receiving it because Post Office was a complex business.
Ms Price: How did you ensure that the PSNI and, ultimately, the PPS were provided with all available evidence, including any evidence relating to possible explanations which pointed away from the guilt of the suspect?
Suzanne Winter: I would have had telephone conversations with the police beforehand and then, whenever – the file had to be hand delivered to the police and the Inspector would have gone through it with me. We would have discussed the whole case and then we would have looked at the evidence, and he would have advised me, “You need further evidence” or “You have sufficient evidence”.
If he’d said, “You need further evidence”, then I would have went and got the further evidence, and brought it to the police. Once the police were satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to put to the DPP or the PPS, then it went to the Prosecution Office. They then sat with me again and we would have had meetings with them and with their lawyers and discussed the case, and then they would have advised me if there was sufficient evidence or if they required more evidence.
If they did, then we got the evidence that they required and, again, further meetings before any decision was made by the Public Prosecution Office.
Ms Price: Where ARQ data was obtained, as part of your investigation, was it provided as a matter of course to the PSNI and the PPS?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, because it was the police that said “We need evidence from the people that own the computer system that it is reliable”. So, yes, if it was available at that time.
Ms Price: Where it was provided to the PSNI or the PPS, were they provided with any information as to how to interpret the data?
Suzanne Winter: That would have been with, I would have said, the statement from Fujitsu.
Ms Price: Could we have back on screen, please, paragraph 29 of Ms Winter’s statement, that’s page 17. Starting four lines down, you say:
“I did not get involved with Fujitsu until working in the business for a number of years when we were informed we had to produce an expert witness statement from Fujitsu in investigations. The decision to get expert reports was not made by me and I cannot recall who first advised me that I should get a report. I recall there were protocols to follow should you require their assistance and Horizon data would not always be requested if admissions had been made. I found the Fujitsu evidence statements hard to follow as they often had a lot of technical detail in them.”
When were you told that an expert witness statement from Fujitsu had to be produced in investigations; can you recall?
Suzanne Winter: I think it was a number of years within – and it was whenever I was preparing a prosecution file, and it was – the police and I had a discussion about the computer system and it was the police that said “We need to have a statement from Fujitsu”.
Ms Price: Was this in relation to all investigations where Horizon data was being relied upon?
Suzanne Winter: If Horizon – if Horizon data was being relied upon, yes.
Ms Price: Did you understand what the purpose of such a report was?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: What was the purpose?
Suzanne Winter: Well, the purpose of this report from Fujitsu was for them to state that the Horizon computer was reliable, and was not at fault.
Ms Price: You referred to protocols to follow should you require Fujitsu’s assistance. Can you recall what those protocols were?
Suzanne Winter: Well, we did not have access to anyone in Fujitsu or allowed to have access. I had to put my requests through Casework if I wanted anything from Fujitsu, and then, as far as I am aware, Casework then dealt with that. About maybe nine years in, our Casework Team then got a Fujitsu liaison person, and that is the person that we would deal with then, if we wanted anything from Fujitsu, if I wanted statements. I can’t ever recall having direct contact with anyone in Fujitsu. Maybe on an odd occasion, whenever they were required to give me a statement and it hadn’t be forthcoming, or to arrange for them to come to a court case.
Ms Price: You refer to the Fujitsu statements as being “hard to follow”. Which parts of the statements did you find hard to follow; can you recall?
Suzanne Winter: I remember there were statements – they were quite lengthy. Now, this is by recall, as I say, it’s quite number of years ago. But I do remember looking at one of the statements, and there was one time there was statements came regarding the ARQs and then I do believe there was another, a further statement was required, more intricate, into the system and it was that one that I’m referring to but that’s all I can remember, except I do remember it was a man that had made the statement and I think he had to come to one of my prosecution cases at court.
Ms Price: Since the statements related to your investigations, did you ever seek clarification in respect of the bits which you found hard to follow?
Suzanne Winter: No.
Ms Price: Why not?
Suzanne Winter: Because it seemed to be that the technical side – they were being reported as the expert of the computer and you were, more or less – in the Post Office, where we were – if you challenged anything – you didn’t feel you could challenge anything, that’s what I would say.
Ms Price: Was there any particular individual or individuals who made that the case?
Suzanne Winter: No, I wouldn’t say any particular individuals but you just got the impression that, if you started to challenge too much, it didn’t go well.
Ms Price: Can you recall the reason behind the police request for a statement from Fujitsu, in cases where Horizon data was relied upon?
Suzanne Winter: Well, as we discussed earlier, you need to disclose everything that you have, and it would stand to reason, whenever you’re investigating, you have to look at everything and, if there was any possibility that there was something wrong with the computer, that would need to be disclosed, and this is where I was happy working with the police, and the Public Prosecution Service because they knew what you needed to make sure your case, you had investigated everything, and disclosed everything that we had.
We could not disclose that there was anything wrong with the computer because that was not what we had been told and I understood why the police needed a statement to say that the computer was reliable.
Ms Price: You say in paragraph 29, in the penultimate line, that if admissions had been made, then Horizon data would not always be requested. Why was that?
Suzanne Winter: I’m not sure.
Ms Price: Was that the assumption that there was no need to investigate further because an admission had been made?
Suzanne Winter: It may have been. I’m sorry, I’m not sure why.
Ms Price: You refer at paragraph 37 of your statement to there being an expert witness from Fujitsu who provided a detailed witness statement when prosecution cases were progressing through the court. Is that the expert witness that you’ve just been referring to, ie the person who provided the statement required by the police?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: You seem to be referring to one particular person here, you say you do not recall the name of this expert witness; is that right?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, I mean, I would have dealt with Penny Thomas and Andy Dunks in Fujitsu whenever information came through from Casework and, as I say, on the odd occasion, I may have had an email from them. They produced ARQs and they would have given statements regarding the ARQs and the information on them. But I do believe – and it’s just my recall from one of my cases – there was someone different came and it was a more technical statement but I’m sorry, that’s – I just recall that but that’s all I can say.
Ms Price: You say at paragraph 41 of your statement that this requirement, or this feature of an expert witness from Fujitsu, was an exception to the general observation you make that investigations in Northern Ireland were conducted in the same ways as the rest of the United Kingdom. What was it that was different about the use of an expert witness from Fujitsu in Northern Irish cases from the way investigations were carried out in the rest of the UK?
Suzanne Winter: Sorry, could you just bring that paragraph up, please?
Ms Price: Of course. 41, it’s page 21. So this is the paragraph where you deal with the process by which cases were investigated and prosecuted in Northern Ireland and how they differed from that process in England and Wales. In the context of that, you say:
“Investigation cases were conducted in the same ways as the rest of the United Kingdom, except as mentioned in paragraph 37.”
If we can just pull up 37, please, it’s page 20. Towards the bottom, please, this is the paragraph in which you refer to Andy Dunks and Penny Thomas’ contacts in Fujitsu and say:
“There was also an expert witness from Fujitsu who provided a detailed witness statement when prosecution cases were progressing through the court in Northern Ireland.”
So that seems to be you describing that being the exception to investigations being conducted in the same way throughout the UK.
Suzanne Winter: I think that paragraph must be wrong then because that wouldn’t have been – I’d have to go back to that previous paragraph to see what it was but I think that’s the wrong paragraph I’ve quoted.
Ms Price: I see. Well, perhaps we can look at that over the lunch break and try to establish which the right paragraph is.
I’d like to turn, please, to disclosure. You say at paragraph 11 of your statement that, if a case progressed to court, the PSNI and PSO would assist with disclosure. Can you help with PSO? What did that stand for.
Suzanne Winter: That was Public – Public Office, Public – I must have got it wrong. Public Office. It was the DPP. I always worked with the PSNI and the DPP or the PSO.
Ms Price: You say you were the Disclosure Officer in the cases of Alan McLaughlin and Maureen McKelvey. Did you provide to the PSNI and/or the PPS Schedules of Unused Material?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Did you provide them with disclosure reports?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Were they documents that you completed as Disclosure Officer?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, they would have been.
Ms Price: What did you understand to be required to include on those documents?
Suzanne Winter: With disclosure, you disclosed everything that you had, everything that you were aware of, and I would have went through the disclosure with the police and, for instance, if you had notebook entries or if you just had scribbles on paper or evidence. So we went through it with – the police and I together and then they would have assisted with the disclosure.
Ms Price: Was there any guidance or a checklist to ensure that, once a case was proceeding to court, as opposed to that earlier stage of you doing your evidential report, that all relevant information was sent to the PSNI and/or the PPS?
Suzanne Winter: You could always take – you could always look at information on the Police and Criminal Evidence book or there would have been guidance that I maybe had from the police whenever we were first arranging the Memorandum of Understanding.
Ms Price: Who made decisions as to what material was disclosable in a prosecution?
Suzanne Winter: I think it ultimately would have been the Director of Public Prosecutions because he would have received all the information from the police. So that’s who I would have said, the police forwarded all my file to the Public Prosecution, along with a report, because, once my case went to the police, then they allocated a police officer, and I would have liaised with that police officer through the system until it went to court, and then I would have met that police officer in court.
Ms Price: If a case proceeded to court, would the evidence file be provided to the police in full: in essence, your entire file on the case?
Suzanne Winter: My entire file was produced to the police because it could be quite extensive.
Ms Price: Was the entire evidence file then provided to the defence in that prosecution; can you recall?
Suzanne Winter: I wouldn’t have had involvement with that. That would have then been with the Public Prosecution Office. I do know that, for my file, I had just four copies and the four copies were given to the police for them to distribute wherever they had to distribute.
Ms Price: Was Credence data obtained when gathering evidence and included in disclosure in cases against subpostmasters, their staff and Post Office employees?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, Credence, if you had any Credence data, you would disclose that but you would have to say that, if you needed further disclosure for court, you needed to get an ARQ and a statement.
Ms Price: Credence data only went back a limited period of time, didn’t it? So if it hadn’t been obtained in the initial investigation, you wouldn’t later be able to obtain it at the point of it going to court, would you?
Suzanne Winter: That’s right. But you’d have to be able to show that you’d looked at that information. So you’re wanting to disclose all your material.
Ms Price: I’d like to turn, please, to your involvement in the investigation and prosecution of Alan McLaughlin. To help with your memory of the case, Alan McLaughlin was the postmaster at Brookfield branch, Belfast, between 1999 and 2001. He was prosecuted for 15 offences of false accounting, contrary to section 17.1(a) of the Theft Act Northern Ireland 1969. The offences were said to have occurred between 13 December 2000 and the 26 July 2000.
He initially contested the charges but, ultimately, pleaded guilty on the 16 February 2005 and was fined £700. He was also ordered to pay compensation in the sum of £1,300 and, after conviction, he lost his business and was made bankrupt. You were the Lead Investigator in Mr McLaughlin’s case; is that right?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: I’d like to start, please, with the interview you conducted with the assistance of Mr Thorpe, your line manager, on 26 July 2001. Could we have on screen, please, AMCL0000032. It’s page 94 of that document, please. We can see here that the interview was with Alan McLaughlin. You were the lead interviewer and Frederick Leslie Thorpe, that’s Mr Thorpe, was the second interviewer. The date of the interview there, 26 July 2001.
Going, please, to page 154 of this larger document. At this stage of the interview, you were putting to Mr McLaughlin apparent discrepancies relating to pension payments shown by two documents: the computer adlist and the weekly summary sheet; is that right?
Suzanne Winter: That’s right.
Ms Price: Do you agree that both of these were automated documents created by the Horizon system?
Suzanne Winter: It was the information – the person that was doing it would be checking off actual foils and keying in the information into the system.
Ms Price: These documents, the weekly summary sheet and the computer adlist, those were things generated by the computer; is that right?
Suzanne Winter: The adlist was generated by the person entering the information and then the summary sheet was generated by the computer system.
Ms Price: Okay. Towards the bottom of the page, you suggested that Mr McLaughlin appeared to be balancing. So you say:
“And what made it interesting was that you always seemed to be balancing.”
Then in response he referred back to problems balancing when the Horizon system was first introduced, and we see by “AM”, three lines down:
“Yeah, it would start, we got dreadful problems balancing [because] of the problems with the capture system and the change over to Horizon, things were very see-saw, very up and down, you know. Erm …
“Question: Where did you (inaudible).
“Answer: It wasn’t stable at all …”
Do you accept that this was a reference to significant problems balancing when Horizon was first introduced?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, I think Mr McLaughlin was talking there at first about the capture system, which I think was there before Horizon, and then whenever the Horizon system went in, he had problems with it and that was two years ago, from the interview.
Ms Price: So we can see that there:
“Question: When did you go onto Horizon?
“Answer: In September of ‘99, and it wasn’t stable, the balance were not stable at all.”
That’s the point that you then make:
“That’s 2 years ago.”
Going then to page 166, please, at 19.18, you ask this:
“It should, it doesn’t explain how for last night for instance there’s 3 accounts were then, put through the system.
“Answer: Again it’s personal time, trying to get the balance on, trying to get it you know done by a certain time in a way [because] when I was first here you know and they were all over the place, we were 8 o’clock, 9 o’clock at night, yeah.”
So Mr McLaughlin refers again to problems balancing, doesn’t he?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, he does. I can understand.
Ms Price: Going, please, to page 168. On this page, there is discussion of accounting errors made in branch which Mr McLaughlin was upfront about and was discussing with you here, is that right?
Just take a moment to cast your eye down the page?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, uh-huh.
Ms Price: Then over the page to 169, there is a discussion of shortages and what Mr McLaughlin did in response to those shortages, starting four lines down:
“Where the, the pattern has been established and develop and evolved that has certainly lead to situation where um as you say, that accounts figure is not what it should have been.”
Mr Thorpe, it seems, says:
“Right okay, so you’ve had some big shortage you become.
“Answer: Yeah.
“Question: Accounting errors.
“Answer: Big, big shortages yep.
“Question: And for that reason with a little bit of manipulation here to (inaudible) the surpluses to make good the shortages?
“Answer: Well, it’s a pattern you know and.
“Question: So [that’s that].
“Answer: When people start …
“Question: That’s what happened?
“Answer: Presumably, presume yep, when people, when that happens someone starts working to … paranoid or whatever and it works.
“Question: Yeah.
“Answer: You think oh fine, that’s balancing and all the rest of it, but stores up, a bit stupid really it stores up problems and you know is not accurate accounting.”
Then at page 181 at the top, please, so a question from Mr Thorpe at the top, which is:
“Which was the figure we just carried in your cash account. So why did you adjust it by £660?
“Answer: Obviously to make the cash account show a reasonable balance. If that was the amount over that must have been the adjustment.”
So Mr McLaughlin accepts adjusting the figures to make the accounts balance, doesn’t he, at this stage?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Then going, please, to page 196. The allegation of false accounting is put to Mr McLaughlin:
“So that is a false account which is for you to submit this to the Post Office.
“Answer: Hmm.”
Mr Thorpe says:
“Is actually a criminal offence. And …
“Answer: … sorry.
“Question: No, no, it’s … this pattern as you’ve said has been going on regularly since perhaps January-February of the current year …
“Answer: Yeah. In – when I found out that, you know, what er procedure … what the postmasters were actually doing wasn’t, because obviously we’ve had (sighs) wildly variation cash accounts for a period but whenever I found that what they would do would be, they would take the money, hold it, put it in, or keep it aside as according to what indication they were getting of where their cash account was going. I mean that is what I in my unclear way erm it’s always been well this is the practice and everyone’s doing it so it must be what you do to establish a continuum of … acceptable accounts.”
So Mr McLaughlin here was saying that this is what postmasters do to get a continuum of acceptable accounts where there are wild variations. Would you accept that that’s what he’s saying?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Then going, please, to page 202. The second line down, you ask this:
“And you were aware that this was a criminal offence because it was falsifying accounts?
“Answer: I wasn’t that – I never thought about that or erm put it in those terms at all. No I wasn’t – as aware of that, I [wasn’t] as aware of that …
“Question: You were aware that it was wrong to do that?
“Answer: (sighs) I was aware that erm what I thought was if not unaccepted but a common practice to keep reasonable accounts … was in danger of carrying a pattern which could not be understood or explained in terms of the original motivation for it.
“Question: So you were, you were aware that you were falsifying your accounts?
“Answer: Not – I wouldn’t have set out to do that in that form or, or, or with that intention or plan but … as it were that by allowing this kind of pattern to go on the, the, the final accounting probably would not be completely accurate.
“Question: And the reason you have been falsifying the accounts … was because of shortages?
“Answer: Any overages which resulted from those cash accounts were used for any shortages which resulted [because] we had a lot of problems with staff at a particular point, which, timing of which coincides with this, this pattern. I had a lot of problems with my erm … figures in the office. These were two staff, they were both dismissed.
“Question: And I just want to clarify with you, did you keep a record anywhere of the discrepancies that you were making?
“Answer: Not that I know …”
So Mr McLaughlin was denying any criminality in his interview, wasn’t he?
Suzanne Winter: He was.
Ms Price: He gave a number of possible reasons in interview for discrepancies arising, including accounting errors, but he also clearly raised balancing issues caused by the Horizon system, didn’t he, looking at those sections we’ve just been through?
Suzanne Winter: No, I’m not sure about that.
Ms Price: Why do you think not?
Suzanne Winter: Just looking at those sections is really just looking at that part of the interview. It’s not telling the whole picture.
Ms Price: We will come on in due course to the question of whether data was requested from Fujitsu after Mr McLaughlin’s interview but, in terms of other enquiries, did you make any enquiries at the time of any colleagues or seniors as to whether other postmasters were experiencing or had experienced balancing difficulties because of the Horizon system?
Suzanne Winter: No, because, at that time, I think that was in 2001, there had never been any question of computer problems within the Horizon system.
Ms Price: But just taking that first example, going back to when Horizon first came in in Mr McLaughlin’s branch and he was saying balancing was all over the place, did that not cause you any concern? Even if you thought it wasn’t of particular relevance for your case, two years later?
Suzanne Winter: No, because it was two years down the road and, during the interview, I think he did say that he got to do the balancing okay, after a while, that that was at the beginning. I think he said the balancing was okay. But, also, I do not know or recall if the information would have been available at that time because it was 2001. I wasn’t aware of it at that time, of information being available from Fujitsu.
Ms Price: Well, just staying on the point I asked you about in terms of enquiries of colleagues or seniors, someone had told you that, after Horizon was introduced, balancing was all over the place, it wasn’t stable. Was that something you thought important enough to discuss with other colleagues?
Suzanne Winter: As it had been two years ago, I’m not sure. I can’t recall. But I do know I would have been looking at audit reports and information from his Retail Line Manager, who would have been visiting the office to see if there had been any reports. I would have been looking at – if there was any call logs available, I would have been asking more general knowledge from the people coming in to the office; I would have been asking them is there any problem with this particular office?
Ms Price: Okay, but setting aside Mr McLaughlin’s case for a second, was it not a concern that the system was capable of causing balancing problems, regardless of whether they were operating in this case?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, it was a concern.
Ms Price: So did you say that it was a concern to anyone else?
Suzanne Winter: It would have been sort of – I don’t know if I actually would have put it out that it was a concern because we were being told there was no concerns with the computer system. We did know – I wasn’t on the investigation at the time of Horizon going in but we had heard that there was trial periods where there was some glitches, as they were put, but that that had all been ironed out and sorted out. Also, maybe it could have been the person operating the system so, no, I don’t think I’d have raised many concerns because of what I had been told by senior management regarding Fujitsu.
Ms Price: Given what Mr McLaughlin had told you about balancing issues, not just at the beginning but the other references he made to balancing issues, more broadly, did you think to contact the helpline to see whether Mr McLaughlin had raised any issues about the system in the past?
Suzanne Winter: We would have gone – I would have contacted the helpline. I would have contacted – I would have spoke, actually, with the Casework Management Team and asked them for points of contact to see any information on this particular post office.
Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, page 26 of Ms Winter’s statement. The paragraph at the top of page 26, this is a continuation of paragraph 50 from the previous page and, in the last six lines here, you say this – so this is in the reference of the line before referring to the interview with Mr McLaughlin.
You say – well, actually, let’s read that whole section together. You say:
“During the interview with Mr McLaughlin he mentioned having difficulty in processing certain documents which I understood were inputting errors. He also stated he had had counter losses and staff dishonesty but as I had always been assured there wasn’t any problem with the Horizon system with regard to cash discrepancies I did not consider the counter losses to be attributed to the Horizon system. I do not recall Mr McLaughlin suggesting any direct issue with Horizon that would cause cash discrepancies or suggesting there was some error which could be attributed to Horizon.”
You may not recall it but, having looked at the interview transcript, would you agree that Mr McLaughlin had raised having had problems balancing because of the operation of the Horizon system in his interview?
Suzanne Winter: Whenever I read through the taped transcript again, Mr McLaughlin kept referring to a system and I believe it was the system that he was using to do his pension foils and not the system as in the Horizon computer system.
Ms Price: You appear to be saying here that, because of the assurances you had been given that Horizon was completely reliable, you concluded that the counter losses raised by Mr McLaughlin were not attributable to Horizon; is that right?
Suzanne Winter: No. What I’m saying is, whenever I was discussing with Mr McLaughlin during interview, he was referring to a system that he used for his pension foils and he classed it as “the system”. So sometimes whenever you’re reading through the tape transcript, you are thinking that the system he is talking about is the Horizon computer system, whereas it was the system that he was using with the help of an ex-subpostmaster to process the paid pension foils.
Ms Price: Well, what you say here is:
“He had also stated he had had counter losses and staff dishonesty but as I had always been assured there wasn’t any problem with the Horizon system with regard to cash discrepancies I did not consider the counter losses to be attributed to the Horizon system.”
That’s what you’re saying here, isn’t it?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, that’s right. I didn’t consider the counter losses to be attributed to the Horizon system, and –
Ms Price: You’re saying here, forgive me, that this was because you were assured there wasn’t any problem with the Horizon system?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Okay.
Ms Price: Sir, it is 1.00. Is that a convenient moment to take lunch? Sir, you’re on mute.
Sir Wyn Williams: (The Chair gave a thumbs-up)
Ms Price: Yes, if we can come back at 2.00 then, sir. Thank you.
(1.00 pm)
(The Short Adjournment)
(2.00 pm)
Ms Price: Good afternoon, sir, can you see and hear us?
Sir Wyn Williams: I can, thank you.
Ms Price: Ms Winter, moving, please, to Mr McLaughlin’s defence statement. Could we have that on screen, please. The reference is AMCL0000035. The first page here is a covering letter from Mr McLaughlin’s solicitors dated 19 April 2004 and going to page 3 of this document, please, we have the defence statement itself.
We see the background set out, scrolling down slowly, please, and then the section on “Admissions/denials”. At the bottom of the first page we have this:
“It is understood that the post office business was deemed no longer financially viable by February 2002. It is also understood that significant and unexplained losses were still surfacing in the business after July 2001 when the defendant ceased having any direct role in it.”
So Mr McLaughlin was placing unexplained losses in his defence statement, wasn’t he, by this paragraph?
Suzanne Winter: This was the post office after he had left as a postmaster?
Ms Price: Yes. We’ll come on to what he says happened in relation to before but the reference there to “unexplained losses were still surfacing in the business”, that’s on that very first page. Then going, please, over the page. The defendant’s case is set out. So:
“The defendant accepts that he amended and altered certain documents, as detailed in his interviews. The full extent of the defendant’s case is set out in his interviews, the particulars of which can be referred to.
“However, the defendant denies that he amended and altered the said documents dishonestly or that he was motivated by dishonesty.
“He further denies that he was acting, whether as alleged or at all, with a view to gain by himself or another.
“Specifically, the defendant denies that he intended to cause loss to another, or that such loss was caused to another.
“The defendant would say that his only intention was to balance the accounts in the business and that his actions were actuated by no improper motive.
“The defendant denies that he caused a loss to the Post Office to the value of £10,288.47. He would say that the charges in the indictment do not reflect this value and this figure has been arrived at by taking all of the input errors for the given period and attributing them to the defendant. The defendant would say that a large number of these identified transactions have not been carried out by him. Further, these transaction errors may have been rectified at a later stage.
“The defendant would say that the conduct alleged by the Crown, the totality of which is not accepted in any event, does not make out the 15 charges of false accounting … “
Going down, please.
Then we have “Points taken issue with”. Before we turn to that, it’s clear here in his case that he denies dishonesty and puts in issue, doesn’t he, whether there was an actual loss to the Post Office. Would you agree with what we’ve just been through?
Suzanne Winter: I do, yes.
Ms Price: Then we have “Points taken issue with”, and the penultimate paragraph on that page:
“The defendant would take issue with any Crown evidence that would tend to suggest, imply or infer that his intention was not to balance the accounts in the business and/or that his actions were actuated by an improper motive.
“The defendant only accepts such alteration or amendment of documentation as is closed in his interviews and only to the manner and extent that this is detailed in his interviews.”
Going over the page, please:
“The defendant takes issue with any assertion that he caused a loss to the Post Office [to that value], as particularised above.
“The defendant would say that he had experienced difficulties in balancing the accounts from the time that he took over the franchise. He believes that this may have been largely the fault of the accounting system and/or equipment that he was obliged to use. The system rarely, if ever, by land, and was always prone to error.
“The defendant would say that the Post Office (Consignia) was aware of account balancing problems and errors in the system that the defendant was experiencing. The Post Office sent in people to try to help the defendant with the problems that he was experiencing, but the problems were never remedied and the source of the problems was never discovered.”
So Mr McLaughlin was clearly setting out here, wasn’t he, that he had experienced balancing faults from the outset, after he took over the Brookfield Post Office; wasn’t he?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, he was.
Ms Price: He stated in clear terms that he believed the difficulties were caused by the accounting system or the equipment he was required to use, didn’t he?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, he did.
Ms Price: He explained that the system rarely balanced and was prone to error and he also goes on to say that Consignia and the Post Office were aware of his account balancing problems and errors on the system.
Could we have on screen, please, page 20 of Ms Winter’s statement. That’s page 20, the top of that page, please. This is a continuation of paragraph 34 from the page before, and you say:
“I do recall some times when SPMs would cite Horizon as the issue but cannot recall the offices or the issues. I do not recall any of these being prosecuted with me as the Investigating Officer.”
Having looked through both the interview and the defence statement in Mr McLaughlin’s case, do you accept that your recollection set out here is wrong: you were the Lead Investigator in Mr McLaughlin’s case, he cited Horizon as the issue and he was prosecuted?
Suzanne Winter: No, I don’t believe it was wrong.
Ms Price: In what respect do you say it is not wrong? You’re saying here that there were cases where SPMs would cite Horizon as the issue.
Suzanne Winter: I think what you’re asking me that Mr McLaughlin was citing this as a Horizon issue; is that right?
Ms Price: I’m asking you whether you think this recollection in your statement is correct, still? Having been through the defence statement in Mr McLaughlin’s case –
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: – his defence was Horizon issues, you were the Lead Investigator in his case and he was prosecuted. So it would appear that this is wrong, this recollection in your statement here; is that right?
Suzanne Winter: No, because I – Mr McLaughlin’s case, I would not have cited it as a Horizon case and neither did the police believe that or The Crown Prosecution.
Ms Price: Okay. Mr McLaughlin cited that though, didn’t he, in his defence statement, in terms that we’ve just looked at?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, Mr McLaughlin has cited it.
Ms Price: Okay. Could we have back on screen, please, Mr McLaughlin’s defence statement, which is AMCL0000035, and it’s page 5 of that document, please. Scrolling down, please, Mr McLaughlin made a number of disclosure requests in this defence statement, and the paragraph above with the Roman numerals that follow:
“The defendant requires any further material to be disclosed that assists with his defence as now disclosed. Any material that undermines the credibility or reliability of the witnesses in the case, or the allegations made should be disclosed forthwith.”
Then there are some in particular disclosure requests made below. These include: full audit reports at (d) for the business for audits carried out prior to the 26 July; full details of the audit findings from 26 July; full details of the trial balances retained by the Post Office; full history of the details of the accounts and reports submitted by the defendant for the period relevant to the charges; and then, scrolling down a little, please:
“Details of trading after the defendant ceased having any direct role in the business (including details of any significant and unexplained losses and/or balancing problems and/or other accounting errors that were present).”
Then below that:
“Any or all documentation or material, in whatever format, showing or tending to show that the defendant had ongoing difficulties in balancing the accounts from the time he took over the franchise.”
Below that:
“Any and all documentation or material, in whatever format, showing or tending to show that the computer operating system that the defendant was obliged to use was prone to error and/or faults (not limited only to faults experienced by the defendant but also general reported or discovered faults across the system as experienced by other post office franchises in a position similar to the defendant).”
Then last of all:
“Any and all documentation or material, in whatever format, showing or tending to show the Post Office (Consignia) was aware of all the account balancing problems and errors in the system that the defendant was expressing.”
Were you involved in dealing with these disclosure requests; can you recall?
Suzanne Winter: I can. I can recall I would have been involved with them, yes.
Ms Price: At this stage, did you have knowledge of any other problems with Horizon causing balancing issues being experienced by other subpostmasters or Post Office employees?
Suzanne Winter: No.
Ms Price: Did you make enquiries as to whether there was knowledge within the Post Office of other cases where this was the case?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: What was the result of those enquiries?
Suzanne Winter: Every time the result, the story, was always the same: that Fujitsu had assured the Post Office that the Horizon system was completely reliable.
Ms Price: In relation to that last item requested, again, did you make enquiries in this regard for documentation or material showing or tending to show that the Post Office (Consignia) was aware of all the account balancing problems and errors in the system that the defendant was experiencing?
Suzanne Winter: That information would have been requested through the Casework Team and for them to provide that information to me. I cannot recall if it came through but, certainly, any requests would have been put forward to the Casework Team. If I was unable to get the information in Northern Ireland, it would go to them to see if they could get me the information.
It would also be discussed – you also have to bear in mind that everything that’s been requested to me would be discussed with the police and with the prosecution office. Once I would put a file in to the police, then you always had meetings with them and the Crown Prosecution Office.
Ms Price: You were in a position, though, of advantage, weren’t you, over the police and the Prosecuting Service because you had access to information within the Post Office and could more easily discuss with your colleagues and your seniors what the position was in terms of, in particular, a state of knowledge?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, but if someone has asked me to investigate any information on the computer and how good it is, I will do that and, if I found out anything that was wrong with that computer, I would disclose it.
Ms Price: Mr McLaughlin’s solicitors acting for him at the time commissioned a forensic accountant’s report to analyse the Horizon data relied upon to prosecute Mr McLaughlin; do you remember that?
Suzanne Winter: I vaguely recall meeting with him, I think, yes.
Ms Price: We’ll come on to meeting with them. Just in terms of the report, first of all, the report is dated December 2004. Can we have that on screen, please, it’s AMCL0000031. It’s page 37 within this larger document, please. Scrolling down a little, please. This is the front page of the report. We see it’s dated 21 December 2004. Have you had a chance, before today, to look through this report? It was one of the documents provided to you for the purposes of doing your statement.
Suzanne Winter: Yes, I have.
Ms Price: Going, please, to paragraphs 4.4 to 4.6 of this report, which is page 47, scrolling down, please, so down to 4.4, please. Under the heading “Missing Dockets/Foils”, and there’s a figure given there for the amount:
“The claim in relation to missing dockets/foils arises due to the number of inputs in relation to a particular Pension and Allowance grouping (P/A grouping) not equalling the number of foils received, ie the number of P/A inputs on the weekly summary and daily adlist equal each other, but are not matched by the number of foils received.”
At 4.5:
“Attached at Appendix E is an example of the Post Office workings in relation to the claim for the week ending 27 December 2000. The variance in relation to this week totals £213.45 … and is analysed”, in the way that is set out in that box below.
4.6:
“The claim is based on the assertion that the inclusion of a transaction in the absence of a supporting counterfoil is evidence that cash has been misappropriated and that Mr McLaughlin was responsible for the discrepancy and hence the alleged loss.”
Going over the page, please – and it’s a blank page, I think, that one, if we can go over again – 4.7, under “Group Total Casting Differences”, the authors describe the difficulty in understanding a group total casting difference of £201.30 in the week of 31 January 2001, and they do so in this way:
“The above loss in relation to group total casting difference can be broken down [as in the box].
“Attached at Appendix F are the Post Office workings in relation to the claim … for the week ending 31 January 2001. The workings show that although zero units have been claimed in the volume column, an amount of £226.30 has registered in the value column. At present we do not have an explanation or know of a reason as to why this did and could have occurred.
“It is extremely unusual that the computer system should allow such an entry to occur. The claim as set out at Appendix F is not supported by any detailed adlists or other documentation on which would give any indication of how this discrepancy has arisen. The transaction log for this particular period is not available. We are therefore unable to comment further in relation to this item.”
Going then, please, to page 51. At 5.4 and 5.5, under a heading of “Negative Balances”, the authors of this report point out a negative balance for which Mr McLaughlin would have no incentive and they suggest the entry may be due to ongoing inaccuracies in the computer system. They do so in this way, they say:
“Following negative balances are incorporated into the alleged loss totalling £10,288.47”, and that’s broken down.
5.5:
“The above amounts have, in effect, been contrad against alleged losses of £11,030.09 to arrive at the loss [figure]. Mr McLaughlin has been accused of dishonesty and with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, falsifying documents required for accounting purposes. With the inclusion of negative balances totalling £721.62 Mr McLaughlin is in effect being accused in part of the opposite, ie dishonestly and with a view to loss for himself or another with intent to cause gain to another, falsifying a document required for an accounting purpose.”
They conclude on this point in paragraph 5.6:
“The logic of such an assertion would appear flawed. The existence of such amounts would be more likely to arise as a result of:
“(i) Poor bookkeeping and controls;
“(ii) Ongoing inaccuracies in the computerised system; or
“(iii) A combination of these factors.”
Going, please, then to paragraph 5.10 of this report over the page, please, under the heading of “Incomplete information”, we have this:
“The Horizon system is operated by Fujitsu and all transactions recorded by each post office is backed up and held. After a period of 18 months the transactions are deleted from the Fujitsu system. The Post Office did not in their investigations choose to ask for the transaction logs to be provided or retained for the period covering the investigation. The elapse of time is now such that the logs cannot be obtained …”
Pausing there, you say in your statement, Ms Winter, at paragraph 54, that you do not believe Horizon data was available at this time to view. Why do you think, at the point of interview, Horizon data would not have been available to view.
Suzanne Winter: At the time of interview, I am not sure if it was available and, as I said, I don’t know but we didn’t think it was a Horizon case and the reason was that, during interview, Mr McLaughlin did state at the start, two years previously, he had ups and downs of the balancing.
Ms Price: Ms Winter, can I stop you there just to take you back to the question?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: The question relates to why it is that you thought that data might not be available to view, as opposed to whether you thought you needed to ask for it. Is it right that you didn’t ask for it?
Suzanne Winter: No, I would have asked for it.
Ms Price: I’m sorry, you said a moment ago that you didn’t think this was a Horizon case but you’re saying you would have asked for it?
Suzanne Winter: I can’t recall but I do know that, if we thought that Horizon information would assist the case, we would have asked for it. There is the possibility with this system, with this case, that the Horizon information may not have been requested.
Ms Price: Okay. Looking at the conclusion in this report, “The Post Office did not, in their investigations, choose to ask for the transaction logs to be provided or retained for the period covering the investigation”, and, if we can just have on screen, please, your paragraph 54. I don’t know if it’s possible to have that alongside this document. It’s page 26.
Towards the bottom of page 26, paragraph 54 starts – towards the bottom of the page, please, that’s the start of 54. Going over to the top, please, of the next page, you say there:
“During interview on 26 July 2001 he did raise concerns regarding losses and staff dishonesty but not Horizon. I do not believe Horizon data was available at this time to view …”
Let’s leave as a separate point whether he was raising Horizon as an explanation. Why was it that you do not believe that Horizon data was available at the time to view?
Suzanne Winter: I wouldn’t have had that information. I’m sorry, I can’t recall.
Ms Price: I’m just trying to understand why you have said here “I do not believe Horizon data was available at this time to view”. Why have you included that in your statement?
Suzanne Winter: Because I would believe, from myself and from the way that I worked, if there was any information available, I would have asked for that information. I do not believe, if the information wasn’t available – if it wasn’t available, it wasn’t available or I was told it wasn’t available.
Ms Price: On the one hand, you seem to be saying, “Mr McLaughlin was not raising Horizon so I didn’t need to ask” and, on the other, you seem to be saying, “Well, I would have asked, so I must not have been there to view”; which is it?
Suzanne Winter: Well, he didn’t raise concerns. I can’t recall, I’m sorry.
Ms Price: Okay. In any event, it appears, based on this report at 5.10, that, by the time the forensic accountants instructed on behalf of Mr McLaughlin were doing this report, the data was no longer there to be had because of the retention period of Fujitsu.
If we could go to page 59 of this document, please, it’s paragraph 5.25 that we’re looking for, please. This paragraph addresses the continuation of discrepancies after Mr McLaughlin had left the branch and the authors say this:
“The data provided in relation to the Support Centre calls (see paragraph 5.21 above) and the cash differences after Mr McLaughlin’s departure would indicate that there were continuing difficulties experienced regarding the reconciliation of cash balances at Brookfield Post Office.”
Did you ever consider, when you were investigating Mr McLaughlin’s case, investigating whether any problems being experienced by Mr McLaughlin continued after he stopped working in the branch in July 2001?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: Did you do that?
Suzanne Winter: I would have spoken with the Retail Line Manager, who would have been responsible for the office.
Ms Price: What would you have asked that Retail Line Manager?
Suzanne Winter: I would have asked how the person was getting on because I knew that the person that had gone in had been working in the office and had had previous Post Office experience, and to – usually because the Contracts Manager and the Retail Line Manager would have been in my office a couple of times every week. I’d have asked them “Well, is this business going okay? Are there any problems?” and I say that would have been the only enquiry I would have made.
Ms Price: You say “would have”, can you remember actually doing that in this case?
Suzanne Winter: No, I’m sorry, it’s just too long ago.
Ms Price: The conclusions of the report are set out at section 6, that’s on page 61, please, and the conclusions of the report are these:
“The Horizon System operating within the Post Office is designed to manage and track cash transactions passing through the post office. Comparison of a ‘theoretical cash balance’ with an actual cash balance on a weekly basis identifies any discrepancies arising as a result of cash being over or understated (cash surpluses or deficits).
“The theoretical cash balance is calculated by taking the previous week’s opening balances, adding receipts and deducting payments to calculate a closing cash balance.
“As with any system the accuracy and integrity of the information is impacted upon by a number of differing but interdependent factors:
“(i) the integrity of the computer software itself;
“(ii) the controls surrounding the system;
“(iii) the controls surrounding data input;
“(iv) the accuracy of data input; and
“(v) the training and quality of staff operating the system.
“From our review work in relation to the Horizon system operating in Brookfield Post Office we would conclude that there were clearly ongoing difficulties regarding the reconciliation of cash balances at the post office. This is evidenced as follows:
“(i) the discrepancies identified as a result of the current investigation;
“(ii) ongoing cash surpluses and the deficits which occurred not only during the period of Mr McLaughlin’s employment but which continued after his departure (indeed the magnitude of reported differences increased after his departure in or around July 2001);
“(iii) a high number of calls to the helpline many of which related to difficulties regarding the cash reconciliations on the system.”
Going down, please. Sorry, if we could scroll up a little, please, we just lost (iv):
“The evidence produced from the investigation has identified that for a significant number of cash payments made during the period December 2000 to July 2001, that supporting pension or allowance vouchers are not available.
“The absence of such vouchers could be explained by any of the following (or a combination of these):
“(i) that an individual transaction is valid but that the supporting voucher has been lost; or
“(ii) that the transaction has been keyed in error and that cash was not in fact paid out; or
“(iii) that the transaction has been deliberately created to reduce weekly cash discrepancies but that cash was not in fact paid out; or
“(iv) that the transaction had been deliberately created and that cash has also been taken.”
If we can just scroll down to the end of the report:
“Our review has been restricted by the fact that the Transaction Logs which detail all entries to the system are not available. These logs record transactions but also record user IDs which show who has keyed each entry.
“The usefulness of these reports is reduced significantly by the fact that individual vouchers cannot be traced through to individual entries on the log and therefore cannot be traced to individual user IDs. However we cannot comment further on whether a review of the full available logs may have assisted our investigation in identifying recurring patterns in relation to the entries identified.
“The charges brought against Mr McLaughlin are stated in the following terms:
“‘That you … dishonestly and with a view to you for yourself or another or with the intent to cause loss to another, falsified a document required for an accounting purpose …’
“The inference therefore is that the transactions which are not supported by vouchers have been deliberately created by Mr McLaughlin to ‘cover up’ cash taken by him or another person.
“Our review has identified the following weaknesses in supporting this assertion:
“(i) The differences identified by the review include transactions which have been resulted in cash payments being both over and under stated. The logic of why an individual would create fictitious entries which would require him to lodge money into the system is not apparent. Such differences are more consistent with keying errors or system errors rather than theft.
“(ii) For the entries identified and included in the claim there is no direct evidence to trace these entries to Mr McLaughlin, although clearly the subpostmaster he had ultimate responsibility for the operations of the system.
“(iii) Furthermore based on the restricted logs available for a number of the transactions claimed in the loss, it would appear that Mr McLaughlin made none of the relevant entries for the relevant days.
“(iv) Differences continued and indeed increased after Mr McLaughlin’s departure from the post office. This would suggest that surrounding the cash discrepancies were not directly related to his involvement (at least fully so).”
So looking at those conclusions in the report, the reliability of Horizon was being raised in this report, wasn’t it?
Suzanne Winter: It was.
Ms Price: You mentioned a meeting. Do you recall having a meeting with Mr McLaughlin, his then solicitors, and the forensic accountants who authored this report, as well as senior Post Office Management representatives in around January 2005?
Suzanne Winter: No.
Ms Price: What meeting do you recall?
Suzanne Winter: I recall meeting with a forensic expert. I think it may have been this company, along with one of our auditors and trainers, and it was – the Horizon system was shown to him and explained but that’s the only meeting I recall.
Ms Price: Do you recall discussion at that meeting of concerns about how the Horizon system could have generated a series of transactions independently of Mr McLaughlin or his staff?
Suzanne Winter: No, I don’t recall. I don’t recall this meeting that you’ve mentioned.
Ms Price: But in the context of meeting with the forensic accountants themselves, do you recall discussion of how the system could have led to the conclusions that they’ve reached?
Suzanne Winter: Whenever I met this person, this – the person from the company, he hadn’t produced this report. This was whenever he was investigating. This report had not come out.
Ms Price: What was the Prosecuting Service’s view of this report insofar as they discussed that with you?
Suzanne Winter: Well, fully, it had to be disclosed.
Ms Price: What impact did this report have on the assessment of the case by you, first of all?
Suzanne Winter: Sorry, could you just repeat that?
Ms Price: What impact did this report have on the assessment of the case, first of all, by you; did it impact upon your assessment of the case at all?
Suzanne Winter: No.
Ms Price: Did it impact upon the Prosecuting Service’s view of the case, insofar as they discussed that with you?
Suzanne Winter: I would have discussed this case with the barrister and with the lawyers and, yes, they felt that this report, of course, had to be disclosed but they still decided to progress. It was up to them; it was their decision what – whether it progressed to court or not.
Sir Wyn Williams: Sorry, am I misunderstanding? When you say this report had to be disclosed, my understanding is this report had been disclosed to you by the defence?
Suzanne Winter: No, the report had been disclosed to the prosecution and myself, Sir Wyn.
Sir Wyn Williams: Yeah, sure so it wasn’t a question of either the prosecution or you disclosing it; Ms Price’s questions are addressed to whether or not, putting it bluntly, it made any difference to your view of whether the prosecution should continue.
Suzanne Winter: I understand the question but it was not my decision to have –
Sir Wyn Williams: No, I follow that. But, insofar as you – perhaps you didn’t have an opinion but, insofar as you had an opinion, did it affect your view of whether the prosecution should continue?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, I did have the opinion it should continue.
Sir Wyn Williams: Fine. Right.
Ms Price: Did you share the report with the Post Office or, as it would have been then, the Royal Mail Criminal Law Team?
Suzanne Winter: I’m not sure, because this was not a Criminal Law Team case.
Ms Price: Yes, but in terms of the wider import of this report, did you share it with anyone at all within the Post Office?
Suzanne Winter: That – this would have been shared up to the Head of Security.
Ms Price: You say it would have done.
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: How did it make its way to the Head of Security?
Suzanne Winter: In my case file. You get a Green Jacket case file and John Scott, I know, had sight of that case file.
Ms Price: As far as you’re aware, was that report shared any more widely with anyone outside of the Security Team?
Suzanne Winter: I’m not aware of that. It would have went to the – as we said, the Crown but, within Post Office, that report then would have eventually filtered up to the Head of Security.
Ms Price: Can you recall any steps being taken by the Post Office in response to this report?
Suzanne Winter: No.
Ms Price: That document can come down now. Thank you.
Turning, please, to your involvement in the criminal investigation and prosecution of Maureen McKelvey, Maureen McKelvey was prosecuted for theft, contrary to section 1 of the Theft Act Northern Ireland 1969. The sum that the theft was said to relate to was £4,623.48. The theft was said to have occurred between 1 September 2001 and 21 August 2002. Mrs McKelvey was tried and found not guilty by a majority verdict delivered on 16 September 2004, nonetheless she lost her business and was made bankrupt.
I’d like to start, please, with the interview of Maureen McKelvey, which you conducted with Mr Thorpe as second interviewing officer on 4 April 2002. Could we have that on screen, please. It’s PNI00000001 and it’s page 50 of that document. I don’t think we have the right page here: page 50. That’s it. Thank you.
So we can see here the date, 4 April 2002. You and Mr Thorpe are listed as the interviewing officers. Although Mr Thorpe appears first here, you seem to be listed first in the continued record of tape recorded interview and I think it’s right, isn’t it, that you were, in fact, the Lead Investigator in this case, notwithstanding the order of the names on this?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, that’s right.
Ms Price: Going, please, to page 52. The background to the case is summarised by you about two-thirds of the way down the page, and you say:
“And my friend Mr Thorpe and Mr Kenny, the auditor, we arrived at the office this morning about 8.30 and introduced ourselves to you and I stated to you that I’d asked for a special audit to be conducted this morning at the Clanabogan Post Office because of accounting irregularities reported from Chesterfield. We went into the post office and you opened up, you produced all the cash and stock to the auditor and an audit was conducted by Mr Kenny and you were present during the audit. You were also advised of your legal rights and that we’d be interviewing you on tape recorder once the audit had been conducted. I also explained to you that the office would be closed and would remain closed until our enquiries had been completed. You were also advised you could have legal representation or phone someone from the Federation.”
Going then, please, to page 54. The third question on this page is from you:
“So if you can just talk me, and if you come towards the end of the week and you’re doing your cash account.”
“Answer: That’s Wednesday yeah.
“Question: How do you go about preparing everything for your cash account.
“Answer: On the Wednesday?
“Question: Yes.”
Then Maureen McKelvey very gives an account and she says:
“Well usually we try to, we’re supposed to close at 12.30 but we don’t really get closed because in the country community people keep coming, you’re trying to do your audit now. Garry Groogan was in with me on one of the days when I was trying to do my audit and he realised, you know, that people do still keep coming and expect you to serve them or take stuff off them while you’re doing it and you do that because it’s expected of you, that’s the way it’s always been and you try to audit and do everything, you know, put everything out to go through it at different stages on the computer and bring it all to a balance now it doesn’t always balance first time as we all know, you might have to go through the stuff again and check it all and redo, you know, some of it, but that’s normal procedure and you try to balance as close to it as you can also we have an account with Camphill Community which they buy a lot of stamps, they post a lot of parcels to foreign countries and we put money down on their account for them for the stuff they get out of the Post Office so we have to try to work between each week to what they have got, you know, out in postage or stamps and try and, if you’re short, that’s probably where it is, you go and look. It’s probably where it is at the end or you’ve made a mistake and you have to go back and check it, which I always do. But some weeks if I’m out, the next week it usually balances itself out, you know, it’s neither big amounts here or there. I know it will balance itself out and I’m happy enough with that [because] I’m the ones who’s doing it and I know if it’s a mistake made, I know I have made it and just a simple mistake and it will all sort itself out the following week but that’s the way I do to the best of my ability and I don’t do anything wrong as far as I see.”
So Maureen McKelvey was telling you here that she sometimes had trouble balancing but that, where she couldn’t find the cause, she would expect it to balance out the next week; is that right?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: This interview was taking place less than a year after you interviewed Mr McLaughlin. Did what Maureen McKelvey was telling you here, that you didn’t always balance first time, that you could be short, you’d look for the reason why, you’d expect it to come out in the wash, in essence, did you link this at all to what Mr McLaughlin had told you in his interview, in particular about his problems balancing with the Horizon system?
Suzanne Winter: No, because Mr McLaughlin’s problems with balancing was due to staff dishonesty.
Ms Price: Going, please, to page 76 of this document. This is the second section of the record of tape recorded interview, following a short break after the first part of the interview, and about a third of the way down the page, we have:
“Question: Just before the completion of the interview I just want to confirm a conversation that I had with Mrs McKelvey this morning where Mrs McKelvey you produced a bundle of 12 paid pension and allowance foils with an adlist paper clipped around them and the date on the adlist was 4 May 2001 timed at 17.52 and it was cash account period 07 and you had stated to me that you had found the bundle of foils last week in an envelope under the counter in the Post Office; is that correct?
“Answer: Yes.
“Question: You also stated to me you had intended to contact the Post Office to advise how you were going to get rid of the bundles of foils and because of the Easter period as yet you hadn’t contacted anyone, is that correct?
“Answer: Yes”, and goes on to talk about that.
Then about two-thirds of the way down the page, we have from Mr Thorpe:
“FT: We can have with us (paper rustling) the foils to be checked to date would you like to examine those foils again, that’s with the tape record off whilst you do that, if you would like to examine them in any way.”
“Answer: No.
“Question: To see if there’s anything on there that you can suggest there has been a problem.
“Answer: Are these foils wrong, you’re saying, these are the ones from …”
You say:
“From this schedule.”
“Answer: No, that’s okay. No, they’re okay.”
Scrolling down, Mr Thorpe says:
“Week 48 there, just you know.
“Answer: If it’s there it’s there like, I can’t, you’re saying it’s on the paper, that’s it.”
You ask:
“Have you anything else you’d like to say Mrs McKelvey before we conclude the interview?”
Then over the page:
“Answer: Yes I do believe I did everything to the best of my ability, I’ve been doing this for 11 years and I done it right, if there’s been an error on the computer?? I’ve just done that, I didn’t mean to do it, that’s all I can say.”
So Mrs McKelvey had been saying that she was content, she wouldn’t find an issue with the paper copies of the documents themselves, that’s right isn’t it, towards the end of the bottom of the last page; is that your understanding of what she was saying?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: But here, this reference to error on the computer, given what Maureen McKelvey had told you towards the start of the interview, about sometimes having trouble balancing, not being able to balance first time, did this give you any pause, again particularly since this was not the first subpostmaster who had raised the general point about having trouble balancing on the Horizon system?
Suzanne Winter: At that stage of the interview, from what I recall from the papers I’ve received, the documents I’ve received, Mrs McKelvey had been saying that she’d had no bother balancing and that, if she had any problems, she would have contacted John McKenny. So it wasn’t really a highlight, because she had said previously, I think, during the interview, that she’d had no problems balancing and, as we had always been told, the Fujitsu system was reliable.
Ms Price: Does it follow that, after the interview, you didn’t discuss the relevance or otherwise of either the difficulties of balancing in general or this reference to the error on the computer with any colleagues or seniors to see if anyone else was struggling?
Suzanne Winter: It was always discussed. The Horizon computer system would have been discussed between other members of my team, whenever – I’m saying the North Team, you – or even with Auditors, with Trainers, we would have discussed the Horizon system. And I remember I challenged the Horizon system on a number of occasions, where the subpostmaster had said to me that everything was okay, I had done the investigation of all the items that I would investigate and I could see no problem and I would have asked what about the Fujitsu system, especially on one occasion whenever I had problems myself with my own computer, and someone was able to go in remotely, and fix my computer.
And this was the first time I’d ever seen something like this happening, and I raised the question, I remember clearly raising the question with Casework: can Horizon be accessed remotely because I could not find out what was wrong in an office; and they said no.
So, at all times, whenever you were interviewing, you were thinking that the computer was 100 per cent reliable.
Ms Price: Can you recall when you raised that question of casework?
Suzanne Winter: I would have said – I know where I was sitting in an office, I moved office location, but I remember it would have been sitting in the Royal Mail House in Belfast. So it may have been about maybe 2006, 2007. I was surprised that this could be done and I immediately thought about Horizon and could this be remotely accessed and they said no. And you have to remember, I’m being told no by the Post Office, who is the Government, and you just – it just did not enter into your head that this was the wrong information.
Ms Price: Did you consider requesting audit data from Fujitsu following the interview with Maureen McKelvey?
Suzanne Winter: I do not recall. When was that? 2002. I don’t recall.
Ms Price: In August 2004, some further documents relevant to Maureen McKelvey’s case were sent by the PSNI to the PPS. Could we have on screen, please, PNI00000001. If I can just give you another reference, please, another version of this. PNI00000001_071.
This is a covering letter to the documentation I just referred to, the further documents provided in August 2004. It is a letter dated 16 August 2004 to the PPS, scrolling down, please from the PSNI, and it says:
“Please find attached further documentation for your information as to disclosure.”
Going forwards, please, to page 14, there is here a handwritten letter from Maureen McKelvey which says this:
“Dear Sir/Madam
“The Icon for Return of Com Loose Coins were gone off the screen when I went to return them. 10/10/01. I had to balance or take loss of £120. In [something] Helpdesk told me to write to you to claim back £120.
“Yours sincerely Maureen McKelvey.”
So Ms McKelvey appears to have been reporting here an error which appears to have caused a balancing issue, doesn’t she?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Ms Price: We have then on page 19, a table of helpline calls made from Maureen McKelvey’s branch. On page 20, please, we have three entries down, an entry on 16 January 2002, which says, “Discrepancy” and then “Description”:
“Wanting to make a discrepancy good over £100. TP have informed them due to showing the loss on the cash account last week to make good this week – not taken out of suspense yet.”
Then:
“Advised how to take out and to put the shortage amount to cover in the system which will tie it up when balancing.”
Then going to page 22, please, we have an entry on 10 October 2001. The problem text says:
“PM reports a minus figure of [minus] £120 on their balance snapshot but the correct figure of £120 in adjust stock.
“Closure text
“Call closed by Simon Davies: pm has minus figure showing when she goes to balance report for commemorative coins – trans to NBSC as not sure if they have been withdrawn from the system.”
Then over the page, an entry on 16 January 2002:
“PM has discrepancy of over £100 which she wants to make good.”
That’s transferred to NBSC, which may well be linked to the call we were looking at before.
So there were a number of calls, we can see, from these tables, from Maureen McKelvey’s branch reporting balancing problems or discrepancies, weren’t there?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, discrepancies, yes.
Ms Price: Given when this documentation was being provided, so August 2004, can we take it that this documentation was not obtained by you in your initial investigation but later, for the trial?
Suzanne Winter: I don’t recall.
Ms Price: Well, you told us before that you would give everything that you obtained in your investigation, in effect, to PSNI and then onward to PPS, so presumably had you obtained helpline call logs like these, or documents relating to reports or complaints relating to discrepancies, they would have appeared in your original file and that would have gone earlier, not in 2004, to the police and the prosecuting service; is that right?
Suzanne Winter: That’s right. That is right, but I just cannot – you’ve asked me to recall did I send that? I can’t actually recall it, but I would like to think I did.
Ms Price: Had you seen these documents at the time of your initial investigation, assuming for a moment that they were obtained for the first time in August 2004, would that have altered your view of the case at all, that there had been reports of discrepancies?
Suzanne Winter: No, I don’t think it would have altered my view of the case.
Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, PNI00000001_082.
Sir Wyn Williams: While that’s being done, Ms Price, we normally finish at about now on a Friday. What’s your plan, so to speak?
Ms Price: Sir, I have about another five minutes, if that, of my questions. That’s the only reason I hadn’t suggested a break so far.
Sir Wyn Williams: Then are there Core Participant questions?
Ms Price: There are Core Participant questions, yes, sir. Judging by the discussions I’ve had so far, I would think about 20 minutes.
Sir Wyn Williams: Okay. Well, can I just tell everyone that I’ll be looking to finish shortly after 3.30 and I’m happy to go on until then because we lost half an hour this morning but, after that, I’ll be looking to finish. So people should tailor their questions accordingly.
Ms Price: Thank you, sir.
We can see this is a covering letter to your report produced to the PSNI and ultimately the PPS in Maureen McKelvey’s case. It’s dated January 2004, so scrolling down, “This file refers to a theft from the post office”, and that’s the covering letter from the police. Scrolling up to the top, please, to the legal registrar. Then going to page 4, please, we have the actual report.
Scrolling down, please, we have your name next to Mr Thorpe’s name as Team Leader, and the date of the report is December: date report submitted, December 2002.
Going, please, to page 7 about halfway down the page you give an account of the case and, starting “The Paid Order Unit”, I’m just going to let you cast an eye down that, rather than reading it all out, for time reasons.
Then going down to the bottom, please. We get to penultimate paragraph, the interview, and at the bottom you say:
“McKelvey could or would not offer a reason for the discrepancies and stated she had done everything to the best of your ability.”
Over the page, please:
“At the conclusion of the interview McKelvey was informed further checks needed to be completed of the pension and allowance … McKelvey and Atherton were invite to observe the checking of the outstanding pensions add allowance pouches.”
Scrolling down, please, you’ll see:
“McKelvey offered no explanation regarding the additional overclaims identified.
“McKelvey has made no admissions of guilt in this matter and states she has done everything to the best of her ability.
“The discrepancies summarised on the pension schedule indicate it is due to deliberate action and not error and McKelvey is the only person with the appropriate access and opportunity.
“Maureen McKelvey has rendered herself liable to prosecution and in view of the availability of evidence to support such actions these papers are forwarded for authorisation to prosecute.”
You do not mention here, do you, the references to balancing issues and the reference to computer error in the interview. Can you help with why not?
Suzanne Winter: That report there is regarding the whole investigation and, if you listen to the whole tape transcript, the computer was not – I’m trying to think what way you would say this – that the computer did not seem to be at fault because what was actually happening was a human – a person putting the information into the computer.
Ms Price: You reached a conclusion that Maureen McKelvey had rendered herself liable to prosecution. Were you applying any particular test in reaching that conclusion?
Suzanne Winter: The test was that the whole investigation was based around foils being counted by a person and that person entering the information into the system. It wasn’t that the system was doing something. It was a human being that was doing something.
Ms Price: At paragraph 70 of your statement, you say, in essence, that, that Mrs McKelvey’s case relied heavily on paper vouchers, foils and cash requests and deliveries rather than Horizon discrepancies. But it’s right, isn’t it, that the defence raised Horizon integrity issues at trial; do you remember that?
Suzanne Winter: No, perhaps could you remind me?
Ms Price: Well, let’s start with a letter from Mrs McKelvey’s solicitor dated 22 July 2004. This is a letter seeking secondary disclosure and that’s PNI00000001_073. Looking, please, at paragraph 2, this is a request. It appears to be what prompted disclosure of the documents we looked at earlier in August 2004. At 2:
“Disclosure of all records held by the Post Office Limited Investigations Unit, Social Security Agency … of a report in the second half of 2001 by Mrs McKelvey to Garry Groogan … in relation to problems with the Horizon computer system.”
So they’re seeking that. Then at paragraph 3:
“Disclosure of all records relating to the reporting of problems encountered at Clanabogan Post Office following the suspension of Mrs McKelvey in relation to the Horizon computer system.”
So disclosure was being sought, in essence, in relation to problems with the Horizon system. So do you recall that being a part of Mrs McKelvey’s case?
Suzanne Winter: No, I’m sorry, I don’t recall that.
Ms Price: Okay. Having seen that and being aware that it was a part of Mrs McKelvey’s case, albeit that you can’t recall that now, do you accept that your characterisation of Mrs McKelvey’s case as not relying on Horizon discrepancies is not quite right?
Suzanne Winter: No, because it wasn’t Horizon discrepancies. The case of Mrs –
Sir Wyn Williams: I think we are going round in circles now, really.
Ms Price: Yes, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: As interesting as it may be, I don’t think Ms Winter’s characterisation of the case is what is at the heart of this now, is it?
Ms Price: Sir, that was the last of my topics for Ms Winter.
So I will hand over to Core Participants, given the time.
Sir Wyn Williams: Thank you.
Ms Price: Mr Moloney is first, sir.
Questioned by Mr Moloney
Mr Moloney: Thank you very much.
Ms Winter, I have just two topics for you. The first is this: did PSNI rely on Post Office employees, such as you, for assistance as to the operation of accounting procedures in Post Office branches?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Mr Moloney: So you were one of the people who provided that type of assistance to PSNI?
Suzanne Winter: I would have provided that assistance plus my Team Leader.
Mr Moloney: Yes, that’s the first topic.
The second topic is this: you first said at about 10.45 this morning that “We were told that the system was 100 per cent reliable”, and you’ve explained that you were told at the training college and that was reinforced by Senior Managers and you’ve repeated that a number of times today, yes?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Mr Moloney: Just looking at Mr McLaughlin’s case, whatever you may say about the interview – and I don’t propose to debate the merits or otherwise of your analysis of that interview – you’d received a defence statement which put Horizon reliability front and centre, it said that documents were altered to deal with discrepancies without any dishonesty. This was said in that defence statement at a time when nobody could say there was a Horizon bandwagon in existence; would you agree with that?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Mr Moloney: You had a report from the forensic accountants McClure Walters that showed that there were negative entries in the accounts for which Mr McLaughlin would have no in incentive. He would, in effect, have been defrauding himself, yes?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Mr Moloney: The authors suggested that the entries might be due to ongoing inaccuracies in the computer system. There were also discrepancies that continued after Mr McLaughlin had left the Brookfield branch and Mr McLaughlin could not have carried out all the transactions. I just want to ask you about that report. Did that report from the forensic accountants not cause you to question whether the system was 100 per cent reliable?
Suzanne Winter: It did ask me to question myself. But it also – I also questioned some of that report.
Mr Moloney: Of course. Did you ever, when you questioned Horizon in that way, the 100 per cent reliability, did you seek assistance as to the significance of those findings before the prosecution continued and, when I say significance, from Fujitsu or from technical experts that Post Office could contact?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, from Fujitsu.
Mr Moloney: You requested – you requested permission – assistance from Fujitsu, did you?
Suzanne Winter: There would have been a statement would have been requested from Fujitsu because I do remember that, at the time that I requested a statement, I was told by Casework that they didn’t think a statement existed from Fujitsu and it would take a while to get that statement.
Mr Moloney: Did you get a statement, Ms Winter?
Suzanne Winter: Because I’ve – from what I can recall, from that – I remember discussing this report with the Director of Public Prosecutions and it was him that said we would need to have a statement because of this defence from Mr McLaughlin; we would need a statement from Fujitsu.
Mr Moloney: Did you get one?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Mr Moloney: You are saying you got a statement from Fujitsu?
Suzanne Winter: If the DPP had asked for a statement, it would have to be produced.
Mr Moloney: Now, you said your file was sent to Post Office, yes?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Mr Moloney: You said Mr Scott would have had it?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, because I do remember at the time of what was Second Sight, which was – well, Second Sight, on my files, past files were all asked to go to John Scott personally.
Mr Moloney: Right. So it’s at that time you think Mr Scott would have had it?
Suzanne Winter: Not at the time, Mr – I’m saying that, later on, all our files went to Mr Scott.
Mr Moloney: At the time of Second Sight?
Suzanne Winter: And one of –
Mr Moloney: Head of Security in 2005 was Mr Marsh, yes?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Mr Moloney: Did Mr Marsh get it?
Suzanne Winter: No, I can only remember sending all the files to John Scott personally. They had to go to him personally.
Mr Moloney: Right. So at the time of Mr McLaughlin’s proceedings, did you send this report to Post Office Security senior levels?
Suzanne Winter: That report would have went into Casework and it would have went into my file and then your files are examined and I suppose I would have assumed that Casework would have passed that on.
Mr Moloney: Did you flag the report as raising interesting issues when you sent it?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Mr Moloney: You did?
Suzanne Winter: I flagged the report with my line manager at the time, I mean, it was – the statement coming through, yes.
Mr Moloney: Who was your line manager at the time, Ms Winter?
Suzanne Winter: That would – it may have been Les Thorpe, or –
Mr Moloney: Mr Thorpe’s left Post Office in January 2003. This will have been February 2005 when the proceedings against Mr McLaughlin finished.
Suzanne Winter: It may have been Dave Pardoe –
Mr Moloney: Did anybody –
Suzanne Winter: – or –
Mr Moloney: – contact you about it, Ms Winter?
Suzanne Winter: Pardon?
Mr Moloney: Did anybody contact you about the report when you flagged it?
Suzanne Winter: I don’t recall.
Mr Moloney: But, just to be clear, you’re sure that Post Office had been sent the forensic accountant report from McClure Walters about the case of Alan McLaughlin before Lee Castleton’s case was heard in the High Court in 2006?
Suzanne Winter: I wouldn’t recall dates, I’m sorry.
Mr Moloney: Well –
Suzanne Winter: It would have went – this report would have went higher up, because of what it was stating.
Mr Moloney: Because Mr McLaughlin pleaded guilty in February 2005. Did you wait until 2007 to send this report to Post Office or did you send it in 2005?
Suzanne Winter: It would have went in 2005.
Mr Moloney: Thank you very much, Ms Winter.
Sir Wyn Williams: Mr Moloney, can I ask you and Ms Price as well, do we actually know whether or not a statement from Fujitsu was obtained in this case?
Mr Moloney: We haven’t seen one, sir, but we’ll check the detail and come back to you with that.
Ms Price: Sir, I haven’t seen one either, if that helps.
Sir Wyn Williams: Well, I’d rather assumed that but I don’t think it should be a secret, so to speak, what’s going on. All right.
Mr Moloney: Thank you.
Sir Wyn Williams: Mr Jacobs, yes?
Questioned by Mr Jacobs
Mr Jacobs: It’s me next, sir.
Ms Winter, I act for four ladies: Maureen McKelvey, who sits next to me; Deidre Connolly, who sits behind me; Katherine McAlerney, who sits behind me and Heather Earley who sits behind me. You were the Lead Investigator in Ms Connolly’s case and Ms McAlerney’s case and you were involved in Ms Earley’s case.
But I want to ask you about Mrs McKelvey and, in relation to her interview, Ms Price took you to part of the end of the first tape in her interview which took place on 4 April 2002. I don’t want to put the document on screen. I’ll read out what we saw before.
So right at the end of the interview, you asked:
“Have you anything else you’d like to say Mrs McKelvey before we conclude the interview?”
She said:
“Yes, I do believe I did everything to the best of my ability, I’ve been doing it for 11 years and I’ve done it right.”
Then:
“If there’s been an error on the computer?? I’ve just done that, I didn’t mean to do it, that’s all I can say.”
Then you didn’t ask any more questions about the computer, you just said:
“Here’s a notice advising you what will happen to the tapes.”
Now, I want to go to your investigation report and, again, I’m not going to ask for this to go up on the screen, for reasons of time and because we’ve seen it already.
When you are summarising to the Northern Ireland Police Service your investigation, you say:
“McKelvey could not or would not offer a reason for the discrepancies and stated that she had done everything to the best of your ability.”
Then it stops. Now, what she said in her interview, and this is the bit that you’re summarising is:
“I believe I did everything to the best of my ability, I’ve been doing it for 11 years, I think I’ve done it right but there’s a problem, there’s probably been a problem on the computer”, words to that effect.
Now, you didn’t give the full quote. You omitted from your investigation report what she had expressly said in the interview when you were summarising that interview. That’s right, isn’t it, and why did you do that?
Suzanne Winter: This was a summary of my report in the way that I had been directed by the police because the police advised me how to do that report and that everything then would be produced, the tape transcript, statements for everyone to read, rather than taking a summary of my report.
Mr Jacobs: All right, so in your summary of the report, you deliberately, because you say the police told you to do this, left out what Mrs McKelvey told you about the computer; is that what you’re saying?
Suzanne Winter: No, that’s not what I’m saying.
Mr Jacobs: Could we go, please, to Mrs McKelvey’s witness statement, and this is in relation to what happened at her trial. So it’s WITN03700100. If we could go, please, to paragraphs 37 to 44 and that’s at page 6 of the document. So this is Mrs McKelvey’s account of her trial. She says:
“In 2006, my case came to trial at Dungannon Court in Northern Ireland. I had to attend court for a full week. I was still on a lot of medication at this point because my health was not good.
“My experience in the court was dreadful. I had to sit and listen to all of the evidence the Post Office had against me, and it was clear in their eyes I was not worthy of the Post Office.”
Then, significantly, she says:
“The way the Post Office tried my case was by asking me to pick out a number of days at random that according to them I had balanced wrong and so owed the Post Office money.”
Over to paragraph 40, please:
“They went through all the evidence and marked up everything they thought I’d done wrong.
“However, it just so happened that one of the days I picked out was actually a balance that I did not do but was still short. I was able to prove that I had not carry out the balance on that particular day because my son had an accident and I had to take him to hospital. So a man named Garry Groogan …”
Pausing there, he was the Area Manager in Omagh, wasn’t he?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Mr Jacobs: “… who was employed by the Post Office and was the manager of the Omagh Post Office did the balance in my office that day.
“My solicitor pointed this out to the court, and we were able to prove that Garry had carried out the balance, because he did it in a red pen and used a completely different method to me but it still came out short.”
So, effectively, one of the incidents of theft, of stealing, that Mrs McKelvey was accused of, had actually been carried out by the Area Manager while she wasn’t in the branch. That’s the long and the short of it.
Then at 43:
“It was at this point that the judge and jury realised what the Post Office was trying to do, and you could see that the judge was less than impressed by the Post Office now. The judge took a very dim view of what the Post Office had done.
“If I had not spotted that Garry had done the balance that day, I would have no doubt that I would have been looking at jail time.”
Now, to be fair to you, this was something that you spotted in the interview; do you recall that?
Suzanne Winter: No, I don’t recall.
Mr Jacobs: Can we go, please, very quickly, to that interview, PNI00000001_062 and it’s page 86 of 304, on the pdf, it’s probably one of the longest documents we’ve had to look at, but page 86.
It’s at 12.46, just waiting for it to come on the screen. I’ll try and get through this quickly because it’s a simple point. I just want to show you that you raised it. 12.46, please, great. So you say:
“Why I’m asking, I’m showing you copies of the updated pension schedule dated 21 May …”
Then you go on to say:
“My interest why anybody had covered for you, if we go to the final page of the summary …”
Then you talk about week 32, halfway down the page:
“I’ve indicated it W prepared differently to other weeks compared to the way, week 32 was week ending 31 October 2001 …”
Then you go on to say:
“It just seems strange.”
Ms McKelvey says:
“Prepared differently from other weeks, red tick on list.”
You asked her if anything came to mind and it was Hallowe’en.
Then, over the page, please. You say, just before 15.51 that there was a little red tick on that schedule which indicated someone else different had done the pensions because that’s not the way they were normally presented.
Then over the page, please, again, at 17.17, Maureen McKelvey says:
“Would that have been the week that we had the errors and I got Garry out?”
She goes on to say:
“That seems like Garry or someone has checked all the bundles or something. There was a week that, so hard to remember …”
So we can take that off the screen now. So what we’ve got here is we’ve got you, raising that week 32 had been done differently to all the other weeks where there were discrepancies. Can you see that you raised that?
Suzanne Winter: That’s right.
Mr Jacobs: Now could we go back to the investigation report which is at PNI00000001_082, and it’s page 8 in the pdf.
Very grateful to the person who is putting this up on the screen, it’s a long document. Great.
So if we go to the end of that document, please, and scrolling down. Okay, so we can see here:
“The discrepancies summarised on the pension schedule indicate it is due to deliberate action and not error and McKelvey is the only person with the appropriate access and opportunity.”
Then you go and say:
“Maureen McKelvey has rendered herself liable to prosecution …”
Now, my question for you is: can you see that you are misrepresenting the fact that it was thought that someone else had done one of the discrepancies? Why didn’t this go in the investigation report, Ms Winter?
Suzanne Winter: Because this was a summary.
Mr Jacobs: So it’s the same answer: you didn’t think this was something – even though we now know that’s the basis of the acquittal, you didn’t think this was something that should go in your investigation report to inform the Police Service whether to charge my client?
Suzanne Winter: I would like to ask, was that the basis of the acquittal?
Sir Wyn Williams: Well, I think nobody knows that, with respect to you all.
Suzanne Winter: That’s what I mean, that it was the –
Sir Wyn Williams: So –
Mr Jacobs: Yes, well, my client’s evidence is that that was the basis.
Sir Wyn Williams: Well –
Mr Jacobs: I don’t want to get into an argument, of course.
Sir Wyn Williams: Excuse me, can I just ask, was this a jury trial?
Mr Jacobs: Yes.
Sir Wyn Williams: Well, I think that’s enough to answer the question, Mr Jacobs.
Mr Jacobs: In relation to that trial, you have said in your statement at paragraph 59, that you have no direct recollection of the case; is that right?
Suzanne Winter: Direct recollection of the investigation or of the court case?
Mr Jacobs: You say:
“I do not have any direct recollection of this case and therefore I can only rely on what is contained in the documents provided to me with the request.”
Suzanne Winter: That’s right. I’ve read all the documents that have been sent to me.
Mr Jacobs: Now, my client finds that difficult to believe, and I’ll tell you why, and I’m going to ask you a series of questions. Do you recall that you attended every day of that four-day trial in September 2004?
Suzanne Winter: I recall – I recall going to court.
Mr Jacobs: Do you recall you gave –
Suzanne Winter: I recall my witnesses and I believe it was – Charlie Mckay was the barrister.
Mr Jacobs: Do you recall that you gave evidence as a prosecution witness?
Suzanne Winter: I recall giving evidence; I don’t recall what evidence but I do recall giving evidence.
Mr Jacobs: Do you recall that, after the jury returned their Not Guilty verdict that the trial judge, Judge McFarland made number of comments that were very critical of the conduct of the Post Office?
Suzanne Winter: I don’t recall.
Mr Jacobs: My client says that the judge said in open court and in the presence of the jury and your presence that the Post Office case had been a sham; does that ring any bells?
Suzanne Winter: No.
Mr Jacobs: He said:
“The Post Office case was just as much of a sham as its rebranded new image of the nation’s most trusted brand.”
Do you recall the judge saying that?
Suzanne Winter: I recall the judge saying at the beginning of the case that was this case being presented by Post Office or Consignia?
Mr Jacobs: Do you recall the judge telling you and your team that the jury had been right to return a Not Guilty verdict?
Suzanne Winter: No.
Mr Jacobs: Do you recall the judge saying that the Post Office had been trying to trap Mrs McKelvey into pleading guilty?
Suzanne Winter: Absolutely not. I do remember the jury was out for quite some time.
Mr Jacobs: Mrs McKelvey says that the judge told her that she could leave the court with her head held high and never have to look back at the Post Office again; do you remember that?
Suzanne Winter: No, I’m sorry, I don’t recall.
Mr Jacobs: Mrs McKelvey says that you were visibly devastated at the outcome and you had your head in your hands whilst this was going on; does that ring any bells?
Suzanne Winter: That would be definitely not.
Mr Jacobs: Coming towards the end of my questions, sir.
We’ve heard evidence from Rob Wilson, who was the Head of Criminal Law at the Post Office, that there would be a review when the Post Office lost a case; is that something that you know?
Suzanne Winter: No.
Mr Jacobs: There wasn’t a review here, was there?
Suzanne Winter: I don’t recall.
Mr Jacobs: An acquittal in 2004, based, we say, on the Horizon system not working at the branch, would have had an impact on future cases going forward, would you agree with that?
Suzanne Winter: Yes.
Mr Jacobs: You didn’t flag up the problems that Mrs McKelvey raised with the computer system in your investigation report; you didn’t flag up the issue with Mrs McKelvey being absent from the Post Office when one of the incidents of theft was supposed to have taken place. In your statement, you give a general apology to those who were affected by the Post Office scandal. Do you have any apology to make to Mrs McKelvey?
Suzanne Winter: As I’ve said in my statement, I am devastated, actually, by the way that this whole – has been revealed. I trusted the Post Office. It was the Government. I’d worked for them all my life, practically. I just could not believe the deceitfulness and I am so sorry for anyone who was wrongfully prosecuted because of this system.
Mr Jacobs: Coming to the end of my questions. You took a robust line. We’ve seen in a document that you had a target in 2013. Was there a target in 2004?
Suzanne Winter: No, I don’t recall. I don’t recall that at all.
Mr Jacobs: You’ve said in your statement – and this is my final question to you – that you feel that your work has been tarnished because those higher up in the Post Office didn’t tell you what was going on.
Suzanne Winter: Absolutely.
Mr Jacobs: You’ve said that you would like the Inquiry to find out what went wrong and what happened?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, and I think it’s gone on for far too long.
Mr Jacobs: You named John Scott, earlier on in your evidence today, as someone who was saying that the Horizon system was robust in a conference. Are you able to assist the Inquiry by giving the names of anybody else who ought to have told you what was going on with the Horizon system?
Suzanne Winter: No, and whenever I say John Scott it is because he was Head of Security. Other people would have said similar. From the training school, we were told the Horizon system, but they always did emphasise Fujitsu, that Fujitsu had said that this system was 100 per cent reliable.
Mr Jacobs: I’ve been asked – sorry.
Suzanne Winter: I cannot put names because that would be – I cannot recall for definite. I would know at conference, with John Scott, that that would have been where we would have discussed or they would have had some programme about Fujitsu.
Mr Jacobs: I have been asked to ask you one final question. As I said at the beginning, I have four clients who flew from Belfast yesterday, they’re Maureen McKelvey, Deirdre Connolly, Katherine McAlerney and Heather Earley. They say that, collectively, they’ve spent 64 years fighting for justice. You were involved in all of their cases. With that in mind, do you have anything that you want to say to them today?
Suzanne Winter: Yes, I was involved in their cases but I would like to think I did everything to the best of my ability. Information that I had not been received by the people and the executives from above; what I know now is completely different to what I knew then.
Mr Jacobs: Just one final question I’ve been asked: are you going to say you’re sorry to my clients?
Suzanne Winter: Of course I would say sorry to anybody who has been put through what I can only imagine is a nightmare, but I did not know of any problem with the Horizon system.
Can I now say something?
Sir Wyn Williams: Have you finished asking questions, Mr Jacobs, first of all?
Mr Jacobs: I have and I’m sorry if I overran a bit.
Sir Wyn Williams: That’s fine.
Before you say what you want to say – because you can have the last word here, Ms Winter – does anyone else want to ask questions?
Ms Price: There are no other questions from Core Participants, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Right. Then please, Ms Winter, say what you want to say.
Suzanne Winter: I just want to say there, whenever we were talking about Mrs McKelvey, I read through all the core statements of anyone involved in Northern Ireland and I just wanted to point out where she had said that the person investigating had approached her twice after the investigation. I just want people to know, whenever I was involved in a criminal investigation, if a solicitor was involved, I was not able to approach anyone unless through their solicitor. So I – that would not have been me approaching Mrs McKelvey after the investigation.
Sir Wyn Williams: Right. Is that it, Ms Price?
Ms Price: Yes, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Right, well, thank you, Ms Winter, for making yourself available to give evidence during the course of today. I’m grateful.
I hope that those Core Participants who have travelled to London to be in person at the Inquiry have found today’s proceedings informative and I wish them a good journey home. We’ll reconvene again on Tuesday, when we will continue investigating events in Northern Ireland. I think that’s correct, is it not?
Ms Price: That’s correct, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Thank you all very much.
Ms Price: Thank you.
(3.44 pm)
(The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am on Tuesday, 30 January 2024)