Official hearing page

13 December 2023 – Christopher Knight and Kevin Ryan

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(10.00 am)

Ms Price: Good morning, sir. Can you see and hear us?

Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, I can, thank you.

Ms Price: Sir, may we please call Mr Knight.

Announcement re Evidence of Martin Smith

Sir Wyn Williams: Just before you do that, I need to make a public announcement. Yesterday I caused the Inquiry Team to notify Mr Smith, who was due to give evidence tomorrow, and Core Participants, that it would not be possible for Mr Smith to give his evidence on account of there being significant disclosure of documents over the last number of days, which were relevant to his evidence.

I want to stress publicly that the members of the Inquiry Team are working extremely hard to ensure that, when they are faced with late disclosure, they assess the relevance of the documents in the hope that a witness to whom the documents relate will be able to give evidence as scheduled. In most instances, happily, that has occurred.

However, as everyone now knows, from time to time that is not possible and it was not possible in Mr Smith’s case to deal with upwards, as I understand it, of 700 documents in the time available between the disclosure of those documents and Mr Smith’s evidence tomorrow.

As I have said repeatedly, fairness demands that witnesses see relevant documents in good time to digest them and understand them before they give their evidence to the Inquiry.

As it happens, no great damage has been caused by this latest episode, save for the loss of one day of the Inquiry’s time, because Mr Smith can return at a later stage, as was always anticipated that he would, and so instead of his giving evidence over two days, his evidence will be given over one day at some suitable date in the New Year.

Thank you, Ms Price. Over to you.

Ms Price: Thank you, sir.

Christopher Knight

CHRISTOPHER GRANVILLE KNIGHT (sworn).

Questioned by Ms Price

Ms Price: Good morning, Mr Knight. My name is Emma Price and, as you know, I will be asking you questions on behalf of the Inquiry. Could you confirm your full name, please.

Christopher Knight: It’s Christopher Granville Knight.

Ms Price: Thank you for coming to the Inquiry to assist it in its work and for providing a statement in advance of today. You should have in front of you a hard copy of that statement. It is dated 23 October 2023. Do you have that statement?

Christopher Knight: I do, yes.

Ms Price: If you turn to page 41 of that, please –

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: – you should have a copy with a visible signature; is that right?

Christopher Knight: Correct.

Ms Price: Is that your signature?

Christopher Knight: It is, yes.

Ms Price: Are the contents of that statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

Christopher Knight: Yes, they are.

Ms Price: For the purposes of the transcript the reference for the statement is WITN08290100.

Starting, please, Mr Knight, with an overview of your career at the Post Office, you’ve worked for the Post Office since 1983; is that right?

Christopher Knight: That’s correct.

Ms Price: You remain employed by the Post Office today?

Christopher Knight: I do, yes.

Ms Price: In the last 40 years you have held a range of roles including Postal Officer roles, various investigator roles and now a role within the Intelligence Team; is that right?

Christopher Knight: That’s correct.

Ms Price: You say in your statement that in 1997, you applied and were promoted within the Post Office Investigation Department from a Postal Officer role to an Assistant Investigation Officer; is that right?

Christopher Knight: That’s correct.

Ms Price: You held this role until the year 2000?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: What kind of investigations were you involved in when you held this Assistant Investigation Officer role?

Christopher Knight: It was working for the Post Office Investigation Department, which was a sort of corporate Investigation Department that sat over the business and, initially, I was in a team, and the first enquiries we did was regarding postage, we used postage stamps, counterfeit stamps, things like that. And then I moved on to a team, I think there was six of us and we looked at losses of Special Delivery items over the Royal Mail Network, so it sort of covered the country.

Ms Price: You say in your statement that, when you were in this role, the Post Office Investigation Department underwent a structure change and changed its name to the Post Office Security and Investigation Service. How did your role change when these structural and name changes came in?

Christopher Knight: There was the name change, that was a major change, and then I think it was in 2000 there was options to move into other parts of the business, and I ended up moving to a newly formed part of the business called Cash Handling and Distribution which was an amalgamation of the Cash Centres and the in-house Cash In Transit business.

Ms Price: When you moved into that role, you say you were a Lead Investigator; is that right?

Christopher Knight: I think I was the only – I think there was two of us who went over, we were the only Investigators. The previous or the current, as it were, Security Managers were physical Security Managers.

Ms Price: Is it right that your investigations in this role focused on possible criminal offences, involving the in-house Cash in Transit Service and Cash Centre staff?

Christopher Knight: Yes, that’s correct.

Ms Price: You say the role soon became one of physical security; is that right?

Christopher Knight: It became, yeah, dual yeah.

Ms Price: You stayed in this role until around 2003 –

Christopher Knight: 2003/2004, I think, yes.

Ms Price: – at which point you took up a role as an Investigator for the Post Office, investigating possible criminal offences within the network?

Christopher Knight: That’s correct.

Ms Price: This related to both directly managed branches, formally Crown Office branches –

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: – and also the Branch Network; is that right?

Christopher Knight: That’s correct.

Ms Price: Your job title during this period was Investigation Manager?

Christopher Knight: Yes, it – yeah. There was sort of – I think it sort of changed but, ultimately, it was the same job, it was just different types: Fraud Investigator, or whatever.

Ms Price: You were doing the job of an Investigator?

Christopher Knight: Yes, yeah.

Ms Price: This was a role you held until 2016, when you moved to your current role in the Intelligence Team?

Christopher Knight: That’s correct.

Ms Price: Is it right that in your current role you have no involvement in internal investigations?

Christopher Knight: There aren’t any. Yes, correct.

Ms Price: Turning, please, to the training you received as an Investigator, in 1997 when you first started as an Assistant Investigator Officer, did you have any experience of criminal investigations?

Christopher Knight: No.

Ms Price: Is it right that you recall attending a three-week residential training course when you took up the role?

Christopher Knight: Yes, I believe it was three weeks.

Ms Price: You say in your statement at paragraph 5 that you recall this covering the Police and Criminal Evidence Act Codes of Practice and the relevant investigation forms that were used to ensure adherence to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. Do you recall disclosure obligations being covered on that initial three-week course?

Christopher Knight: I can’t say that I remember it fully. It was ‘97, so I apologise for that. There were – I think as I’ve stated, there were disclosure forms that were part of the sort of plethora of forms that were used in investigations. So it would have been covered within that, I believe.

Ms Price: So you recall being introduced to the forms on that initial training course?

Christopher Knight: Yeah, yeah, and the disclosure. Yeah.

Ms Price: You did some study in 1999 and 2000, as part of an NVQ level 4 in Investigation but you didn’t end up completing that qualification; is that right?

Christopher Knight: Yeah, I started it, I believe, when I was in POID and my line manager was the assessor or mentor, or whatever, but when I moved over to CH – Cash Handling and Distribution, CH&D, there wasn’t many investigations, so some of – you had to sort of covering certain aspects of an investigating role. So it sort of got prolonged and then I got towards the end and it never got sort of finalised, but –

Ms Price: You then had some Cash Handling and Distribution-specific training in the year 2000; is that right?

Christopher Knight: It would have been around then, yes.

Ms Price: When you started in your role as an Investigation Manager for the Post Office – and so I think you say that was around three or 2004 –

Christopher Knight: I think so, yeah.

Ms Price: – were you given any refresher training on criminal investigation?

Christopher Knight: I don’t believe so. I don’t believe so.

Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, paragraph 10 of Mr Knight’s statement. That is page 7 of WITN08290100.

In the context of the role of Investigation Manager, you say this:

“During this time, although I cannot recall exactly when, I attended Chesterfield Future Walk building to receive counter training. The training would have given a basic understanding of Horizon, ie how the system performed transactions, not data analysis. There was also a refresher course where we were tasked with working in the DMBs for 3 days during the Christmas period and again when we were tasked with covering strike action win the DMBs …”

So those are directly managed branches?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: “… (possibly 2006 to 2008, I cannot recall exactly). We also received training on security equipment at various times when I was within POL as the role covered both investigative and physical security. I also recall Cartwright King giving specific training which covered notebook use, interviewing and disclosure to solicitors at interview.”

The Cartwright King training you refer to here, is that the Cartwright King training which happened in 2013, which is addressed in a number of emails sent to you by the Inquiry for the purposes of preparing your statement?

Christopher Knight: I think it would be latterly, yes.

Ms Price: You address at paragraphs 44 and 45 of your statement the refresher training that you do recall receiving dealing with interviews and taking statements. Could we turn, please, to page 18 of this statement, paragraph 47, and you say this:

“Investigators had a duty to investigate a case fully. During an investigation any evidence/information that came to light would be looked and assessed and reported, whether it pointed to or away from the suspect. Also, every line of inquiry that was reasonable would be followed. I would have been aware of this process through the policies that were in place and training that was provided although I can no longer remember the specifics.”

So you are clear, are you, that you understood when you were an Investigator, that you had an obligation to pursue lines of inquiry which pointed away from the guilt of a suspect, as well as towards?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: Going over the page, please, to paragraph 49. You say here:

“As mentioned previously in this statement the Investigator disclosure obligation would be by discharged by completing the various PO SEC disclosure forms, 006 A, B, C & D. I would have been aware of the disclosure forms from the policies that were in place although I can no longer remember the exact policy in place during my time in the team. I also received training when I joined the team as well as guidance from the Legal team.”

You refer here to the Investigator disclosure obligations.

Christopher Knight: Mm-hm.

Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, a document provided to you by the Inquiry for the purposes of preparing your statement, which governs the disclosure of unused material to the defence. The document reference is POL00104762.

This document is dated May 2001, which we can see at the bottom and we can see from the title at the top that it refers to the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 Codes of Practice. Did you recognise this document when it was sent to you by the Inquiry?

Christopher Knight: Yes, I did, the content of it. I don’t know whether it was this particular one as in the date but, yeah, I recognised it.

Ms Price: Do you think it was provided to you when you were an Investigator?

Christopher Knight: I would suggest it was available, yes, and provided.

Ms Price: Under “Purpose”, the document says this:

“The aim of this policy is to ensure that Security Managers know and understand the Investigation Procedures in relation to the Disclosure of Unused Material as described in the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 Codes of Practice, which must be adhered to by all Consignia staff undertaking investigations.”

You refer in your statement to the Inquiry to the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, governing the conduct of your investigations. At the time you were an Investigator, were you aware of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act Code of Practice?

Christopher Knight: Yes, I believe it was – I think it might have been a little book.

Ms Price: Were you aware that this applied to your work as an Investigator?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: The document explains in the “Introduction” that:

“The rules relating to the disclosure of unused material to the defence are laid down in the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.

“In light of the Human Rights Act 1998 the Attorney General has issued new Guidelines on the disclosure of unused material. The Guidelines clarify the responsibilities of Investigators, Disclosure Officers, Prosecutors and Defence Practitioners.”

Were you aware at the time you were an investigator of the Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure?

Christopher Knight: I don’t recall that specifically.

Ms Price: It is not referenced in this document but were you aware of, and did you ever refer to, the Code for Crown Prosecutors?

Christopher Knight: I don’t believe so.

Ms Price: Further down this page, we have the general principles section with a section on Investigators and Disclosure Officers. Then over the page, please, the second paragraph on this page says this:

“The Disclosure Officer is the person responsible for examining material retained during an investigation, revealing material to Legal Services during the investigation and any criminal proceedings resulting from it, and certifying to Legal Services that he has done this. Normally the Investigator and the Disclosure Officer will be the same person.”

Do you recall that being the case, that the Investigator and the Disclosure Officer in a case were usually the same person?

Christopher Knight: Usually. There was only one Investigator in the case. So yes.

Ms Price: You refer in your statement at paragraph 49, which we’ve looked at, to the disclosure forms which were completed by the Investigator. Did you understand, when you were an Investigator completing disclosure documentation, that you were acting as the Disclosure Officer in the case?

Christopher Knight: I don’t know in those terms. I knew that they were to be completed. I guess, by its reference, that if I was disclosing it then I would be the Disclosure Officer but I wouldn’t associate myself as that, I’d just be the Investigator providing those documents – completing those forms.

Ms Price: At the time, did you understand that the Disclosure Officer role was a distinct role over and above your role as an Investigator, which imposed on you additional and distinct duties?

Christopher Knight: I don’t recall thinking that. I don’t know.

Ms Price: In terms of your training on the Horizon system, we have looked on screen at paragraph 10 of your statement already. You deal in that paragraph with the counter training you received on the Horizon system. Do you recall the rollout of the Horizon system?

Christopher Knight: I don’t, no.

Ms Price: Were you told, when you were trained on the Horizon system, about any Acceptance Incidents or technical problems with the system arising during the rollout?

Christopher Knight: No. The training was literally just seeing the screen and using it to do little transactions.

Ms Price: Were you ever given any training on Horizon from the point of view of an Investigator looking at Horizon data in the course of an investigation?

Christopher Knight: I don’t believe there was specific training of looking at data.

Ms Price: Turning, please, to the supervision there was of Investigators’ work, could we have on screen, please, paragraph 24 of Mr Knight’s statement. That is page 11 of the statement. You say here:

“The Inquiry has asked me what supervision there was over criminal investigations conducted by Security Managers. From what I recall between 2004 to 2007 Senior Managers would view case papers that were submitted for legal advice via our Casework Team and would add comments or give advice to the Investigator. I believe this then grew into the Case Compliance process. This was a checklist setting out a list of actions to ensure everything had been completed correctly. In addition, during my latter years as an Investigator there was a monthly Cases on Hand meeting where Security Managers would provide updates on their cases and what actions were needed. The team leaders would discuss and come up back with any recommendations. In general, I could always ask my team leader or a peer for advice on a current investigation. But my memory of how things changed over the years is not complete.”

Should we take it from this that, at least within your team, Investigators would discuss their cases with each other?

Christopher Knight: Not in a formal – there might be a mention of a case. It wasn’t a discussion about this case and this was what happened. It might just be a – almost over a coffee type discussion.

Ms Price: Going back a page, please, to paragraph 23 of Mr Knight’s statement. Here you address the process for dealing with complaints about the conduct of an investigation by the Security Team, and you say this:

“I am not sure of the process or if there was one. I would expect if an SPM had an issue with an investigation, they would raise it with their Contract Manager or the National Federation of SubPostmasters who would then follow up the issue with senior management in the Security Team.”

This deals with subpostmasters. Do you know what the route or process was for Crown Office employees if they had an issue with an investigation? Those individuals, of course, would not have the benefit of the membership of the NFSP.

Christopher Knight: Potentially they would have their own union, the UCW. So, it would be basically a union, an equivalent union or, potentially, a line manager, which would be the same sort of structure as in the network.

Ms Price: As far as you were aware, did Crown Office employees, through any union or representative, have any input into the policies and procedures governing the investigation of Crown Office employees?

Christopher Knight: I don’t believe so.

Ms Price: Turning, please, to the involvement of Investigators following an audit identifying an apparent shortfall. Could we have on screen, please, paragraph 29 of Mr Knight’s statement, that is page 13. You say here:

“In the early 2000s an Investigator was more likely to get called to an audit to enable them to approach the SPM and/or staff and arrange further enquiries. In later years this approach diminished as Auditors were instructed to write down any significant comments made by the SPM or staff. Auditors were trained in this and the fact that they should not solicit comments as they should not get into an interview scenario. This relates to adhering to PACE (cautioning someone before they were asked or if they were starting to admit to a crime).”

Were you aware of the practice of Auditors taking so-called admission statements from an SPM and getting them to sign it before the arrival of an Investigator?

Christopher Knight: I don’t know if I was aware. I – presumably there must have been because I guess this is why this was brought in. So – I don’t know how to answer that, if I’m honest. I can’t think of any examples but I would assume that there must have been something – or I can’t remember any examples but I assume there must have been something for this to have been implemented.

Ms Price: By “this”, do you mean training of Auditors? What do you mean by “this”?

Christopher Knight: Sorry, yes. They called it a – I think they brought a form in and it was “Significant Comment”. I forget the title of it. Notes – something of significant comment, and Auditors, I believe, were – I don’t know who they were trained – I think they were possibly trained by maybe some of the Security Team at team meetings, or whatever, but there would be something to give them details that, as it says there, that they weren’t to elicit – you know, get into a questioning scenario but if, something was said to them, then they were to write it down and get the person to sign it as an agreed content.

Ms Price: At paragraph 30, you deal with the circumstances in which an investigation would take place, and you say this:

“In order to determine if an investigation was to take place, the information would be given to an Investigator by the Team Leader. It is my understanding that the decision would be made if the loss reached a threshold (from memory I think it was £5,000) or there was suspected/admitted dishonesty. If the matter was being dealt with by the Contract Team and there was no suspected criminality an investigation case would not be raised.”

You have used the word “or” between “the loss reaching a certain threshold” and there being “suspected/admitted dishonesty”. Should the Chair understand from that that, where there was an apparent shortfall identified at audit, providing the amount met the threshold, there would be an investigation, regardless of whether there was suspected or admitted dishonesty?

Christopher Knight: This wasn’t my role to, you know, begin an investigation but I think there was some criteria. Like I say, £5,000, I think that was but I couldn’t be certain of it. But I think there was certainly some sort of criteria involved but, again, it wasn’t something that I would be doing. It was a Team Leader role.

Ms Price: Going over the page, please, to paragraph 32, about five lines up from the bottom of paragraph 32, you say:

“During the investigation of a case the decision as to what crime (Theft or False Accounting), if any, had been committed and the points to prove would have to be covered. The relevant information would be passed to the Legal Team who would have the final decision on whether a case should progress to court.”

In terms of the culture of the Investigation Team, were investigations viewed as a fact-finding activity or were they seen instead as a form of prosecutorial support?

Christopher Knight: I would have to say the former, fact-finding, because I certainly, from experience, I can recall interviewing somebody and realising that this person wasn’t either the suspect or there was something else, so it was a start point.

Ms Price: Looking at the wording there about points to prove, were investigations seen as the vehicle by which points were proved?

Christopher Knight: What I mean by that is the points to prove for the offence. That would be to cover the mens rea and actus reus, those points.

Ms Price: Can have on screen please document reference POL00126810. This is a copy of your CV from a point in the past, I’m not sure exactly the date of this document but you’ve seen this before and were provided with a copy for the purposes of preparing your statement. At the top, you list a number of key achievements. The third bullet point down says this:

“being the Lead Investigator in a number of cases where the employees have been found guilty after progressing an investigation to Court.”

Was pressure ever placed on Investigators to increase the number of successful prosecutions?

Christopher Knight: No. I don’t see how it could be but, no, it certainly wasn’t, as far as I was aware.

Ms Price: Was your performance ever assessed by reference to the number of cases where an individual had been found guilty after an investigation was progressed to court?

Christopher Knight: No, not at all.

Ms Price: Were bonuses or financial reviews ever linked to the number of successful prosecutions achieved, either by an individual Investigator or a team of Investigators?

Christopher Knight: No. I don’t believe so, no.

Ms Price: Why was it that you considered it a professional achievement to have been the Lead Investigator in cases which led to guilty verdicts after prosecution?

Christopher Knight: I don’t – well, it’s obviously on my CV. I don’t recall when it was done. I’m guessing at the time, ultimately, if you’re investigating a case and it went through to court and it had been found guilty, you’d sort of done your job, is only the way I can, you know, sort of explain it.

Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, document reference POL00167241. This is an email from Chris Card, whose role is described as Law Enforcement and Performance Manager, if we can scroll down a little, please – at the bottom there: Law Enforcement and Performance Manager for Royal Mail Security.

The email itself, going back up to the top, please, is dated 1 November 2011 and you are one of a long list of recipients. The email attached to it, if we can scroll down, please, showing the attachment, an Investigation Communication, “Investigation Communication 5”.

Could we have that communication on screen, please, the reference is POL00167242. This is also dated 1 November 2011. It says it is issued to “Royal Mail Letters Security (Investigations)”. Can you help with why it was being sent to Post Office Investigators?

Sir Wyn Williams: Sorry, Ms Price, both those documents on screen, I think, are dated 2010, not ‘11.

Ms Price: My apologies, sir. That is my misdescription. You’re entirely right.

Sir Wyn Williams: That’s okay. I just want to be sure I had the right document, that’s all.

Ms Price: You entirely do, sir. My apologies. It’s 2010.

The “Issued to” lists “All Royal Mail Letters Security (Investigations)”. Can you help with why it was being sent to Post Office Investigators?

Christopher Knight: Hopefully I can, yes. Obviously, up until Royal Mail and Post Office Limited split in 2012 I believe it was, up until that time, so 2010, Royal Mail would have been the lead security investigation policyholder so they would have driven the policies and then disseminated it to everybody, as you’ve seen in that list.

Ms Price: The Procedures & Standards document is referred to in here but, reading the content of this communication:

“The recovery of criminal assets and business losses is of paramount importance to Royal Mail Group Limited. This not only increases the deterrent effect of committing acquisitive crime it also makes complete commercial sense. Accordingly, new Procedures & Standards dealing with the Recovery of Property Obtained Dishonestly, Compensation, Costs and Final Disposal of Case Exhibits have been published on the Royal Mail Security SharePoint site.

“Investigators should familiarise themselves with the provisions of the new P&S and bring them and the new forms into immediate effect.”

The Procedures & Standards document referred to in this investigation communication is at POL00104846. Could we have that on screen, please. We can see the title there “Recovery of Property Obtained Dishonestly, Compensation, Costs and Final Disposal of Case Exhibits, P&S document 9.6”, and the “Purpose” is:

“The aim of this document is to provide Investigators in Royal Mail Letters Security with clear guidance on the procedure to be adopted to ensure that the recovery of business assets dishonestly obtained is maximised and that appropriate applications are made for Compensation and Cost Orders at Court.”

At paragraph 3.1, there is this:

“The recovery of criminal assets and business losses is of paramount importance to Royal Mail Group Limited. This not only increases the deterrent effect of committing acquisitive crime it also makes complete commercial sense. Accordingly Investigators must ensure that whenever possible offenders repay the value of any benefit acquired as a result of their criminality and any costs incurred by the business as a result of the investigation or prosecution.”

Do you recall reading this document now?

Christopher Knight: I don’t, I’m afraid, no.

Ms Price: Do you recall there being any discussion about why it was felt necessary to stress to Investigators that the recovery of criminal assets and business losses is of paramount importance to Royal Mail Group?

Christopher Knight: I don’t know why it was worded like that or sent like that.

Ms Price: As an Investigator, did you ever feel any pressure to use prosecutions as a means of recovery apparent losses from subpostmasters and branch staff?

Christopher Knight: No, no. Just on that one, branch staff – well, yeah. Sorry, no. I was going to say branch staff, if they have losses in branch, they don’t cover it but, if they were prosecuted potentially, yes, so I apologise.

Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, document reference POL00167366. This is an email from Jane Owen to you and a number of others, and it is dated 14 April 2010. The subject of the email is “Matters affecting case closures and failings”, and it reads as follows:

“Dear All

“Just a reminder that you need to ensure that we are sent separate notifications for both the case closure and the failings.

“There have been a couple of instances whereby the failings have been included on the closure document which has then been sent to Secondary Stakeholders. We need to be mindful of the audience that receives the failings as these are to identify improvements within the business and not for sharing with the external customer.”

Do you recall the issue being raised in this email?

Christopher Knight: I don’t, if I’m honest, no.

Ms Price: Why would it have been a problem for secondary stakeholders to have been aware of failings identified in the course of an investigation?

Christopher Knight: The way I read that, and, presumably, if I read it back then, would be because, obviously, the Post Office conducts transactions on behalf of numerous other stakeholders, so if there was a failure in a product or a transaction of a product, or something of that nature, that’s what I’m guessing what is being referred to.

Ms Price: Was this reflective of a wider culture within the Post Office to conceal failings from those outside of the business?

Christopher Knight: I don’t know.

Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, paragraph 33 of Mr Knight’s statement to the Inquiry, that is page 14. At paragraph 33 you say this:

“When I received a case for investigation I would start by understanding the background, including the audit result and why the audit had taken place. Usually, the branch was targeted for audit as the branch had come to the attention of the Branch Analysis Team (BAT) due to anomalies or concerns. For example, this may be because the branch had not returned cash when asked to do so or had complete suspicious transactions such as a large number of reversals or excess spoiled postage. I would also obtain the last 3 months of Credence data to view the updated data in relation to concerns raised by BAT. If necessary, further archive data may have been needed via the ARQ process.”

You say here that you would obtain the last three months of Credence data to view data relating to concerns by the Branch Analysis Team. First of all, what was the Branch Analysis Team and where did it sit within the structure of the business?

Christopher Knight: I think it sat in the FSC, the Finance Service Centre, initially.

Ms Price: In cases where the audit had taken place in the absence of any concerns being raised by the BAT, would you obtain the last three months’ of Credence data?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: So you did that in all cases?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: Before Credence data was available, what did you rely upon?

Christopher Knight: I don’t know. I don’t know.

Ms Price: Can you recall there being Horizon printouts obtained by the Auditor printed from the counter in a branch?

Christopher Knight: I do recall printouts. There was various documentation that is produced by a branch at various points, in a day, in a month, or whatever.

Ms Price: In general terms, did you consider that Credence data was sufficient to evidence a loss to the business?

Christopher Knight: I don’t know whether it would evidence a loss. It would just be sort of transactional data, as I’ve said there, if there was something specific you’re looking for, it was transactional data. Nothing sort of stood out, per se.

Ms Price: Where you had a report from an Auditor saying what had been found in terms of cash and stock in a branch and that was being compared to Credence data about what the Horizon system said should be in branch, in that context, did you consider that the comparison between those two things was sufficient to evidence a loss to the business?

Christopher Knight: The audit would be the result. So they would do their balance of what the Horizon system in branch said should be there and they would count it and if it was there or wasn’t there. If it wasn’t there, obviously, there was a loss. The Credence data was just the data of all the transactions along the way. Obviously, there was other data and the back office data, for transfers and logging on and logging off and suchlike. That was the data. So it wasn’t used to verify the audit, if that makes sense.

Ms Price: So from your perspective, the audit report produced from the Auditor, was that the evidence that you considered proved a loss to the business?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: What guidance was given to Investigators to assist them in obtaining Horizon data from Fujitsu?

Christopher Knight: I just – you could request it from the Security Team, the archived data. So anything over three months, obviously. You could request it from – or they would request it on your behalf from Fujitsu.

Ms Price: You’ve referred to anything over three months. Was that the only reason you would seek ARQ data from Fujitsu, if you wanted to go further back in time?

Christopher Knight: That was – I guess so, yes.

Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, paragraph 57 of Mr Knight’s statement. That is page 22, please. You say in the first sentence here:

“When required, Credence data would more than likely be used as that showed exactly the same information as ARQ data.”

Who told you that that was the case?

Christopher Knight: I don’t know whether anybody told me that was the case. I think it was – I think it was because it was transactional data, if that …

Ms Price: Were you aware, when you were an Investigator, that the audit trail data held by Fujitsu contained more information than in the standard ARQ response?

Christopher Knight: Sorry, say that again?

Ms Price: Were you aware that there was additional data held by Fujitsu, which contained more information than you would find in a standard ARQ response to a request?

Christopher Knight: I don’t know, I can’t recall.

Ms Price: Were you ever made aware that an enhanced interrogation of the audit trail could show when a transaction or event had been performed by the system?

Christopher Knight: There was transactional data and event data, if that makes – so one was the transaction and was sort of the front end, and the other one was the back office. That’s what I understand.

Ms Price: Were you aware that others could perform enhanced interrogation of audit data and find more information, particularly when a transaction or event had been performed by the system?

Christopher Knight: I don’t know if I was aware of that.

Ms Price: Who was responsible for deciding whether to retrieve Horizon data from Fujitsu?

Christopher Knight: I’d say the Investigator.

Ms Price: Were there ever circumstances in which you would request more detailed audit data from Fujitsu before you interviewed a subpostmaster or branch staff member?

Christopher Knight: I don’t know. I don’t recall.

Ms Price: Do you recall ever doing that?

Christopher Knight: I don’t know – no, I don’t recall.

Ms Price: Was this step ever taken before a decision was made to prosecute?

Christopher Knight: I don’t know.

Ms Price: Was this step ever taken before a not guilty plea was entered, to your recollection?

Christopher Knight: Again, I don’t recall.

Ms Price: Were you aware at the time that there was a quota placed on audit request queries made of Fujitsu?

Christopher Knight: I don’t know. I’m aware now because of the team I’m in, we manage that process. So I’m aware now. I don’t know if I was aware then. I think I probably was. I think there was made mention of quotas but I don’t think I could pinpoint what it was at the time. But I think I was aware.

Ms Price: Was this something which you were ever conscious of when deciding whether to seek further data from Fujitsu?

Christopher Knight: No, I don’t believe so.

Ms Price: You say at paragraph 38 of your statement to the Inquiry that NBSC call logs were requested to understand if the branch had reporting issues that related to the Inquiry. Would you request NBSC call logs in all apparent shortfall cases you dealt with?

Christopher Knight: Possibly not.

Ms Price: In what circumstances would you?

Christopher Knight: Um … I don’t know. If somebody had been querying something, if they thought they’d been queried it, or just to check, I don’t recall.

Ms Price: In what circumstances would you request Horizon helpline call logs in addition to the NBSC call logs?

Christopher Knight: I think that was probably – I can’t recall doing it. Probably latterly, I would suggest. I can’t think – sort of early, when I joined POL.

Ms Price: You say latterly. Why latterly?

Christopher Knight: I think there was – just because that was – I think that was sort of brought in towards – I want to say latterly, probably 2010-ish, around that way, I think.

Ms Price: Turning, please, to the role of the Security Team in relation to prosecution decisions. Could we have on screen, please, paragraph 40 of Mr Knight’s statement to the Inquiry, which is page 16. You say here:

“Once the Investigator had concluded the investigation or got to a point where legal advice was needed, the case file would be passed to the Legal Team who would decide if a case was to be taken to Court. The Designated Authority Manager (DAM), a senior member of the Security Team, would give the final consent to continue to prosecution.”

Was the Designated Authority Manager the same role as the Designated Prosecution Authority?

Christopher Knight: Yes, I’ve probably called it the wrong name but, yes.

Ms Price: Did an Investigator conducting the relevant investigation have any input into the decision as to whether someone should be prosecuted?

Christopher Knight: No.

Ms Price: Did it ever strike you as being inappropriate that a Senior Security Manager from the Security Team, which was responsible for conducting initial investigations, was the one to give the final consent to continue to prosecution?

Christopher Knight: I never thought about it. It was just a process.

Ms Price: Could we have, please, paragraph 56 of Mr Knight’s statement on the screen, please. It’s page 9 – it’s not page 9, my apologies.

It’s page 22, paragraph 56. You say this:

“During my time in the Security Team before the GLO, I do not recall an SPM, SPM assistant or Crown Office employee attributing a shortfall to problems with Horizon.”

Could we have on screen, please, document reference POL00066743. This is a transcript of the interview with Peter Holmes on 19 September 2008, for which you were a second officer, and this is one of the cases you address in your statement. You were provided with the record of tape recorded interview for the purposes of providing your statement and you’ve more recently been provided with this transcript of the tape. Have you had a chance to read through it?

Christopher Knight: I believe I have, yes.

Ms Price: It is just a full transcript, as opposed to the summary and partial transcription we find in a record of tape recorded interview.

Christopher Knight: Right.

Ms Price: Could we go, please, to page 7. About halfway down the page, please, Robert Daily asks:

“And your experience with Horizon, how would you – how would you rate it?”

Mr Holmes says:

“Very slow, um, it’s okay it’s an auditor’s tool. Um, that particular one we had problems with because it was connected to a telephone line that also had the fax machine connected to it.”

Robert Daily says:

“The one’s that? Jesmond?

Mr Holmes says:

“At Jesmond [the branch]. And we had BT engineers in looking at the line, we had Horizon engineers in looking at the line. And eventually we had to take the fax machine out, throw it away and get a new one in, provided by Mr Canner. And now it seemed to work. But there was a time when –

“What, what”, says Mr Daily.

“It wasn’t so slow – it wasn’t so good. People using cards just weren’t getting through.”

Mr Daily says:

“Err, what period was that?

“Um, I suppose nine month ago for three month.

“So we’re talking about the beginning of this year? December?

“I’m not very good with times, but yes, possibly.”

Mr Holmes, at this point in the interview, was raising some technical problems with the functioning of the system here, wasn’t he?

Christopher Knight: It seems that way.

Ms Price: Could we go, please, to page 27 of this document, and this Robert Daily again asking the questions. About two-thirds of the way down the page there, he says:

“Yeah. So what can you tell me about the shortage then?”

Mr Holmes says:

“I have absolutely no idea.

“No idea?

“Absolutely no idea. Unless it’s the Horizon that’s let us down. I – I mean there’s nobody in there storing 46,000, I haven’t got it, it’s not in my bank account. Um, I spent too many years in the police force seeing things go wrong to start stealing money from anybody. Um, I just – I really do not know.

“Okay, [says Robert Daily]. Why is there two cash declarations then?

“There was one in because I knew we were showing short and I covered it up.

Mr Daley: “Covered what up?”

Mr Holmes: “The fact we were short in cash.

“By how much?

“… I can’t remember …”

So Mr Holmes here was offering, as a possible explanation, the shortage being caused by the computer system, the computer system letting them down, wasn’t he?

Christopher Knight: Yes, from reading that, on top of what he was saying, it was slow and not very functional.

Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, document reference POL00120627. This is a suspect offender report sent by you to the Fraud Team and to Graham Ward on 1 February 2009, relating to the investigation of Scott Darlington. Next to the “BRIEF summary of facts of the case”, there is this:

“Audit shortage, £40K. [Subpostmaster] told auditors immediately that there would be a shortage. He said he was expecting TCs.”

That’s transaction corrections, isn’t it?

Christopher Knight: Mm-hm.

Ms Price: Then under this, next to “BRIEF summary of admissions/denials made at interview”:

“Admitted false accounting since first shortage in September/October Trading Period. Denied stealing – adamant that it would be errors and TCs would come to light.”

So this subpostmaster was saying that the shortage was caused by errors and he expected transaction corrections to come to light. Is that a fair summary of what this document is saying?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: Would you not categorise this as a subpostmaster attributing a shortfall to the Horizon system?

Christopher Knight: No, I wouldn’t. Not that. Errors to me – and TCs were errors, something that had occurred in the branch by somebody making a mistake or, you know, an error, not a technical Horizon deficiency.

Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, document reference POL00120600. This is a memo from Jarnail Singh, if we can scroll down, please, to the second page. Apologies, down again. You see at the bottom it’s from Jarnail Singh, Senior Lawyer, Criminal Law Division.

Going back to the first page at the top, please. This is sent to Post Office Security and copied to you and Graham Ward, as well as the Press Office, and it is dated 2 March 2010. Mr Singh is reporting back on the outcome of the Darlington case, and he says this:

“The above named Defendant having pleaded Guilty to all 5 counts of false accounting at Chester Crown Court on 1 February 2010. He attended Chester Crown Court for sentence on 23 February. The prosecution was conducted by Deborah White and the defendant was also represented and the case was heard by His Honour Judge Dulton.

“On hearing the facts of the case His Honour Judge Dulton enquired whether there was an actual loss or whether the missing funds were the result of a ‘glitch’ in Royal Mail systems. Counsel for the defence maintained that he had pleaded on the basis that although there was a shortfall Mr Darlington was not responsible for it and had merely covered it up. Prosecution counsel requested a Newton Hearing to address the issue however having considered the request His Honour Judge refused the adjournment that the expense of the delay of further investigation was unjustifiable and that he proposed to proceed on the basis most favourable for the defendant. As a result Mr Darlington was sentenced on the basis that no money was missing and His Honour Judge sentenced as follows …”

Then further down that page, the sentence is set out.

Do you recall being made aware that the judge had queried in this case whether there was an actual loss or whether instead there was a glitch in the Royal Mail systems?

Christopher Knight: I believe I was but I think I was actually – I think I was actually in the – not in the court but in the court building, I think, at the time. But I don’t remember the specifics like that, and obviously to that but, yes.

Ms Price: Did this cause you any concern at the time?

Christopher Knight: I don’t think I sort of understood it, as such. I think it was just something that was said there. I don’t know what a glitch, or however it – meant. Obviously, you know, hindsight and where we are now, looking back, but, at the time, I wasn’t thinking of Horizon issues.

Ms Price: Can you recall if there was any discussion within the Security Team or with the Criminal Law Team following this judicial comment?

Christopher Knight: I don’t believe I was – if there was, I don’t think I was party to it. I don’t recall.

Ms Price: Can you recall anyone suggesting there should be a review of what had happened in this case?

Christopher Knight: No, I don’t.

Ms Price: Were you ever trained or given instruction by the Criminal Law Team or anyone else at the Post Office on proof of loss when relying on Horizon data?

Christopher Knight: I would say not. As I said, previously, I think the loss was derived from an audit.

Ms Price: Can you recall there being any discussion following this case of what would be required to prove loss when Horizon data was being relied upon?

Christopher Knight: I don’t recall that.

Ms Price: Did the judicial comment in this case cause you to question your approach to proof of loss in any future cases?

Christopher Knight: I would say no because the process – it was always the audit.

Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, document reference POL00021244. This is the transcript of the second tape from an interview which you conducted with Alison Hall on 28 September 2010, some six months after the outcome in the Darlington case had been communicated via that correspondence we’ve just looked at.

Christopher Knight: Mm-hm.

Ms Price: Again, you were provided with the record of tape recorded interview for the purposes of preparing your statement and have more recently been provided with this transcript of the tapes. Again, have you had a chance to look through it?

Christopher Knight: I’ve had a look through it, yes.

Ms Price: Could we go, please, to page 4 of this transcript. About two-thirds of the way down the page, you say this:

“Right, so you’re adamant that the £14,000 is nothing that you’ve done, criminally, fraudulently, however you want to put it.”

Alison Hall says:

“I have not taken a penny out of that Post Office, criminally. I wouldn’t dare.”

You say:

“It’s something to do with some sort of discrepancy.”

Mrs Hall says:

“I think it’s to do with discrepancy with the Lottery, and I’m hoping that we can come to the bottom of this.”

You say, “Right”.

Mrs Hall says:

“I will pay any money back, what’s owed to Post Office Limited. I am not a thief. I will pay anything back, but I just want all this to be looked at in detail, and because Horizon system’s not 100%, if I’ve got all the details here. I’d like that to, um, be taken into account, please.”

You say:

“Right, and that’s fine. I understand that, and like I said, I, you know, I don’t want to harp on the subject. Yes, you have given me some details.”

Why did you not want to “harp on the subject” of the problems with Horizon being reported by Mrs Hall here?

Christopher Knight: I don’t think I was relating to the Horizon problem. I think I was just relating to that we’d been speaking about the Lottery. I don’t say it would have been the Horizon system. I don’t think there was a discussion much about that.

Ms Price: That comment from you about not wanting to “harp on the subject” is not included in the record of tape recorded interview that we’ve got. Do you know why that is?

Christopher Knight: I don’t know. I would suggest when I was – if – presumably I did this summary, that that wasn’t a significant comment or anything.

Ms Price: Mrs Hall was telling you that the Horizon system was not 100 per cent and asking for that to be taken into account. Do you accept that Mrs Hall was directly raising Horizon integrity issues in her interview?

Christopher Knight: Looking at it now, looking back, but, at the time, I don’t think I took that as great substance. Just – it was just – it just seemed there, because Horizon not 100 per cent. Lots of computers, you might say, you know, like the one previously, if it’s slow, or whatever it might be, it’s what the context is of why is it not 100 per cent.

Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, document reference POL00091063. This is the report for the Criminal Law Team which you produced relating to Mrs Hall’s case after interviewing her. If we go, please, to the last page of that document, maybe the penultimate page – forgive me. If we go back two pages, and again, and to the bottom of that page, please, and that’s the last page of that document with your name and the date of the report. That’s 18 October 2010.

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: Have you had a chance to read through this document recently?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: In this report, you recounted the parts of the interview, if we can go, please, to page 2. Without going through line by line, you set out the parts of the interview with Mrs Hall where she raised issues relating to the Lottery scratchcards but, having looked through this a number of times, I can’t find any reference to Mrs Hall’s request that the matter be looked at in detail because Horizon was not 100 per cent. Do you agree that that isn’t in your report?

Christopher Knight: Yes, yes.

Ms Price: Why didn’t you include that in your report?

Christopher Knight: I guess I didn’t take it as a comment. She was talking about scratchcards and Lottery, and that’s what I was sort of focused on.

Ms Price: By the time you completed this report, you were aware of at least two cases of subpostmasters raising issues to do with Horizon: Mr Holmes’ case that we’ve looked at and Mr Darlington’s case. You were also aware of the judge’s comments in the Darlington case.

You were aware at the time, weren’t you, that the advice given by the Criminal Law Team on charging and prosecution decisions was based on the information contained in an Investigator’s report to them; were you aware of that?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: It was this document which the Criminal Law Team considered when assessing whether any further investigation was needed as well, wasn’t it?

Christopher Knight: I presume so, yes.

Ms Price: Would you accept, therefore, that it was important for your report fully to reflect any and all reasonable lines of inquiry raised by Mrs Hall in interview?

Christopher Knight: I would concede that viewing this and in light of where we are now but, back then, again, as I said, that comment about not 100 per cent, I wouldn’t have taken that as something that was fundamentally wrong with the system. And the other bits and pieces, you said about the glitch, I don’t recall ever being given the full explanation of, you know, what glitches and whatever there was.

Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, document reference POL00055783. This is an email from Rob Wilson to Dianne Chan, prosecution counsel, copied to you. It is dated 17 November 2010 and it relates to Mrs Henderson’s case. The email reads as follows:

“Dianne, have received a defence statement today despite the telephone conversation yesterday. A hard copy has been put in the post today.

“At point 2 the Defence allege that any discrepancy was as a result of the Horizon system. There is also a challenge to the initial missing figure of £18,000 which was reduced according to the Defence statement in a matter of minutes. The statement also maintains that further investigation by the auditor ‘would have discovered the whereabouts of the alleged missing sum’.”

Mrs Henderson had, by this point, made it part of her pleaded case that any discrepancy was as a result the Horizon system, hadn’t she?

Christopher Knight: I believe the defence statement mentioned that – not during the interview, I think it was the defence statement, I believe. I might be corrected on that but …

Ms Price: Indeed. This email is telling you that a defence statement received that day contained an allegation that the discrepancy was as a result of the Horizon system, and you were being told about this, weren’t you, in this email from Mr Wilson?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, document reference POL00169422. This is an email from Jane Owen to you and others. It is dated 18 January 2011. The subject line is “Urgent update required”, and Ms Owen’s email reads as follows:

“Dear All

“Can I please ask for your help urgently. I have been asked to provide an update on the attached cases where Horizon integrity has come into question and need the information by tomorrow.

“I have checked against the spreadsheet but am unable to cover off the ‘gaps’ which are namely

“Court case details

“Result

“Accused’s defence (exactly).

“Could you either add into the spreadsheet using bright pink font as I have done in the recoveries column or just pop updates on an email and I will collate.

“Many thanks.”

Ms Owen attached a spreadsheet. Could we have that on screen, please. The reference is POL00169423.

Just scrolling through this spreadsheet, if we’re able to, we can see a number of cases listed and, four columns in, column D, we see the Post Office branch being listed, with some information relating to each of those cases –

Christopher Knight: Mm-hm.

Ms Price: – which are said to be ones where Horizon integrity has come into question, as Ms Owen puts it. On my count, this spreadsheet lists 20 cases. Mr Darlington’s case is one of these.

Do you accept that by January 2011, when Ms Owen sent this email, you were aware that there were at least 20 cases where Horizon integrity had come into question?

Christopher Knight: Yes, I would have to say that viewing this, but I don’t know at the time if I was – if that had – had comprehended that.

Sir Wyn Williams: Well, the email is pretty straightforward in its terms, Mr Knight.

Christopher Knight: Yes, sir, it’s – I understand what the email, and this sheet – I – again, I don’t know. I’ve got no response for it.

Sir Wyn Williams: Would I be fair if I concluded that, if you had read that email, you must have understood that the attachment contained 20 cases where Horizon integrity issues had been raised?

Christopher Knight: Yes, I would say that’s a reasonable assumption.

Sir Wyn Williams: Thanks.

Ms Price: Sir, I wonder if that might be an appropriate moment for the morning break.

Sir Wyn Williams: Yes.

Ms Price: If we could take 15 minutes, please.

Sir Wyn Williams: Well, let’s say 11.40, is it?

Ms Price: 11.40, sir, thank you.

(11.23 am)

(A short break)

(11.40 am)

Ms Price: Hello, sir, can you see hear us?

Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, thank you.

Ms Price: Mr Knight, in light of the answers you gave us before the break, I’d like to go to one further document and the reference is POL00325402.

This top email is from you to Steve Bradshaw dated 4 February 2010, forwarding the email below which is the subject “Horizon challenges”. If we can go, please, to the email below, this is you to Andy Hayward, Iain Murphy, Andrew Daley and Jason Collins. “Horizon challenges”, you say:

“Gentlemen,

“Further to my remark in my previous email.

“Regards,

“CK.”

You seem to be providing links there underneath to various articles and resources including Computer Weekly, The Grocer, BBC, Talking Retail. Just scrolling down, please, that’s the bottom of the email, but we’ve got the title there “Horizon challenges” of that email.

Did you understand those Horizon challenges to be challenges to the integrity of the Horizon system when you sent that email?

Christopher Knight: I don’t recall, obviously, what the content of each one of those articles was but I knew that there was a growing media – as those, you know, a talking point, a topic or whatever. But, again, in comparison with what the business was saying, I think that was probably my point, that we were told that everything is fine, that – we weren’t told anything different but there was this under current.

Ms Price: In terms of what you say in your statement at paragraph 56, that you do not recall an SPM, SPM assistant or Crown Office employee attributing a shortfall to problems with Horizon, is that not exactly what this is: an email about subpostmasters attributing shortfalls to Horizon?

Christopher Knight: It is, again, from where we are today, looking back – but, again, at the time, my viewpoint would have been one of what the business was saying and any sort of challenges, you know, to Horizon that had been upheld.

Ms Price: So is paragraph 56 of your statement wrong, in that case?

Christopher Knight: I don’t know if it’s wrong. I don’t know how – how I’m interpreting this information. I’m going by what I sort of believed at the time, and what the message was, the overarching message, I should say, from the business that everything was okay.

Ms Price: We’ll come in due course to the business message but could we have on screen, please, document reference POL00167369. This an email from Graham Ward to a list of recipients, including you. It is dated 14 April 2011, and the subject line is “Credence v Fujitsu” and Mr Ward says this in his email:

“All

“If anyone has any evidence of disparities between Fujitsu and Credence transaction data, please get in touch (eg timing issues … session numbers not matching for postage label transactions etc).

“Ta muchly.”

What was your understanding of why this enquiry was made of you?

Christopher Knight: I don’t honestly recall the email, or – the email – the question. Reading it there, I don’t – just discrepancies between the Fujitsu and the Credence data, so …

Ms Price: On its face, it suggests there was an issue being investigated by Mr Ward of a disparity between the transaction data shown on Credence and the data held by Fujitsu, doesn’t it?

Christopher Knight: Yes, I guess it does, from the – on the face of it, yes.

Ms Price: That would be potentially very significant, would it not, where Investigators like you understood the Credence data to show exactly the same information as ARQ data?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: Did this concern you at all at the time or can you simply not remember?

Christopher Knight: I don’t – I don’t recall, I’m afraid.

Ms Price: Looking at it now, would it have concerned you at the time?

Christopher Knight: With hindsight, and everything that’s gone on subsequently, I think it would have made me think, yes.

Ms Price: This should, shouldn’t it, have led you to question the reliability of the Credence data you were relying on to prove loss, where you hadn’t requested further data from Fujitsu?

Christopher Knight: Yes, looking at this in its – you know, in the sentence, yes. What those disparities were, it’s given some examples of timing issues, session numbers not matching. I don’t know if they would have affected the reliability of the data. I don’t know.

Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, document reference POL00107683. This is a report to Legal Services which was produced by Stephen Bradshaw on 18 April 2011, four days after Mr Ward’s email about Credence data versus Fujitsu data. It relates to a case where you sat in on an interview as a second officer.

Could we have page 3 of this report, please. About halfway down the page is a heading covering the interview, with Ms Threlfall. Underneath, Mr Bradshaw says this:

“At 12.13 am I interviewed Mrs Rita Catherine Threlfall at the Liverpool North Delivery Office … Present throughout the interview was Mr Christopher Knight Fraud Investigator.”

Then two paragraphs down, Mr Bradshaw explains that a pre-prepared statement was read out in the interview by the legal representative in attendance and the content of that statement is then set out towards the bottom of that page and over to the next page. Going over to the next page, please, the third paragraph down:

“She then explained the type of transactions performed when she took over the branch, the contact she had with Post Office Limited and that she used to perform a weekly balance and that mistakes could readily [be] found.”

Then going down four paragraphs, please, the paragraph starting “She then said”:

“She then said that the system upgrades started to be implemented and that she did not know how these upgrades affected the balances. She told to leave the computer switched on.

“She said that when there were discrepancies it was difficult to get a result from the transaction log and she received a printed message stating ‘no transaction found’.

“She then said that monies were placed to make good the supposed cash shortages due to discrepancies becoming increasingly difficult to uncover. She said that on the balance snapshot the figures show an amount defined as cash and this fixed is meant to equal the declared cash and that for some considerable time these figures at her office differed greatly.”

She sets out a number of other issues below and then, over the page, please, the second paragraph:

“She denied stealing any Post Office monies or false accounted and that she had received no assistance from Post Office Ltd. If these losses had happened at her office, then they must be happening at many more offices.”

This is another example, is it not, of a subpostmaster, in an interview you were present at, attributing shortfalls to the Horizon system?

Christopher Knight: Yes, it is.

Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, document reference POL00323734. This is an email chain containing emails sent between you and Neil Thorneycroft on 24 May 2011, a little over a month after Mr Ward’s email about Credence data versus Fujitsu data. Can you explain, please, who Mr Thorneycroft was?

Christopher Knight: He worked in the Finance Service Centre on the Lottery Team.

Ms Price: The emails relate to Mrs Hall’s case and starting, please, towards the bottom of the page, you email Mr Thorneycroft attaching a statement you put together for him from previous notes about the case.

Just pausing there, was it usual for you to prepare draft witness statements for court for witnesses?

Christopher Knight: It would be, yeah, to go through it because the – obviously, a member of staff wouldn’t know how to complete a witness statement, so it would go through and then obviously he would check that everything is correct that’s been put in it.

Ms Price: Mr Thorneycroft’s email replies in the middle of the page, and he says this:

“Hi Chris.

“Made a few amendments. I’m no longer working as the Lottery Team manager, I’ve gone back to my previous PO role.

“I hope this won’t go to court. The perceived Lottery discrepancy was a bit of a phantom.”

Then your response to Mr Thorneycroft is at the top, and you say this:

“Neil.

“Thanks. I hope it won’t go to court either.

“I have heard she is blaming Horizon now …!!!!”

There is no way of characterising Mrs Hall’s position in this case other than she was attributing shortfalls to the Horizon system, is there?

Christopher Knight: It was around the Lottery – she was saying it was Lottery and I tried to, you know, get to the bottom of that and it didn’t seem it was Lottery.

Ms Price: But you’re saying here, as a separate issue, aren’t you, “I have heard she is blaming Horizon now”?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: You were fully aware of that position at the time because it’s said, in terms, in this email, weren’t you?

Christopher Knight: It’s what, sorry?

Ms Price: You were fully aware that she was attributing shortfalls to the Horizon system because you have said in terms that that is the case in this email?

Christopher Knight: I think I must have heard it from Legal Services.

Ms Price: In Mrs Hall’s case you made some enquiries of those responsible for the Lottery and we’ve seen the interaction here with Mr Thorneycroft but did you make any enquiries of Fujitsu or anyone else within Post Office to explore Mrs Hall’s assertion that Horizon was not 100 per cent?

Christopher Knight: I believe I asked – I got call logs, if she’d reported any Lottery issues. I don’t think there was any Lottery calls to the helpline.

Ms Price: So what –

Christopher Knight: But, no –

Ms Price: – you were looking for was Lottery calls?

Christopher Knight: Yes, I was focused on the Lottery.

Ms Price: Is it the case that when you made your statement and you say you don’t recall cases where people were attributing shortfalls to Horizon, is the reason that you didn’t recall that you didn’t treat the concerns raised as being significant?

Christopher Knight: That’s probably a good explanation. I think it was there was no – I had no background on what the claims were. And, obviously – and I know you said you’re going to get on to it but obviously what the business was saying. So that was probably my thoughts on it.

Ms Price: Would you accept now that you were unduly dismissive of the concerns which were being raised about the integrity of the Horizon system?

Christopher Knight: Probably looking at it now, on the information I had then, I was unaware, I would suggest, with all the other information, as we said, about the business and such like. So yeah, in hindsight.

Ms Price: Do you accept that, at least in Mrs Hall’s case, by not exploring concerns about Horizon, you failed to pursue a reasonable line of inquiry?

Christopher Knight: Again, I say, I was going with the Lottery, so, in essence – in view of that, I would have to concede to that, I’d suggest.

Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, page 40 of Mr Knight’s statement paragraph 116. In the first sentence at 116 you say this:

“I do not recall being aware of any robust challenges to Horizon (other than the GLO).”

What do you mean by “robust challenges to Horizon”?

Christopher Knight: Robust challenges where something had been shown as Horizon was – had failed or something had been thrown out, you know, completely by Horizon, or some message or something had come through. Obviously, the GLO was the big piece. So I think I was basing it on that type of level of detailed information.

Ms Price: But, in the context of criminal prosecutions, isn’t that the wrong way round? It is for the prosecution to prove the guilt of someone, not for them to prove their innocence?

Christopher Knight: Yes, that …

Ms Price: You go on:

“I dealt with a number of people who admitted their dishonesty and so the integrity of Horizon was not at the forefront of my mind. The business message was consistent that Horizon was robust so there was never any doubt in my mind.”

Who was the business message that Horizon was robust coming from?

Christopher Knight: It was obviously within our Security Team, you know, John Scott, and it was – it just seemed to be the business message. I think there was other people, other Senior Managers, you know, but I can’t recall them exactly. But it was an overarching message, you know, that the system was fine, and the – this – you know, these – as I say, these claims, or whatever, were not an issue. Just that seemed to be – that was the message.

Ms Price: You’ve mentioned John Scott. Was the message coming from outside of the Security Team as well?

Christopher Knight: I think it was. I think it was. I can’t recall who it was but I think it was other senior, you know, managers, who probably had an awareness of what our team did and the business.

Ms Price: Can you recall what level within the business you’re talking about?

Christopher Knight: I think it would have been more senior people, you know, it would have been senior – I guess on a level with Mr Scott or potentially more – higher. I can’t recall exactly but it just seemed to be that that was the message.

Ms Price: Did you ever question the party line, given the mounting number of cases which you were aware of, where Horizon integrity was being raised?

Christopher Knight: No, is the answer to that.

Ms Price: Do you think you should have?

Christopher Knight: I think that email you showed where I sent the four links, I think that was my point of seeing these things and being – you know, passing it on. But, as for challenging the business ethos, I don’t know how I would have done that and I’ve certainly – I wouldn’t have done that, and I didn’t, obviously.

Ms Price: Regardless of what the business message was, you were under a duty as an Investigator to pursue reasonable lines of inquiry, weren’t you?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: What was a reasonable line of inquiry was your call, wasn’t it, nobody else’s?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: So would you accept that reassurance from the business about Horizon could not have justified a decision not to pursue an otherwise reasonable line of inquiry?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, document reference POL00141218. This is an email from Andrew Daley, dated 5 July 2010, forwarding to you and others an email from Jane Owen below, dated 2 July 2010, and there are a number of other emails beneath hers. The subject is “Duplication of Transaction Records in ARQ Returns”, and this is a document you comment on at paragraph 61 of your statement to the Inquiry.

Ms Owen’s email reads as follows, scrolling down a little, please:

“Dear Both …”

The original recipients being Jason Collins and Andrew Daley:

“Please see email below from Penny Thomas.

“Mark, Alan Simpson and myself have had a conference call today to look at potential problems that this is likely to cause. Firstly the suggested workaround will need to be put to our Legal Team and until that has been agreed any further ARQ requests, including those which have already been submitted, will be suspended.

“There are 2 cases currently with the court – West Byfleet and Porters Avenue and I will speak to Lisa and Jon about these as we need to know what in the way of ARQs and the corresponding statements have been presented to court. In addition I have identified the following offices from the casework spreadsheet as ones that potentially could have already had information presented to the court. Could you please confirm whether or not this is the case and also whether there are any I have missed as Fujitsu will need to take corrective action.”

On the face of things, this email is expressing concern, is it not, that inaccurate data may have been presented to the court in support of prosecutions?

Christopher Knight: Yes, it is, ARQ, yeah.

Ms Price: Was it your understanding, based on what you say in your statement, that the issue affected the integrity of ARQ data provided by Fujitsu?

Christopher Knight: That’s what I put in my statement. That’s – I don’t recall this but that’s, I think, how I understood it, that when it was – yeah, however it was taken off the main system, that something had happened with the duplication.

Ms Price: Did this concern you or, if you can’t recall, would it have concerned you at the time that incorrect data might have been provided to the court in support of prosecutions brought by the Post Office?

Christopher Knight: Well, yeah, any – anything that’s not correct, yeah.

Ms Price: In circumstances where an increasing number of subpostmasters were raising concerns about the integrity of the Horizon system, did it occur to you, looking at this, that they might be right, that there might be a problem, not just with the ARQ data produced to support prosecutions but with the integrity of the Horizon data itself?

Christopher Knight: Probably not. Again, I’m going back to thinking back then, not from, you know, hindsight. And this was an ARQ – potentially an ARQ issue but the Horizon data was – you know, its integrity was intact. I think that was the thought.

Ms Price: I’d like to go back, please, to your involvement in the investigation and prosecution of Allison Henderson and we touched on an email about that case earlier.

Could we have on screen, please, paragraph 79 of Mr Knight’s statement to the Inquiry. It’s page 29. At paragraph 79, you say this:

“In order to progress the investigation, the next step was to interview Ms Henderson. The timing of the interview is down to the Lead Investigator. It was standard procedure to have a second officer at all interviews. In this case it was my colleague Mr Paul Whitaker. I can see that in Ms Henderson’s witness statement she states, ‘I was allowed to bring my Federation rep, but he was not allowed to speak during the interview’. As part of PO rules a person being interviewed can have someone from the union present. This is only to act as an observer. They are told at the start of the interview of their role. They may be permitted to speak if it helps facilitate the interview.”

Can you help with the circumstances in which it might facilitate the interview if a union representative was allowed to speak?

Christopher Knight: I’m having – relating an occasion, trying to explain – if I’m trying to talk about a transaction or something like that, and maybe I’m not explaining it how the postmaster would understand it, and maybe if the Federation rep can sort of see past my confusion or whatever, is to just facilitate it.

Ms Price: You go on at paragraph 80 to say this:

“Disclosure would only be made to a solicitor not the suspect so that the solicitor could advise their client.”

Do you mean by this that pre-interview disclosure would only be provided if someone was represented by a solicitor?

Christopher Knight: Yes, we would only give the disclosure to a solicitor.

Ms Price: Who was it who instructed or trained you to the effect that pre-interview disclosure should only be made if someone was legally represented?

Christopher Knight: I believe that’s how I understood it to be: disclosure for the solicitor.

Ms Price: What was the reasoning behind this?

Christopher Knight: Just so they could advise their client.

Ms Price: Forgive me, what was the reason for not providing it, if there wasn’t a solicitor?

Christopher Knight: Probably – mainly probably because we were talking about something that person would already know, I guess. I don’t know.

Ms Price: Mrs Henderson’s position in interview was that she did not know what the cause of the apparent shortfall was and that it was a complete shock to her when the shortage was found on audit. In effect, she was saying the cause of the apparent shortfall was unexplained. Would you agree with that, having that the opportunity to read the documents?

Christopher Knight: Yeah, yeah.

Ms Price: The interview took place on 11 March 2010. That was nine days after Jarnail Singh had reported to you and others the result of the Darlington case with the judicial comment we looked at. Mrs Henderson was someone apparently completely in the dark about the reasons for a shortfall. Did occur to you at the time, with what you knew by that point, that the Horizon data you were relying on might be wrong?

Christopher Knight: No. It didn’t.

Ms Price: Did you consider that you were under any obligation to get to the bottom of the shortfall?

Christopher Knight: Yes, that’s – you’re always looking to understand what it was.

Ms Price: You’ve had an opportunity to look at the record of interview in Mrs Henderson’s case. Your questions in interview tend to suggest you were convinced that Mrs Henderson was guilty of theft. By way of example, you told her it was difficult to believe she did not know what happened to the money. Is that the case, that you were convinced she was guilty of theft?

Christopher Knight: I believe she – well, yeah – of theft, I believe she knew something that what she wasn’t telling me, but …

Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, paragraph 75 of Mr Knight’s statement. It’s page 28. You say here:

“In this case I was what was known as the 1st Officer or Lead Investigator. Various data would have been obtained from Credence, which gives the same data as ARQ but is immediately accessible to download rather than having to request from Fujitsu. Credence data covers the 3-month period prior to the current date. It’s also easier to read than the ARQ data as the ‘Item Long name’ is shown rather than just an item ID. From Credence you can obtain transactional data and event data (back office items).”

So the data you obtained in this case was Credence data not ARQ data; is that right?

Christopher Knight: That’s correct, yes.

Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, POL00047155. This is a memo from Rob Wilson. If we can go to the bottom of that, please, and over the page, so we see Rob Wilson, Head of Criminal Law.

Going back to the top of the first page, please, it’s dated 25 March 2010, and Mr Wilson’s memo, which is sent to the Security Team and copied to you, reads as follows:

“I understand from the papers that an audit discovered a shortage of just in excess of £11,900 at a sub post office that was only open on a limited basis.

“I also understand from the papers that whilst the suspect would maintain that she was unaware of the loss, the suspicion is that when she completed the branch trading statement on 6 January 2010 she would have been aware of the loss. Could you explain to me why she would have been aware of the loss? I note there is reference to a table in Appendix B which leads to the suspicion that she knew of the loss. I am not able to understand why it shows that she would have been aware that the accounts were short on that occasion.

“Presumably, we would be able to interrogate Horizon and establish a full accounting pattern for the sub office to show all transactions that were conducted and therefore how much money was paid out, how much was received in remittances and therefore how much should have been present in the account.

“Accordingly, I would like to understand how it is that we can pinpoint where this loss occurred. You may think it sensible at this stage, bearing in mind it is most unlikely that she will plead guilty that we start to put together full witness [statement] and exhibit bundles.”

You replied to Mr Wilson on 20 April 2010. Could we have this reply on screen, please? It’s POL00044501. You say here:

“I believe that Mrs Henderson would have been aware of the shortage on 6 January 2010 when she completed the Branch Trading statement as a discrepancy was shown in the Horizon Events log.

“I have spoken to a manager at the Crown Office and she couldn’t understand why such a large figure had been entered. She confirmed that the ‘CASH’ figures would have been entered manually and then the system produces the Discrepancy Positive or Negative entry. It would appear very strange that an ‘error’ was £20 different to the audit shortage discovered 4 weeks later.

“Circumstantial possibly but Mrs Henderson hasn’t been able to offer an explanation.”

Then two paragraphs down, you say this:

“If Mrs Henderson is to be believed and the BT was correct on 6 January 2010 she lost nearly £12K in 5 weeks to 10 February 2010. Then factor in that she is open two full days and two half days, so in essence three (3) full days. The £12K loss has occurred in 15 days. The largest transaction in that period was a Post Office Card Account withdrawal for £400.”

Just above that, we can see your sentence here:

“I hope you feel we can continue with charges(s) of theft and false accounting.”

Was it usual for you to express hope that the Criminal Law Team would advise in favour of charges?

Christopher Knight: I think that’s probably badly written on my part, for how it comes across. I think it was more of a – that I’ve answered your questions and we can progress. It wasn’t anything malicious or anything of that nature.

Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, POL00047159. This is the Criminal Law Team’s advice dated 21 May 2010 from Rob Wilson, who says this in the first two paragraphs:

“In my opinion the evidence is sufficient to afford a realistic prospect of conviction of the above named on a charge of theft as set out on the attached Schedule. I have not drafted a commencement date in the theft as I am not clear when we are saying the losses started. Can you fill in such a date and explain to me your rationale for relying on this particular date.

“Bearing in mind Mrs Henderson’s explanation in relation to the loss, it does not seemed appropriate to consider false accounting charges. It would be helpful if we could obtain some evidence to refute the possibility that the money she alleges must have gone missing was not, in fact, in the account during the last accounting period prior to the audit.”

He requests some further evidence in this memo. Going over the page, please, at 4 he says:

“Reference is also made in the report at page 27 to the initial entry for £6,967.28. The paragraph goes on to explain that the other cash figure of 11,970.69 was probably a discrepancy shown which has been re-input to achieve a zero balance. Could this theory also be explained in the form of a witness statement producing all documents that establish the theory. In other words, the prosecution really need to try to prove that the thefts in this case took place over a period of time in circumstances where the defendant must be the thief as she is the only person who has access to the cash at the Post Office.”

A further memo was sent by Mr Wilson on the 19 August 2010. Could we have that on screen, please. It’s POL00055189. This is sent direct to you and it reads as follows:

“The above-named entered a not guilty plea in relation to the current charge. The charge has been amended to read between 1 January 1997 and 10 February 2010. Clearly, this cannot be the full period of the fraud and no doubt some indication as to the beginning date will be given in due course.

“The prosecution are now required to prepare the witness [statement] and exhibit bundles and serve the disclosure evidence. I would be grateful if the statements as outlined in my advice of 21 May could be obtained. In addition to those statements, it would be helpful to understand why the audit took place on 10 February.

“I am sure that this case will be one of those cases where the Horizon evidence will be challenged and in due course I expect we will need to obtain expert evidence from Mr Jenkins of Fujitsu.”

So Mr Wilson was flagging that this may be a case where Horizon evidence was challenged, wasn’t he?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: At this stage, there was still some doubt, wasn’t there, as to the date period in relation to the alleged theft or fraud?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, POL00055314. This is a memo dated 29 September 2010, to you, again from Rob Wilson. In the third and fourth paragraphs, Mr Wilson says this:

“The current charge covers a period from 1 January 1997 to 10 February 2010. Is there any indication from the Horizon documentation, the defendant’s bank statements, or any other material, when this money first went missing? Can you confirm when the last audit took place so that if necessary that date can actually appear in the indictment?

“At the moment I suspect that this will be a case where Horizon itself is challenged and, as such, the Prosecution will be under pressure to disclose a huge amount of Horizon data. It would therefore be extremely useful if we could identify something that assists the prosecution in the pursuit of this criminal allegation.”

So it appears, even at this late stage, that nobody could pinpoint when the alleged loss first occurred; is that right?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Price: Given all the doubt over the date in this case, did it not occur to you that you should seek further data from Fujitsu?

Christopher Knight: Yes, I presume it would.

Ms Price: Why didn’t you?

Christopher Knight: I don’t know. I can’t recall that.

Ms Price: Did it not concern you, as an investigator, that a theft charge was proceeding when nobody could say when or how the loss occurred?

Christopher Knight: Yeah, it would have done, asking that – he’s asking that question, I don’t recall the reason why it wasn’t obtained.

Ms Price: Going back, please, to the email from Mr Wilson dated 17 November 2010. Could we have that back on screen, please. It’s POL00055783.

This is the email we looked at a little earlier and we looked at the first two paragraphs there. In the last paragraph here:

“Clearly if there were to be a plea to false accounting but on the basis that the Horizon system was at fault that would not be an acceptable basis of plea for the prosecution”.

Looking at the email below this, this is Rob Wilson to Dianne Chan, the day before on 16 November, he says:

“Dianne

“Have spoken to defence solicitor who indicated that the defendant may be filling to plead to false accounting and pay money back. Taken instructions from Chris who has confirmed that he would be happy to proceed on this basis.”

Is the “Chris” there a reference to you?

Christopher Knight: I would guess it is.

Ms Price: Did you form any view at the time about the appropriateness of making a guilty plea to false accounting, contingent upon Mrs Henderson not making reference to her belief that the discrepancies were as a result of the Horizon system?

Christopher Knight: That – the wording of that, “taken instructions from Chris, who has confirmed he would be happy to proceed on the basis”, I don’t know how – why that’s written like that, because he wouldn’t have taken – wouldn’t have taken instruction from me on anything. So I’d have to query the meaning of that sentence.

Ms Price: Could we have on screen, please, document reference POL00019111. This is a case file event log and it relates, this time, to Alison Hall’s case. Was this event log completed by you?

Christopher Knight: I believe – yes, it was.

Ms Price: There is an entry in it on 30 June 2011, if we can scroll down, please. You say here:

“Phone call from Adrian Chaplin, Barrister, while at Leeds Crown Court. Asked if we’d accept False Accounting. I said we would but nothing mention against Horizon.”

This is your note in which you say the plea was okay but nothing mentioned against Horizon. You deal with this in your statement at paragraph 107, if we could have that on screen, please. It’s page 37. You’ve dealt with this earlier in this paragraph but, as a point of general principle, about halfway down this page you say:

“I have never had any involvement in making a plea deal or applying conditions to such a deal and this would be outside of my remit as an Investigator.”

Does that remain your position, notwithstanding the case event log that we’ve just looked at?

Christopher Knight: Yes, because that case – what I’m saying here, I’ve never had involvement in – I think I’m trying to explain that case log, that I would have been passing on a message because counsel had phoned me. I wouldn’t have been giving instructions, it would be more so passing on a message because I wouldn’t have been involved in plea deals or conditions of any sort.

Ms Price: You have referred a number of times to the business line in relation to Horizon. In relation to your own involvement, particularly in the cases of Mrs Hall and Mrs Henderson, do you feel any responsibility for what happened to those two subpostmistresses?

Christopher Knight: I was the Investigator, so I guess that would be part of it, yes.

Ms Price: Sir, those are all the questions I have for Mr Knight. Do you have any questions before I turn to Core Participants?

Sir Wyn Williams: No, thank you, no.

Ms Price: Ms Patrick has some questions.

Sir Wyn Williams: Certainly.

Questioned by Ms Patrick

Ms Patrick: Mr Knight, my name is Angela Patrick. I act with Mr Moloney KC for a number of subpostmasters who were prosecuted and who have subsequently had their convictions quashed. We act including for Ms Henderson and Ms Hall, who sits next to me today.

I want to ask you about two topics and the first is about a document which is at POL00136717. This isn’t a message that we’d have expected you to see at the time, I just want to ask you about it. If we can start at page 2.

Christopher Knight: Excuse me, nothing has come up.

Ms Patrick: I am going to say something –

Christopher Knight: Oh, sorry.

Ms Patrick: – for the document management team. If we can bring it up at page 2 at the very end, we can see where the email trail starts, and you can see there we start with a request from Simon Baker dated on 9 June 2013. I’ll take it very quickly there. It’s about a Spot Review, which we understand were exercises that were conducted during the Second Sight review, so not something we’d have expected you to see at the time.

Christopher Knight: Right.

Ms Patrick: If we can scroll up, we see a reply to that email from Dave Posnett and, at the bottom of page 1 you can see the start of that. You see Dave Posnett replies on 10 June 2013.

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Patrick: What I want to look at, if we can scroll on to the next page, it’s first two paragraphs or three paragraphs there. If you can read that to yourself, I’ll read it for the record.

“I’ve read the associated document and I would say there were issues … the scratchcard process worked but some SPMRs [subpostmasters] had trouble getting to grips and understanding it. The volume of TCs [which we know are transaction corrections] across the network were, I recall, a concern. I owned Scratchcards as a fraud risk programme when I was Fraud Risk Manager up until around May 2010. The problem was that scratchcards were the only product which wasn’t simply remmed in and then sold. Instead, they had to be accepted on the Lottery Terminal as received and then activated as and when required on the Lottery Terminal and remmed in on Horizon when activated, then sold, and then prizes/stock holdings were recorded on Horizon … as well as online sales.

“I ran a number of intervention/education initiatives and associate a zip file of two such initiatives (1 & 2) … both of which featured Hightown … “

Now Hightown was Ms Hall’s branch:

“… (so they weren’t left to flounder as seems to be the insinuation). There are also help guides and comms articles included and I would think that POL sent out many more comms to branches and the Lottery Team made numerous TP calls each month, as well as the Ops Manual as a point of reference in branch.”

He goes on:

“Also in the file [and he refers to a spreadsheet]. From this data we determined branches that would be telephoned and branches that I would request an audit. If you see the ‘branches of concern’ tab you can get a sense of the concerns around perceived scratchcard holdings. There were many audit shortages and scratchcard holding concerns seemed to highlight other problems at branches.”

Now, what I wanted to ask you, Mr Knight, was a few questions. This seems to suggest that there were problems known to the Post Office arising from the management of Lottery scratchcards in 2010; is that fair?

Christopher Knight: That’s what that seems to imply, yes.

Ms Patrick: And that those were problems that called, at the time, for initiatives and interventions on the part of the Post Office; is that fair?

Christopher Knight: Yeah, that’s what it seems to be saying, some sort of, yeah, clarity, yeah.

Ms Patrick: And that those initiatives included Hightown, which was Ms Hall’s branch. That’s recorded there in that message, isn’t it?

Christopher Knight: Yeah, yeah.

Ms Patrick: He goes on to say that there were many audit shortages and concerns which highlighted other branches.

Now, this information about the education initiatives involving Hightown and that there was a known problem around scratchcards and associated audit shortages, is that something you would have known at the time you were investigating Ms Hall in 2010?

Christopher Knight: I don’t believe so. I don’t think I’ve seen this document – or aware of the content of it.

Ms Patrick: That content is all information that would have been relevant to your investigation, isn’t it?

Christopher Knight: It would have been, yes, it would have been relevant.

Ms Patrick: Thank you. Can we move on to the second topic, and that’s Ms Hall’s interview. Now, you’ve answered a number of questions from Ms Price on Ms Hall raising Horizon Issues and integrity, and your failure to explore that as a reasonable line of inquiry. I only want to ask you a few questions about the interview to be absolutely clear on what she said to you. Can we look at POL00021252 and that’s the transcript of interview, and I’d quite like to look at page 11, please.

I’d like to start at the point where there is 00.07.37, so 7 minutes and 37 seconds into the transcript, please. Sorry, if I can just catch up and check that we’re all at the same place.

So we see there, can you see Mr Knight, at the top of that page, you say:

“okay, um, can you tell me why there’s a cash shortage of £14,000 in the account?”

Can you see that?

Christopher Knight: Yes, I can see that.

Ms Patrick: I’m going to read that just so we can all be looking at the same thing. Mrs Hall says:

“Well, I think it’s all to do with the scratchers, um, I’ve been having problems with them for a while now, and I should have asked for help earlier on, and I didn’t. Um, I can’t see it being anything else. I know sometimes we get, err, discrepancies for missing giros and cheques and stuff, but I don’t think it’s going to add up to that amount.”

You go on:

“Right. Right, I’ll ask you another question more. You said a while.”

She says, “Mm.

“Can you, you know, put some time frame on that?

“I don’t know, really. It’s just probably six months.

You say:

“… probably six months.

“Yeah.

“So, are we in, let’s say, beginning of September.

“I think it maybe started at the beginning of the year, when it all started, um, I’m building up.”

Now stopping there, Ms Hall was referring to problems and she thought the problems might be about the Lottery, didn’t she?

Christopher Knight: Yes, that’s what we were talking about.

Ms Patrick: That’s just what she thought, wasn’t it?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Patrick: But she was raising other issues, wasn’t she?

Christopher Knight: Sorry, in what sense?

Ms Patrick: She’s saying:

“There were other problems, there’s missing giros, cheques and stuff, discrepancies, it might not add up to that amount, but um …”

She didn’t know what was going on, did she?

Christopher Knight: Sorry, yeah.

Ms Patrick: She couldn’t explain the shortfalls, could she?

Christopher Knight: No.

Ms Patrick: But she was telling you they’d been going on from the start of the year and this was you in September, wasn’t she?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Patrick: That was a period of more than three months, wasn’t it?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Patrick: Okay. Now, if we can read on, if we go over the page. Just checking you can see it.

Christopher Knight: Yes, I can see.

Ms Patrick: At the beginning she starts:

“And I’ve been trying to rectify it and been calling the helpline, the Lottery line. Just trying to get everything sorted, and it’s just got on top of me. And I actually asked for an audit myself.”

You say, “When was that?”

She says:

“Um, I can’t remember all the dates. I spoke to Denise at Chesterfield, and she put me in touch with another lady. I wish I’d have wrote all the reference number down and I didn’t ‘cause I was just in such a state, but she –”

You say:

“That’s fine. When did you phone up?”

She said:

“This is before, when I came back off, um, holiday. It all started because the branch was rolling over. No, not the branch, the, the online, the, the, we were going online.”

You say:

“Oh, you were going onto the next, yeah, changing [onto] the new, the next generation, yes.”

She says, “Yeah, onto the new, new change and that. So, I asked, um, I spoke to Denise at Chesterfield, and she gave me another lady’s number to ring, and I requested an audit because I wanted all this sorting out. So, I’ve got nothing to hide, I just want it all sorting out, so I can get back to my post.

“Right. Right, you’re saying, just going back. You said that it looks like it’s been happening from the beginning of the year, you’ve had a problem.

“Yeah.”

Now, I just want to ask you a few questions. Stopping there, Ms Hall was telling you she knew she had problems and she wanted help, wasn’t she?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Patrick: She wanted help to get to the bottom of it, didn’t she?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Patrick: She’d been experiencing problems over many months, hadn’t she?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Ms Patrick: That was at around the time of the transition to Horizon Online?

Christopher Knight: I believe so.

Ms Patrick: Thank you.

We don’t have any more questions for you, Mr Knight. Thank you.

Ms Price: Mr Jacobs has some questions, sir.

Questioned by Mr Jacobs

Mr Jacobs: Thank you, sir.

I’m going to ask you about Peter Holmes. I represent him and a large number of other subpostmasters who were the victims in this scandal.

You have given evidence at paragraph 69 to 73 of your statement in relation to the prosecution of Mr Holmes and your investigation of him.

Christopher Knight: I can’t see anything. I don’t know if you’re showing me something, sorry.

Mr Jacobs: Okay, perhaps if we could turn that up. WITN08290100. That’s your witness statement, and it’s paragraphs 63 to 79. That’s where you deal with Mr Holmes’ case.

Oh, yes, we’ll locate the page number now. It is 27. Thank you.

So you say you were involved as the second officer in that case.

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Mr Jacobs: Do you recall that you attended a search of Mr Holmes’ family home?

Christopher Knight: I don’t recall, I’m sorry, no.

Mr Jacobs: With Mr Daily, you don’t recall it?

Christopher Knight: I don’t recall it, no.

Mr Jacobs: You’ve answered questions from Ms Price about what Mr Holmes said at the interview that you attended? He said that he believed the Horizon system may have been responsible for the alleged shortfalls. He repeated his concerns of the Horizon system during the interview and he said that he was hoping that error notices would have come back but he thought it was something the computer had done or hadn’t done. Those were his words, effectively.

Now, his conviction, his subsequent conviction, was overturned by the Court of Appeal and quashed in 2021. Mr Holmes had died in 2015, so it was a posthumous overturning of his conviction, and the Court of Appeal found that Mr Holmes’ prosecution was an abuse of process. They found that there was no evidence to corroborate the Horizon evidence, they found there was no investigation into the integrity of the Horizon figures and they found that there was no proof of any actual loss to the Post Office.

Now, can we look at paragraph 73 of your statement, so just scrolling down, please. Page 28, thank you. You say:

“The Inquiry has asked me for my reflections on the way the investigation and prosecution of Mr Holmes was conducted … with regard to the Court of Appeal judgment …”

I have just given you the findings of the Court of Appeal. You say, from what you recall, you did not have any concerns with the way the investigation was run at the time as second officer.

The question that we ask you, on behalf of Marion Holmes, who is the widow of Peter Holmes, is: surely you must have been concerned when you were aware of this outcome from the Court of Appeal that Mr Holmes had repeatedly challenged the Horizon system and it was not investigated. Why didn’t you, as an Investigating Officer, investigate the issue that Mr Holmes had raised repeatedly at his interview?

Christopher Knight: I was the second officer, so I was literally there on the day. I wasn’t investigating the case. I was there on the day to be a second person for safety and other reasons, to facilitate the interviews and searches, and such like. So I was going by that, you know, and, obviously, the case had been prosecuted so I hadn’t – subsequently, obviously, having seen the overturned and the reasons for that, then that was that.

But, at the time, I believed it was – from the bits I saw, that was fine. I wasn’t involved in any other part of it.

Mr Jacobs: Well, I appreciate, of course, that you were the second officer and we’re going to be asking very similar, if not the same, questions of Mr Daily who was the primary interviewing officer?

Christopher Knight: Right.

Mr Jacobs: But surely, as an investigating officer, present and in attendance at that interview, when a subpostmaster, as so many others did, was making these claims, wouldn’t that, as an Investigator, at least raise a few red flags in your mind and wouldn’t you have said, or ought to have properly said, “Well, surely we should look into this?” even though, as you say, you weren’t leading the investigation.

Christopher Knight: Yeah, I appreciate what you’re saying. It’s a very difficult question to answer, really, because, as I said to Ms Price, it’s – from what – where we are now, looking back then, I don’t think there was anything of that – that there wasn’t a process in place to sort of raise it and discuss it, if that makes sense. Probably not a very good answer, I apologise.

Mr Jacobs: No, I can see what you’re saying. You’re saying that there wasn’t a set procedure –

Christopher Knight: Yeah, it wasn’t like a forum –

Mr Jacobs: – for looking into allegations that subpostmasters made.

Christopher Knight: Mm.

Mr Jacobs: Surely that’s part of the investigating function though, to follow things through?

Christopher Knight: Yes, it would be.

Mr Jacobs: Right. The final question in relation to Mr Holmes is, with the benefit of hindsight, now you know what the Court of Appeal said, do you accept that Mr Daily and you failed properly to investigate Mr Holmes’ case in light of what he said at interview?

Christopher Knight: It sounds like I’m trying to cop out, I’m not. I was second officer, I was literally there on the day so, yes, I appreciate, as you’ve just said, what I would have heard, and no action. What Mr Daily did, I’m not fully aware. So that –

Mr Jacobs: Well, perhaps I’ll put it in a different way. As the second officer, do you accept that you should have done more to ensure that this case was properly investigated?

Christopher Knight: In hindsight, but, as the process was back then, a second officer was just there on the day. Sorry if that’s –

Mr Jacobs: All right, well, I’ll move on. I want to ask you about Rita Threlfall, and Ms Price has asked you about your involvement in her interview.

Christopher Knight: Mm-hm.

Mr Jacobs: If I could perhaps ask you just to refresh your memory to go to the – if we could ask – if we could go to the document POL00107683, and it’s page 3 of 9. This is the document Ms Price took you through, it’s the investigation report of Ms Threlfall.

Christopher Knight: Oh, right.

Mr Jacobs: 3 of 9, please. I think we can see that it says:

“… I interviewed [and this is Mr Bradshaw writing this] Ms Rita Threlfall at the Liverpool North Office, Crown Street Liverpool … Present throughout the interview was Mr Christopher Knight, Fraud Investigator.”

That interview took place on 10 March 2011 and you confirmed you were there and present at that interview.

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Mr Jacobs: Now, can we turn to the witness statement of Ms Threlfall and I’ll give you the reference for that, it is WITN02360100. Page 7 of 15, please. I should make it clear, this isn’t a document that you’ve seen previously.

Christopher Knight: Okay.

Mr Jacobs: If we could go, please, to paragraph 49. So we can see, in fact starting at 48 – I should say that Ms Threlfall is wheelchair dependent and disabled. She says:

“Upon arrival they left my husband and me in a hallway, we asked for a chair and never received one. I ended up having to sit down on the stairs.

“The interview room was upstairs and I told them there was no way I could make it up the stairs. In order to make it to the interview room I was placed in a tiny parcel lift.”

Now, Ms Threlfall is watching this hearing today. She was going to give evidence in the Human Impact part of the Inquiry but was too upset to do so and so on 23 February 2002 Mr Stein, King’s Counsel read a summary of her statement to the Inquiry. Do you recall this treatment of my client?

Christopher Knight: I don’t, I’m afraid, no. I don’t recall any of the – that day.

Mr Jacobs: It’s quite striking, isn’t it, that a disabled lady, who is wheelchair dependent, has an interview arranged up a staircase that she cannot access and is transferred to the interview room in a tiny parcel lift. Surely that is something that you ought to have remembered?

Christopher Knight: I don’t. I don’t remember it. Now, I would imagine when we interviewed – and I’m speaking sort of generically, if that makes – if we interviewed people, then we would find a location and I don’t know whether – was this at a Royal Mail site?

Mr Jacobs: She says Liverpool –

Christopher Knight: Mail – Sorting – Post Office.

Mr Jacobs: – sorting –

Christopher Knight: Yeah, it would be a Royal Mail Sorting Office. So that would have been a room within that building. I’d imagine, as a sorting office, the ground floor would be where they’re doing their sorting, so this would have been up there. I didn’t arrange it, so Mr Bradshaw did.

And talking about the tiny parcel lift, knowing Royal Mail buildings, it would be a lift. It would be a working – not a passenger lift, as it were, it would be a working lift. I don’t know the size of it so it might have appeared to be a bit rough and ready not a – as you would imagine a lift being in a superstore or whatever.

Mr Jacobs: Well, her evidence, and this evidence is that has been received by the Inquiry, is that it was a tiny lift, it was inappropriate. She is still shaken by that experience. She says in her evidence that she suffers from crippling anxiety and depression. Do you think this is any appropriate way to treat a disabled person who you’re investigating, or at all?

Christopher Knight: It’s not – no, taking this aside, everybody should be treated fairly. So I don’t know the circumstances of how – what this lift was, tiny in comparison to what? You know, and all I’m going by what I’m reading here is, if you go into a first floor and there’s a lift, then that would be the lift.

Mr Jacobs: Well, given that she says it is a tiny parcel lift –

Christopher Knight: I can’t argue either way. I don’t know.

Mr Jacobs: You’re still a current employee with Post Office.

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Mr Jacobs: Would Post Office put a disabled person into such a lift today?

Christopher Knight: Probably not but I don’t know what lifts – whatever lift we had today, if we had a lift and somebody is going up to another floor, we would go in that lift. Over my years within the business, I’ve been in some – some buildings had very old lifts with the old shutter, the concertina shutter you pull across and then that would go, whereas now they’re more modern. So I can’t comment on what this was.

Mr Jacobs: If we can then go back to the statement, which is still on the screen, paragraph 50, Ms Threlfall says that she was interviewed under caution. She says the interviewer was horrendous, she had a solicitor with her and she provided a no comment interview on advice.

Then scrolling down very slightly please, paragraph 52. She says:

“At the end of the interview the Post Office Investigator turned off the tape and the chap turned to me and said ‘Do you wear a watch, I said yes and can I see your earrings and rings, and, what are the colour of your eyes’, so I responded and he said in a joking manner ‘Good so we’ve got a description of you for when they come’. It was so awful I nearly fell to the floor when he said that. I couldn’t believe what I had heard.”

Now, it was Mr Bradshaw who was the Lead Investigator?

Christopher Knight: Yes.

Mr Jacobs: Do you recall these comments being made?

Christopher Knight: As I said, I don’t but I could give you an explanation of what I believe was taking place. Following an interview and, again, I’m not talking about this specifically, I’m talking about all interviews, we have to fill a form out called a NPA01, Non-police Prosecution Authority 01 form and, on that form, there’s lots of questions and it’s basically identifying a person.

I think it mirrors – if you get arrested by the police you go into custody and they take your fingerprints, so I think it mirrors that. So basically, you’d have your name, da, da, da, and then it would be: male, female; left-handed or right-handed; scars, tattoos, distinguishing marks; build; and there would be various questions you’d have to go through. So that sounds to me that that is what is taking place there, although she’s not possibly describing it. She’s describing how she took it but that’s what I would suggest is taking place.

Mr Jacobs: Mrs Threlfall, who is watching today, says that she believes – in her words that she’s used to us today, she believes that she was deliberately persecuted and the question I have for you is: was there a strategy or a tactic employed by Investigators to unsettle or unnerve or intimidate subpostmasters and subpostmistresses under investigation to exert pressure upon them during interviews and in the investigating process?

Christopher Knight: No, not at all. Not –

Mr Jacobs: Do you accept from Ms Threlfall’s evidence that that is exactly what we see happening here?

Christopher Knight: It’s her feelings, so I can’t argue with how she feels. So if she’s saying she felt like that then I would have to accept that. But I don’t believe that was how it was delivered.

Mr Jacobs: Mrs Threlfall says the only motive for treating her in this way was to unsettle her, belittle her, humiliate her and that was what Mr Bradshaw was doing and you were involved in that as the Second Investigator?

Christopher Knight: I don’t believe that at all. I don’t believe that at all because, if you’re interviewing – it’s putting somebody at ease rather than putting them on the – you know, aggravating them.

Mr Jacobs: I’m going to ask to see if I have any more questions.

Mrs Threlfall was originally prosecuted for false accounting and theft, the Post Office dropped the charges and she was formally recorded as not guilty, as a verdict. She’s watching today. As someone who was involved in her investigation, do you have anything that you’d like to say to her now?

Christopher Knight: There was – well, as far as – I don’t remember it but would say there was nothing, as you’ve said there, malicious.

Mr Jacobs: Are you sorry for the way she was treated?

Christopher Knight: If that’s how she felt she was treated, then that’s not nice for her.

Mr Jacobs: Are you sorry for how she was treated or are you sorry –

Christopher Knight: I don’t know –

Mr Jacobs: – if that’s how she felt she was being treated?

Christopher Knight: I don’t believe – I wouldn’t have treated anybody disrespectively (sic) so, if she felt like that, then that’s – you know, I’m sorry that she feels like that, but –

Mr Jacobs: Thank you. I haven’t any further questions for you?

Sir Wyn Williams: Anyone else?

Ms Price: Sir, I think those are all the questions from Core Participants.

Sir Wyn Williams: All right, thank you.

I hope that Ms Hall and Mrs Threlfall have found today’s proceedings informative.

Thank you very much for making a witness statement and for coming to give evidence, Mr Knight. I’m grateful to you.

Where do we go from here, Ms Price?

Ms Price: Sir, if we can come back at 2.00 for this afternoon’s witness, please, if we take lunch now.

Sir Wyn Williams: Fine, all right.

Ms Price: Thank you.

(12.57 pm)

(The Short Adjournment)

(2.00 pm)

Ms Millar: Good afternoon, sir. Can you see and hear me?

Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, I can, thank you.

Ms Millar: May we please call Mr Ryan.

Kevin Ryan

KEVIN JAMES RYAN (affirmed).

Questioned by Ms Millar

Ms Millar: Could you please confirm your full name Mr Ryan?

Kevin Ryan: It’s Kevin James Ryan.

Ms Millar: You should have in front of you a witness statement, which is dated 16 November 2023. If you turn to the last page of that, which is page 44, is that your signature?

Kevin Ryan: It is.

Ms Millar: Are the contents of that statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

Kevin Ryan: They are.

Ms Millar: For the purposes of the transcript, the URN is WITN08950100. My name is Megan Millar and, as you know, I will be asking you questions today on behalf of the Inquiry.

I’m going to be asking you about issues which arise in Phase 4 of the Inquiry, focusing on your involvement as an Investigator in the Security Team and, in particular, your involvement in the case study of Angela Sefton and Anne Nield.

First, I’d like to ask you some questions about your professional background. Is it correct that you joined the Post Office in 1985 as a counter clerk?

Kevin Ryan: It is, yes.

Ms Millar: Is it correct that you are still employed by the Post Office?

Kevin Ryan: I am.

Ms Millar: Is it fair to say that you’ve had a varied career, over almost 38 years you’ve been working for the Post Office?

Kevin Ryan: Very much so, yes.

Ms Millar: I just want to ask you about some of the roles that you’ve held. Is it right that in 1997 you became a National Field Trainer?

Kevin Ryan: I did, yes.

Ms Millar: Do you remember the Horizon system being rolled out during the time you held that role?

Kevin Ryan: I’m not sure whether it was before I held that role or – I’m not sure exactly the date it was rolled out. But I did use Horizon in that role, yes.

Ms Millar: Were you involved in training subpostmasters to use Horizon?

Kevin Ryan: Yes, that was part of the training.

Ms Millar: From 2005 to 2006, you were an Area Intervention Manager; is that right?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Can you please give a brief description of what that role entailed?

Kevin Ryan: It was dealing with issues raised via a number of sources, branch support, the helpline, Retail Line Managers. I worked for a Retail Line Manager and they would send me issues in a branch, could be anything from customer complaints, and it would be a case of trying to resolve any issues in branches for the Retail Line.

Ms Millar: In April 2010, you were appointed a Horizon Migration Manager for a short time until August 2010?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Is that right? At the end of 2010, is it right that you were initially going to take redundancy but you then saw the Security Team advertising vacancies and decided to apply?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: What motivated you to apply for a job in the Security Team at that point?

Kevin Ryan: I wanted to stay in the Post Office. Unfortunately, the role I’d previously had as sales manager wasn’t something that I enjoyed, so I decided to leave rather than continue in that role. When the Security Manager role came up I thought it was appropriate to my skillset, so I applied for it.

Ms Millar: Is it then correct that you joined the team as a Security Manager in January 2011?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: For a six-week period in July 2013, did you temporarily step up in a Security Team Leader role?

Kevin Ryan: Yeah, the team leader that was my team leader left the Post Office and I was asked to stand in temporarily until they either appointed somebody or, due to restructure, they were not going to replace that person, so they would shrink the team – the number of Team Leaders, sorry.

Ms Millar: Who was that, who was your team leader?

Kevin Ryan: At that point it was Keith Gilchrist.

Ms Millar: Moving on then, please, to the structure of the Security Team. Is it correct that when you joined in 2011 the physical Security Team and the Fraud and Crime Investigation Team emerged?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: At that time there were three teams responsible for three regions in the UK –

Kevin Ryan: Yeah.

Ms Millar: – north, Midlands and South; is that right?

Kevin Ryan: Yeah.

Ms Millar: Each time at that point had approximately 18 to 20 Security Managers; is that right?

Kevin Ryan: I think so, yes. I can’t exactly remember the numbers too clearly but it was larger than the team is currently.

Ms Millar: You explain in your statement that, over the years, the size of the team has decreased, so now there are eight Security Managers and one Team Leader in total?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: You’ve told us that when you became a Security Manager you reported to a team leader; is that correct?

Kevin Ryan: Yeah.

Ms Millar: The team leaders you remember were Leslie Frankland, Keith Gilchrist, Simon Hutchinson, Helen Dickinson and Simon Talbot; is that right?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Then when you became a Team Leader temporarily in 2013 you reported to the Senior Security Manager, who you remember being Andy Hayward?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: When you were a Team Leader, is it correct then that you had three or four Security Managers reporting to you?

Kevin Ryan: Yeah, it may have been five, I’m not exactly sure of the number.

Ms Millar: The Security Managers you recall reporting to you were Mike Stanway, Steve Bradshaw and Robert Daily; is that right?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: You explain at paragraph 11 of your statement that you don’t recall providing any in-depth supervision to those Security Managers; is that right?

Kevin Ryan: Not a great deal, no. That I can recall – and I’ve checked with Post Office HR – I think I was only in the role for about seven weeks, maybe a little bit longer. So really speaking, it was literally just a stopgap to fill a role while a replacement was sourced.

Ms Millar: But you did remember doing some of their performance reviews and conducting one-to-ones and meetings; is that right?

Kevin Ryan: Yeah, it was one-to-ones, yeah, some one-to-ones with some of them.

Ms Millar: You go on later in your statement at paragraph 28 to explain that Team Leaders regularly provided supervision to Security Managers conducting criminal investigations. Did you provide it in that respect?

Kevin Ryan: No, I didn’t really have the experience, so anything to do with the fraud side of things was done by one of the other Team Leaders because I was only standing in and I’d only been there in the team for just over two years. I didn’t really have the experience to supervise on fraud.

Ms Millar: So one of the other team leaders managed the Security Managers reporting to you in respect of fraud; is that correct?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Who was that?

Kevin Ryan: I seem to think it was a lady by the name of Sharron Logan but I’m not 100 per cent sure on that.

Ms Millar: Can we, please, have a document with the reference POL00127137 on screen, please. This is a one-to-one meeting record between you and your line manager at the time, Simon Hutchinson. At page 2, if we can have a look at that, please, at the bottom of the page, the very bottom of the page, I think it’s a comment from you saying:

“Glad to be back in my old role and area and a job I enjoy. Team Leader role was simply not for me but will fully support Simon in that role.”

Can you explain why you didn’t think that the Team Leader role was for you?

Kevin Ryan: Throughout my career I’ve been working in the field, being a desk job, I just didn’t feel comfortable with it, so – and also there’s the pressures that were on that role at the time. I just wanted to get back to doing what I know.

Ms Millar: Moving on, then, to the training you received when you joined the Security Team. That document can come down. Thank you. In your statement you say that when you joined the Security Team, you’d been working for the Post Office for 26 years but you hadn’t gained any experience of investigations; is that correct?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Did you have any knowledge of criminal law?

Kevin Ryan: No.

Ms Millar: After you were offered the position, you went on a residential training course, which lasted three weeks; is that correct?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: You remembered this training being delivered by two Royal Mail Security Managers called Paul Whitaker and Paul Southin; is that right?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Do you remember any lawyers being involved in delivering this training?

Kevin Ryan: Not in that training, no.

Ms Millar: Could we have the document reference POL00129182 on screen, please. So we can see that’s “Investigations Workshop Feedback”, and is that then the residential training course?

Kevin Ryan: Yes, it looks like, yes.

Ms Millar: We can see underneath the title “Course Content”:

“The topics covered on the course enabled the focus to be centred on interviewing suspect offenders and witnesses, the cognitive witness interview process, searching and notebook entries. Detailed training was provided in those areas.

“Additionally training was provided in respect of RIPA, Safe Systems of Work and PORA …”

What do you understand that to be a reference to?

Kevin Ryan: I can’t remember. No, I can’t recall what that one is.

Ms Millar: “… NPA forms, notes of interview, tape summaries and offender reports.”

Are those the things you remember being covered?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Thank you. That can come down. You explain at paragraph 45 of your statement that you believe you would have learned when to seek relevant evidence from third parties and about your disclosure obligations through mentorship and shadowing; is that right?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Does that mean that you don’t remember receiving training on those topics?

Kevin Ryan: It was – I would say it was probably on-the-job training, so, as you were going through things, the mentor would talk you through how to deal with certain things. I don’t remember it specifically, no.

Ms Millar: What did the mentorship and shadowing involve, then?

Kevin Ryan: Basically, initially when we started – when I started, sorry, I would only be involved as Second Officers for a number of months, so shadowing the mentor mostly, and then eventually I’d be allocated some cases and the mentor would take me from start to finish right through the cases, making sure that I covered all of the relevant points that need to be covered.

Ms Millar: Your mentor was Steve Bradshaw; is that right?

Kevin Ryan: It was, yes.

Ms Millar: How long was the period of on the job training before you were able to take on investigations on your own?

Kevin Ryan: I think I got my first lead – well, you never really took them on on your own, you always had somebody as a second officer, which nearly always was Steve Bradshaw but my first case as a Lead Investigator, I think, was in late 2011.

Ms Millar: At paragraph 29 of your statement, you refer to the fact that, even after you started undertaking your own investigations, that Steve Bradshaw attended interviews as your Second Officer?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: For how long was that period of time where he would attend interviews with you?

Kevin Ryan: Probably until we really stopped doing full investigations. We were very small team, so myself and Steve Bradshaw lived relatively close, so it was easier to always be – work together.

Ms Millar: Was that in 2013?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Then at paragraph 48 of your statement you say that Cartwright King Solicitors started to deliver training in 2013. Do you know why they started running the training at that point?

Kevin Ryan: I don’t know the reason behind it, no. They did run number of courses, usually once a year, for a few years.

Ms Millar: Can we please have POL00129310 on screen, please. So this is an email from Dave Posnett to you and a number of others, dated 22 March 2013, and the subject is “Cartwright King Training Day”. So if we scroll down just a little bit, please. There’s a list of proposed topics, which includes: awkward interviewees; significant statements; points to prove; interviewing techniques; defence solicitor role; pre-interviewing/caution; and borrow v dishonesty.

Do you remember attended that training?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: What was your view of the training delivered by Cartwright King?

Kevin Ryan: Obviously, as a relatively new Security Manager, any kind of training was useful. So, yeah, I found it useful.

Ms Millar: Thank you. That document can come down. Do you remember receiving any other refresher training during your time as Security Manager?

Kevin Ryan: We did sessions when we had team meetings on various aspects of the role but I can’t remember anything specific, other than the Cartwright King days.

Ms Millar: Moving on, then, to the guidance which was available to you, relating to the conduct of criminal investigations. The Inquiry provided you with a number of policy and guidance documents, which you list in your statement at paragraph 19. Could we have just the end of that list on screen, please. It’s page 10 of your witness statement, which is WITN08950100.

If we can just go down to the end of that list, please. In your statement you say that you don’t recognise the first 21 documents we provided you with. So is it correct, then, that you do recognise the final four in that list?

Kevin Ryan: Yeah, I’ve probably seen them, yes, at some point.

Ms Millar: Thank you. That can come down.

Could we then, please, have POL00122557 on screen, please. At the bottom of page 1 we can see this is an email from Rob King and you’re cc’d in and it was sent on 21 July 2013. He is sending through the draft case review policy and key points document.

If we go then to the top of that page. So we can see this is an email from you to another address which appears to be in your name. Is that your personal email address?

Kevin Ryan: It was at the time, yes.

Ms Millar: I think you explain in your statement that you sent policies to your personal email to enable you to print and review them when you were working away from the office; is that correct?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: So do we take from that that you couldn’t access those documents from your work devices when you were away from the office?

Kevin Ryan: We could access them but couldn’t print them when you’re away from the office, you can only – because it wouldn’t connect to a personal printer. At that time, we weren’t allocated work printers at home, so the only way to print something off at home would be to send it to my own email address so I could print it at home, so I could be able to read it.

Ms Millar: So you could access them remotely from your work device?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: You just couldn’t print; is that correct?

Kevin Ryan: Just couldn’t print.

Ms Millar: Thank you, that can come down.

Where do you remember policy and guidance documents being stored?

Kevin Ryan: I would imagine they’d have been on a database that we had access to.

Ms Millar: If I could turn, then, please, to casework compliance. The Inquiry has provided you with a number of emails from 2011 from David Posnett relating to casework compliance. Is it right that compliance checks were introduced shortly after you joined the Security Team?

Kevin Ryan: Yes, they were.

Ms Millar: What was your understanding of the reason those checks were introduced?

Kevin Ryan: I think they just wanted uniformity in the way case files were put together, so that everybody was doing everything in a standard fashion.

Ms Millar: Did you understand that there’d been a problem with that before?

Kevin Ryan: No, it was mentioned that it had been something that had been done in the past with previous Investigation Managers, so they thought, because we had so many new people, it would be worthwhile running again.

Ms Millar: So one of the documents which Mr Posnett asked recipients of his email to familiarise themselves with was the Identification Codes document, and this is a document which you comment on at paragraph 58 of your statement and you refer to as a “disgrace”. The Inquiry is familiar with this document and I don’t intend to display it on screen but do you know the document I’m referring to?

Kevin Ryan: I do, yes.

Ms Millar: Does it remain your position that you don’t recall ever having seen this document before?

Kevin Ryan: No, I don’t.

Ms Millar: Can you think of any reason why you wouldn’t have seen it, given Mr Posnett asked you to familiarise yourself with the documents attached and you were fairly new to the team?

Kevin Ryan: I’d never really used identity codes, so it’s not something that I was familiar with anyway. I mean, I may have opened the document but I wouldn’t have read it in depth but I can’t recall whether I did or not.

Ms Millar: So you go on to explain in your statement that Security Managers used identification codes for reporting offences following prosecution, and these were recorded using the NPA01 form at interview and NPA02 form at conviction; is that correct?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Could we have a document reference POL00118374 on screen, please. This is a blank NPA01 form, if we could go to the top of page 2, please. So we can see there’s number of options for recording ethnic appearance. Are those the identification codes you’re referring to?

Kevin Ryan: That’s the form we used, yes.

Ms Millar: Can you remember using any other identification codes?

Kevin Ryan: With physical security, sometimes we’d get police reports that would have them on, so, if I didn’t know one, I would use Google to find the latest ID codes. That’s how I would refer to it.

Ms Millar: Rather than using the Post Office documents?

Kevin Ryan: Yeah.

Ms Millar: So if there were only those Identification Codes documents being used by the Post Office, can you think of any reason why Mr Posnett would have circulated a separate Identification Codes document?

Kevin Ryan: I don’t know.

Ms Millar: I’d like to ask you some questions about the involvement of Post Office Investigators following the identification of an apparent shortfall at audit.

Who made the decision to commence a criminal investigation?

Kevin Ryan: As far as I recall, the cases were raised by Team Leaders. Later on it may have been the Casework Team but, so far as I remember, it was Team Leaders who’d make the decision to commence an investigation.

Ms Millar: When you were a Team Leader in 2013, do you remember what factors you would have considered in raising a case?

Kevin Ryan: No, because, again, I didn’t really raise – that I can remember, I didn’t raise any cases. It was done centrally at that point. But, again, possibly by another team leader.

Ms Millar: So it wasn’t your responsibility to raise a case whenever you became –

Kevin Ryan: Due to experience, no.

Ms Millar: At paragraph 36 of your statement, you explain that you believe the level of loss required changed over time. Can you explain what you mean by that?

Kevin Ryan: I think once everything started to reduce with regards to investigations, the team got smaller, I think they didn’t start looking at criminal investigations until the value – it started to increase before they’d start looking at it. I can’t remember any exact details but I did hear that they were looking at different figures at different times.

Ms Millar: When you refer to value, do you mean the –

Kevin Ryan: Cash.

Ms Millar: – the size of the loss?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: At paragraph 31 of your statement, you explain that if a significant shortage was reported during a routine audit, your Team Leader may ask you to attend to begin investigating the issue as an open inquiry. Can you please explain what an open inquiry is?

Kevin Ryan: That’s just an initial inquiry to find out the facts of what’s happened before any decision is made on whether it would go to a full investigation.

Ms Millar: So that was a step before –

Kevin Ryan: Yeah.

Ms Millar: – criminal investigation being commenced?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: At paragraph 32, you explain that you might also be asked to attend an audit which was going to be raised due to a suspicious activity?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Can you help us with what you mean by “suspicious activity”?

Kevin Ryan: Chesterfield – the admin centre in Chesterfield, they may have noticed some suspicious transactions going through, or Cash Management might have raised an issue with cash not being sent back when the branch is holding an excessive amount of cash. So, under those circumstances, we may have been aware of an audit taking place that may result in a shortage, so we may be asked to attend on the day.

Ms Millar: You explain in your statement at paragraph 37 that, where there was prior notice of a potential shortage which resulted in an audit, the Security Manager would speak to the necessary individuals in the Post Office at the outset.

Kevin Ryan: Yeah.

Ms Millar: So who would that include?

Kevin Ryan: The auditors, usually, and the postmaster or the staff member who was on site at the time.

Ms Millar: Would those individuals be contacted in every case?

Kevin Ryan: If – yeah, I would – yes, eventually, yes. Sometimes a postmaster might not be on site, so you’d have to contact them by phone.

Ms Millar: You go on to say that all relevant data would be obtained. What would that include at that point?

Kevin Ryan: Well, obviously, the auditors would run off Horizon logs, cash declarations, et cetera, and eventually they would produce an audit report, so all those documents would be passed to the Lead Investigator.

Ms Millar: What tools were available to you as an Investigator to investigate that information you’d been provided with?

Kevin Ryan: Tools, as in?

Ms Millar: Transaction data or any requests that you could make for further evidence?

Kevin Ryan: Right, yeah. Obviously, we had access to different types of data, such as Credence, HORice, ARQ data, as well.

Ms Millar: How did you decide which type of transaction data you would request in a certain case?

Kevin Ryan: It varied from, in different circumstances – depends on the circumstances, whether you would – I mean, Credence was virtually downloaded on every occasion. ARQ data occasionally, sometimes. It just depended on the facts of the case.

Ms Millar: With regard, then, specifically to ARQ data, what circumstances would you request ARQ data?

Kevin Ryan: I think I only ever requested it on one or two occasions. Certainly high-value losses, later on, as – obviously as Horizon Issues became more prevalent, then under those circumstances, as well.

Ms Millar: You explain in your statement that you vaguely remember a case you worked on in Newcastle –

Kevin Ryan: Yeah.

Ms Millar: – where a subpostmaster had attributed a shortfall to Horizon and you requested two months’ worth of ARQ data?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Did you request the ARQ data because they’d attributed the shortfall to Horizon in that case?

Kevin Ryan: It was requested because my line manager at the time asked me to get the data to basically rebuild the account over two months, to see if I could find any evidence of transactions that were out of sorts, out of place.

Ms Millar: Is it correct that you remember going through the data yourself to rebuild the accounts?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Do you believe you had the necessary expertise to interpret the ARQ data?

Kevin Ryan: Probably not, if I’m being honest. I did manage to rebuild the accounts, everything seemed to balance on that occasion but I’d never had any training in going through ARQ data at all.

Ms Millar: Would you personally be able to recognise the bug or an error with Horizon from looking at the ARQ data?

Kevin Ryan: No.

Ms Millar: You say that, as far as you recall, Fujitsu would not have gone through the data in this case?

Kevin Ryan: Not that I am aware of, no. They would just provide the data.

Ms Millar: Was there a reason why they wouldn’t have gone through it?

Kevin Ryan: I’m not aware of.

Ms Millar: You go on to say, then, you’re unsure if Fujitsu went through the data in any other case; is that correct?

Kevin Ryan: Yeah, I wouldn’t be aware of that.

Ms Millar: Would you not have expected Fujitsu to be asked to go through the data, given it was their data that they were providing?

Kevin Ryan: Looking back probably, yes.

Ms Millar: Do you remember there being a limit on the number of ARQ requests, which could be provided by Fujitsu?

Kevin Ryan: There was a limit on the number of free ones, yes.

Ms Millar: Do you ever recall being told you could not have ARQ data because of those limits?

Kevin Ryan: No.

Ms Millar: Could we please have POL00167369 on screen, please. This is an email from Graham Ward to you and number of others and it’s dated 14 April 2011. The subject is “Credence v Fujitsu” and the body of the email says:

“All

“If anyone has any evidence of disparities between Fujitsu and Credence transaction data, please get in touch ([for example] timing issues … session numbers not matching for postage label transactions etc).”

Do you remember there being disparities between the Fujitsu and the Credence transaction data?

Kevin Ryan: I’ve never had an example of that, no.

Ms Millar: Did this email cause you concern when you received it?

Kevin Ryan: No. I mean, I’d only been in the role for two months, so I wasn’t really aware of any issues.

Ms Millar: Do you remember any further discussion about that issue at the time?

Kevin Ryan: No.

Ms Millar: Thank you. That can come down.

So you also explain in your statement that, as part of the investigation, any activity would be recorded on an event log. Again, is that by the Security Manager?

Kevin Ryan: Yes, the person who was running the case as part of the case file. There was an event log that every action you took, you would list.

Ms Millar: Were entries made throughout the investigation or just at a specific part?

Kevin Ryan: Throughout that, that I recall.

Ms Millar: Was that from 2011 when you joined the Security Team?

Kevin Ryan: It may have started a little bit after that. But I certainly did use event logs a lot.

Ms Millar: Is it correct that you were also involved in conducting interviews as a Security Manager?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: So at paragraph 59 of your statement, you explain you recall a new set of interview questions were provided to Security Managers in 2013?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Can we please have POL00031005 on screen, please. This is the “Conduct of Criminal Investigations Policy”, which is one of the documents you were provided with, and if we just go to the bottom of the page, please. We can see just at the very top right it’s effective from 29 August 2013.

Kevin Ryan: Yeah.

Ms Millar: If we can go to the bottom of page 16, please, just starting at paragraph 5.11.6, it says:

“Should the recent Second Sight review be brought up by a suspect or his representative during a PACE interview the Security Manager should state: ‘I will listen to any personal concerns or issues that you may have had with the Horizon system during the course of this interview’.”

It goes on in the next paragraph to say:

“The following three areas need to be covered in as much detail as possible at an appropriate point during all PACE interviews, regardless of whether Horizon is mentioned or not. Where the case clearly has no link with Horizon ([for example] theft of mail) then you must gain authorisation from your line manager to proceed outside of this process.”

So if we could scroll down just a bit further, we can see there’s three topics: training, support and Horizon. Are those the new questions you’re referring to?

Kevin Ryan: Yeah, we were sent those on an email and, obviously, they’ve been incorporated into that.

Ms Millar: Thank you. Can we please have POL00166044, please. So this is a document we will come back to again later, but it’s a record of a case file governance meeting, which took place on 31 July 2013. We can see that you were present.

Kevin Ryan: Yeah.

Ms Millar: If we look at the fourth point in that document, please. It says:

“Produce Template to assist Security Managers for investigation interviews (questions to include ‘subpostmaster training, induction, support’).”

We see your initials as one of the leads beside that point. Are those the new interview questions?

Kevin Ryan: Yes. The initials are the people that the action was given to. However, that was not drawn up by myself. It was drawn up by a lady called Sharron Logan, because the email that I’ve got with that on, has come from Sharron.

Ms Millar: Were you involved in drafting, then, the new questions –

Kevin Ryan: No.

Ms Millar: – in the policy documents?

Kevin Ryan: No, not at all.

Ms Millar: So what questions are those referring to that –

Kevin Ryan: They are those questions but it’s just that that action was actually transferred to somebody else.

Ms Millar: Okay, so even though it says you’re one of the leads, that’s incorrect?

Kevin Ryan: It’s incorrect, yes.

Ms Millar: Thank you. That document can come down.

Do you remember the reason why those new questions were introduced?

Kevin Ryan: I think it came after the Second Sight report. That’s when it was drafted for us to use at interview.

Ms Millar: Why did you understand Second Sight prompting new –

Kevin Ryan: I think they just wanted to cover the bases with regard to questions about it, to make sure that they’ve asked about the training, the support that the branches have been given, et cetera.

Ms Millar: Was it because you understood there had been a problem with that previously?

Kevin Ryan: With?

Ms Millar: With covering the bases, in terms of training and Horizon issues in interviews?

Kevin Ryan: I don’t think so, no.

Ms Millar: You explain at paragraph 59 of your witness statement that, when the new interview questions were introduced, if a subpostmaster raised issues with Horizon, Investigators would have to report this in the case file?

Kevin Ryan: That’s the way I understood it, yes.

Ms Millar: And that an Investigator also had to request ARQ data for the relevant period?

Kevin Ryan: Yes, as far as I remember.

Ms Millar: Do we understand from that that these weren’t explicit requirements before 2013?

Kevin Ryan: I don’t remember being told explicitly to do that in the past, no.

Ms Millar: Could we have your witness statement on screen, please, at the bottom of page 43. It’s page 43 and paragraph 97. You say:

“Following the introduction of further questions to be asked to [subpostmasters] in an interview relating to the Horizon system, I believe that I would have considered a challenge to the integrity of Horizon in one case to be relevant to others. We had to ask them in all new cases going forwards. I cannot recall if I would have thought the same from when I started in 2011 …”

So is it your position that, before 2011, you don’t know whether you would have thought that one Horizon case might be relevant to another?

Kevin Ryan: No, I don’t think that’s particularly clear. If there were issues with Horizon, then, yes, it would always have been relevant to other cases.

Ms Millar: Is that your position even before 2013?

Kevin Ryan: Yes, yeah.

Ms Millar: So at all points when you were a Security Manager, you would have thought a challenge would have been relevant to another case?

Kevin Ryan: If we’d been aware of anything, then, yes, it would be relevant. Of course it would.

Ms Millar: When you say “aware of anything”, do you mean aware of a bug or aware of an allegation? What do you mean by that?

Kevin Ryan: Yeah, aware of any bugs in the system that would affect balancing.

Ms Millar: What about if there was allegations that the Horizon system was at fault for a loss?

Kevin Ryan: Well, obviously that would need to be looked into.

Ms Millar: Thank you. That can come down.

Is it correct that following the interview, the Lead Investigator would complete a report which was reviewed by the Team Leader, before being passed to the Legal Team?

Kevin Ryan: Yes, unless he had any further investigation to do before he completed the case file. But eventually the case file would be passed to the Team Leader and then on to the Legal Team.

Ms Millar: That case file would contain a report which is sometimes referred to as an offender report?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Who then made the decision to proceed to prosecute someone?

Kevin Ryan: That would be the Legal Team.

Ms Millar: So you say in your statement that, at the end of the offender report, there was a conclusion section –

Kevin Ryan: Mm-hm.

Ms Millar: – where a summary could be provided of which offence the facts pointed to; is that correct?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: So is that another way of saying that the Investigator would recommend which charges they considered to be appropriate?

Kevin Ryan: No, just what the evidence showed.

Ms Millar: But would they say “The evidence shows that this is false accounting”, “The evidence shows this is theft”?

Kevin Ryan: Can you just show me the phrase at the end of the report? I just can’t remember it. Just repeat that question again?

Ms Millar: Of course, no problem. So in your statement at paragraph 39, you say that, at the end of the report which went to the Legal Team – I can get that up for you. It’s page 18 of your statement.

Kevin Ryan: Ah right, yeah.

Ms Millar: You say at the end of that paragraph 39:

“At the end of the report there was a conclusion section where a summary could be provided in relation to what the facts pointed to.”

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: My question was: is that another way of saying that we recommended charges which were appropriate?

Kevin Ryan: Wouldn’t be recommended, it would be what it showed, what the Investigator’s opinion would be. But it wouldn’t recommend charges.

Ms Millar: So would it be “It’s my opinion that the evidence shows that there is theft in this case”?

Kevin Ryan: I can’t recall, to be honest.

Ms Millar: Do you think that Investigators were qualified to provide a summary of what the facts pointed to in terms of criminal offences?

Kevin Ryan: Possibly Senior Investigators, maybe, yes. Obviously, it took time to learn those skills.

Ms Millar: By a Senior Investigator, do you mean Security Managers that have been in the post for a long time or team leaders and above?

Kevin Ryan: Probably both.

Ms Millar: Who made the decision, then, to recover a loss from a subpostmaster who was being prosecuted?

Kevin Ryan: That would be the Financial Investigators.

Ms Millar: Did you have any involvement in relation to that decision to recover losses?

Kevin Ryan: Not that I recall, no.

Ms Millar: Could we please have POL00105025 on screen, please. This sets out the Security Team objectives from April 2013 to March 2014. If we could go to page 117 of that document, please.

Thank you. Are those your objectives for that year?

Kevin Ryan: They are, yes.

Ms Millar: Go to the bottom of that document, section 3. So we see the objective is:

“To ensure a robust approach to fraud loss recovery with a return rate of 65%.”

Do you remember that being a personal objective or a team objective?

Kevin Ryan: It was a team objective.

Ms Millar: Did you personally receive any benefit if that objective was met?

Kevin Ryan: Not that I recall, no.

Ms Millar: Thank you very much, that document can come down.

In the two cases that we will go on to touch on in a moment, you explain that you were the Second Officer in both cases; is that correct?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Can you just briefly explain the difference between the Second Officer and the First or Lead Investigator in a case?

Kevin Ryan: The Second Officer is usually just in attendance at an interview, sometimes at an audit shortage, as well. At the interview, it would be around meeting the interviewee, setting up the room, making sure everything was set up for the interview. You could interject with questions if you felt there was a relevant one but most of the questions would normally be done by the Lead Investigator.

Ms Millar: Would the First and Second Officer typically discuss a case before an interview?

Kevin Ryan: Potentially, yes.

Ms Millar: Would there be any discussion afterwards about further enquiries which might be necessary?

Kevin Ryan: Not that I recall no. Usually once the interview was done, the Second Officer would step away.

Ms Millar: If you had a concern in respect of issues raised during an interview or any other aspect of a case, would you raise it with the First Officer?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Turning first, please, to the case of Khayyam Ishaq, who was the subpostmaster at Birkenshaw Post Office, is it correct that you attended Mr Ishaq’s follow-up interview with Steve Bradshaw –

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: – which took place on 27 September 2011?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Were you aware at that time that Mr Ishaq had previously been interviewed earlier that year?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Prior to attending the interview, did you discuss the case with Mr Bradshaw?

Kevin Ryan: Vaguely. I can vaguely remember discussions on the basics on the case, yeah.

Ms Millar: What did you understand about the case before you attended the interview?

Kevin Ryan: Not a great deal, to be honest. As I say, the case had already been running for a while. I was just asked to come along for the second interview, the follow-up interview.

Ms Millar: Is it right that you subsequently provided a witness statement in the case exhibiting the interview transcript?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Is it also correct that you attended one of the court hearings in his case?

Kevin Ryan: Yes, I did attend. It was more of a learning experience because I’d never actually been to a live courtroom.

Ms Millar: Was it for your own experience rather than you were there to provide any assistance?

Kevin Ryan: Yes, it was just for my own experience.

Ms Millar: Did you have any further involvement in this case?

Kevin Ryan: Nothing at all. No.

Ms Millar: Moving on, then, to the case of Angela Sefton and Anne Nield, who were employed at Fazakerley Post Office.

Kevin Ryan: Yeah.

Ms Millar: Could we please have POL00113343 on screen, please, at page 6. This is a judgment of the Court of Appeal in which the court quashed Ms Sefton and Ms Nield’s convictions, along with others. If we could go to page 6, please, starting at paragraph 23, I won’t read the full extract but I just wanted to highlight the following paragraphs.

So at paragraph 23, then:

“On 11 April 2013, in the Crown Court at Liverpool before [His or Her Honour Judge] Hatton, Angela Sefton and Anne Nield each pleaded guilty to one count of false accounting with which they were jointly charged. The allegation against them was in short that between 1 January 2006 and 6 January 2012 they had falsified giro deposit entries on Horizon in relation to the receipt of £34,115.50 in donations made to the charity Animals In Need.”

So paragraph 25 states:

“Ms Nield was employed as the branch manager in the Fazakerley Post Office where Ms Sefton was employed as a clerk. Their employer was the [subpostmaster] but he was rarely at the branch owing to illness. In 2006, the [subpostmaster] identified an explained shortage of £4,000. He paid half of the shortage and they paid the other half. He told them that, from then on, they would be responsible for all losses.”

Paragraph 26:

“In December 2011, Santander bank contacted [the Post Office] following a complaint to Santander by Animals In Need that there was a significant delay between money being deposited in the Fazakerley Post Office and payment into the charity’s bank account. This triggered an investigation.”

Then paragraph 27:

“[The Post Office] audited the branch on 6 January 2012. During the audit, 40 giro deposit slips and a number of cheque envelopes were recovered from a cupboard which showed suppressed deposits in the sum of £34,219. Ms Sefton and Ms Nield handed the Auditor a jointly signed letter in which they said they’d tried to repay shortages by using their own credit cards and their holiday money. They had eventually run out of funds. As a result, they began to covering up shortages by delaying the processing of business deposits to Santander and to one other bank. They could not explain the shortages. They had reached ‘breaking point’ in their lives and health had been deeply affected.”

Then paragraph 28:

“On 20 January 2012, Ms Sefton and Ms Nield were each interviewed.”

We’ll come back to that interview. Over the page at paragraph 33, then. The court’s conclusion was:

“In these circumstances, [the Post Office] accepts that the prosecution of Ms Sefton and of Ms Nield was unfair and an affront to justice.”

That can come down.

So you explain at paragraph 76 of your statement that the first thing you recall about this case is Ms Nield phoning Steve Bradshaw on the 5 January 2012; is that correct?

Kevin Ryan: At the time, yes.

Ms Millar: Is it right that you understood she asked to speak to him outside work about a matter?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: What did you understand she wanted to speak to him about?

Kevin Ryan: I don’t know until the day we went to the audit, when Steve told me that they were having balancing difficulties and they wanted to tell somebody about it.

Ms Millar: Why was it Mr Bradshaw that she contacted in those circumstances, do you know?

Kevin Ryan: As Steve lives in Liverpool, so he’s probably aware of the office and the staff in the office, so he’s probably had previous dealings with them.

Ms Millar: At the time that Ms Nield phoned Mr Bradshaw, an audit had already been arranged at the branch for the next day; is that correct?

Kevin Ryan: Yes, due to the complaint made by Santander.

Ms Millar: Do you understand it then to be a coincidence the timing of her phoning Mr Bradshaw the day before?

Kevin Ryan: Yes, I don’t think – she wouldn’t have been aware that the Auditors were going.

Ms Millar: Is it correct, then, that you attended the audit of the Fazakerley branch on 6 January 2012 with Mr Bradshaw?

Kevin Ryan: Yes, I accompanied Steve Bradshaw, yeah.

Ms Millar: When you arrived at the branch, the audit was already under way; is that correct?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: So what was your role during the audit?

Kevin Ryan: I think Steve took me along just – again, just for experience and to have somebody with him in case it moved on to searches, which it did. So he obviously being local – fairly local to Steve, he asked me to come with him because it was fairly short notice anyway.

Ms Millar: But your evidence is that you didn’t actually have any kind of active role during the audit?

Kevin Ryan: No.

Ms Millar: You explain in your statement that you witnessed Ms Nield hand a letter to Mr Bradshaw; is that correct?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Can you describe the circumstances in which the letter was handed to Mr Bradshaw?

Kevin Ryan: I can’t recall, no.

Ms Millar: Do you remember if anything prompted the letter being handed over, a question from Mr Bradshaw?

Kevin Ryan: No, I don’t think so.

Ms Millar: So you then explain that you were directed to a number of Girobank deposit slips; is that correct?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Who was that by?

Kevin Ryan: I can’t recall for certainty. I think it was Ms Sefton but I’m not sure on that.

Ms Millar: So at this point, then, had the audit finished?

Kevin Ryan: No, I think it was still ongoing.

Ms Millar: Was there a reason that you were then directed to participate rather than the Auditors?

Kevin Ryan: Just because the – I think the ladies told Steve where to find the documents.

Ms Millar: So there was a conversation with Mr Bradshaw during the Audit?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Is it correct, then, that you subsequently attended the searches of both Ms Sefton and Ms Nield’s homes later that day?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: What was your role during those searches?

Kevin Ryan: Just to assist Steve.

Ms Millar: You were also present during their interviews on 20 January 2012; is that correct?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: If we could go, then, to the transcript of Ms Sefton’s interview, please, and the reference is POL00044010. We can see that the date of the interview is 20 January 2012 and you and Mr Bradshaw attended along with Ms Sefton’s solicitor. If we go to page 2, please. So at 7 minutes and 53 seconds in, it says:

“SB read out the letter.”

Do you understand that to be a reference to the letter handed to Mr Bradshaw during the audit?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: The start of letter reads:

“In 2005 we had a change of computer systems by the Post Office. It occurred that we had a £4,000 shortage. The Post Office said they would leave the shortage in abeyance for 6 months so that all work could be checked. Nobody could find the shortage so the postmaster was asked to pay it back in full.”

So, stopping there, from the documents provided to you by the Inquiry, do you know whether the audit was the first time you attended Fazakerley branch?

Kevin Ryan: No, from the documents you provided, I didn’t remember them, but had done a couple of intervention visits there back in, I think, it was 2005.

Ms Millar: Thank you. That document can come down. If we could have on the screen POL00044222. Thank you. So we can see this is an “Area Intervention Manager Visit Log”. The date of the visit is 14 September 2005, and the name of the AIM – is that Area Intervention Manager –

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: – is yourself?

Kevin Ryan: Yeah.

Ms Millar: So the details of visit read as follows:

“The above office has a loss from week 19 of £592.21. OIC states this is something to do with an upgrade of Horizon …”

Just pausing there, who is the OIC in those circumstances?

Kevin Ryan: Officer in charge, so that would be – I think it was Anne Nield, I think. I think she was the – managing the office at the time.

Ms Millar: So in that context, then, the officer in charge is the person at the branch –

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: – rather than a criminal investigator?

Kevin Ryan: No.

Ms Millar: “… and a problem with the declaration of the cash. There is no errors so I am unable to put in suspense. OIC is unable to make good as the [postmaster] on holiday until 12/09/05.

“Please contact office and reply within 7 days.”

Then the next paragraph, it says:

“I attended the office today to find that the loss has now cleared for no apparent reason. The office balanced £1,330 short last week but this was due to a £1,250 entry with the ATM meaning that this should straighten itself out on balancing today. This will make a shortage of £80 which the [subpostmaster] will make good.”

Do you remember this visit?

Kevin Ryan: I don’t.

Ms Millar: Do you accept, looking at that first paragraph – first of all, actually, did you complete the “Details of visit”? Would that have been your entry?

Kevin Ryan: The top half is what would have been sent to me. The bottom half is what I would have responded with.

Ms Millar: So what we can see on screen at the minute –

Kevin Ryan: Yeah –

Ms Millar: – is that your entry or somebody else’s?

Kevin Ryan: Yeah, the above office bit, down to “Please contact office”, that would have been pre-populated when it was sent out to me.

Ms Millar: Okay.

Kevin Ryan: The bottom bit “I attended the office today”, that would have been the bit that I would have filled in.

Ms Millar: So the top bit, would that have been pre-populated by Ann Wilde? We can see that –

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Do you know who that would have been?

Kevin Ryan: I think she used to work in Chesterfield but I’m not 100 per cent sure. But I used to get – some of these would come from Chesterfield.

Ms Millar: So are the circumstances this: that a problem would be reported from a branch to Chesterfield?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Chesterfield would pre-populate part of the form –

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: – send it to you to go to the branch?

Kevin Ryan: To arrange a visit, yes.

Ms Millar: Then you would provide a response?

Kevin Ryan: A response, yeah.

Ms Millar: If we could then just look at the first paragraph. Do you accept that, from looking at that, that there seems to be a problem, at least on the face of it, with the Horizon system?

Kevin Ryan: That seems to be what they’ve put it down to, yes.

Ms Millar: When you attended the office, you found that the loss had cleared for no apparent reason?

Kevin Ryan: Yeah, it may well have been that they’ve accepted another transaction correction because, having read all the documents, they used to get quite a few transaction corrections.

Ms Millar: But you can’t tell that –

Kevin Ryan: No.

Ms Millar: – from looking at this –

Kevin Ryan: No.

Ms Millar: – and you have no independent recollection of it?

Kevin Ryan: I can’t recall, no.

Ms Millar: If we could go then to consider POL00068605, please. This is another log, again with your name on it, and the date of the visit is 18 January 2006. The “Details of visit” say “DUPOF Visit”.

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: What does this refer to?

Kevin Ryan: I saw this one, I think you sent me this one last week and I have no recollection of what “DUPOF” stands for. I can only assume there was some work going on at the branch. It could have been disability access, or other things it could have been involved with is security installation, cameras, et cetera. But I honestly cannot recall what that visit was about.

Ms Millar: But would that – would you have completed that “Details of visit” section?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Okay. So that would have been your entry but you can’t help us with –

Kevin Ryan: I have no idea what a “DUPOF Visit” was because it’s obviously come out to me with just “DUPOF”, so at the time I assume I would have known what that was about, so I must have been getting a few of those at the time.

Ms Millar: Then, finally on this topic, can we please have POL00044223 on the screen, please. This is the third log and the date of the visit is 8 February 2006. In “Details of visit”, we see there’s a £3,959 shortage in week 41. Would that have been your entry?

Kevin Ryan: That would have been – again, that would have been pre-populated and sent out to me with the details. I assume the branch must have settled that centrally, so it’s gone to Chesterfield so they will have populated it to send somebody out to see if they could –

Ms Millar: Sorry, can you just repeat your answer?

Kevin Ryan: Can you just scroll it back down again a second for me?

Ms Millar: Can we just go to the top, thank you.

Kevin Ryan: Yeah, the top part of that would have been pre-populated. I would assume that the branch has settled the shortage centrally, so it’s gone to Chesterfield, and they would have pre-populated the form and sent it out as a request to go and assist.

Ms Millar: Thank you. If we could go to the bottom of that page, then, please, we see another box which says, “Current issues” – would that have been your entry, this box –

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: – which says:

“I attended the office as they had received a request for payment for the loss sustained in TP09. Chesterfield have now put a temporarily block on this awaiting a transaction correction. I have checked all the office documents, transaction logs and events logs for the week concerned and there is no sign of what has caused this loss. I have contacted Girobank, who are looking to see if there are any errors that have come to light. I have advised the manager that Chesterfield will only allow the block to stand for so long unless they can discover where the errors were made. If not, then the postmaster will have to make arrangements to settle with Chesterfield. Girobank have stated that there is no discrepancy showing.”

Do you remember this visit?

Kevin Ryan: I don’t remember the visit, no.

Ms Millar: Do you, at any point, have a recollection of speaking to either the subpostmaster or Ms Sefton and Ms Nield?

Kevin Ryan: I mean, obviously, I have visited the branch or I must have spoken to them. I know the postmaster wasn’t in branch very often, he left them to run the branch for them, so I would assume I’ve spoken to one of the two ladies there.

Ms Millar: Do you accept, then, that you’ve said that there is no sign of what’s caused this almost £4,000 loss?

Kevin Ryan: Yeah, I mean, my role in the visit was to go through all of the documents to see if I could see anything. Obviously, I can only go through what was on hand. So, obviously, I’m not finding anything, I’ve contacted Girobank. In those days, sometimes we could ring them to try to speed up an error process, if there’d been an error. And then I’d completed this to send it back to where it came from so that they could make further checks. So I had no access to any other data.

Ms Millar: So you would have completed that and sent it back to Chesterfield –

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: – is that your description?

So would it have been usual for you to have received anything back from Chesterfield or would it be usual for you to not hear anything after that?

Kevin Ryan: It would be – usually, I would not hear anything. I was just boots on the ground to go and have a look to see if I could help and then it goes back to Chesterfield.

Ms Millar: Would you have been concerned about that situation, where you’ve got quite a large loss and no sign of what’s caused it?

Kevin Ryan: In those days, the problem was a lot of errors took a very long time to come back, hence the shortcut by ringing Girobank to see if they could identify anything because, historically, Girobank were very, very slow on sending errors back. But that wasn’t – I wouldn’t say it was common but it happened, where you’d have losses like that.

Ms Millar: Which you couldn’t find an explanation for –

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: – when you attended? Do you accept that this sounds similar to the loss reported in the letter handed to Mr Bradshaw, the £4,000 loss?

Kevin Ryan: Yeah, it’s similar. I’m not sure on the timeline how far away it was from then.

Ms Millar: They say it was 2005, and the date of this visit is 2006 –

Kevin Ryan: Right.

Ms Millar: – at the start of 2006.

Kevin Ryan: Possibly. I don’t know, honestly.

Ms Millar: Did you inform Mr Bradshaw that you’d attended this branch previously when it was experiencing shortages?

Kevin Ryan: No, because I had no recollection of it at the time.

Ms Millar: Did you ever check your records to see if you’d previously visited a branch you were involved in investigating?

Kevin Ryan: Unfortunately, as I said to you earlier, that I was – I’d decided to take redundancy, so I was going through that process, so one of the parts of that process was to clear my laptop, so I didn’t have all those records any more.

Ms Millar: So even if you’d wanted to –

Kevin Ryan: No.

Ms Millar: – when you joined the Security Team you couldn’t have checked your records?

Kevin Ryan: No.

Ms Millar: Did you ever ask whether those checks could be made or think about making those checks?

Kevin Ryan: Not that I recall, no.

Ms Millar: Can you see any potential problems with not making those checks?

Kevin Ryan: I mean, ordinarily when an investigation is going on, they would be checking for losses anyway on the branch.

Ms Millar: But, in this circumstance, where maybe Mr Bradshaw might not have known, can you see any problems with you not having independently told him that you’d been at this branch before?

Kevin Ryan: Yeah, obviously, if I’d recalled it, then I would have told him but I didn’t at the time.

Ms Millar: You subsequently provided a witness statement in this case, dated 21 March 2012; is that right?

Kevin Ryan: Yeah.

Ms Millar: That dealt with the audit, the searches –

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: – and the interview. Did you have any further involvement in this case?

Kevin Ryan: Nothing at all, no.

Ms Millar: Thank you, sir. I wonder if that would be a convenient moment. I don’t have many more questions for Mr Ryan but if we could have a 15-minute break, please.

Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, certainly so what time shall we –

Ms Millar: 3.25?

Sir Wyn Williams: 3.25. All right, fine.

Ms Millar: Thank you very much.

(3.05 pm)

(A short break)

(3.25 pm)

Ms Millar: Thank you, sir, can you see and hear us?

Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, thanks, yes.

Ms Millar: Thank you.

Mr Ryan, earlier on I’d taken you to one of the logs where it said “DUPOF”.

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: You couldn’t remember what that was. Does “Deprived Urban Post Office Fund” sound correct?

Kevin Ryan: Yes, yes, it does. It was basically a fund for helping postmasters do branches up so that that equates to the work that was done in the branch. So, obviously, the Post Office had paid or helped to pay for some renovations in some way.

Thank you. That’s just for completeness.

Finally, I just want to turn to ask you some questions about your knowledge about problems with the Horizon system. At paragraph 53 of your witness statement, you say:

“I do not recall ever having any issues or errors with the Horizon system being reported to me. We were always assured by the Post Office and Fujitsu that the Horizon system was robust.”

Kevin Ryan: Yeah.

Ms Millar: Does that remain your position?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: You also say in your statement that you were regularly informed the same by the Post Office in your team meetings?

Kevin Ryan: That’s correct.

Ms Millar: Can you help us with the names of the individuals from the Post Office who assured you that Horizon was robust?

Kevin Ryan: It was a number of people from the top down, so I – John Scott, Andy Hayward, and any of the team leaders that I had over that timescale. So Helen Dickinson, Keith Gilchrist. I think it always came from the top. I don’t know where it came from beyond John Scott, but we were always told it was business as usual, “Carry on, Horizon is fine”.

Ms Millar: Were those oral assurances, written assurances?

Kevin Ryan: Mostly oral at team meetings on conference calls.

Ms Millar: Who from Fujitsu assured you that Horizon was robust?

Kevin Ryan: I had no contact direct from Fujitsu.

Ms Millar: So when you say in your statement “We were always assured by the Post Office and Fujitsu that the Horizon system was robust” –

Kevin Ryan: Yeah, the comments were – from John Scott would be that Fujitsu had informed him, et cetera, et cetera, and he filtered that down to us, that Horizon is robust.

Ms Millar: So it was something that he was passing on –

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: – coming from Fujitsu?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Was your understanding?

Kevin Ryan: That’s my understanding, yeah.

Ms Millar: Could we please have POL00094108 on screen, please. We can see this is an internal memo to the Post Office Security Team from Helen Dickinson, and it’s dated 9 September 2011.

If we go down the page, then, please, we can see that it discusses a financial investigation which has now been concluded:

“The subpostmaster … was reinstated at the branch as there had been failings in the training given by Post Office Limited. He intimated to the Auditor that Horizon system had ‘lost’ data. The Contracts Manager, Paul Williams, felt that due to these issues he would have to reinstate with conditions attached including a full repayment of the shortage.”

Next paragraph, it says:

“Kevin Ryan, Security Manager discussed the case with Leslie Frankland and Dave Pardoe and it was decided that there was no point in continuing with the investigation.”

Do you have any recollection of that case?

Kevin Ryan: No, that would have been one of the very early cases that I would have been allocated in 2011. From reading that, I would say, the Contract Manager, probably following a discussion with him, he decided that there was enough to put the postmaster back in place. So I raised that with my Team Leader, they decided that, under those circumstances, we wouldn’t proceed with an investigation.

Ms Millar: Do you accept that, on one reading, the reason for his reinstatement and the stopping of the investigation was because the Horizon system had lost data?

Kevin Ryan: Well, the postmaster has intimated that. I had no information on that at the time.

Ms Millar: Can you recall what information you had or –

Kevin Ryan: I can’t, no.

Ms Millar: Thank you. If we –

Sir Wyn Williams: It wasn’t just – excuse me, it wasn’t the postmaster saying it. I think Ms Millar’s point is that, if you carry on reading, the Contracts Manager, Mr Williams, appears to have accepted it.

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Sir Wyn Williams: Do you know why he accepted it.

Kevin Ryan: I can’t recall why, no. He’s obviously had his own discussion with the postmaster.

Sir Wyn Williams: But this is an example, is it not, of a complaint about Horizon apparently being accepted by the Post Office?

Kevin Ryan: Feasibly, yes.

Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, okay thanks.

Ms Millar: Do you remember that when you stepped into the role of Team Leader that the Second Sight report was published around the same time?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: What was your understanding at the time of the significance of that report for criminal investigations?

Kevin Ryan: Again, we were informed that we would carry on as normal, because they would defend Horizon. So that’s what they were telling us, so that’s what we were led to believe, so that’s what we continued to do.

Ms Millar: Could we, please, have POL00125273 on screen, please. This is a “Profile Form” and it’s got your name on it. At the top of page 9 then, please, it explains some of the activities that you undertook as the Team Leader and mentions that it came at an exceptionally busy time when the Second Sight Report was published and this resulted in a lot of work being generated around case file governance.

Can you help us with what that means?

Kevin Ryan: John Scott decided he wanted to see every case file. So I was asked to put a spreadsheet together that listed the whole – all the active cases, so that he could study every single case.

Ms Millar: Did that just involve you providing him literally with the case files?

Kevin Ryan: With the information, yeah. No, with the information from the case files. It was just an Excel spreadsheet, effectively, that had all the active cases on.

Ms Millar: Were you responsible, then, for populating that spreadsheet with information from the case files?

Kevin Ryan: I don’t recall ever populating it, it was just putting the spreadsheet together. As I say, I was surprised to be in the role because it was quite early in my career. So I was just asked to put that together. That tended to be the kind of thing that they asked me to do.

Ms Millar: You go on to say that you were tasked with putting together the spreadsheet and adjusting it, as and when requested by John Scott?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: What does that mean: adjusting it as and when requested?

Kevin Ryan: One of the forms we saw earlier on mentioned about adding certain tabs and lines to add further information to the spreadsheet.

Ms Millar: This may be the document you’re referring to but could we go back, then, to POL00166044. This is the record of the case file governance meeting that we looked at earlier, and we’ve looked at point 4 already. Could we look at point 7, just further down the page. It says:

“Cascade to Security Managers: Requirement to censure emails, particularly with reference to Second Sight review/Horizon and any personal/opinionated comments that could become public/requested under the Freedom of Information Act.”

Similar to earlier, we see that your initials are beside the lead for that point. Can you help us with what that means?

Kevin Ryan: Basically, that was a message from John Scott and the other Senior Security Managers and that was to be passed on to the members of your team.

Ms Millar: What was it that had to be passed on?

Kevin Ryan: Basically, the message that is within that information there.

Ms Millar: When it says, “The requirement to censure emails”, is that censor, remove information?

Kevin Ryan: No, just not to put any comments on around – banter, that type of thing that you would get between Security Managers, like people do in a workplace. So just to be careful what you put in an email regarding Second Sight.

Ms Millar: Can you tell help us with what kind of banter there was going around at the time that needed to be controlled?

Kevin Ryan: Yeah, just everyday stuff, you know, asking people what they were doing at the weekend and making jokes about it. Nothing to do with your case files, it was just everything else. On that particular point, he was asking us not to make too many references to Second Sight.

Ms Millar: Why did you understand he was making that request –

Kevin Ryan: I don’t know. I just followed what I was told to do.

Ms Millar: Did you ever question what you were being told to do?

Kevin Ryan: No.

Ms Millar: Point 8, then:

“Liaison Cases: Ensure Security Managers have oversight and are aware of third party operations (Royal Mail/Police), that could impact on the Second Sight Review/Horizon integrity.”

Again, we see your name beside the lead.

Kevin Ryan: Yeah.

Ms Millar: Can you help us with what that is?

Kevin Ryan: Yeah, there were a lot of cases that were police liaison cases. So, as an example, if a postmaster reported one of his clerks for theft to the police, then we needed to notify the police regarding the information around Second Sight.

Ms Millar: So that was to provide information about Second Sight –

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: – to those people?

Kevin Ryan: Yeah, we were given a document that we would send in those cases, we’d send out to the police.

Ms Millar: Do you remember what that document says?

Kevin Ryan: I don’t but I’m pretty sure I’ve probably got it somewhere.

Ms Millar: Was the message in the document that the Second Sight had taken place and was there any undertaking as to the integrity of Horizon in that –

Kevin Ryan: I can’t remember exactly what was in it but it was just to make them aware of it, is all I can recall.

Ms Millar: Thank you. That document can come down.

So having considered all of those documents and the other ones provided to you by the Inquiry, does it remain your position that you don’t recall ever having any issues or errors with the Horizon system reported to you?

Kevin Ryan: Not that I can remember, no.

Ms Millar: You explain in your statement at paragraph 14 that the decision was made not to pursue any new prosecutions in 2013; is that correct?

Kevin Ryan: I think there may have been one or two after then but I certainly wasn’t involved in any.

Ms Millar: Were you told about the reasons for that decision at the time?

Kevin Ryan: They were looking for a new subject matter expert to defend Horizon.

Ms Millar: Did you understand that there had been an expert previously that they were looking to replace?

Kevin Ryan: Yes.

Ms Millar: Who was that, please?

Kevin Ryan: Gareth Jenkins.

Ms Millar: Did you have any interaction with Mr Jenkins that you can remember?

Kevin Ryan: No.

Ms Millar: Who told you that he was the subject matter expert?

Kevin Ryan: It would have, again, been relayed at a team meeting, he would have been mentioned. I know from the documents you’ve provided he was involved in the two cases that you raised earlier.

Ms Millar: But at that point in both of those cases, you had no involvement; is that correct?

Kevin Ryan: No.

Ms Millar: So when you say they were looking for a new expert, what did you understand that led them to seek a new subject matter expert?

Kevin Ryan: I don’t know. All I know was there was a reason why Gareth Jenkins couldn’t be used in the future. So they were – we were told that, once they’d found a new subject matter expert, we would continue doing prosecutions.

Ms Millar: Was that reason explained to you at the time?

Kevin Ryan: No.

Ms Millar: Could we please have POL00124105 on screen, please, at page 3. This is an email from Mark Raymond to you and a number of others. Can you help us with who Mark Raymond is, please?

Kevin Ryan: He’s the current Head of Security.

Ms Millar: It’s dated 20 December 2017. The first paragraph says:

“I just wanted to give you a quick update from the prosecution’s meeting …”

The second paragraph says:

“A report has been produced externally examining the issues with regard to the Group Action litigation …”

Do you have any understanding of what that was at the time?

Kevin Ryan: No.

Ms Millar: The last two sentences of that paragraph read:

“The report has been considered by a specialist external lawyer.”

Can you help us with who that was?

Kevin Ryan: I have no idea at all, no.

Ms Millar: “Certain findings have been referred back for clarity but overall there appear to be no major flaws.”

What did you understand that to be a reference to?

Kevin Ryan: I would imagine that’s in relation to Horizon but I’m only assuming that. I don’t know for certain.

Ms Millar: Can you remember receiving this email?

Kevin Ryan: No.

Ms Millar: If we go down, then, to the fourth paragraph, it says:

“What has been highlighted is the risk of testing a case in the criminal court prior to the civil hearing, where the burden of proof has to be beyond all reasonable doubt, as opposed to the balance of probability in civil cases. The risk is that should a trial collapse or not guilty advert be reached, this could have a devastating impact on the civil cases …”

The next paragraph reads:

“At this stage the risk appetite dictates that every case will be reviewed on its merits, weight of evidence and public interest as it is now, however we are unlikely to proceed to prosecute until post-civil action …”

Did you understand that to mean that there was going to be a pause on prosecutions because of the civil litigation?

Kevin Ryan: Yes, I would say so.

Ms Millar: What was your view of the decision?

Kevin Ryan: At the time, I suppose they would know better than I would, so we just accepted that.

Ms Millar: Thank you. That can come down.

With the benefit of hindsight, then, do you have any reflections in respect of the way in which criminal investigations were conducted by the Post Office?

Kevin Ryan: Yeah, I wish we’d have been privy to all the facts because we certainly weren’t.

Ms Millar: Thank you for your assistance, Mr Ryan. I don’t have any further questions for you.

Sir, do you have any questions before I turn to the representatives from the Core Participants?

Sir Wyn Williams: No, thank you, no.

Ms Millar: I think those are all of the questions for Mr Ryan. Thank you.

Sir Wyn Williams: All right.

Well, thank you very much, Mr Ryan, for coming to give evidence to the Inquiry and providing your witness statement in advance. I’m obliged to you.

The Witness: Thank you.

Ms Millar: Thank you, sir.

Sir Wyn Williams: I think, Ms Millar, tomorrow is now a non-sitting day and we will resume on Friday, yes?

Ms Millar: Correct, sir. Thank you.

Sir Wyn Williams: All right, 10.00 on Friday.

(3.41 pm)

(The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am on Friday 15 December 2023)