17 October 2024 – John Bartlett
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(10.00 am)
Mr Blake: Good morning, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Good morning, Mr Blake.
Mr Blake: This morning we’re going to hear from Mr Bartlett.
Sir Wyn Williams: Thank you.
John Bartlett
JOHN JAMES BARTLETT (affirmed).
Questioned by Mr Blake
Mr Blake: Thank you very much. Can you give your full name, please?
John Bartlett: John James Bartlett.
Mr Blake: Thank you, Mr Bartlett. You have provided three witness statements in this Inquiry. The first was produced for Phases 5 and 6 and related to whistleblowing. Can I ask you, please, to turn to that first.
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Is that statement dated 25 April 2024?
John Bartlett: It is.
Mr Blake: Can I ask you, please, to turn to the final substantive page. That is page 19.
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Can you confirm that is your signature?
John Bartlett: It is.
Mr Blake: Can you confirm that that statement is true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
John Bartlett: There’s a couple of amendments, if that’s okay.
Mr Blake: Absolutely.
John Bartlett: So on page 62, paragraph 88, the final sentence, which says, “5 October 2005”, could we change that please to “5 October 2004”.
Mr Blake: Absolutely.
John Bartlett: Page 67, footnotes 132 and 133, amend to 26 July 2019 – from 26 July 2019 to 29 July 2019.
Mr Blake: Thank you.
John Bartlett: Page 77, paragraph 92. The first and then into the second line, amend “March 2015” to “May 2015”.
Then the last one on that statement, page 130, so index entry 125: amend “26 July 2019” to “29 July 2019”.
Mr Blake: Thank you very much. Subject to those changes, is that statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
John Bartlett: It is.
Mr Blake: Thank you. That has a Unique Reference Number WITN11190100 and will be uploaded on to the Inquiry’s website.
The second statement was produced for this phase. Can I ask you, please, to turn to that. Is that dated 22 August of this year?
John Bartlett: It is.
Mr Blake: Can I please ask you to turn to the final substantive page.
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: I think that is page 99.
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Is that your signature?
John Bartlett: It is.
Mr Blake: Is that statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
John Bartlett: Another amendment, if that’s okay.
Mr Blake: Absolutely.
John Bartlett: Page 57 of that statement. The last sentence in the second to last paragraph of 76(a), it should say that A&CI perform an independent sample check of cases. So that’s changing “my” to “A&CI”.
Mr Blake: Thank you, and is that the only change to that statement?
Sir Wyn Williams: I haven’t located that yet. Can you tell me the reference again?
Mr Blake: I think it’s page 57, just the final sentence before the final paragraph.
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes.
Mr Blake: “The policy provides that”; is that correct?
John Bartlett: It does.
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, and what was the substantive amendment?
John Bartlett: Sir, that was to remove the word “my” and replace it with “A&CI”.
Mr Blake: I think, actually, that change has been made in the version I have.
John Bartlett: Ah, thank you.
Sir Wyn Williams: So “The policy provides that A&CI perform”, yes?
John Bartlett: Yes, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Fine. My version has that as well, so that’s fine.
Mr Blake: Is that the only change, or not change, to that particular –
John Bartlett: That’s it, thank you.
Mr Blake: Is that statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief, subject to that change?
John Bartlett: It is.
Mr Blake: That has a URN of WITN11190200 and will also be uploaded onto the Inquiry’s website.
Third and final statement is dated 9 September this year; is that correct?
John Bartlett: Yes, it is.
Mr Blake: That addresses the Project May, that’s race identity codes issue?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Could I please ask you to turn to page 9?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Is that your signature?
John Bartlett: It is.
Mr Blake: Is that statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
John Bartlett: It is.
Mr Blake: No changes to that one?
John Bartlett: No changes.
Mr Blake: Thank you very much.
Mr Bartlett, you are currently the Director of the Assurance & Complex Investigations Team; is that correct?
John Bartlett: It is.
Mr Blake: That was formerly known as the Central Investigations Unit?
John Bartlett: That’s correct.
Mr Blake: You were appointed to that role on 21 February 2022?
John Bartlett: To the Head of role, yes.
Mr Blake: When did you first join the Post Office?
John Bartlett: On that date.
Mr Blake: Thank you. The Central Investigations Unit became what we know as A&CI in August 2023, is that correct?
John Bartlett: That’s correct.
Mr Blake: Now, taking them separately, what is “assurance”, in Assurance & Complex Investigations Team?
John Bartlett: So the assurance is investigative assurance, so part of my team’s role is to work with, particularly, the Retail Teams and they look – they review on a regular basis – every two months they dip sample cases that are worked on in the retail space and they look at it from an investigative practice basis, dip sample, and then make any recommendations for improvements.
Mr Blake: You’ve mentioned the Retail Team. Lots of teams are known by different names; what do you mean by Retail Team?
John Bartlett: Predominantly the teams that work under Mel Park.
Mr Blake: Thank you. And CI, “complex investigations”; what does that involve?
John Bartlett: Okay, so that involves cases that we’re asked to investigate in respect to principally sort of allegations made against senior members of staff, particularly those at SEG, so the Strategic Executive Group, or at the Board. It involves looking into what we call fact finds of where there may be enterprise-wide or otherwise significant failings – process failings in the organisation. So we look at root cause.
It also covers the Project Phoenix, or past investigations work, that falls under that too and, within that – sorry, separate to Project Phoenix but within the complex or sensitive side, are any investigations that come out of Speak Up reports.
Mr Blake: Thank you very much. Your background is as a former police officer; is that correct?
John Bartlett: 17 years ago, yes.
Mr Blake: Can you assist us with what rank you achieved in the police?
John Bartlett: Detective Constable.
Mr Blake: Following that, I think you’ve worked at various private sector organisations and also The Pensions Regulator; is that correct?
John Bartlett: So I have worked in two financial regulators and two corporates before coming to Post Office.
Mr Blake: Largely, those roles involved investigations?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Thank you. I think you also have some legal training; is that correct?
John Bartlett: I have a legal qualification, rather than training. I have the graduate diploma in law.
Mr Blake: Thank you. How were you recruited to the Post Office?
John Bartlett: I was approached by an agency.
Mr Blake: Thank you. Where were you at that point in time?
John Bartlett: I was Head of Investigations – Enforcement Investigations at The Pensions Regulator.
Mr Blake: Thank you. I’d like to begin today by just asking you about your induction at the Post Office. Did you receive any briefings when you first joined on matters relating to the Inquiry, such as wrongful prosecutions, Horizon issues, Group Litigation?
John Bartlett: Yes, I did.
Mr Blake: Who provided you with that induction?
John Bartlett: My boss. So the Group Legal Director.
Mr Blake: Who was that at the time?
John Bartlett: Sarah Gray.
Mr Blake: Thank you. That’s still Sarah Gray?
John Bartlett: It is. I also – sorry, just to complete that, I also did a one-day induction, which every new joiner goes through, and they covered those issues as well, there.
Mr Blake: Since then, have you been following the developments in the Inquiry?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Have you read, for example, the expert reports produced by Duncan Atkinson KC, or listened to his evidence?
John Bartlett: I have listened to some of his evidence.
Mr Blake: In light of what you have heard from the Inquiry subsequently, what are your reflections on the training that you were provided or the induction that you were provided at the beginning?
John Bartlett: I think it has been reinforced by the compulsory training that everybody in Post Office has to do, in relation to understanding the timeline and the effects of the scandal and the role that Post Office played in that. That has certainly assisted that – I think it was about a year ago.
Mr Blake: Thank you. Are you in any way involved in that?
John Bartlett: No.
Mr Blake: Right. I would like to talk to you about various other teams at the Post Office that touch upon matters relating to investigations. The first is what was called the Security Team, and that’s a team that we’ve heard quite a lot about in this Inquiry?
John Bartlett: Mm-hm.
Mr Blake: At paragraph 11 of your second witness statement, you say that that team stop being responsible for investigations in 2019; is that correct?
John Bartlett: Yes, although I think, in effect, they’d stopped before then, but they had it removed from them as part of their role, as I understand it, then.
Mr Blake: You’ve said that they’ve been renamed the Network Crime and Risk Support Team; is that correct?
John Bartlett: It is.
Mr Blake: You say in your statement that they support postmasters to prevent retail crime in their new role. Can you assist us with what you mean by that?
John Bartlett: So I have drawn that from material produced by that team’s director, and my understanding from that material and from conversations with them is that it’s a crime prevention or incident response function. But more than that I couldn’t really say because we don’t really interact with them over those issues.
Mr Blake: Could we please turn to POL00447931. This is a document that you have exhibited, it’s says “Service & Support, Overview of Teams and Responsibilities”:
“Our vision is to champion our postmasters through easy, reliable and trusted service to give postmasters confidence that we will deliver the best possible outcome.”
Do you know when this was produced or the approximate time? The metadata, if it assists, suggests May 2021. Is this a document that you are, first of all, familiar with and, second of all, was it around when you joined the business?
John Bartlett: I don’t know. The name change, I think – I’m not sure if the name change is connected to this document but the name change that I’m aware of is much more current than that date.
Mr Blake: Thank you. Because, if we turn to page 12 of this document, it sets out a who’s who in the Security Team. We see there a number of names that are well familiar to the Inquiry. We have, for example, Security Analyst, Chris Knight. We know that he was at the Post Office from 1983, was involved in the cases of Peter Holmes, Allison Henderson, Alison Hall, as examples.
We have on the right-hand side Mr Talbot, who was a Phase 4 witness in the Inquiry. He had been at the Post Office since 1987.
We have a little further down there Robert Daily, by way of example, again longstanding at the Post Office since 1979. He was involved in a number of cases the cases of Quarm, the Peter Holmes case, amongst others.
We have Steve Bradshaw, another name that’s well known to the Inquiry. He had been at the Post Office since 1978 and was involved in a large number of investigations that had been looked at by this Inquiry: Janet Skinner, Hughie Thomas, the case of Ishaq, Lisa Brennan, Lynette Hutchings, Joan Bailey, the Sefton and Nield case, McKnight case, amongst others.
Are these individuals, or some of them, still involved in that Network Crime and Risk Support Team?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Does that team involve interacting with subpostmasters?
John Bartlett: I believe so.
Mr Blake: Can you see a problem with that?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: If we could turn to your second statement, please. That’s WITN11190200. Can you expand: you said you can see a problem with that; what is the problem, as far as you are concerned?
John Bartlett: I think the work of the Inquiry and from what I know from Project Phoenix would strongly suggest that it’s not appropriate for those individuals to be interacting with postmasters, given the behaviour of the past.
Mr Blake: Could we turn, please, to page 6 of your statement, that’s paragraph 13. You say there:
“I have been asked to provide detail about where the former Security Team Investigators sit within the new structure. The Inquiry has linked that request with recent media reports which suggest those former Investigators all continue to be employed by Post Office to conduct investigations. It is right that some individuals who previously worked in the Security Team within Post Office remain in the business whilst others have left. However, none of those remaining are members of the A&CI team, which now has conduct of all criminal investigations within Post Office.”
So that’s true, as far as it goes, that they’re not involved in your particular team and are not involved directly in those criminal investigations that are carried out by the Post Office, but do we have to add to that that a number of them are still involved in the business, in subpostmaster-facing roles?
John Bartlett: Yes, but not investigatory roles, as I understand it.
Mr Blake: What do you think supporting postmasters to prevent retail crime involves?
John Bartlett: From what I’ve been told, that’s around placement of CCTV, cameras, panic alarms. I think they also do a review of things like safe codes and things like that. So it’s physical security.
Mr Blake: Do you know of any plans or considerations that might be taking place to either remove those individuals from the business or to put them in roles where they don’t interact with subpostmasters?
John Bartlett: I believe that’s being discussed, yes.
Mr Blake: What is your view as to what should happen?
John Bartlett: The least should be that they are not in postmaster-facing roles.
Mr Blake: Can you tell us why you think it is that it’s taken so many years to reach a decision on that?
John Bartlett: I don’t know, I’m afraid. I joined two years ago, I don’t know why this wasn’t considered before that. I know it’s been discovered – sorry, discussed during my time here but I’ve not been party to those discussions or any rationale as to why they are there.
Mr Blake: Thank you. That can come down, please.
Moving on to another team, Criminal Law Team. Now you’ve said in your statement that that was effectively Jarnail Singh between 2012 and 2015; is that correct?
John Bartlett: As I understand it, yes.
Mr Blake: There is now a criminal lawyer at the Post Office called Stuart Lill; is that right?
John Bartlett: Yes, in the Remediation Unit.
Mr Blake: So he sits in the Remediation Unit –
John Bartlett: (The witness nodded)
Mr Blake: – addressing matters such as compensation and redress?
John Bartlett: I think it’s around appeals, actually.
Mr Blake: Appeals, thank you very much. Does he provide any advice to your team in respect of criminal investigations?
John Bartlett: Yes, he does.
Mr Blake: Does he provide any training to your team in respect of criminal investigations?
John Bartlett: He provides feedback on a case-by-case basis, and we – he has attended some of our team – at least one that I can remember – team training sessions where we discussed disclosure and things like that.
Mr Blake: Thank you. Do you know his background at all?
John Bartlett: I believe he was a prosecutor for – either for CPS or for HMRC.
Mr Blake: Thank you. Do your know when he joined the Post Office?
John Bartlett: It was before me but I don’t know the precise date.
Mr Blake: Thank you. In terms of a Criminal Law Team at the Post Office, is the closest we come to that something within your team that’s called the Law Enforcement Engagement Team?
John Bartlett: I wouldn’t describe it as a Legal Team, no.
Mr Blake: Sorry, a criminal team. So a team that has a direct link to, for example, law enforcement agencies?
John Bartlett: Yes, there are three and a half people whose role it is – is to engage with law enforcement on behalf of Post Office.
Mr Blake: Am I right to say that all criminal investigations will go through that team?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Who heads that particular subteam?
John Bartlett: One of the Senior Investigation Managers in my team.
Mr Blake: What’s their name?
John Bartlett: Andrew Morley.
Mr Blake: Thank you. In terms of other teams, you’ve explained in your witness statement that there’s also a Financial Crime team that deals with things like anti-money laundering, counter terrorism and anti-bribery and corruption. Am I right to say that they wouldn’t be involved in matters such as investigating individual shortfalls in post offices?
John Bartlett: So they sit in the compliance team, they’re not within my department, and their role is one of really a financial intelligence team. So they manage the receipt and submission of suspicious activity reports, money laundering related issues. I’m not aware of them having been involved in shortfall issues.
Mr Blake: In respect of, say, submitting a case to a law enforcement agency, where the Post Office or a sub post office has been the victim of a crime, would that not go through that team; would that go through your team?
John Bartlett: If Post Office is requesting assistance or reporting a crime, then that would be through my team, not through the Financial Crime Team. But they do liaise with law enforcement, as I understand it, in terms of longstanding national money laundering projects, best practice around anti-money laundering, things like that. So they do deal with law enforcement but on a more strategical, thematic basis.
Mr Blake: Thank you. Then we come to the Retail Team, which is something we have briefly addressed already. In terms of investigations into apparent shortfalls at individual branches, am I right to understand that that is now principally dealt with by that Retail Team?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Who would you say is responsible for those investigations, ultimately?
John Bartlett: The Retail Team.
Mr Blake: Who in particular?
John Bartlett: So they all sit under Mel Park and so she’s ultimately accountable for those.
Mr Blake: Thank you. You say at paragraph 11 of your witness statement that the Retail Team has supported postmasters to investigate discrepancies. The suggestion seems to be in that statement that their involvement only takes place if instigated by the subpostmaster. Now, is that right or do they carry out their own investigations?
John Bartlett: I think it’s a combination of the two. I think the vast majority comes through postmasters identifying, through the review and dispute process, or through the call centre. But I am aware of the Market Monitoring Team, I think they’re called, who look at patterns, and that might commission some work to be done within the retail space.
Mr Blake: Does that team also fall within Mel Park’s responsibility?
John Bartlett: It does, yes.
Mr Blake: Do you know which team will be responsible for pursuing subpostmasters in the civil courts, should that happen?
John Bartlett: I’m not aware that that’s going to happen. If it would, I imagine it would start in the retail space but I don’t know because I don’t think it’s been approved or planned.
Mr Blake: There’s no plan for your team to be directly involved in that, other than, for example, ensuring the consistency of the Retail Team?
John Bartlett: I’m pretty sure we would be asked to do that, were such activity to take place.
Mr Blake: Your team, as you’ve described in your statement, is principally for high-risk investigations. What about more mundane, everyday investigations: low level, civil debts, or what appear to be debts, to the Post Office caused by, for example, apparent discrepancies?
John Bartlett: No, we’re not involved in those.
Mr Blake: So when you say it would likely be your team that pursues subpostmasters in the civil courts –
John Bartlett: No, that’s – sorry, that’s not –
Mr Blake: Sorry, that was my understanding of your evidence.
John Bartlett: No, we would probably be requested to assure the work, whichever team, if it happens, would be conducting that activity. So we’d be the second line of defence in that regard.
Mr Blake: So your involvement would be one of assurance, not of direct involvement?
John Bartlett: I believe it would be, yes.
Mr Blake: Now, we’ve looked at various teams, the A&CI team, Security Team, Retail Team, and we’ve looked at particular individuals in the Security Team and they are still in various roles relating to postmasters. Does anyone involved in the historic investigation of subpostmasters relating to shortfalls still work for your team?
John Bartlett: No, not at all.
Mr Blake: Does anybody who was historically involved in investigating apparent shortfalls work in Retail Team, as far as you’re aware?
John Bartlett: Not that I’m aware.
Mr Blake: How about the Financial Crime team?
John Bartlett: I don’t believe so.
Mr Blake: Thank you. In terms of outside firms you’ve mentioned in your witness statement, you say at paragraph 31 that A&CI non-criminal work is supported by nominal, full-time equivalent staff in external firms assisting Post Office; can you assist us with what that means?
John Bartlett: Yes. So due to capacity issues within the team, ie availability of staff within the team, we regularly engage law firms to conduct investigations, either as an extension of our team or, more frequently, where we feel the investigation would benefit from being conducted entirely by an external party, and that’s when we engage law firms or professional services firms that have capability like that.
Mr Blake: So law firms, accountancy firms, possibly?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Any other type of firm that you can think of?
John Bartlett: Sometimes barristers in an individual capacity but they are often engaged via a law firm.
Mr Blake: Is there any mechanism in place to ensure the quality of the service that they provide?
John Bartlett: So those investigations have the same level of oversight as if we were conducting them. So they will report in to probably a SEG member, so a Strategic Executive Group member, there would be a Terms of Reference that would have to be agreed by that SEG member. That SEG member will be advised by probably the General Counsel or the Group Legal Director, and there may well be other senior members of staff as part of that oversight group.
We’re trialling on two investigations something called an Investigation Oversight Group as a concept, for our was high-risk cases, and that’s how that operates.
Mr Blake: We’ve heard in previous phases of actions on behalf of the Post Office being farmed out to external firms like Cartwright King –
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: – et cetera. Is there any large-scale farming out, under your team?
John Bartlett: Not large scale in terms of volumes of numbers because we don’t deal with volumes of – we’re a relatively small caseload, certainly compared to how it was in the past that’s relevant to this Inquiry. We’re not on the same scale at all. So I would say no, it’s not – they are frequent and, percentage wise, yes, we do engage a lot because we’re a small team. But it’s not at scale.
Mr Blake: What proportion of your cases end up at an external firm?
John Bartlett: Not for – for non-criminal cases, I’m not entirely sure. It would be less than half.
Mr Blake: For criminal cases?
John Bartlett: None.
Sir Wyn Williams: Sorry, was that “None”?
John Bartlett: Yes, sir. None.
Sir Wyn Williams: Sorry, yeah.
Just so I can understand this process, I think I’ve got it, but let’s use an example. The Inquiry knows that Mr Read was subject to an investigation, which ultimately – I say “ultimately” – the last step in the investigation was by a barrister, Ms Tutin. So is this what would have happened in practice: that it would have come first to your team, because that would have been a high-profile investigation, but, in that instance, you or someone on your behalf decided that an external law firm should be involved, a firm of solicitors, who in turn instructed Ms Tutin, and then she made her report back; is that it in summary form?
John Bartlett: That’s a proper description of the process, sir, yes.
Sir Wyn Williams: Fine. Thanks. Yeah, okay.
Mr Blake: I’d like to look at the oversight of your team’s work. Can we please turn to POL00447971. This is a team organogram. It might be difficult to see but, if we could just look at the top, thank you. If we could focus on the top half. Is it possible to zoom in a little more? We can see your name is on the left-hand side – thank you very much – the third row down. Can you see your name there?
John Bartlett: I can.
Mr Blake: It appears that you report to Sarah Gray, who is now the Interim General Counsel.
John Bartlett: Correct.
Mr Blake: I don’t believe she reports to Ben Foat currently?
John Bartlett: Not currently.
Mr Blake: No. Am I right to say there is no direct line from yourself to the Group Executive?
John Bartlett: Sarah sits on the SEG so I would say that’s the link there.
Mr Blake: Thank you. So, essentially, Sarah Gray is responsible for your team insofar as the Executive level is concerned?
John Bartlett: Correct.
Mr Blake: Who do you consider to be responsible and accountable for your team at Board level?
John Bartlett: That’s in two ways. So we have a Speak Up champion, who is a Non-Executive Director, Amanda Burton. We also have an investigations Non-Executive Director champion, who is Andrew Darfoor, now. So we have – I report in to them, they are monitoring what we do.
Mr Blake: Do they speak on your behalf at Board meetings?
John Bartlett: I believe they have, yes.
Mr Blake: Thank you. If we zoom out, please, we can see that there are, including you, 18 members of staff here in your team. Is that the current position; has that changed?
John Bartlett: No, I think we’re one fewer.
Mr Blake: So 17 including yourself?
John Bartlett: Including the Project Phoenix team, yes. If you take them out, I think it’s nine.
Mr Blake: Thank you very much. If we could take that down, please.
I want to move on to the KPMG report, focusing in particular on the issue of training, but we’ll look at their findings. We’ve already looked at them in the Inquiry, so I’m not going to take a great deal of time going through every individual one. You’ve set out their key findings at paragraph 17 of your statement. Can we please turn to POL00423697.
This is the Project Birch report. That was commissioned and also produced prior to you joining the Post Office; is that correct?
John Bartlett: That is correct.
Mr Blake: We see there at the bottom, 13 August 2021. Was this a document that was brought to your attention pretty soon into taking up the role?
John Bartlett: Day one.
Mr Blake: Thank you. If we could scroll down, please, to page 4. We see there the context. I’ll very briefly take you through that:
“Whilst Post Office no longer bring private prosecutions it continues to perform a variety of investigations as required, across its business.
“The Post Office’s vision is that these investigations be conducted to the appropriate standard by appropriately qualified individuals and adhere to the market practice with the necessary records created, maintained and retained so [that the Post Office] can discharge all its obligations, now and in the future, including those required by statute.”
It sets out there that:
“Post Office engaged KPMG to undertake a review of its current investigations process as set out in our terms of engagement dated 30 June 2021.”
What was your view on receiving this?
John Bartlett: I think it was the basis of the establishment of the team that I was asked to build and their recommended approach seemed to make a lot of sense, a centralised function. It’s something I’ve seen in other corporate entities, and it seemed logical.
Mr Blake: Thank you. Could we please turn to page 10, and it sets out there the “Executive summary”. As I’ve said, we’ve been through these before, so we’ll speed through them.
The first significant bullet point there on the right-hand side:
“Investigations are not conducted consistently across [the Post Office].”
Is that the very purpose for the establishment of your team?
John Bartlett: Yes, particularly the assurance piece of my team.
Mr Blake: Thank you. If we scroll down, please, we see more bullet points. Over the page:
“Lack of overarching governance and oversight over high-risk investigations.”
Again, that’s essentially the purpose of your team, isn’t it?
John Bartlett: It’s one of them, yes.
Mr Blake: “There is no clear, consistent triage process in place across [the Post Office] …
“Lack of consistent monitoring and reporting of all investigations …
“There is no consistent approach to quality assurance across the business teams …
“There is limited evidence of ‘lessons learnt’, and continuous improvement arising from investigations across [the Post Office] …”
Over the page, please:
“Business teams often use Area Managers and Line Managers to conduct investigations …
“There is a lack of training in respect of investigations across [the Post Office] …
“There is no consistent use of an investigations case management tool across [the Post Office] …”
That’s the final substantive recommendation or observation.
In your view, have all of those been addressed?
John Bartlett: The first bullet point about use of Area Managers and line managers, in a grievance context, so within the ER area, that still takes place, but that’s outside of the remit that my team has. So for fact-finding, for accountability investigations and for any criminal ones, Area Managers and line managers are not used.
Training, we’re beginning to address. There’s more to do there, and we’ve just got a new case management tool.
Mr Blake: If we scroll up to the bullet points above, how about in respect of those?
John Bartlett: Okay, so quality assurance is absolutely under way. I think there will probably be more teams that we are asked to assure but, at the moment, we have – we’re at capacity in terms of teams. But there is a consistent approach to that that’s been validated by the Group Assurance function.
Lessons learned, we have a process now where lessons learned from investigations are collated by Group Assurance, and followed through by them. Monitoring and reporting, we’ve centralised investigations to a greater extent and we operate a triage function within my team.
Mr Blake: If we scroll up, I think we’ve addressed the first – is there anything additional you’d like to say about the first bullet point on implementation?
John Bartlett: So all the assurance work in non-A&CI teams of – sorry, of non-A&CI teams, one of the drivers for that assurance work is to drive consistency and so, yes, that is being dealt with.
Mr Blake: Thank you. You’ve highlighted in your witness statement in particular the training issue. Is it your view that of all of those bullet points, the training is the one you’re the most far behind in implementing?
John Bartlett: Refresher training, yes.
Mr Blake: You explain that there have been delays in getting it up and running; is that correct?
John Bartlett: Yes, we’ve engaged with – so I think the focus of the questions that I was asked to answer in my witness statement was primarily focused on criminal investigations. So, in terms of refresher training or primary training for investigative work around the criminal conduct, it is behind but we’ve been engaging with the College of Policing and two of my staff are doing fraud investigation apprenticeships.
Mr Blake: Is the plan for you to adopt College of Policing training, a package?
John Bartlett: Yes, absolutely.
Mr Blake: I think it was two and a half years after this KPMG report that that approach was made or the first meeting took place with the College of Policing; is that correct?
John Bartlett: So it was a year after my team started.
Mr Blake: Can you assist with why that took so long?
John Bartlett: There was a lot of other things going on and we were trying to work out what requirements the Post Office had around criminal investigations because that would determine the nature of the training that would – or refresher training as well, and ongoing training that would be required.
Mr Blake: Is the current position that there is not yet a training programme in place?
John Bartlett: We’ve had a needs analysis completed by the College of Policing. They’ve proposed a training package, which we would like to do, and we’re just waiting for a formal offer, if you like, of what that training would be, both upfront, refresher and ongoing. But, as soon as we can get that in writing, we’d like to agree it.
Mr Blake: When do you expect that to take place?
John Bartlett: I don’t know. That sits with the College of Policing at the moment.
Mr Blake: So you’re waiting on them to put forward the proposal?
John Bartlett: They have given us a provisional proposal, which we’ve given positive feedback on and we’re just waiting for it formally now.
Mr Blake: Are we talking months, years?
John Bartlett: Well, certainly not years. I’m hoping one or two months.
Mr Blake: Thank you. That’s the College of Policing. So, presumably, they can assist with the legal issues relating to the preservation of evidence and matters such as that. What about covering, for example, the interpretation of Horizon data, how to analyse Horizon data; how is your team going to be trained in that?
John Bartlett: So one of the aspects that we asked them to look at is whether or not the transaction analysts – I have two in my team – whether their methodology could be accredited or approved by the College of Policing. They’re still looking into that aspect as to how that could happen but that is something that we would like the College of Policing to do.
Mr Blake: Who provides them with training as to what it means, what the printout from the Horizon system means, what the ARQ data, for example, from Fujitsu means; who assists them in understanding that?
John Bartlett: So one of the two came from the Tier 3 Retail Team so he had all of their training and experience and he’s brought that in and he’s effectively mentoring the other transaction analyst, who is an experienced intelligence data analyst from HMRC.
Mr Blake: What about investigations of underlying problems with the Horizon system itself: how is your team going to be trained to be able to interrogate the Horizon system or to properly understand issues such as bugs, errors, defects in the Horizon system?
John Bartlett: So there is a process and guidance for doing that within Tier 3, within Retail. We follow that practice and that experience but, ultimately, if it’s something that we’re not sure about, then we can approach Simon Oldnall’s team, the Horizon IT Team, in the first instance, and seek their advice. We have done that on other technical datasets before and it’s worked very well.
Mr Blake: In terms of the training that’s provided by, for example, the College of Policing, how are you going to link that up with the wider teams that are involved in investigations, such as the Retail Team that you’ve spoken about?
John Bartlett: So we’re going to – we will build in any developments or new processes or procedures that we get from that training, we’ll consider it for inclusion in our assurance work, and it will be through the assurance work framework – so the assurance framework that that will percolate into the Retail Teams.
Mr Blake: So are we to understand that, for example, your team go to a training session with the College of Policing, they’ll have that training and then they will then train the teams below them, or other teams in the business?
John Bartlett: Yes, so depending on the significance of any changes or new approaches, we can either – the plan will be to either give an actual training session, probably starting with the team leaders in retail. But, in any event, it will be considered as to whether it should be folded into the multiple sets of criteria that we have agreed with each of the different teams that we assure.
Mr Blake: I appreciate you haven’t been at the Post Office for all that long but is it disappointing that these kind of changes to training haven’t already been implemented?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Where would you say responsibility for that lies?
John Bartlett: I’m not sure I can place that at any particular personal group’s door but I think what I can say is I’m not sure Post Office, in 2019, thought they needed to understand what had gone wrong in the investigation process. I think that is evident. And the reason I feel I can say that is Project Phoenix was not commissioned then when perhaps it should have been.
Mr Blake: So that’s a broader concern but are there any particular individuals who you would say that responsibility lies with?
John Bartlett: I wouldn’t know. I wasn’t in the Post Office then, I’m afraid.
Mr Blake: Was it something that you understood when you came in to the business that there was that lack of introspection?
John Bartlett: I think the fact that a CIU was required and authorised was indicative of a change of approach, that there was a recognition that professional investigations capability was required and that it needed to be conducted not by people entirely brought through Post Office.
Mr Blake: Who, in your view, was responsible for that change in approach?
John Bartlett: Sarah Gray and Ben Foat.
Mr Blake: Thank you. I’d like to move on to various policies and procedures. You’ve addressed the investigations policies, the two current key investigations policies, at paragraph 48 to 49 of your witness statement. They are the Group Investigations Policy, the GIP, and the Cooperation with Law Enforcement Agencies and Addressing Suspected Criminal Misconduct Policy – is that correct – that’s the CLEP?
John Bartlett: Known as the CLEP, yes.
Mr Blake: Thank you. Those policies date back to 2021; is that right?
John Bartlett: That’s correct.
Mr Blake: They pre-date your joining –
John Bartlett: They do.
Mr Blake: – and there is now a new policy that is being developed, that’s known as the Group Investigation and Cooperation with Law Enforcement Policy, the GICLEP?
John Bartlett: We refer to it as the Proposed Combined Policy but, yes, it is that.
Mr Blake: So, in effect, combining those two previous policies, the GIP and CLEP to create a single unified policy?
John Bartlett: Yes, correct.
Mr Blake: Can we please turn to POL00448353; is this the current draft of that policy?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: So we see there version 2.2 but it’s still a draft for comment. What stage of development do you say this policy is up to now?
John Bartlett: So, just to clarify, this is the current CLEP?
Mr Blake: Yes.
John Bartlett: So that is in force. I don’t know why it has “Draft” on it.
Mr Blake: Thank you. This is the CLEP?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Not the GICLEP?
John Bartlett: I would need to see the next page, but looking at that …
Mr Blake: Even though it’s called Group Investigations & Cooperation with Law Enforcement Policy, if we scroll over?
John Bartlett: Apologies, yes, you’re right. That is the proposed new document. My mistake, sorry.
Mr Blake: So this the combined policy?
John Bartlett: This is the combined document.
Mr Blake: It’s called a “Draft”, on the front page it says, “Draft for comment”; what stage do you say this is currently at?
John Bartlett: It’s a discussion document.
Mr Blake: Discussing with who?
John Bartlett: Board and SEG.
Mr Blake: Has it gone to both of those groups?
John Bartlett: They’ve discussed some of the concept in them. I have provided it to both groups and, in two weeks’ time, it’s going to be discussed by the Board and next week it’s being discussed by SEG.
Mr Blake: Do you expect that it will be adopted in its current form?
John Bartlett: I think SEG will support it; I’m not sure about Board.
Mr Blake: Why are you not sure about the Board?
John Bartlett: Some of the feedback or commentary on one or two parts of this that I’ve had would suggest that one or two of the members of the Board want to discuss it further. So, therefore, I don’t think that they will, without those discussions, want to say yes, go through the governance process to have it approved.
Mr Blake: Can you assist us with what in particular their concerns are?
John Bartlett: I think, in particular, is the element around changing the current requirement that the CLEP has for Board to approve the provision of certain types of evidence to law enforcement.
Mr Blake: This policy would make it easier for your team to pass information to law enforcement without Board approval; is that right?
John Bartlett: It would remove the requirement to go to Board. It would put in place a different governance structure around that material being passed but, yes, it would – we would notify Board of what’s happened. That’s clear in the feedback that I’ve had from the Chairman, for example, that that’s what he would like. He – the feedback I’ve had is that the Chairman would approve that change in responsibility but they would like to know volumes, trends, characteristics.
Mr Blake: Can you assist us with who, at Board level, is not happy for that change to take place?
John Bartlett: Elliot Jacobs, one of the Postmaster NEDs.
Mr Blake: Just him?
John Bartlett: That’s – he’s the only person I’ve been aware of with feedback.
Mr Blake: Thank you.
Can we bring up onto screen your second witness statement. It’s WITN11190200. I’d like to look at page 6 and into page 7. In your statement you have identified some criticisms that have been made from the Group Litigation and from the Hamilton appeals, and you’ve identified and set those out in your statement. I’d just like to take you through those and, really, my question is how this new policy addresses those criticisms.
John Bartlett: Okay.
Mr Blake: Thank you. So it’s paragraph 14, and you say there:
“The GLO Judgments and the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Hamilton & Others … were critical of the Post Office’s approach to investigations, specifically in relation to apparent shortfalls and discrepancies shown by Horizon. In particular and in summary, those criticisms included:
“(a) That the Post Office operated with the presumption of culpability …”
Is that addressed in your new policy and, if so, how?
John Bartlett: Yes, it’s pretty explicit in there that you have an investigative mindset, which is open, you make no presumptions of anything and you follow the evidence and lines of inquiry, including towards or away from any investigative hypothesis that you might have.
Mr Blake: “(b) That Post Office provided insufficient information to postmasters who had shortfalls during the investigation and before and during proceedings …”
Again, is that addressed and, if so, how?
John Bartlett: I think that’s principally addressed in the processes within the Retail Teams that look at shortfalls.
Mr Blake: So the responsibility for addressing that, you see, as lying with the Retail Team?
John Bartlett: Yes, but what I would say is if we had cause to investigate anything like that, we would make that information available, if it’s a criminal matter, to the police, for example.
Mr Blake: How about making it available to the subpostmasters, say, if a subpostmaster is being investigated?
John Bartlett: We wouldn’t investigate a subpostmaster for anything other than something that might be criminal, and we don’t investigate people anyway. That is a principle within the policies: that we investigate circumstances or events; we don’t investigate people.
Mr Blake: Do you have guidance as to how much information should be given to a postmaster if they are going to be investigated –
John Bartlett: So that –
Mr Blake: – for criminal conduct?
John Bartlett: For criminal conduct, the police carry those investigations, not us.
Mr Blake: But you carry out a level of investigation to identify whether it is sufficient to provide to the police?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Part of that might include an interview, for example?
John Bartlett: No.
Mr Blake: That’s not the case?
John Bartlett: No. We don’t do interviews with postmasters.
Mr Blake: Is that not part of the proposal in the new policy?
John Bartlett: No.
Mr Blake: Okay. Well, we’ll get to that and we’ll have a look at the section on investigations?
John Bartlett: So it’s worth noting that this policy isn’t just about – doesn’t just cover investigations into postmasters; it’s any investigation. So the piece about interviewing, or – it is interviewing – interviewing people largely relates to Post Office Limited’s staff. We do not – so as the proposed policy is explicit, which the previous policy wasn’t – is, we will not do interviews under caution.
Mr Blake: Thank you. If we scroll down, (c):
“That there was poor communication with postmasters throughout an investigation with the outcome that postmasters were unable to examine the issue themselves …”
Is that something that is addressed in the policy and, if so, how?
John Bartlett: Yes, so if you take the investigations conducted in retail space or, to some degree, within the Contracts Team, they should be sharing information with the postmaster as they go along or at the conclusion of their reporting. To the extent that the Dispute Resolution Team, when they produce a report following their investigations, they consider that they are writing those reports for the postmaster.
Mr Blake: Thank you:
“(d) That there were failures to follow all reasonable lines of inquiry, including potential alternative explanations provided by postmasters.”
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Is that addressed and, if so, how?
John Bartlett: So it is. It’s covered in more detail in the Investigator’s Manual, which is the aid for people conducting investigations. It’s not a policy; it’s a guidance document. But, yes, lines of inquiry is essential.
Mr Blake: How is that addressed?
John Bartlett: I think it’s in there as a policy statement, which is “You will follow lines of inquiry towards or away from the investigative hypothesis”.
Mr Blake: “(e) Suspicions of knowingly making false assertions relating to the reliability of Horizon data …”
John Bartlett: Yes, so in the – I think in the policy we talk about the purpose of an investigation is to establish the truth, not to achieve a particular outcome, and I think that fits in there.
Mr Blake: “(f) That Post Office failed to discharge properly the duties of a prosecutor, especially in respect of disclosure.”
Now, you’re no longer the prosecutor but how else is that addressed?
John Bartlett: Well, we state we’re no longer a prosecutor and we say – and we will assist any prosecutor or Investigations Team in the discharge of their disclosure obligations.
Mr Blake: What do you see as your disclosure obligations?
John Bartlett: Well, I think, on a strictly legal basis, if we’re not the investigating authority or the prosecuting authority, we don’t legally have one under CPIA, but we adopt that as a concept. You know, it’s something that we support and we would provide whatever law enforcement want. To the extent that, if they move towards the disclosure phase of their investigation prior to it going to a prosecutor or a prosecutor moving to disclosure to another party, then we will give them everything we have.
Mr Blake: When you say “everything”, what do you mean by that?
John Bartlett: So the contents of the case file, and we will not apply any form of relevancy test.
Mr Blake: A case file might include internal logs, internal comment; is it envisaged that those kinds of things will be passed to the police?
John Bartlett: Yes, well, we – I think we’d have to apply some common sense but that would be in discussion with law enforcement. So we would open our file, I guess, in effect, to them, and then talk through what material we have, what material they want to consider, as part of their relevancy test, and then we will give it to them.
Mr Blake: Thank you. Are there any other significant changes made in that draft policy that you can point to that you believe will make a significant difference?
John Bartlett: So in there we talk about the retention of material. I think that’s important, the material that is received or generated in the course of an investigation, and it doesn’t have – it shouldn’t be restricted to criminal investigations; it should be any investigation. That material should be retained, and we should be prepared to reveal it.
So for example, if there’s an investigation that leads – not in my area but in the contract space, for example, they should be prepared to show material evidence to postmasters or any other party that’s there. So show them CCTV, show them analysis reports, witness statements, whatever is necessary. So I guess it’s the concept of transparency in investigations, and that transparency has to be based on the retention of material to begin with.
Mr Blake: You’ve mentioned in terms of this policy that, when it gets to Board level, there will be some further discussion at least in respect of one aspect. But why, in your view, has it taken so long to get to this stage, and it’s still not completed?
John Bartlett: So part of it is volume of work within the team. Principally, at the senior – my level and my direct reports, we’ve had a volume of operational work, investigative work, setting up the assurance function that has meant that we had to deprioritise something; we couldn’t do it all. So we that to deprioritise the formalisation of that policy.
Mr Blake: We’ve heard evidence from some witnesses about a fear of decision making and a fear of accountability within certain levels of the Post Office.
John Bartlett: Mm-hm.
Mr Blake: To what extent has that contributed to these new policies not yet being implemented?
John Bartlett: I think that’s – I think that applies to this as well.
Mr Blake: Where do you say the responsibility lies for that?
John Bartlett: SEG.
Mr Blake: The Senior Executive Group?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Thank you. You’ve mentioned the Investigator’s Manual perhaps we can turn to that, that’s POL00448014.
This is a document that is in force, it has been approved, I think, in June 2023; is that correct?
John Bartlett: Yes, that’s perhaps giving it a higher status or authority than perhaps it should have.
Mr Blake: Because it’s not a policy; it’s a guide?
John Bartlett: Correct.
Mr Blake: This particular version is 19 September 2023, version 1.1. Is that the most up-to-date version, as far as you’re aware?
John Bartlett: I’m not sure. There is constantly – it’s meant to be a living document, so it’s not – there will be different versions. I know another one is being worked on at the moment, to some degree. It has been paused pending the discussions in the next couple of weeks around the new policy because, obviously, that will have implications for the guidance that’s required.
Mr Blake: Where does this sit with those other guides – other policies, sorry – that you’ve mentioned?
John Bartlett: So it’s not a policy. This is a manual, it’s not even – it’s not a procedural document. It’s guidance. I think it’s been described as a handrail for investigators.
Mr Blake: But it presumably needs to be consistent with the policies –
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: – and will therefore be adapted as the policy adapts?
John Bartlett: Yes, and, of course, policies are not “how to” guides; policies should be a statement of a particular position on an issue.
Mr Blake: Thank you. If we scroll over the page we can see how it’s described in the foreword. It’s page 4.
“The Post Office is committed to doing things correctly. Our Values and Behaviours represent the conduct we expect. This expansive and detailed manual, its guides and templates support those of our colleagues charged to help us ensure the highest standards of integrity, proper behaviour, crime prevention, detection and case management are maintained.”
Did you draft this or presumably this is one of the first documents that you were involved in, having joined the Post Office?
John Bartlett: It was a team effort, so the team put this together, and then sections of it that relate to the operations in other teams, so for instance the Retail Teams, they had an input too and provided their elements of this manual.
Mr Blake: Thank you. If we could scroll down the page and into the “Introduction”, we see there:
“This manual is intended to provide clear guidance on the considerations that must be made when conducting investigations. It is not intended to be a training manual for Investigators. The manual prescribes the professional standards which the Group expects of all those that undertake investigations on its behalf.”
Is this used not just by your team, then, but by the other teams within the business who carry out the lower level investigations?
John Bartlett: Correct.
Mr Blake: Could we please turn to page 16. This is actually the section I mentioned before. I’d just like to spend a bit of time looking at “Interviews”. It says there:
“This guidance applies to all types of investigative interviewing, not only to interviews conducted as part of a criminal investigation. The principles are based on ensuring fairness to interviewee but also to facilitate an appropriately effective investigation.”
Then it sets out three different types of interviews that might be conducted: witness interviews; conduct subject interviews; and something called criminal conduct subject interviews. It says:
“A witness interview is conducted with persons who are able to provide testimony to the event under investigation or provide clarification on matters or systems relating to the investigation.”
So that’s somebody, presumably, who isn’t suspected of something, they might be a witness?
John Bartlett: They can help the investigation, yes.
Mr Blake: Thank you:
“A conduct interview is conducted with a person suspected of breaching Group policy or regulation and there is no suggestion that a criminal offence may have occurred. Authority to conduct this type of interview must be obtained from the investigator’s line manager … designated deputy.”
What does that mean: investigator’s line manager designated deputy?
John Bartlett: The interviewer’s line manager or someone that might be acting in their stead. So, for example, if the line manager is on annual leave or sick, then someone should be acting in that capacity.
Mr Blake: Should that be line manager or designated deputy?
John Bartlett: Yes, there should be a space between the “R” and the “O”.
Mr Blake: Ah, manager or – yes, thank you very much:
“A criminal conduct interview is conducted with a person who is suspected of committing a criminal offence and may be conducted by a police officer or by appropriately trained, professionally qualified and experienced investigators within A&CI. Authority to conduct such interviews can only be authorised by the Head of A&CI [that’s you] or their designated deputy.
“When conducting interviews, IOs …”
What’s an “IO”?
John Bartlett: That’s shorthand for the person that’s conducting the investigation.
Mr Blake: An investigation officer?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: “When conducting interviews, [investigating officers] must comply with the seven College of Policing investigative interview principles. These principles apply to all interviews, whether part of a criminal investigation or any other form of investigation.”
So there is something called a criminal conduct interview but, as you have previously said, that is not something that you envisage taking place under caution; is that correct?
John Bartlett: So, when – if it would help, I could explain the background to this section.
Mr Blake: Yes, please.
John Bartlett: So when we first were tasked to start the team in early 2022, there was consideration that our team might do interviews under caution in relation to suspected offences against Post Office. That affected the drafting of this. That intent changed and so the new version of the manual, when we know where we stand, in terms of what’s expected of us, this section will entirely come out.
Mr Blake: So, in future, will you just have two different types of interviews or something else?
John Bartlett: No, I think it would be a general witness who can assist us within the Post Office or, indeed, outside the Post Office, and then there will be the – we call them accountability investigations, so anyone who, during the course of that investigation, might potentially be held accountable for an event that we were asked to investigate but that would not include anything suspected – a suspected criminal offence.
Mr Blake: So, I mean, I’m not asking you to redraft this right now but, if you could summarise what it might say in future, once the proposal is passed, what do you envisage this will say, in broad terms?
John Bartlett: Okay. So I’m expecting us to adopt the general guidelines around how to conduct an effective, sensitive, witness interview. So –
Mr Blake: So those College of Policing investigative interview principles will stay, will they?
John Bartlett: No, because they relate to the conduct of a criminal investigation. So we would look at things like we can look at the ACAS guidelines, we can look at College of Policing do give guidance on dealing with – on interviewing witnesses – vulnerable people and witnesses generally. So we can look at drawing on that sort of material, but also the ACAS side because we can balance that – those two approaches.
Mr Blake: Will a person who is being interviewed know whether they are being interviewed as a witness, as somebody whose conduct is suspected of wrongdoing in some way and whether – here we have a third category – something even more serious than that.
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Will they be told the actual level of seriousness of that interview?
John Bartlett: They are, effectively, already. So because of our history, we tell people who might be witnesses of any type that they are not going to be interviewed under caution because we want to be really clear about that upfront, so they don’t worry about that and they know this isn’t going to result in a criminal issue. We say to them – we write to people internally, Post Office Limited staff, and say, “We would like you to meet with the investigator”, that could be one of my team, it could be an external lawyer, for example, doing it, “because we would like to talk to you about X, Y and Z which we think you could help us with”.
Then there are various bits about “You can have a friend”, and stuff that goes with that.
In terms of conduct, sometimes people might start as a witness, and then as the evidence evolves, that may change, in that they may then be accountable for something they’ve done and that would be made clear to them during the course of that interview, or any subsequent interview.
Mr Blake: Is that not problematic because somebody may say things in an interview that they shouldn’t be saying, because they think you’re interviewing them as a witness when in fact your officer may suspect that they’re more than just a witness?
John Bartlett: Not outside of a criminal context, no, because I think you may go into an interview not really knowing what this person can tell you, or having one set of views based on what has been said by other witnesses, and then that might change during the course of the investigation. Bearing in mind we don’t do – the resulting output of any of those accountability type investigations, the worst-case scenario is that we would make a recommendation that ER would conduct a code of conduct type investigation, based on information we have gathered. So they would then have another opportunity to speak with ER, and do it that way.
But –
Mr Blake: “ER” being Employee Relations?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: I mean, is it not possible that you might pass on the information to the police?
John Bartlett: We haven’t seen any of those so far and we – I guess theoretically, yes, but, on issues that are potentially criminal, we try not to deal with too many people that would muddy the evidential environment for the police.
Mr Blake: How is that going to work, in practice, though, because let’s say you have a subpostmaster, you’re not sure if I they have been committing a crime, there’s a –
John Bartlett: We don’t interview postmasters.
Mr Blake: You won’t interview any subpostmasters?
John Bartlett: Well, it’s not our role.
Mr Blake: Who is going to be interviewing subpostmasters?
John Bartlett: So, potentially, the Contracts team.
Mr Blake: Even for a very significant loss?
John Bartlett: If there’s no suggestion of criminality, it won’t come to A&CI.
Mr Blake: If there is a suspicion of criminality, what happens? You don’t interview them or you do interview them?
John Bartlett: We don’t interview them.
Mr Blake: So they’ll be interviewed by a tier below you that doesn’t have the training that your team is provided with, because your team are the experts in investigations, they’ll be interviewed by somebody who is not that top tier?
John Bartlett: No. So as soon as a lower tier forms a suspicion, which will not be based on – well, it might be based on something that’s voluntarily offered during a – and saved to a call, to the call centre. So that’s them initiating contact. But my understanding is that Tier 3, for example, do not speak to postmasters particularly, so they won’t be interviewing them.
Mr Blake: So you won’t have a postmaster’s account, necessarily –
John Bartlett: No.
Mr Blake: – and you will have to determine whether something is going to be passed to the police, based on what?
John Bartlett: So we’ll have to – so that’s – so all the alternative explanations are considered in Tier 2 and 3.
Mr Blake: But a postmaster wouldn’t have provided their explanation?
John Bartlett: Well, they may have volunteered information or an account already but my understanding is that Tier 2 and 3 don’t formally conduct an interview.
Mr Blake: Can you assist us with the tiers: what is Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3?
John Bartlett: I think Mel Park addressed that yesterday.
Mr Blake: Can you briefly address that?
John Bartlett: So the vast majority of issues are, as I understand it are dealt with at the call centre, and then the funnel sort of narrows, the pyramid narrows. So those issues that can’t be resolved at that level are then escalated to Tier 2. Most issues are dealt with there, and then a much smaller subset are then passed to Tier 3, who are very technically capable, and then they are the ones that make referrals to us.
Mr Blake: Although the guidance that we’re seeing here refers to these various types of interviews, actually, we should read into here somewhere that this only applies to people directly employed by the Post Office or it certainly doesn’t apply to subpostmasters?
John Bartlett: In the main, yes. So there are – so there are a few occasions where the Contracts Team do speak with postmasters over potential contract breach issues, and what the purpose of this is, for them, is we would like them to apply the same concepts of fairness, transparency, sensitivity and openness in those – document keeping, recordkeeping, and that sort of thing, that you would have in another situation, so that they are treating the postmasters fairly in those discussions.
Mr Blake: But those are discussions, not interviews?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: What determines the extent of an internal investigation prior to reporting something to a law enforcement agency?
John Bartlett: I’m not aware that we’ve reported anything to law enforcement relating to an internal investigation.
Mr Blake: How about the actions of a subpostmaster, an apparent discrepancy, or something along those lines?
John Bartlett: Okay, so we have had – so none of our, I think it’s 16, cases that A&CI are currently working on that we’ve reported to the police, none of those relate to a cash shortfall.
Mr Blake: In those particular cases, how do you determine whether to pass something to the police or not?
John Bartlett: So there is often information provided by another person – another party. So, for example, we’ve reported a matter to the police where the postmaster has reported that a family member has run off with a bag of cash – a pouch, cash pouch. We’ve had issues where we have taken a witness statement from a postmaster who was subject to coercive behaviour from a partner that has resulted in activity in the branch that has come to our attention.
So we will seek to get that additional evidence and, when reporting the matter that affects Post Office, we would pass that information on as well, and that would form part of our decision-making process to do it.
Mr Blake: Thank you. I’d just like to talk about two other policies very briefly before we take our mid-morning break. The first is the Financial Crime Policy of July 2023. Could that be brought up on screen, that’s POL00447947. This isn’t your team’s policy, is it, I don’t think?
John Bartlett: No, it’s not.
Mr Blake: In your statement, though, you have identified at page 14 there was an error. If we could turn to page 14, please. It’s the bottom of that page in respect of “Internal Financial Crime/Fraud”. At the bottom there, it says:
“Detective Controls:
“All reports received of or instances identified of internal fraud will be fully investigated and where appropriate, Post Office will prosecute individuals.”
You’ve identified that as an error in that policy. Are you aware of that having been amended since it has been identified?
John Bartlett: I know people were instructed to amend it. I don’t know whether they have.
Mr Blake: The final document that we’ll go to before the break is the Subpostmaster Contract. That’s POL00000254. So this is the Standard Postmasters’ Contract. If we could turn please to page 71, this is an issue that’s been identified and addressed with other witnesses, including Mr Read. We can see there that it refers, at the top of the page, to the “Investigation Division” and, if we scroll over the page, we can see, for example, it refers to “Enquiries by Officers of the Post Office Investigation Division”. At point 12, it says:
“… the Investigation Division does NOT enquire into matters where crime is not suspected.”
Is this it of date?
John Bartlett: Absolutely. So, if I may, it might assist.
Mr Blake: Yes.
John Bartlett: In early August, I was asked by the lawyers who were reviewing Postmaster Contracts to come up with a new, better contract, fairer contract. I was asked to review sections of this and I’ve asked for all of this to be taken out.
Mr Blake: Is it surprising, given the level of scrutiny that has been taking place for years now on Postmaster Contracts and on the policies and procedures of the Post Office, that that has remained in there for so long?
John Bartlett: I think I was very surprised it was there.
Mr Blake: Who, in your view, is responsible for that?
John Bartlett: I don’t know who actually owns Postmaster Contracts, I’m afraid.
Mr Blake: Would it have been your predecessor who would have inputted into that?
John Bartlett: I don’t consider myself to have a predecessor but I take your point: do you mean the Head of Security?
Mr Blake: Perhaps.
John Bartlett: Okay. I imagine they – yes, partly. But I think Postmaster Contracts are likely to be owned in their totality in a different department.
Mr Blake: Okay. Thank you.
Sir, that might be an appropriate moment to take our mid-morning break.
Sir Wyn Williams: Fine.
Mr Blake: Can we come back at 11.40, please?
Sir Wyn Williams: Okey doke.
Mr Blake: Thank you very much.
(11.23 am)
(A short break)
(11.39 am)
Mr Blake: Thank you, sir.
Mr Bartlett, just to revisit that issue we were just addressing before the break, does it say in the investigators manual or in any of those policies that we’ve looked at, that the Post Office won’t interview postmasters?
John Bartlett: It says in the new draft manual that we won’t conduct interviews under caution. I’m not sure it goes down another level. I was thinking in the break perhaps we need to separate out in the investigation policy, so that we can be explicit as to what applies to a postmaster linked investigation conducted in Retail, for example, as opposed to inhouse – Post Office Limited type people.
Mr Blake: Has there been an explicit decision that Post Office will not interview postmasters?
John Bartlett: There has been a decision that my team will not interview postmasters, yes.
Mr Blake: I think where we got to before the break was that the other teams wouldn’t interview postmasters: they would have a discussion with them?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Are you aware of any overarching decision that no interviews will take place with postmasters?
John Bartlett: So my understanding of practice and policy within the retail space is that they do not do interviews.
Sir Wyn Williams: There may be a degree of difficulty, in practice, in deciding whether what is, in fact, happening amounts to an interview or a discussion, right? Forget interviews under caution, that’s clear. There has to be a caution. I understand your evidence on that. But how is anyone to determine when a discussion becomes an interview, Mr Bartlett?
You’ve got experience, I know, of both police and other regulators in respect of this. I mean, I’m familiar, obviously, with the situation in which an employee – let’s forget subpostmasters, to take the heat out of it – has a discussion with an employer or is formally interviewed by an employer about various things. It’s not an interview under caution, the employer isn’t doing anything like that, but they are trying to get to the bottom of something, if I can put it in that way.
John Bartlett: Yes.
Sir Wyn Williams: In practice, how is the difference to be delineated?
John Bartlett: I think it’s very difficult to draw a distinction, myself. It depends what definition of an interview that one would want to settle on. You know, is it a structured conversation with the objective of establishing facts or experience of a particular matter in hand? That could be one definition, in which case my view is that that will occur in the retail space but it depends on what they mean and what is meant.
Sir Wyn Williams: Yeah, I mean, let’s take the example that I raised with you to understand the process in respect of involving outside investigators. When Ms Tutin was speaking with Mr Read, I would expect that most people would call that an interview, not a discussion.
John Bartlett: I agree, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Right. So, I’m only asking completely open-mindedly: is it possible, in a document like a manual or a policy, to actually lay down when a discussion becomes an interview or vice versa, for that matter?
John Bartlett: It is very difficult, and I think there are a range of views as to when an interview is – what an interview is and when it is occurring.
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, I think – well, I have some sympathy with that, having seen various manifestations of all this over 50 years. Anyway.
I think the more important question for me is: can you foresee – this is not about interviews under caution, all right, I understand what’s going on about that – but do you foresee any problem about there being the facility for investigators, whether part of your team or any other team, when appropriate, to interview someone?
John Bartlett: I think, in any other organisation, no, sir, I wouldn’t. In post office, because of the sensitivity of the past, which I completely understand –
Sir Wyn Williams: So what we’re really grappling with is the fact that, because of the history, people are very sensitive about what might be regard as oppressive interviews. That’s the reality of it, is it not? So they’re trying to do everything they can to avoid it?
John Bartlett: Yes, and I think it’s something that the people who would be spoken with would like to avoid and are cautious about –
Sir Wyn Williams: Sure.
John Bartlett: – participating in but, absolutely within Post Office, there is huge nervousness about those sort of conversations happening.
Sir Wyn Williams: Fine. Thank you.
Sorry, Mr Blake.
Mr Blake: No, it’s been helpful, sir.
Can I just follow on, just to establish who is responsible at the Post Office for formulating an overarching policy that addresses that issue?
John Bartlett: I think it would need to be a combination of different teams.
Mr Blake: The way I understood your witness statement and your evidence was that your department, A&CI, essentially sets the overarching POC for investigations –
John Bartlett: Mm-hm.
Mr Blake: – and then that filters down throughout the rest of the business and, by your assurance purpose, you ensure that the rest of the business essentially keeps to the kinds of standards that your department sets?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: So is it not your responsibility and your department’s responsibility to formulate the policy with respect to interviewing, or however you may call it, subpostmasters?
John Bartlett: I think we would play a central part in that, absolutely, but it needs to be a collegiate approach because a lot of the staff that would need to do that would not be within my team and I know that they would be uncomfortable in some situations in doing that. So I think it’s something I can take away and discuss.
Mr Blake: The Investigator’s Manual is a manual that your team is responsible for; is that right?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: The Group Investigations and Cooperation with Law Enforcement Policy, the new policy, again, that is something that your team are responsible for?
John Bartlett: For drafting, yes.
Mr Blake: So wouldn’t your team be responsible, ultimately, however much consultation you carry out amongst other teams, for a policy that addresses what to do in circumstances where a postmaster, or their assistant, is being interviewed?
John Bartlett: Yes, once that policy is formulated and approved, then yes, we would.
Mr Blake: Can you assist us with why such a policy is not yet in place?
John Bartlett: Because of the sensitivities – sorry, that particular element of the policy or the policy generally?
Mr Blake: Why there isn’t a policy that sets out, for example, what to do if, during an interview or a discussion, you suspect somebody of criminality? Where does someone turn to in the business, in the Retail Team, in the Contracts team, where do they turn to to answer that question?
John Bartlett: They would contact our team.
Mr Blake: Your team currently doesn’t have a policy. Why doesn’t it have a policy?
John Bartlett: Because the landscape is constantly changing.
Mr Blake: What does that mean?
John Bartlett: In terms of the expectation or appetite within the Post Office for investigations, it’s not been yet nailed down to my satisfaction. There’s also –
Mr Blake: Isn’t this is an absolute perfect example of that fear to take things forward in the business because things are going to be sensitive forever, if you let them?
John Bartlett: No, I would agree with that.
Mr Blake: Can you assist the Chair with when such a policy might be implemented?
John Bartlett: Not with a specific date, no, because I’d need to go – we’d need to go back and consult with other departments, get their input, run it through the approvals process, there. It will absolutely –
Mr Blake: There’s consultation, consultation, approvals processes in all of these policies. We’re years down the line now.
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Can you say to the Chair when you anticipate that those various consultations will have developed a policy that relates to the interviewing of postmasters?
John Bartlett: I can’t say for certainty because I can’t control that but my ambition would be that we would have it done, perhaps by the end of the calendar year or the financial year.
Mr Blake: Which calendar year?
John Bartlett: This calendar year.
Mr Blake: I’d like to move on then to liaison with law enforcement. The Post Office formally ceased private prosecutions on 22 September 2020; is that right?
John Bartlett: Formally, yes.
Mr Blake: I think you’ve said that they, essentially, didn’t have a criminal trial for fraud, theft or false accounting after the Second Sight Report, so after 8 July 2013, subject to, I think you’ve said, there’s a caveat in your witness statement, that addresses an instance in 2015?
John Bartlett: That’s correct.
Mr Blake: You’ve provided some data in your statement, paragraph 89 onwards. There are lots of caveats in the figures that you have provided but, broadly speaking, you have set out that there have been in the region of 328 investigations into alleged fraud, theft or false accounting since 8 July 2013; is that correct?
John Bartlett: Yes, so I believe it was 301 were done in the old Security Team, whilst they thought that they were waiting for the business to continue, as they saw it.
Mr Blake: So a much smaller figure that has been carried out under your team?
John Bartlett: Correct.
Mr Blake: You say that there have been in the region of 25 that have been reported to the police in that period; is that correct?
John Bartlett: That was correct to the time of writing the statement, yes. I’m sure that may have changed since writing the statement.
Mr Blake: What do you consider the difference in those figures shows?
John Bartlett: I think it shows that issues are being resolved in the Retail Teams now on a more equal, collegiate and open basis, through the process Mel Park oversees, that perhaps in the past went straight to a criminal investigation.
Mr Blake: Do you think that those matters are being resolved through Mel Park’s team?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Do you know how many prosecutions have actually taken place, not just reported to the police, but actually taken place, either in respect of that particular time period or in respect of any time period that you’re able to assist us with?
John Bartlett: From matters that we’ve reported?
Mr Blake: Yes.
John Bartlett: None.
Mr Blake: None. So there have been 25 reported to the police –
John Bartlett: (The witness nodded)
Mr Blake: – none have actually reached the prosecution stage?
John Bartlett: Not yet.
Mr Blake: Do you anticipate that a high proportion or a low proportion of those 25 will reach that stage?
John Bartlett: I don’t think it – that I’m able to comment on that because I don’t know what evidence the police have.
Mr Blake: But I mean, those 25 go back to 2013, some of them, presumably –
John Bartlett: Not the ones we’ve reported.
Mr Blake: Sorry, can you assist us, how many have you reported since your team has been in place?
John Bartlett: I think that’s the 25 figure but I would need to check.
Mr Blake: Okay.
Sir Wyn Williams: Well, I’m sorry to interrupt again but am I right in thinking that these 25 cases are the ones that are summarised in your appendix – I’m calling at that – from page 105 onwards?
John Bartlett: It’s included in the appendix, sir, yes, I think with summary of others.
Sir Wyn Williams: So we’ve actually got, at the end of that, the last column of that analysis tells us if there’s been a closure date, in other words the case is over one way or another, or whether it’s ongoing? As far as you’re aware, is that still essentially the picture or has it changed from the time you produced your witness statement?
John Bartlett: I think it’s broadly the same, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Yeah, okay.
Mr Blake: Thank you.
I’d like to look at a number of Group Executive Report decisions and Board decisions that relate to the issue of placing with law enforcement. Can we please turn to POL00447975. We start on 20 April 2022 and that’s a Group Executive Report, you’re listed there as one of the authors of this report, and it sets out the background to the establishment of what was then the Central Investigations Unit, the CIU. If we scroll down, we can see it says:
“Following detailed assessment, KPMG concluded in their report of August 2021 that Post Office should create a Central Investigations Unit. The introduction of the CIU was to ensure [Post Office-wide] investigations would be properly planned, resourced, documented, and executed; with lessons learnt fed back into the business. KPMG also recommended a target operating model.
“Post Office decided to form a CIU and the Head of CIU was appointed on 21 February 2022.”
That’s you?
John Bartlett: Correct.
Mr Blake: “We are seeking approval to recruit the rest of CIU in line with KPMG’s recommendations”, and it sets out there what was required at that point in time.
Paragraph 4 says:
“All observations made by KPMG are considered as being met or [adopted] in this proposal which is as follows:
“A virtual Post Office Investigations Branch develops a one-team approach to Post Office investigations, ensuring the application of best practice across the organisation.”
Is that in place?
John Bartlett: Partially.
Mr Blake: I mean, we spoke earlier of something overarching that ensures the consistency of all of the investigations; was that the aim of that?
John Bartlett: Yes, it was.
Mr Blake: When you say “partially”, why partially?
John Bartlett: I –
Mr Blake: If we scroll up, sorry.
John Bartlett: That’s okay. The intent at the time was perhaps to have a more – so to help to embed practice approaches, it’s always good for different teams to have the same purpose and to relate well to each other and to understand the positions and that was the idea of a virtual scheme.
The business prefers a linear approach, which is stuff – reports come into the call centre, they go through the process of Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3, and come to us, and I think there was not the appetite within the organisation to have something called an Investigations Branch because of the history of the organisation.
So when I say “in part”, I mean, it hasn’t landed as a branch, if you like, but the assurance and consistency of approach methodologies has.
Mr Blake: Thank you. So I don’t know, what does the word “virtual” even mean?
John Bartlett: Well, certainly not in the same management chain. So as opposed to a single chain of command with different teams reporting in to us, into the same hierarchy and up, what the virtual side is, for example, in Mel Park’s team, she has several team leaders that report into her and she reports into someone different, to who I report to. So that’s why it would be virtual.
Mr Blake: Thank you. If we scroll down:
“Business-based, decentralised teams conduct the highest volume and lowest risk casework with the CIU conducting the higher risk or more complex investigations.”
That’s accurate, is it?
John Bartlett: It is.
Mr Blake: If we scroll down, it says there, the penultimate bullet point:
“An alternative to private prosecutions is proposed to permit criminality evidenced by Post Office Investigators to be progressed in all four nations of the UK in order to act as a deterrent and to seek financial recoveries.”
Can you assist us with what that means?
John Bartlett: Where we have suspicion that a criminal offence may have occurred and harm may have been caused to the Post Office because of that suspected criminal conduct, we should report it to the police.
Mr Blake: Thank you. “Seeking financial recoveries”, this is a term or similar words are used in a number of other documents. To what extent is it necessary, in your view, to use the criminal justice system to seek financial recoveries, as opposed to, for example, a civil claim?
John Bartlett: I’m not sure I understand the question, sorry.
Mr Blake: We’ll see in a number of places that there’s reference to criminal prosecutions, passing matters to the police, in order, amongst other things, to recovery money. Is it your view that the criminal justice system is the appropriate place to recovery money, and is it seen as more helpful than, for example, civil proceedings?
John Bartlett: Oh, okay. So to be very clear, the purpose of engaging with the criminal justice system is not to recover funds. That’s not the overriding purpose but it is an output of the criminal justice system for any individual or organisation. So it wouldn’t be to engage law enforcement in order to recover funds. In fact, I believe I’ve said that in a SEG meeting and asked for it to be minuted.
Mr Blake: I think we’ll come to that.
John Bartlett: Okay. But it is a potential output. The reality of that producing much is low.
Mr Blake: Can you assist us, the authors are listed as yourself and Sarah Gray. Did you draft different parts or are you ultimately responsible for …
John Bartlett: No, I did the initial draft and then Sarah reviewed it and made amendments that we agreed.
Mr Blake: Thank you. If we stay then on this page and if we scroll down, I’d just like to ask you about the bullet point on this page. In this it’s bullet point 5, we’ll see it appears elsewhere as well. It says:
“The Post Office Investigations Branch was the first recognised investigation unit in the world dating back to near the foundation of the Post Office itself. It has an unblemished reputation.”
It gives its motto:
“… Gentle in Manner, Resolute in Deed, which is very much in keeping with the intended approach of the new investigation function.”
Did you draft that?
John Bartlett: I did.
Mr Blake: Can you assist us with why it’s thought that the Investigations Branch has an unblemished reputation?
John Bartlett: Because that applied in principally – no, I’ll rephrase that. The security and investigation – or the Security Investigations Team that are responsible for the scandal was not what I was referring to. Here, I was referring to earlier, much earlier, iterations of an investigative capability within the Post Office.
Mr Blake: Because, plainly, the Investigations Team that was part of the Security Team was involved in matters that the Inquiry has been investigating?
John Bartlett: Absolutely.
Mr Blake: It’s not, presumably, your view that they have an unblemished reputation?
John Bartlett: The opposite.
Mr Blake: We’re going to move on slightly in time. Can we please look at POL00448354. This is a Group Executive report of 6 July 2022. Am I right to say they have quite similar wording all of these reports but they did go separately to the Group Executive?
The one we just looked at was April 2022. We’re now in July 2022.
John Bartlett: Mm-hm.
Mr Blake: The proposals are changing slightly; is that right?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: If we scroll down, we can see that the input that is sought from the Group Executive here is to approve, for onward distribution to the Board, the following three things: first that the Post Office, Post Office staff, postmasters and postmasters’ staff, all being within the remit of the Post Office Investigation Branch. But, as you say, that didn’t happen, or there was no investigations branch?
John Bartlett: No.
Mr Blake: “CIU to conduct criminal investigations”, so that’s your team?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: “Mobilising a new partnership model with the relevant bodies across the UK to facilitate the investigation and referral of suspected criminal misconduct.”
If we scroll down, the “Executive Summary” is that:
“CIU will be staffed from September 2022 and full operational by January 2023.”
There’s the proposal, halfway down, that the Investigation Branch remit includes Post Office and Post Office staff, postmasters, and postmasters’ staff for a range of matters, based on employment, ownership of property and practical factors.
Although the Investigations Branch doesn’t exist, do you see your own team’s remit as including all of those?
John Bartlett: Yes, but also the Retail Team.
Mr Blake: As in both of you have responsibility or the remit of both your team and the Retail Team includes those individuals?
John Bartlett: Correct.
Mr Blake: Thank you:
“Post Office has no appetite to pursue private prosecutions. However, it is proposed that Post Office Investigators conduct investigations into suspected criminality and to report what has been evidenced to law enforcement and prosecutors in all four nations of the UK. The rationale being to act as a deterrent and to seek financial restitution through the independent and external criminal justice system.”
Again there, slightly different wording, but there’s the reference there to “acting as a deterrent and seeking financial restitution”.
Do you have a view as to whether too much emphasis is being placed on financial restitution through the criminal justice system?
John Bartlett: Too much emphasis in regards to in the document?
Mr Blake: Yes.
John Bartlett: Um –
Mr Blake: In this document and similar documents?
John Bartlett: No, because I think court enabled confiscation and compensation is part of – is an established part, an accepted part, of the criminal justice system, and so maybe an output from one of the CPS or whoever are prosecuting –
Mr Blake: Yes.
John Bartlett: – and a court finding of guilt.
Mr Blake: As a former police officer, do you think that you might put too much emphasis on the criminal justice system as being used as a root for, for example, financial restitution, as opposed to non-criminal courts?
John Bartlett: No, because I have been out of the police longer than I was in the police. So my last law enforcement experience was 17 years ago. So I have had a variety of non-law enforcement roles since then.
Mr Blake: Have your other roles involved the criminal justice system?
John Bartlett: Sometimes but not always.
Mr Blake: Do you think that your focus might be too much on the criminal justice system as a mechanism to obtain financial restitution.
John Bartlett: My commentary and connection to law enforcement is not, again, restitution.
Mr Blake: Can we scroll down, please, to page 2. At 1.2, it seems there that the Group Executive agreed on 20 April 2022 to the forming of that virtual Post Office Investigations branch.
John Bartlett: (The witness nodded)
Mr Blake: So what happened that meant that that didn’t, actually, ultimately take place?
John Bartlett: As the various phases of the Inquiry progressed, members of the GE became increasingly sensitive – and I don’t mean that pejoratively, I just mean that they were generally more sensitive – to the use of language, and so support for labelling, naming and acting, as a collective function – across functions lost its appeal.
Mr Blake: You mentioned earlier parity with the Retail Team in certain respects, in terms of investigation functions. Is a risk that, now that that doesn’t exist, that that overarching oversight has been lost in some way?
John Bartlett: No, I think the insurance work that we conduct is the practical measure of that.
Mr Blake: Could we please turn over to page 5. Page 5 has a heading “Operating Model – Criminal Investigations”. I’d just like to take you through a few passages from that. If we scroll down to 3.4:
“As a wholly government-owned corporation in receipt of government funds, it may be viewed that we have a duty to investigate as well as report suspected criminal events to the relevant authority. We may be criticised for not doing so, particularly where [Post Office] funds have been misappropriated … and where we seek only a commercial outcome to these events. For example, where evidence obtained via an investigation supports a suspicion of someone having defrauded [the Post Office], they should be reported to the police irrespective as to whether or not the loss has been made good so that a credible deterrence may be established. Existing policies facilitates the reporting to police but not the preceding internal investigation. This paper seeks the [Group Executive’s] approval for CIU staff to conduct criminal investigations within the IB’s remit and report these matters to police when appropriate and in accordance with the CLEP.”
It then sets out the operating model. It says:
“As a government organisation, Post Office is viewed by law enforcement differently from a privately owned company. It is unfortunately fact that LEAs deprioritise most reports of crime made by government-linked organisations if made in the traditional way.”
Can you assist us with that?
John Bartlett: Yes, my experience outside of the Post Office, as well as within, is that police forces will prioritise the allocation of resources, investigative resource, to general members of the public first, which I think is correct. Then there’s a sort of hierarchy, unofficially, of who is assisted, and government-owned institutions come forwards the bottom of that list. And so sometimes there is a struggle for law enforcement to adopt honestly-held and submitted reports of crime.
Mr Blake: Has that been your recent experience with the police?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: It says:
“There is an expectation that a degree of self-sufficiency exists. Without recourse to private prosecutions an alternative is required if the interests of Post Office, postmasters, our staff, our shareholder, and the public are to be protected.”
Then it makes the proposal. It says:
“Suspected offences with an element of criminal dishonesty would form the vast majority, if not all, of our criminal investigations and potential referrals. This would include theft, fraud of all types, and money laundering. These types of offences are those which most LEAs do not have sufficient, nor sufficiently skilled, resource allocated, and which are lengthy to investigate, often resulting in them not being prioritised. If we do not investigate these matters prior to referral then the likelihood of preventing the loss of public money significantly diminishes, as does any deterrence factor.
“Jurisdiction is also relevant. Typically, authorities in Scotland are less inclined to adopt evidence collected by non-LEA investigators. England and Wales LEAs expect an almost complete case in an admissible format and Northern Ireland is likely to be somewhere between the two.”
Just pausing there, if the policy is to not interview postmasters or their assistants, how can there be sufficient information to meet that almost complete case?
John Bartlett: It can’t, which is – this is an example of how the environment has changed since I started in the Post Office and the appetite of the Post Office.
Mr Blake: So is it your view – and I don’t want to put words in your mouth, please do answer exactly in your own words – that the not interviewing of postmasters is going to significantly limit the ability to take matters forward in the criminal courts?
John Bartlett: I think it makes it more difficult for the police to adopt an investigation. I don’t think it – and then it would sit with them. So for them to use the investigative tools that they have, that we don’t and shouldn’t have, as a corporate, they need a basis in which to open an investigation, and it would be easier for them to do that if an interview, for example, or other techniques have been used to gather evidence that they can consider.
Mr Blake: “England and Wales”, it says the proposal is for:
“A CEO letter to [what’s now the Department for Business], and then on with a Minister’s endorsement requests assistance from the Commissioner of the City of London Police’s Economic Crime Directorate … to work in partnership with the CIU to investigate and then refer to the Crown Prosecution Service all strong cases of dishonesty-based offences above a certain level of complexity or monetary loss;
“A dedicated team to be formed within [the City of London Police Economic Crime Department] …
“Post Office or [the Department for Business] may be asked to contribute to the cost of this team.”
Then there are also similar proposals for Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Paragraph 4.7 says:
“By seeking partnership working in this way, [Post Office] demonstrates that we do not operate as victim, investigator and prosecutor. Conceptually, the police and the prosecutors will decide on the strength of evidence [that] they will (or will not) progress through the criminal justice system, not [the Post Office]. To get to that point, [Post Office] will need to collect admissible evidence to assist over-stretched LEAs and that requires competent, evidence-led, ethical investigators.”
Can you assist us with the current position insofar as that’s concerned: has there been, for example, a letter sent to the City of London Police Economic Crime Team?
John Bartlett: A letter was sent to the Chief Constable – sorry, the Commissioner of the City of London Police, and there is no dedicated team within the City of London Police, but they have agreed – because they also are lead force for fraud and they oversee the fraud reporting position for the country – well, for England and Wales – they have undertaken to look at cases had come through Action Fraud that we report. That’s the extent of that.
Mr Blake: Well, one proposal is contribution from the Post Office to the cost of police investigations.
John Bartlett: No, those discussions haven’t taken place.
Mr Blake: Scotland, Northern Ireland have –
John Bartlett: So Northern Ireland, we’re hopefully about to sign an MOU with them, in terms of a single reporting point for Post Office. That’s not an undertaking by PSNI that they will investigate everything we tell them or report to them at all but it establishes a pipeline for Post Office to go to a single point of contact.
In Scotland, we have a good, informal working relationship with the Economic Crime Unit there but, again, that’s just so we have a single referral point into someone that understand the issues that we’re dealing with. It doesn’t affect their independence as an investigator, and it doesn’t guarantee that those matters would be adopted as an investigation.
Mr Blake: Thank you. Can we please turn to POL00448321. This is a meeting of the Group Executive, “[Group Executive] Tactical Meeting”, 3 August 2022. We can see matters being discussed over the page, please. It says, “Investigations, Sarah Gray and John Bartlett”; did you attend this meeting?
John Bartlett: Yes, it looks that way. I don’t remember it particularly but it says I attended.
Mr Blake: Let’s have a look from the third bullet point down, if we could scroll down, slightly:
“SG [Sarah Gray] outlined the 3 approvals requested from the [Group Executive]. The remit in terms of the applicability of the CIU branch was not controversial. The part that was more controversial was the proposal in relation to the CIU conducting criminal investigations. To be clear, we were not looking for the CIU to undertake criminal prosecutions; we were proposing that the CIU undertook criminal investigations before referring. In terms of why we wanted to do this – we were a cash business and £2.5 million had been identified as potentially being recoverable …”
Do you know how that figure was arrived at?
John Bartlett: I don’t think that’s correct. So it is – I believe at the time it was true that the apparent value of loss to Post Office of the potential criminal matters that were afoot totalled 2.5 million but it absolutely would not be recoverable.
Mr Blake: Do you have an idea of what that current figure might look like?
John Bartlett: So – well, if you take it as not what could be recovered but the total value of potential loss, is about 3.6 million.
Mr Blake: Thank you. If we scroll down:
“NR [Mr Read] queried whether the culture was that people were back footed due to the situation over the last 3 years. [Ms Gray] replied that whilst the vast majority of [postmasters] were decent honest reliable people, in any big group there would be people who looked to take advantage of loopholes and there was knowledge that there would be no deterrent. This was incredibly disheartening for police who undertook the investigations then saw the work go nowhere.”
Is that something that you had been experiencing?
John Bartlett: No, I think that relates to the Retail Team.
Mr Blake: Thank you:
“[Ms Gray] referenced the legal duty the Company has as an organisation in receipt of public funds to investigate and then refer suspected criminal conduct; we were not currently completely fulfilling this duty …”
Then it goes on to you. It says that:
“[You] noted [Post Office’s] ownership structure and shared [your] view that we needed to be doing more when it came to criminal investigations; we could provide evidence to law enforcers and prosecutors to assist them …”
Then this is Mr Mladenov:
“… noted that we could still recover losses via civil recovery. [You] agreed that civil recovery remained open to us, or we could pursue under the Proceeds of Crime Act, so we could ask law enforcement to ask the court for the criminal proceeds to be repaid to us. We would also assert that we were asserting the rights of [postmasters] when [postmasters’] staff stole from them, so Proceeds of Crime Act was likely the best way to recovery monies …”
This touches again on the same point I made before: that it may be suggested that you were perhaps too focused on the criminal aspect rather than the civil aspect, but that’s something that you don’t agree with there?
John Bartlett: So that was a discussion about the Proceeds of Crime Act and recovery through the courts.
Mr Blake: Yes.
John Bartlett: So that’s what the discussion was about.
Mr Blake: But Mr Mladenov suggested, for example, that civil recovery could be the root to recover losses.
John Bartlett: He did, yes.
Mr Blake: The focus from you seems to be on the Proceeds of Crime Act; what’s your view on that?
John Bartlett: Because the discussion was around court cases and the recovery – sorry, criminal court matters, and so that was the focus of the conversation.
Mr Blake: Do you think there’s been sufficient thought given within the business to actually using the civil courts to recovery money that’s owed to the Post Office?
John Bartlett: I believe papers have been taken to SEG in relation to civil recovery.
Mr Blake: Yes, and what role do you see you having in that?
John Bartlett: I think, as mentioned earlier, we might assure the evidence collection and testing of that evidence.
Mr Blake: What is your view as to whether civil recovery, or using the criminal courts and the Proceeds of Crime Act would be more appropriate as a general policy?
John Bartlett: That’s a difficult one, it depends on what perspective you come from, I think. So, for example, if I was a postmaster or postmaster’s assistant, and I was told that Post Office wanted to take me through a civil recovery process I would be worried, the reason – because history. And the reason being, I feel that, is that there would be no independent assessor of evidence between the Post Office and that material being introduced into a civil court.
Mr Blake: So, in essence, a civil process is adversarial –
John Bartlett: (The witness nodded)
Mr Blake: – whereas a criminal process you have the level of the police involvement as well?
John Bartlett: And a prosecutor so it’s two additional levels.
Mr Blake: Thank you. We see there at the bottom, if we could scroll down, please:
“SG [Ms Gray] noted that after encouraging a culture of speak up, we had seen allegations increase of fraud, theft or nebulous financial crime. NR asked for more detail and also asked who was making the complaints. [You] advised that [postmaster] staff were reporting more than [postmasters].”
So have you seen an increase in the postmaster staff reporting crime?
John Bartlett: We did at that time. It was the predominant category of reporting through the Speak Up service at that time. It isn’t now. That’s changed. But, at that time, that was the case.
Mr Blake: What is it now?
John Bartlett: Behaviours at senior level.
Mr Blake: What do you mean by that, sorry?
John Bartlett: So people at – the predominant or a high number of reports through the Speak Up line, at the moment, are commenting or reporting poor behaviours at Head of Department level or SEG level.
Mr Blake: Without going into any specific detail of specific complaints can you give us a flavour of what those focus on?
John Bartlett: They are often around bullying, harassment – sorry, not harassment. Bullying, poor conduct, matters that would normally be – that would be dealt with in an ER context.
Mr Blake: Thank you. The final bullet point there:
“In AC’s [I think that’s Mr Cameron] absence, [Ms Gray] raised his concern regarding the reliability of evidence whilst we remained on Horizon. [You] replied that you could choose which data we relied on and we would use the most reliable data. [You] furthered advised that in speaking to MR, MR’s team …”
That’s Mr Roberts, is it, Martin Roberts?
John Bartlett: Probably.
Mr Blake: Sorry:
“… MR’s team were not seeing any inherently unreliable data.”
Just pausing there, in this phase we’ve heard some criticism of Mr Roberts: Karen McEwan was critical of his abilities; the Subpostmaster Non-Executive Directors also raised concerns about Mr Roberts. Did you have concerns or do you have concerns about Mr Roberts’ abilities.
John Bartlett: I didn’t interact very often with Martin Roberts so I haven’t seen a range. I certainly wouldn’t know anything about his performance.
Mr Blake: Do you know how he could have formed the view that they were not seeing any inherently unreliable data; what was your understanding at that time?
John Bartlett: So that’s through the application of the process in the Retail Teams, where they look for what bugs, errors, defects, calls to the helpline, existed around those particular transactions that they were looking at.
Mr Blake: So they look at helpline data?
John Bartlett: I believe so.
Mr Blake: “NR noted that whilst he took [Mr Cameron’s] point, where we proceeded and handed over to law enforcement and prosecutors, it would be on the basis of having conducted sound and thorough investigations …”
If we scroll over the page, please. Thank you:
“[You] advised that you had spoken with public prosecutors service, and they were willing to work with us. What we wanted to achieve was a strategic relationship as it would be the same officers who dealt with the cases.”
Is that what we saw earlier?
John Bartlett: That is – what is missing from there is the Northern Ireland Public Prosecutions Office.
Mr Blake: Ah, so that was specific to Northern Ireland, was it?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: “[Mr Foat] noted that it was important to emphasise that the case assessment, decision and conclusion would be performed by the external prosecutor. Post Office had a legal and a moral obligation to provide the information of suspected criminal misconduct to law enforcement and there was a public narrative that supported that approach.
“[The Group Executive] RESOLVED to APPROVE for onward forwarding to the Board for noting:
“[Post Office], [Post Office] staff, postmasters and postmasters’ staff all being within the remit of the Post Office Investigation Branch;
“CIU to conduct criminal investigations; and
“The Mobilising of a new partnership model with the relevant bodies across the UK to facilitate the investigation and referral of suspected criminal misconduct.”
Are you able to assist us with why the Group Executive approved that to the Board for noting, rather than for active discussion at Board level?
John Bartlett: No, I can’t.
Mr Blake: Can we please turn to POL00448320. So that was August 2022. By 27 September 2022, we have a Board report. Is that the report that followed those discussions at Group Executive level?
John Bartlett: Presumably.
Mr Blake: We have you there as the author, alongside Sarah Gray. It says, “The Board is asked to note”, and that’s exactly as we saw it in the previous document.
If we scroll down, we can see the recommendations in terms of the operating model at page 6 and 7 remain the same and you’ve explained the ultimate decision that was taken in respect of progressing that matter?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Can we please turn to POL00448327. We’re back at Group Executive level now, we’re now in 2023, 28 June 2023, so this is nine months later, and you are reporting to the Group Executive in respect of prioritisation and resourcing of your department; is that correct?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: It says there:
“The [Group Executive] is asked to agree the priorities for CIU for the next two financial years …”
So that takes us into now.
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: “… and approve the additional funding recommended below necessary to service the current and projected investigations within these priorities.”
So by this stage you’d been given approval to carry out investigations into criminal matters; is that correct?
John Bartlett: Correct.
Mr Blake: If we scroll down, please. We can see a section over the page on “Prioritisation”. It says:
“[The Post Office] requires a business as usual central investigation function which is resourced to deliver quality investigations in priority areas at an appropriate scale and to assure the investigative capabilities of the Dispute Resolution, Network Monitoring & Reconciliation, and Contracts teams. Financial Crime, Data Protection & Information Rights, and ER investigation teams could also be assured in this way in the future.
“[The Post Office] also needs the central function to be able to flex in a way that allows it to deliver [investigations required] outside of, and in addition to, business as usual.
“[The department] is not currently resourced to deliver these demands.”
Can you assist us with that; what was meant by “not currently resourced”?
John Bartlett: We were being asked more than we had capacity to do.
Mr Blake: Is that capacity in respect of funding, in respect of manpower or something else?
John Bartlett: Predominantly staffing.
Mr Blake: We’ll get to, in due course, how things developed but was this approved?
John Bartlett: Not entirely.
Mr Blake: In terms of additional resourcing, was sufficient resourcing provided?
John Bartlett: No.
Mr Blake: Why not, in your view?
John Bartlett: Because the Post Office has limited budget, it has to make difficult funding decisions and, on this occasion, it was decided that this – that there were other priorities.
Mr Blake: If we scroll down, I’d just like to read to you from paragraph 6:
“The intention to conduct a full network count of stock and cash prior to rolling branches on to NBIT will reasonably generate significant numbers of criminal investigations. CIU will be required to play its part in managing this investigative demand. CIU is not staffed to meet current requirements and certainly not a short to medium-term increase caused by the move to NBIT. The rollout of NBIT will almost certainly generate significant case work for CIU during the all-branch audit phase.”
This is something we have heard some evidence on, so the idea is that, once NBIT is up and running, all branches are audited?
John Bartlett: Yes, I think the idea is so it’s a fresh start on a new system.
Mr Blake: “Whilst this is difficult to precisely anticipate, if only 1% of branches are found to have issues that need potential criminal investigations to resolve shortfalls or stock issues then a potential [circa] 115 new cases will result.”
So is it still your anticipation that when the move is undertaken to the new system, NBIT, that there will be a significant number of new criminal cases?
John Bartlett: I think it depends what NBIT – what the new system entails and what it looks like. So is it going to be a direct replacement or is it going to be a different thing? I don’t know at the moment. But if the – the presumption here at that stage was that it would be an entirely new thing rolled out and, therefore, the audits would be required, and that would remain the same if that becomes the case.
Mr Blake: When you say you don’t know at the moment whether it will become a new thing or not, NBIT’s relatively far down the line now, certainly in terms of the time it’s being taken to be built, are you sufficiently aware of those developments of NBIT to be able to forward plan?
John Bartlett: Not at this stage, no.
Mr Blake: Why not?
John Bartlett: Because I’m not sure – I think the strategic review and the NBIT project are yet to settle on something firm to that level of detail, I think. I have provided a this what we would need from an investigative perspective, in terms of data access and understanding and things like that, so I have been engaged at that level.
Mr Blake: We saw from the reporting lines, you report to the Interim General Counsel. Do you think that you are sufficiently involved in the business, both structurally and in practice, to be able to input sufficiently into the NBIT system?
John Bartlett: I mean, it’s a technical project, and we are being consulted and we are providing an input in terms of, from a practical point of view, once it’s in place, what we would need in terms of data to be able to perform our role.
Mr Blake: How about the concern that’s being raised here: do you think the business sufficiently understands the resourcing impact that the all-branch audit, for example, or simply the new system, might place on you?
John Bartlett: I believe so it was evident in this paper, and it wouldn’t be CIU that would need to be involved: there were many operational teams that would need to be involved in that rollout.
Mr Blake: Can we turn over the page, please, and there’s a section there on NBIT rollout and assisting the reset. It says:
“All suspected theft/frauds to be passed to CIU who will then triage them and report as necessary to the police. Where a report is for amounts in excess of £100,000 then CIU will provide active investigative support to the police. Where the summed is below £100,000, CIU will form a link between the Retail Central Operations investigation teams and the police to facilitate the obtaining of evidence and witness statements by the police.”
Is that still the intention?
John Bartlett: I think it would be the start point. There is no plan that’s cast in stone at this stage.
Mr Blake: I don’t want to pin you down on dates again but when do you anticipate have to a plan might be in place?
John Bartlett: I think it would depend on what the target rollout date is, and I don’t know what that is.
Mr Blake: Is there a risk by placing this value threshold – say £100,000 goes to your team, below that goes to another team – of some two-tier system developing within the Post Office with respect to investigations?
John Bartlett: So this is in terms of – so what it says here is that we would provide active investigative support to the police for over 100,000, but we would introduce the police investigators for other matters below that 100,000 direct into the business.
Mr Blake: Yes.
John Bartlett: So you’re still having police look at all of those matters, so that’s the same; the difference is the level of involvement from my team. But it is a two-tier system.
Mr Blake: Do you think the 100,000 mark draws a line appropriately?
John Bartlett: I think that flexes, depending on – well, it would – it’s a start point. It’s slightly arbitrary and, at the moment, we apply the same level within our teams at the moment but we flex it depending on available resource and what matters are requiring investigation.
Mr Blake: If we look down to “Business Integrity Operations (1) – protection of public funds”. It says:
“Investigate all suspected theft and fraud offences against the [Post Office] and manage the interaction with police for cases over the value of £100,000. For matters below £100,000, CIU will manage a reporting process to the police, but the police will need to deal directly with other [Police] teams …”
Sorry, that’s –
John Bartlett: “POL teams”.
Mr Blake: The second bullet point there:
“Provide support to case having and testing of evidence for civil recoveries [over] £50,000. Matters below £50,000 would need to be supported by external counsel (for which there is currently no funding) or not proceeded with.”
Can you assist us with that?
John Bartlett: At the time that this was written, there was work underway to look at whether civil cases was an option, and as we – as I mentioned earlier, the anticipated involvement of A&CI, or CIU as it was then, would be to effectively provide quality assurance over the evidence that had been collected.
Mr Blake: At that point in time there was currently no funding; is there funding for that and what’s currently envisaged for that?
John Bartlett: I don’t believe there is funding. I think it’s still a concept under discussion.
Mr Blake: Thank you. Can we please turn to POL00447948. There is then discussion of this paper at the Group Executive level on 28 June 2023. Sarah Gray is present at this meeting. Were you an attendee?
John Bartlett: Er –
Mr Blake: Pardon?
John Bartlett: Sorry, I was just thinking. I don’t know. I’m not listed as having attended.
Mr Blake: If we turn to page 6, it has your name but it may be that your name is on the paper rather than attending it.
John Bartlett: (The witness nodded)
Mr Blake: Actually, no, it does mention “JB”, so let’s have a look. If we scroll down, please, to the bottom of page 6, it appears that you were at the meeting.
John Bartlett: Okay.
Mr Blake: It’s over the page, sorry. It’s internal page 6, our page 6. “Central Investigation Unit Resourcing”, if we scroll down.
John Bartlett: Yes, I’m noted there as attending but not at the top.
Mr Blake: Yes. It says:
“JB [you] spoke to the paper outlining the request for additional resource to service the backlog of investigations (which was increasing) and also to pin additional support ahead of the rollout of NBIT where there could be a number of referrals to CIU.”
It sets out there “Even if the 1%”, that’s exactly the same as in the paper itself:
“NR [Mr Read] queried how would [you] prioritise [business as usual] work in [your] team. [You] replied referencing the prioritisation as set out in the paper …
“KS [I think that’s Kathryn Sherratt] clarified that the ask was an increase in budget. [Sarah Gray] replied that it was, however outlined the potential financial pay back with future years. [You] noted this and shared [your] view financial savings should not be the basis for the decision …”
I think that’s the point you were making in your evidence earlier.
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: “… it was only one element. KS advised that whilst the Group Executive did not appear to disagree with the ask, that there needed to be understanding as to where this money would come from in the budget …”
Over the page, please.
“TM [Mr McInnes] queried whether a scaled up CIU team was part of path clearing and NBIT preparation. [Mr Mladenov] replied that the additional resource in the CIU team required for NBIT should be charged to NBIT. [You] contributed that it was not simply an issue of scaling up the team, it was a matter of matching resource to task.”
What do you mean by that?
John Bartlett: So there are two approaches to team staffing and remit making. One is, you decide what you want to achieve and you resource it properly, or you decide what your resource is, and you task reasonably what that team can deal with. We had neither of those.
Mr Blake: “[You] raised a concern around fairness to postmasters with relation to the capacity of CIU, for example, suspended postmasters would remain suspended until CIU had capacity to address the case …”
Can you expand on that, please?
John Bartlett: Yes, that’s talking hypothetically that, if a matter was referred to CIU for us to investigate, because it – there was some suspicion of dishonesty and if, as a consequence of that referral, the Contracts team had suspended a postmaster, a case sitting on our books because we don’t have enough people to deal with it is unfair.
Mr Blake: “ACTION KS noted similar requests for additional funding that had been and were coming to the Group Executive and advised that the Group Executive needed to devise a process to deal with these requests as the year went on. [She] advised she was happy to take an action to think about the best way to process these requests.”
You have there:
“The [Group Executive] RESOLVED:
“that the priorities for CIU [for those financial years] are … APPROVED; and
“in order to prepare for and manage anticipated pre-NBIT rollout branch audit matters additional funding in the amount of £360,000 to provide the resource as set out in the paper is hereby APPROVED.”
But it then says:
“The [Group Executive] declined to approve the other additional funding requests in the paper at this time.”
Where did that leave matters and have matters changed since then?
John Bartlett: So the 360 for the NBIT was to come from the NBIT budget, so it was to use an existing budget to pay, if required, whenever we got around the NBIT rollout, that we could provide that support to that programme, which in effect meant no extra money was being assigned out of the normal Post Office budget because it was the NBIT budget. So where that left us was I didn’t get any additional resource and, to a point you’ve made previously, which is that this is an example of no decision making.
Mr Blake: Is it still the position?
John Bartlett: I’ve had some additional, I think two, fixed-term contract provision since. But I don’t have a team – going back to those two options, we don’t have enough people in the team to deal with – comfortably deal with, in a way that won’t break my people, what’s being asked of us, and we’re spending a lot of money on external lawyers to do that work that we can’t do.
Mr Blake: When you say “external lawyers”, we spoke much earlier about using external firms.
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: In respect of what work and how, actually, is that a saving to the business?
John Bartlett: It isn’t a saving to the business.
Mr Blake: Why is it, in your view, that funding can’t be extended to your team in the way that you’re asking?
John Bartlett: So we get it – we get funding on a – so – an outcome, actually, from what Kathryn Sherratt is talking about in this paper is that an Operational Expenditure Committee, I think it’s called, was established, which is a central point for all teams within the organisation to go to when they’ve got unexpected funding requests. So that was a positive outcome. It was centralised, it was more coordinated.
And when we have an investigation where we feel there’s a need to go outside to have law firms or whoever, accountancy firms, conduct that investigation, we go there and we ask for the money, and that has, so far, always been authorised. But what hasn’t been authorised is a permanent increase in the headcount within my team. So, initially, those two extra Investigation Managers that I mentioned earlier, they were to be permanent, they were authorised to be permanent, and then it was downscaled to being temporary on a fixed-term contract for a year.
So I think – I can understand a commercial decision being let’s have a – let’s not increase an ongoing expense, it might be simpler to – or more expedient to have a temporary increase in cost.
Mr Blake: Thank you. There’s one final document that we’ll go to before the lunch break and that is at POL00458015. The document we’ve just been looking at is June 2023, this now October 2023 and it’s a Post Office Board meeting. If we could please turn to page 117. Sorry, it might take a moment to come up.
If we go over the page, perhaps. This is a document, a Board report, dated 31 October 2023. It’s written by you. I’m just going to read to you from the “Input Sought” and the “Executive Summary”, and this is something that we spoke about earlier today:
“The Board is asked to 1) approve in line with policy to pass evidence to Police Scotland; and 2) for Board to discuss the pros and cons of a policy change which would allow a more confident handling of Horizon data and its provision to law enforcement.”
The “Executive Summary” says:
“[Post Office’s] current Investigation Policy, Cooperation with Law Enforcement Policy, and Legal Play Book requires Board sign-off to permit the passing of HNG-A Horizon evidence to the police to support their investigations where [the Post Office] may be the victim of a crime;
“In line with this Policy, Board sign-off is sought for the passing of evidence to Police Scotland relating to”, and that’s a particular case?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: “Following the implementation of robust processes and the hiring of highly experienced staff, a change to the current Policy and Play Book is recommended. This would remove the necessity for Board approval prior to the provision of evidence to the police where [the Post Office] suspects that they have been a victim of a crime and allow more efficient sharing of evidence with police.”
Can you assist us with the purpose and the background to this?
John Bartlett: So it’s two-fold. The first request was in a compliant way – policy compliant way that the Board approved the passing of evidence to Police Scotland on a case that they were investigating. So that was the first one.
And then it was to elicit, or – yes, to elicit views from the Board as to what their views would be about a change of process in terms of authorising future passing of evidence to law enforcement.
Mr Blake: Can you assist us with how this developed at Board level, whether it was approved or not approved?
John Bartlett: So they approved the passing of that in compliance with the policy, of that particular piece of evidence to the police, and then there was a discussion in the Board that did not approve but wanted further discussion, about the change in authorisation levels.
Mr Blake: Do you understand why it was not approved?
John Bartlett: It was very difficult to tell, during the course of that Board meeting. It wasn’t the best run Board meeting. People were talking over each other. It was struggle to understand the different views that were being said at the time but I think the underlying objection for those – so some of the Board supported the change; others didn’t; others, I think, were unsure. And so they agreed that they wanted more discussion about it. But I think those that were in the “No, we shouldn’t change” group, I think they felt that what would be passed would be data that could be considered to be unreliable, that they still viewed or felt that it could be viewed that the data was flawed.
Mr Blake: We’ll get to –
Sir Wyn Williams: The date of the meeting is what, sorry?
Mr Blake: 31 October 2023.
Sir Wyn Williams: 2023. Sorry, if you were going to ask this question, Mr Blake, but this actual issue is still under debate in October 2024, is it not?
John Bartlett: Yes, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Right.
Mr Blake: You’ve said “not very well run”. Can you assist us with that: who was running it at that stage?
John Bartlett: Henry Staunton was the Chairman.
Mr Blake: What did you identify as the issue with regards to how it was run?
John Bartlett: There was no structure or control over the conversation.
Mr Blake: Were there particular tensions between particular groups?
John Bartlett: Yes, I think the group that felt it was appropriate for a change were disagreeing with the group that felt that there shouldn’t be a change and they weren’t really listening to each other.
Mr Blake: If we go over the page, please, we see there it says:
“The current Group Investigation Policy was written during the long hiatus from 2015 to 2023 where [the Post Office] did not conduct investigations nor proactively pass evidence to the police. This Policy identifies at 1.3 Core Principles, including proactively reporting matters to law enforcement and the manner of the provision of information and for what purpose it may be shared.
“Policy minimum control standards requires that the Group Legal Director makes the decision to report a potential crime against [the Post Office] to law enforcement. Tool 2 of the Legal Play Book is a flowchart which lays out how data intended to be shared is categorised by risk and how it may be provided to law enforcement.
“Where the evidence is not Legacy Horizon or HNG-X and where there is no reason to believe the data to be provided is unreliable or inaccurate, corroborative evidence should be sought. Where none can be discovered in [the Post Office’s] control, the evidence is to be considered Medium Risk.”
Can you assist us with that paragraph in particular and how it is that corroborative evidence can be sought?
John Bartlett: So that part of the policy is basically saying: if it’s the current version of Horizon, it can be passed, but it would be – sorry, it would be considered medium risk if there wasn’t anything else to corroborate that evidence.
Mr Blake: Does that reflect in some way a concern that there may be unreliable data within even the new system?
John Bartlett: I didn’t write that and I wasn’t party to it, but my reading and my understanding from those that were around at the time is that it’s a sensitivity issue, not necessarily a distrust of the data. It’s a “We’re seeking to rely on Horizon data; that didn’t go well before”.
Mr Blake: 1.4 says:
“Point 3 of Tool 2 describes how the provision of Medium Risk data to law enforcement must be managed: ‘The data must not be provided unless [the Post Office] is legally compelled to provide it or the Board approves its voluntary disclosure’.”
It’s that point that you were seeking to change?
John Bartlett: Correct.
Mr Blake: Thank you. In line with the Chair’s question: what is the current status of those discussions? Your evidence has been that that change hasn’t been made; why do you think it hasn’t been made, and who do you think is responsible?
John Bartlett: So I think that the decision hasn’t been made because of the obvious sensitivities connected to saying, “Actually, we think the version of Horizon that we run at the moment is fit for the business to use”. I find that slightly odd because, if there were concerns, why are we using it?
Mr Blake: Thank you.
Sir, that might be an appropriate moment to take our lunch.
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, by all means, yes.
Mr Blake: Can we come back at 2.00, please?
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, of course.
Mr Blake: Thank you very much.
(12.57 pm)
(The Short Adjournment)
(2.00 pm)
Mr Blake: Good afternoon, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Good afternoon.
Mr Blake: Mr Bartlett, I’m going to pick up where we left off, and that is the issue of reliance on Horizon data. I want to go back in time slightly and, if we could begin with BEIS0000789. These are notes from a meeting you weren’t present at but I think it does set a scene.
This is the Post Office quarterly shareholder meeting on 10 January 2023. If we scroll down, we can see who was present. Please can we turn to page 4. There’s discussion there of what to do in respect of losses. I’d like to take you to the third bullet point. It says:
“AC [I think that’s Mr Cameron] mentioned they are seeing a rapid increase in losses including shortfalls of cash in branches. [The Post Office] need to conduct a proper investigation and demonstrate whether the postmasters are accountable. However, it is difficult to conduct a proper investigation based on the Horizon data, and also [the Post Office] are not in a position to ask for the relevant money back in the current climate. It was noted as not a good time to prosecute postmasters due to the current historical cases, but this is seeing a rapid rise in losses for [the Post Office]. MR’s team are working on putting a new system in place.”
Was that a feeling that you shared as at January 2023?
John Bartlett: I was not aware of that.
Mr Blake: No? How about at the present time: is dare there, for example, a rapid rise in losses for the Post Office?
John Bartlett: I don’t know.
Mr Blake: If we look down it says:
“AC raised that there are other solutions rather than going to the police. If postmasters are responsible and don’t pay the money back, there is an option to take it off their remuneration. Any solutions as to how any shortfalls that postmasters are accountable for can be recouped from postmasters, aside from remuneration, were noted as preferable.
“[Post Office] – In cases where there is fraud, these could be tested in a civil jurisdiction. A paper on this was noted as being worked on currently and would be raised to [the Government] in due course.”
Are you aware of that paper having been developed at all?
John Bartlett: I think that might have been the paper or the work that I referred to earlier today but – I’m not sure about the timing but I think it might be.
Mr Blake: Has that work been completed?
John Bartlett: Yes, and I think that’s led to there’s no decision at the moment, and I think, as Mel Park said yesterday, it’s still being considered.
Mr Blake: Thank you. If we scroll down, it says there:
“[Post Office] noted that where full investigations are done quite often [the Post Office] does get the repayment. The issue is that the investigation has to be good enough and that it is independent. However, the problem is that the data is not sufficient to do an investigation in many cases.
“[Mr Read] noted that ultimately those who steal from [the Post Office] will be prosecuted.”
The concerns about the data not being sufficient for an investigation: as at January 2023, are you aware that that was a concern within the organisation?
John Bartlett: So at I think about that time there were concerns not over Horizon data but over stamp stock dispatch data, and I know Al Cameron was close to those issues. But this does seem to say it relates to cash shortfalls and, no, I wasn’t aware of that.
Mr Blake: If we turn, please, to POL00423698. Around this time, 24 January, we have an email from Mr Cameron to Nick Read. It’s not an email you were copied into at the time but he says:
“My view on losses, which I think you would know but:
“From a cultural view we cannot start trying to take money off postmasters until we have demonstrated HIJ …”
I think that’s Horizon Issues Judgment.
John Bartlett: Judgment –
Mr Blake: “… /Data.”
Then he sets out various things that need to take place. But, as you said, your understanding at this time, you didn’t have understanding of these issues at this time?
John Bartlett: No.
Mr Blake: Can we please turn to POL00448362. This is a loss recovery update. We have metadata that suggests it’s from February 2024. It does refer to your team in its current form. Are you able to assist us with when this might have been produced?
John Bartlett: No, I think the first time I saw this was when it was raised with other witnesses in the last week or two.
Mr Blake: If we turn to page 3, it’s the “Background” section, and this you may have seen raised with other witnesses:
“Following the recommendations made in the Group Litigation Order and Common Issues Judgment, [the Post Office] ceased action to recover Established Losses from [postmasters]. This activity has been on hold since this time, except where a [postmaster] both agrees to repay the established loss and proceeds to repay.
“To support implementation of associated [Common Issues] recommendations, a new team … and target operating model was set up …
“The process to review a discrepancy and identify the cause is formally documented and regularly assured by the Assurance and Complex Investigation Team.”
So that’s your team?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: That’s an accurate statement?
John Bartlett: So the – yes, it is.
Mr Blake: “This includes looking at Horizon transaction data to ensure Horizon acted as expected and is therefore unlikely to be the cause of the discrepancy.”
Just pausing there, I think we addressed this previously but the looking at Horizon transaction data, can you assist us with what that involves?
John Bartlett: So the safeguard side of this are the actions taken within the Retail Teams, which is what bugs, errors, defects had been reported that could be referring to that branch, at the relevant time, and the relevant transaction type. They look at training issues, they look at calls into what is effectively Tier 1, the call centre and then they look all the way through. So I think that’s what that means.
Mr Blake: “There are a number of possible outcomes …
“Write off as below de minimis value …
“Write off as the cause has not been established,
“Correct with a transaction correction if the cause was due to a processing error,
“Establish that the loss has arisen on the balance of probabilities, due to the negligence, carelessness or error of the [postmaster] and/or their assistants.
“In the last case above, the [postmaster] is asked to contact the Postmaster Account Support Team to arrange repayment …
“If the [postmaster] disagrees with the findings, they are able to refer through an internal dispute process …
“Currently repayment for discrepancies is only sought from a [postmaster] voluntarily …”
Then it is 7, really, that I’d like to look at:
“Whilst the current discrepancy review process does involve checks in Horizon, the target operating model and ultimately any recovery activity is predicated on Horizon data being robust and for [the Post Office] to be able to rely on this data. [The Post Office] is currently awaiting confirmation from both Fujitsu and [Post Office] IT that this is the case.”
Now, if that metadata is right, if this was February 2024, are you aware since then of confirmation being provided by Fujitsu and the Post Office IT Team that that is the case?
John Bartlett: So, the letters that have been brought up at the Inquiry over the last few weeks from Fujitsu, between Fujitsu and POL, I think the final sort of letters on there show that, although Fujitsu do not want POL to use Horizon data for this sort of activity, they did not say it was unreliable. In fact, they said that the data could be used for appeals and it could be used for the calculation of compensation for postmasters.
So I think that has been taken as a confirmation that the data is correct because Fujitsu would not, I am sure, want that data to be used in a Court of Appeal case if it’s not accurate.
Mr Blake: So your reading of all of the correspondence, and we’ll get to some of it, between Post Office and Fujitsu, is in effect confirmation from Fujitsu that the Horizon data is reliable?
John Bartlett: Yes, and also, if I may say, is – there must be a duty on Fujitsu to declare if they think it is unreliable, and they haven’t, as far as I’m aware.
Mr Blake: Can we please turn to FUJ00243203. This is, I think, the beginning of a dispute between you and Fujitsu. It may have a longer history than that but I’m just going to take you to this particular document, which relates to supporting a City of London Police investigation. That is 19 April, and it’s an email from you to Daniel Walton; who is Daniel Walton?
John Bartlett: I believe he’s the relationship manager at Fujitsu.
Mr Blake: Thank you. We’ve seen this email before but I will read from it because it’s quite an important document in the context of this dispute:
“One of my team has gone back to City of London Police to see how the contact you referenced below was progressing as we have an open and objective engagement with [City of London Police City] on this matter.
“[City of London Police City] has informed us that they have not had any additional information nor contact with Fujitsu after the single, exploratory and inconclusive conversation. They left that conversation with the feeling that they were indirectly being told that the Horizon system was unreliable and so the case could not progress. We really need to explore this as this is not the nuanced impression Simon Oldnall has given me.
“As the potential victim in this case, [Post Office] would be grateful if you could provide me with contact details for either the equivalent person in Fujitsu … to my role … or an appropriate person in your UK legal team. I will then pass those details on to [City of London Police] who are looking to have a trilateral conversation with Fujitsu, [Post Office] and [City of London Police].”
Just pausing there, do you think it is appropriate for the Post Office, who could in some senses be described as the victim – and we will get to whether “victim” is the right word or not – do you think it is right for the Post Office to be contacting Fujitsu in respect of the City of London Police investigation?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Why do you say that?
John Bartlett: Because the feedback that we were provided from City of London Police showed that there was some confusion as to what was wanted and what was needed, and I felt that, if I could speak to another investigator within the Fujitsu organisation, that they would understand the evidential needs of City of London Police and, therefore, be able to better help the City of London Police.
Mr Blake: Why, in your view, was it appropriate for Post Office to do that conversation rather than, for example, the City of London Police directly?
John Bartlett: Because it was agreed with City of London Police that we would do that.
Mr Blake: The next paragraph says:
“It is impossible to overstate how important this is: I need to advise both the police and [Post Office] as to the evidentially-established reliability (or not) of data that is being used every day in establishing outcomes with postmasters and, potentially, to be presented to the criminal justice system by the police and the three public prosecuting agencies. The non-provision of relevant witness statements from [Post Office] and Fujitsu will rightly be interpreted by the police and prosecutors as [Post Office] and Fujitsu not having faith in the reliability of the data with the obvious outcome resulting.”
What do you mean by “with the obvious outcome resulting”?
John Bartlett: So two different things: one is the immediacy for that investigation, which would be closed, which, just to be clear, we would agree with. We’re not trying to push through that case to conclusion. We want the evidence to be tested by the police.
And then the broader outcome is if Fujitsu provided a witness statement to the City of London Police that looked at the individual transactions and whether, at that time, date and that branch, with those particular transactions that that evidence was – that those transactions were not necessarily reliable, that would mean something would need to be done in terms of looking into whether it’s a systemic issue or just relating to that branch.
But by failing to provide any witness statement, which was what – the impression we were being given at that stage, means that doubts should be brought into the reliability of the whole system. So the outcome would be that we would be recommending that, urgently, the organisation – Post Office looks at whether we should continue to be using Horizon and to calculate payments to postmasters, to whether our annual report and accounts should be signed off. It’s a significant issue.
Mr Blake: The obvious outcome resulting, though, one reading of that sentence is what you’re saying there is that, without it, the police are obviously going to drop the case?
John Bartlett: That was – that is one outcome, yes.
Mr Blake: That’s the obvious outcome, isn’t it?
John Bartlett: It is one of the obvious outcomes, yes.
Mr Blake: Did you mean for that to imply several obvious outcomes?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Did this come as a surprise to you?
John Bartlett: Yes, it did.
Mr Blake: We saw that discussion from a year earlier, concerns within the business. Why do you think it is that those concerns hadn’t reached you and your department?
John Bartlett: I’m not sure.
Mr Blake: Could we please turn to FUJ00243192?
John Bartlett: Sorry, Mr Blake, just before we go on to this, can I help a bit further? I think we will probably have material from that period in time, that was contemporaneously made, that will show that we were thinking about the wider impacts of this. It may not be reflected with clarity in my email that you’ve just shown, but I believe we have material that might be able to demonstrate we were thinking about the wider impact.
Mr Blake: Sorry, what do you mean by that; do you mean the focus on the final few words –
John Bartlett: The outcomes, yes.
Mr Blake: So I think your evidence is that you could have articulated it better, is that –
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Thank you. Looking at this letter, this is a letter from yourself to the Lancashire Constabulary. Could we perhaps bring up on to screen your second witness statement, which is WITN11190200.
As the Chair has highlighted, there is an annexe to your witness statement that includes a list of different cases. It’s at the back of your statement, and I’ll just take you, please, to page 105, so this where it begins. Can we please turn to 118. There’s a reference there to Lancashire Police, case of 14 September 2022, money laundering and theft. Is that the same case as we see this letter relating to?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Thank you. I’ll just read for background that section that says:
“The branch which was run by an Officer In Charge, not the postmaster, was initially flagged by the Cash Centre due to an increase in cash remittance return amounts to the Cash Centre. It was also highlighted by the MoneyGram compliance team that they wanted to complete a compliance call with the branch to a large number of high value transactions being completed to the same destination. At this point the Financial Crime team was involved and highlighted circa …”
Is that £3.3 million?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: “… worth of MoneyGram Mobile send transactions processed at the branch. The Financial Crime team contacted the branch on requesting more information regarding these transactions. On the same day, the Financial Crime team was contacted by the Area Manager who advised that the postmaster was in touch with them and advised of a possible shortfall of £400,000 which was related to the MoneyGram transactions. The CIU was advised of the situation and tasked with completing an investigation into this matter. Police have interviewed the OIC …”
That’s the person in charge of the Post Office?
John Bartlett: Yes. Sorry. Yes.
Mr Blake: “… and restrained [circa] £500,000. Enquiries indicated by Horizon was a shortage of £398,000 which if proved would be a loss to [the Post Office].”
So it’s a case involving nearly £400,000 of potential loss to the Post Office.
John Bartlett: Correct.
Mr Blake: “Police worked on the basis that the OIC ‘creamed off’ this amount from the cash transferred through MoneyGram. Customer is considered money laundering suspect and OIC suspected for potential conspiracy [regarding] money laundering and theft of [circa] £398,000 from [the Post Office].”
If we return, please, to page 118. We see on the second from right column:
“Police requested statement regarding robustness of Horizon – [Post Office] producing a statement and also referred police to Fujitsu.”
Has the Post Office produced a statement relating to the robustness of Horizon?
John Bartlett: That is in train and it is to be delivered by the end of next month to Lancashire Police.
Mr Blake: If we go back to the letter, please, it’s FUJ00243192. It looks as though, as at 25 April of this year, the police had taken no further action in respect of this case; is that correct?
John Bartlett: No, they’d submitted an advice file to the Crown Prosecution Service and the Crown Prosecution Service came back to them in relation to the money laundering and the theft case matters that they wanted some – effectively, a corroborative witness statement from Horizon to support other evidence that the police had.
Mr Blake: When you say from Horizon, from who: from the Post Office or from Fujitsu?
John Bartlett: CPS, I don’t think, specified, but I’m not sure but, in effect, the best evidence is held by Fujitsu, as opposed to Post Office, which is why we referred Lancashire Police to Fujitsu.
Mr Blake: I’m just going to read to you from this letter. If we scroll down slightly, it says:
“Post Office Legal have reviewed …”
Just pausing there, did you draft this letter?
John Bartlett: I stitched it together. The majority of the stuff, of the text in there in relation to Justice Fraser’s comments are from the criminal lawyer within house.
Mr Blake: That’s Mr Lill?
John Bartlett: Lill, yeah.
Mr Blake: “Post Office Legal have reviewed the reasoning for not progressing to a charging decision. It is not for [the Post Office] to influence the independence of the investigation or the assessment of evidence in any case, however, the reasoning around the credibility of the Horizon system seems to be a significant factor, if not the central factor, in the reasoning for not progressing this investigation further and that reasoning appears to be based on a misinterpretation of the findings of courts.
“[The Post Office] have been asked to address three questions in respect of the decision to No Further Action this matter …”
So had a decision to no further action the matter taken place by this stage or was that something that was just in contemplation.
John Bartlett: I’m not sure, at this stage.
Mr Blake: “[Post Office] hopes that the information provided below in respect of these questions is sufficient to assist with a review of that decision. The questions posed are:
“(a) the new Horizon system is much more reliable than the old system
“(b) evidence that a court has ruled so
“(c) that the new system was installed and in place [in that particular post office].”
If we scroll down, (c) is answered first, and you say:
“We can confirm that [that] branch was operating the HNG-A version of Horizon.”
Then you address questions (a) and (b), and you say:
“The Horizon Issues Judgment … is the judgment of Mr Justice Fraser where, in short, he found there to be numerous bugs, errors and defects affecting the Horizon system that were capable of generating unexplained shortfalls in branch accounts … In the [Horizon Issues Judgment], Fraser J made clear that it was important to distinguish between the versions of the system in use from 2000 to 2018, and the HNG-A system being used thereafter …”
You set out various sections of the judgment, and there, the first section, Mr Justice Fraser says, for example:
“It is agreed by the experts that the Horizon system in its HNG-A form is now relatively robust.”
Over the page, another section on robustness, where he says that:
“… the experts are agreed that it is far more robust than Horizon in earlier times.”
A further section, where Mr Justice Fraser says:
“… there are only isolated instances of it happening in respect of HNG-A, which the experts agree is a better system than either of the other two iterations of Horizon …”
If we scroll down, please, again:
“I have found that the system as it is in 2019 is far more robust than it was prior to 2017.”
So that’s a comparison between the 2017 and 2019 versions. You say:
“Lancashire police may have noted that the proposed legislation by the government to exonerate all postmasters prosecute by [Post Office] acknowledges in the Explanatory Notes …”
You quote from the government’s explanatory notes. It says there:
“The Department is not aware of any cases prosecuted by CPS or Post Office Limited involving the HNG-A system and therefore has concluded that there is no reasonable case to extend the period [and this is in terms of exoneration] beyond the conclusion of the use of the previous versions of Horizon.”
Further down the page, you then address the Hamilton case, and you say:
“In Hamilton, the [Court of Appeal Criminal Division] defined a case as a ‘Horizon case’ where the reliability of Horizon data was essential to the prosecution, in that there was no independent or corroborative evidence of an actual loss from the branch account as opposed to a shortfall where Horizon evidence formed part of the evidence of the shortfall or corroborated other evidence.”
Over the page, please. You say:
“It is important to note that the Horizon scandal relates specifically to [the Post Office] prosecutions of postmasters for shortfalls in their branch accounts where the only evidence to prove the loss was a reliance on data from the Horizon system.”
Is that accurate, do you think?
John Bartlett: That was the information provided to me by the inhouse lawyer.
Mr Blake: The next paragraph says:
“The decision to NFA the investigation appears to be based on the public perception of the scandal and the versions of Horizon in use at the time of the scandal. It is not clear whether the CPS EIA have considered the written judgments of the Horizon scandal when assessing that the undermining issues in the case outweigh the realistic prospect of conviction.”
It says:
“Further, the [Court of Appeal Criminal Division] have reviewed many appeals of convictions and have made clear the safety of those convictions, even though the evidence relied upon was taken from versions of Horizon that were the subject of the [Horizon Issues Judgment], are not unsafe where there is other evidence of the offence being committed or where the Horizon data was used to corroborate other evidence.”
Over the page, please. It’s a passage on the next page that I’d like to focus on. If we scroll down, thank you, it’s that passage there:
“If the defence were to challenge the reliability of Horizon data, which the Post Office accepts is highly likely, the prosecution would be entitled to rely upon the findings of [Mr Justice Fraser] and the [Court of Appeal Criminal Division] as set out above.”
Is that accurate?
John Bartlett: That information, that section, was provided by the inhouse lawyer.
Mr Blake: Looking at it as somebody who, for example, has a graduate diploma in law, do you consider that passage, which was in a letter which you signed, to be accurate?
John Bartlett: So it would certainly be useful to a prosecutor to be able to draw on that judgment in discussions with defence, which I think is the point that the lawyer is trying to make. I don’t think he’s suggesting it’s evidence; I think he’s suggesting that it’s useful, in order that it’s not just dismissed out of hand. That was the purpose of this letter.
Mr Blake: Don’t the police and the CPS have to reach a certain evidential threshold?
John Bartlett: Yes, they do. This doesn’t question that. It’s just saying “Please apply an evidential threshold, don’t dismiss it out of hand before”.
Mr Blake: Is a fair reading of that paragraph not that you can rely on those findings, those judgments, to satisfy the evidential criteria?
John Bartlett: No, it’s saying, “Please don’t dismiss this out of hand”, and you could use that judgment in conversation with any defence, should it progress that far. I think that’s what he meant by this.
Mr Blake: Do you think that is both fair and accurate?
John Bartlett: I think it’s fair that this particular case is not dismissed before an evidential test can take place.
Mr Blake: If we could please turn back to your statement and the annexe. That’s WITN11190200. Page 105 is where the table begins.
We’ve already looked at page 118. If we could zoom out, please. Bottom of page 118 was where the Lancashire Police case can be found.
The wording there, in the second-from-right column is:
“Police requested statement regarding robustness of Horizon – [Post Office] producing a statement and also referred police to Fujitsu.”
If we scroll down, please, to page 121. There is a City of London Police case, again, same form of words in that second-from-right column:
“Police requested statement regarding robustness of Horizon – [Post Office] producing a statement and also referred police to Fujitsu.”
Page 125, there’s a section there addressing Gloucestershire police and, again, the same form of words in that column, “Police requested”, et cetera.
If we scroll down, please, page 126. West Yorkshire case, again, same form of words.
Page 127, West Midlands case. Again, same form of words.
Putting the Lancashire case to one side, has there been any case where the Post Office has produced such a statement for the police in respect of the robustness of Horizon?
John Bartlett: No.
Mr Blake: Is it the intention for the Post Office to produce a statement addressing the robustness of Horizon?
John Bartlett: Yes, so it will be – it’s been produced – we have a draft. It’s been produced by Simon Oldnall but, in conversations with Simon Oldnall, he was very conscious that he was preparing a very similar witness statement for the Inquiry and wanted to do this first.
Mr Blake: There is a draft version of that statement. Is that something that can be shared with the Inquiry?
John Bartlett: Absolutely.
Mr Blake: Can we please turn to FUJ00243199. Is it your view that that statement will get over the hurdle in respect of the police’s ability to rely on Horizon data?
John Bartlett: Not entirely, no. I think it will demonstrate the control environment which surrounds the Horizon data within Post Office, which falls under Simon Oldnall’s remit. The best – so that’s sort of a broad statement saying what that environment is. The reason we’re referring forces to Fujitsu is that that is the best golden source of evidence for them on the transaction-by-transaction basis because no transfer of data has occurred. That is the golden copy. So, for them – so if we can describe what controls we have in place, to ensure that we know if transactions are not accurate, and if Fujitsu can provide a transaction-by-transaction analysis then we deal with those two demands that they have asked for – or not, if the evidence doesn’t support it.
Mr Blake: Let’s look at some of the Fujitsu correspondence. We’ve looked at it in great deal already in this Inquiry but I’ll just look at some of that correspondence. Here we have the letter to Nick Read from Mr Patterson of 17 May this year. He says:
“I am writing to you directly in order to raise serious concerns that have come to my attention which indicate that the Post Office continues to pursue enforcement action against postmasters and it expects [Fujitsu] to support such actions.
“To be clear, [Fujitsu] will not support the Post Office to act against postmasters. We will not provide support for any enforcement actions, taken by the Post Office against postmasters, whether civil or criminal, for alleged shortfalls, fraud or false accounting.
“In particular:
“Criminal investigations:
“We have become aware of a recent investigation by the City of London Police …”
I think that’s the correspondence we’ve been looking at.
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: “The approach of [Fujitsu] is to cooperate with the police and any other third party exercising independent investigative, prosecutorial, regulatory or judicial powers.
“However, we are concerned by the behaviour of the Post Office Investigation Team on this matter. That team maintains an approach of Post Office as ‘victim’ and requires [Fujitsu] to provide a witness statement as to the reliability of Horizon data stating that without such statement the case will not progress. For the Investigations Team to act in this matter seems to disregard the serious criticisms raised in multiple judicial findings and indeed exhibits a lack of respect to the ongoing Inquiry.”
What’s your view of what is said in this letter?
John Bartlett: So it is not Post Office seeking to pursue a criminal prosecution, it’s the police. It’s not Post Office. We are not – we were not looking to pursue any civil outcome, or anything like that. In relation to their concern over the use of the word “victim”, if criminal conduct causes harm to the Post Office, that would make us, in common use of the word and in the use within law enforcement, as status of victim or complainant. And that’s what, in this case, we could be.
Mr Blake: I think we’ve seen later correspondence from Mr Read to suggest that won’t be used between correspondence between you and Fujitsu?
John Bartlett: Yes, I think it might have been Owen Woodley but, yes, in summary, yes.
Mr Blake: Were you party to this correspondence; was it discussed with you at the time?
John Bartlett: No.
Mr Blake: When was the first time you saw this correspondence?
John Bartlett: I’m not sure.
Mr Blake: Is it in your preparation for the Inquiry?
John Bartlett: No, I did see it before the Inquiry.
Mr Blake: We’re now in October. This is during the summer, June/July. Can you assist us approximately with when you first saw this correspondence?
John Bartlett: I think I probably saw the first letter after the response went out.
Mr Blake: But you weren’t consulted as part of the response?
John Bartlett: No.
Mr Blake: Would you have been expected to have been consulted as part of the response?
John Bartlett: Yes, potentially.
Mr Blake: I’m going to stick to the timeline so I’ll come away from that Fujitsu correspondence. We’re still going in date order. Can we please turn to POL00448345, and this is June this year, 26 June, a paper – a report for the Senior Executive Group, written by you:
“SEG approval is sought regarding the proposed change in process in governing the passing of information to law enforcement to assist them in criminal investigations and any subsequent prosecutions prior to this matter being discussed at Board in July 2024.
“Executive Summary
“The current Group Investigations Policy … (‘the CLEP’) and [the old policies] are considered too unwieldy and unnecessarily complex …”
This is addressing the change we saw at the beginning of today to the new policy.
If we could scroll down, please. It says:
“The old policies have been consolidated into a draft single Investigation and Cooperation with Law Enforcement Policy. The [new policy], amongst other investigative operational policy changes, proposes a streamlining of the governance of providing law enforcement with information: the Director of A&CI and the inhouse criminal counsel would have to agree to providing the information and, depending on the age of the information, a caveat would also be provided.”
This is the change that I think we discussed before the break and we saw the Board’s discussion.
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: So this is where you wanted to streamline the process, and effectively for it to be delegate down to yourself to make the decision and –
John Bartlett: In conjunction with a lawyer, yes.
Mr Blake: Yes. If we scroll over the page, we can see the discussion of the caveat that was to be applied. It says:
“There are currently 22 police forces requesting or awaiting Horizon-based evidence across 33 police investigations. To provide this information [your team] will need to draw on Horizon data and often provide transaction analysis. The current approach is that the Board will need to be approached in the majority of these matters as and when the data is able to be shared.
“A draft policy is attached …”
It says:
“In particular, the draft proposes a change in the governance of passing material to law enforcement which we believe is risk balanced.”
Then it says:
“The below is extracted from the draft …”
There is a section there that says:
“It is policy that:
“Any information originating from Horizon after 1 January 2022 may be passed as either intelligence or evidence to [law enforcement agencies] only after [you or your nominated deputy] and an inhouse criminal lawyer both give approval. A record of [their] rationale and decision must be recorded …
“Where information is requested by [law enforcement agencies] that is Horizon data originating from pre-1 January 2022, the same process must be followed. In addition”, there is additional wording that should be applied and we’ll have a look at what that additional wording is.
If we scroll down, it says:
“Best evidence originating from Horizon sits with Fujitsu and so [law enforcement agencies] should be encouraged to request this material direct from Fujitsu.”
If we scroll down, it then has the accompanying lines that would apply to the version of Horizon, HNG-A.
John Bartlett: No, pre-2022.
Mr Blake: Why do you to that line?
John Bartlett: So from that date onwards there are factors that I think give us more comfort in the absence of anyone raising substantial concerns with Horizon, HNG-A, which is the work that Simon Oldnall described in terms of external bodies reviewing bugs, errors, removing them, and that sort of thing. There’s also the process that goes – that the Retail Team goes through that I’ve described earlier in terms of checking the reliability at that branch for those transactions, at the relevant time.
And then, also from that – almost from that time, my team was in place and we can bring that objectivity but also that assurance to what happens in the Retail Team. So based on those three control factors we think that we should, absent something saying that the whole system is unreliable, that we should be able to handle that evidence without Board having to give us permission.
Mr Blake: The caveat that is attached to the earlier material being provided would be as follows:
“From 31 December 2019, all post offices have worked on a version of Horizon that the High Court case of Bates & Others has been considered by the High Court to be ‘relatively robust’. In 2020, Horizon was tested for the known errors and bugs identified in the Horizon Issues Judgment and found not to be prevalent. During 2021, a process was developed to work collegiately with postmasters to understand the causes any shortfalls. Any Horizon data that pre-dates January 2022 cannot be shown to have benefited from all three of those checks and balances.”
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Are these caveats and these form of words to be included in a letter, in a statement or something else?
John Bartlett: I think we’d probably put it in an email, in the first instance, or a letter. In reality, we will not – we are unlikely to pass any material that pre-dates 2022 to the police as evidence anyway.
Mr Blake: Paragraph 7 says:
“There are significant differences between the environment that existed at the time the old policies were formed and the current and future environment. The current approach to dispute resolution and the underlying technology could be seen as supporting a more [business as usual] approach to passing information to law enforcement. However, the most significant difference between 2019 when the old policies were first drafted and now is that A&CI exists and brings significant criminal investigation experience to bear, but more importantly, also considerably more objective rigour to assessing evidence. Project Panther within A&CI is solely focused on testing the reliability of data that the Post Office investigators and law enforcement will rely upon.”
Can you briefly tell us what Project Panther is?
John Bartlett: This is our catch-all project name for us testing the rigour or reliability of evidence that we rely upon in our investigations or would provide to law enforcement and genesis of that was that we came to realise that extraction tools were being used to data mine from HORice, I believe – but anyway, data that was used in the retail space, and we wanted to ensure that those mining tools were not going to change data in the course of their extraction.
So we worked with Simon Oldnall’s team to test the validity of those tools and where we came to, in particular, was that the Retail Team used those as identifiers of something to them to look at, tripwires, in effect. But any conversation with postmasters or any data that they rely upon in resolving an issue with postmasters comes from an original source, not through those tools.
Mr Blake: Thank you. Could we please turn to the discussion of this issue at the Group Executive. That’s POL00448310.
It’s a meeting of 26 June. Could we please turn to page 7. It’s about three-quarters of the way down page 7:
“Disclosure to support police investigations
“Sarah Gray/John Bartlett.”
Did you attend this meeting?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: “TABLED and NOTED was the paper on disclosure to support police investigations/passing of material to law enforcement.
“SEG DECLINED to APPROVE the submission of the paper on disclosure support for police investigations to the Board, noting further work and assurance was required in relation to Horizon data assurance.”
Can you assist us with that, please?
John Bartlett: Yes, I think, succinctly, they were awaiting Simon Oldnall’s witness statement.
Mr Blake: Is there a difference between you and the Executive as to quite how reliable the Horizon data currently is?
John Bartlett: No, I don’t think so, and the reason I say that is, if they genuinely thought that the material produced – that the Horizon data was flawed, to the extent that we shouldn’t share it with law enforcement, they should do something about it.
Mr Blake: Can we please turn to FUJ00243204.
We’re continuing chronologically but we’re now back to the Fujitsu correspondence. We’re looking at correspondence of 8 July from Fujitsu. You’ll have seen this, we’ve read it a number of times, that the fourth paragraph is effectively a criticism of the letter/the email that you sent. It then says:
“As the Post Office is well aware, there have been and there continue to be bugs, errors and defects in the Horizon system. Further, [Fujitsu] currently has, and previously had, access to branch transaction records. Your letter … also acknowledges the existence of other matters (beyond the Horizon system) which could have operated to create innocent discrepancies in branch accounts including ‘miskeys, or omissions [et cetera]’.
“In addition to [Fujitsu], the Horizon system is reliant on the delivery of services by Post Office and third parties retained by Post Office.”
What’s your view of what is said here?
John Bartlett: The same: that sometimes there are bugs, errors and defects in the system.
Mr Blake: Yes. You’re obtaining the statement from Mr Oldnall. Looking at this, do you think that what you’re asking of Fujitsu is achievable?
John Bartlett: Achievable in the sense that could they produce a witness statement, yes, because what that witness statement would need to cover is a little bit like ours in terms of what the control environment is to protect and assure that data but, specifically, what the police need is, at that branch, at the relevant period, the relevant transactions, was there anything that would make that data unreliable? That’s the witness statement that the police need.
Mr Blake: But the kinds of concerns that are being raised here, continued bugs, errors and defects, access to branch transaction records –
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: – access to external providers, won’t all of those issues also have to be raised in a witness statement?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: In light of that, is it likely, possible, that there will be a successful conviction based on that, in your view?
John Bartlett: It would depend on what the reliability of the data is on that particular matter because, obviously, if it comes back as, oh, there was a bug error or defect or power outage, or something like that, that affected the reliability of the specific transactions that the police are interested in, then no, that shouldn’t go forward.
Mr Blake: Who’s going to be able to work that out; who is going to do the investigation as to whether there was a bug, error or defect that did, in fact, impact on a particular branch at a particular day?
John Bartlett: So the police are asking Fujitsu to provide that information. On this particular case as well, I’m aware that once City of London Police have or had received this information, in to the transaction level basis but also the control environment, they were discussing with us having an NCA-approved expert witness then look at the system, but they wanted to look at the transactional data first and the same with Lancashire Police.
Mr Blake: So is there a plan to have an external NCA witness, expert witness, who can provide evidence on the reliability of Horizon data?
John Bartlett: That was City of London Police’s intent, that they told us.
Mr Blake: You say “was”: when was that communicated and how likely is that to happen?
John Bartlett: That is prior to these letters. I haven’t spoken to City of London since, so I don’t know what their current intent is.
Mr Blake: Can we please turn to FUJ00243303.
This is a letter from Fujitsu to the City of London Police on 23 August this year. This letter is in your witness pack. Is it a letter that before this Inquiry you were aware of at all?
John Bartlett: I don’t think I saw this until last night.
Mr Blake: Yes. Is it something that has been discussed with you by Fujitsu at all?
John Bartlett: No, which isn’t surprising because I think in this letter they say, “Please don’t share with any other party”.
Mr Blake: Thank you. It’s to the Investigator, Fraud Operations, Economic Crime Directorate; is that an individual who you’ve been dealing with?
John Bartlett: I think I’ve spoken with her once.
Mr Blake: If we scroll down, Fujitsu say as follows:
“As I understand it, the investigation is using data from the Horizon system. During our discussions, the City of London Police asked whether [Fujitsu] could provide a statement regarding the reliability of the current version of Horizon. As I hope was made clear in our discussions, a witness statement from [Fujitsu] attesting to the reliability or robustness of the Horizon system and of data from it would amount to expert opinion evidence. [Fujitsu] is unable to provide expert opinion evidence in any legal proceedings in relation to the Horizon system and the reliability of its operation as it is neither independent nor does it have sufficient information to provide such an opinion at this time. Such a request has to be considered in the light of the Inquiry.”
Scrolling down, there’s a section there on the existence of bugs, errors and defects and remote access powers. Fujitsu say:
“As discussed, the Horizon system has had and continues to have bugs, errors and defects, some of which may not have been detected at this time.”
So there’s the possibility of unknown errors:
“Accordingly, careful investigation is required to ascertain whether bugs, errors and defects bugs, errors and defects could that have operated to cause the accountancy discrepancies or transactions under investigation. Further, [Fujitsu] notes that evidence in the Inquiry has identified number of additional Post Office and third party systems and business processes (beyond the [Fujitsu] software) which also could or did introduce shortfalls in branch accounts.”
That’s similar to the letter that we just looked at, isn’t it?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Over the page, please. It says:
“In general terms, remote access is the ability to access the Horizon system from a location other than a counter at the branch.”
It sets out there remote access powers:
“Remote access powers enabling [Fujitsu] to access and amend data affecting branch accounts have existed and continue to exist within the Horizon system. The use of such powers would need to be examined to ascertain if they could potentially have caused or affected the accounting discrepancies or transactions under investigation.
“b) Systems and processes to be investigated …
“It should be noted that the delivery of the current Horizon system is reliant on the provision of services by Post Office as well as third parties …”
Then it sets out there further complications in respect of third parties:
“c) [Fujitsu’s] provision of records for police investigations
“Based on the evidence which has been seen and heard in the Inquiry to date, [Fujitsu] considers that all of the matters mentioned above would need to be carefully investigated on a case-by-case basis with the assistance of an independent IT expert, and possibly also forensic accounting expert, to determine as best they can the cause of branch account discrepancies or transactions under investigation. [Fujitsu] considers that only after such investigation has been undertaken could a meaningful statement be made by an appropriate independent IT expert regarding the reliability of the Horizon system and the data it has produced at the relevant branch in the relevant time frame.
“[Fujitsu] is of course prepared to cooperate with the police and the criminal courts in the ways that it can. We have discussed that Fujitsu retains various Horizon system records which may facilitate your ongoing investigations. I said that I would work with the team within [Fujitsu] currently supporting the Horizon system … in order to produce a list of those records. This exercise has proven more complex than I had anticipated”, et cetera.
The letter does actually enclose, as an appendix, a large amount of information – and we’ll scroll through that shortly – that is being provided to the police in respect of their overall systems and repositories, et cetera.
If we scroll down, please, to (f), the letter says:
“Production Order
“To the extent that the records described in this letter and its appendices may assist the City of London Police’s investigations[, Fujitsu] respectfully suggests that the City of London Police provides … a production order … To ensure that the City of London Police receives the data required within an achievable time frame, [Fujitsu] would appreciate the opportunity to review and comment upon [it].”
But they also say:
“In the meantime, in the interests of the transparency and to assist the City of London Police’s understanding of the content of this letter and its appendices, [Fujitsu] is prepared to provide the documents footnoted in [that] letter … on a voluntary basis and unredacted form.”
Perhaps we could just quickly scroll through the appendix. That can be found at FUJ00243304. Thank you. We can quickly scroll through: various potentially relevant records generated by the Horizon System are being identified for the police.
What is your view of this letter and its contents?
John Bartlett: So the issue around expert witness was raised in one of their previous letters that I had seen before. I don’t agree – Post Office doesn’t agree, that it’s an expert witness, they’re actually a witness of fact because what they are being asked to provide is evidence of particular transactions at particular times, and that’s it, together with a description of their Control Framework – is what I understand that the police would like.
So the legal advice we’ve been provided, which I agree with, is that that is not an expert witness statement.
In terms of the material that they’ve pointed out, great. That might assist City of London Police. Fully understand why they would like a production order. Again, don’t have an issue with that.
Mr Blake: As a former police officer, what would you have made of this, in respect of an ordinary theft case? So let’s say a £100,000-discrepancy has been identified –
John Bartlett: Mm-hm.
Mr Blake: – and you’re presented with the keys to the warehouse, effectively, but no statement. What would you have made of that?
John Bartlett: The production order provides you the material, so you can look through the material and then engage with the witness, because that’s what they are, and agree what would go in a witness statement to produce the evidence that the production order prompted. So that would be the next stage.
Mr Blake: Do you feel that the police will be sufficiently resourced, sufficiently interested, to actually pursue those kinds of what may be called just an ordinary criminal case?
John Bartlett: This particular case?
Mr Blake: Any case that the Post Office considers sufficiently serious to pass to the police?
John Bartlett: So City of London Police consider themselves to be a strategic police force, when it comes to fraud in particular. They are also the lead force for fraud in England and Wales and, when I spoke to who was their Assistant Commissioner, he’s now, I believe, the interim Chief Constable – Chief Commissioner, sorry – he saw the strategic nature of us being able to pass cases to them. So although I think this is about £300,000-something, actually, I think (1) that value is significant but I think they would realise that this is potentially a test case.
Mr Blake: But going forward, in terms of relatively routine police prosecutions of cases where they are discrepancies and in the Post Office view, that has been dishonestly obtained, do you think, realistically, looking at, for example, the letter that points to various bugs, errors and defects, it also points out that there are third party suppliers to Horizon, it points out issues of remote access. Do you think, realistically, that’s going to lead to successful prosecutions?
John Bartlett: So I think one of the outcomes of the scandal is that, for all cases, irrespective of whether they’re Post Office derived, linked or otherwise, I think law enforcement are going to have to do those verification exercises, assurance exercises, on digital data, because I think the scandal has shown that the assumption made, that systems could be relied, upon has changed. I remember when I first joined the police, there was no natural assumption that a computer system was functioning and workable, and we had to do what were called system statements. And I think an outcome of the scandal is that that’s where law enforcement will end up going back to. So I don’t think it will be particular to us.
Mr Blake: Looking at further issues relating to the Horizon system, if we could just bring up on to screen our expert report, EXPG0000007. We’ve seen there it’s page 19 of that report, by way of example, identifies current issues experienced by postmasters. Are these results something that was surprising to you or not?
John Bartlett: I didn’t really have a frame of reference to compare them to, if I’m honest.
Mr Blake: But if, for example, we say that 70 per cent have experienced screen freezes; 68 per cent, loss of connection; 57 per cent have experienced unexplained discrepancies in the last 12 months; does that cause you any concern at all?
John Bartlett: Of the respondents?
Mr Blake: Yes.
John Bartlett: Not 70 per cent of postmasters? Okay.
Mr Blake: Sorry, was that an answer or was that a question?
John Bartlett: Sorry, that was – probably should have kept that in my head. I don’t know because I don’t have a frame of reference.
Mr Blake: What do you mean by that?
John Bartlett: Well, because I don’t know the frequency because this – the visibility of these events would, if they are reported to Post Office, be within the Retail Team and I wouldn’t see that.
Mr Blake: But isn’t that something you should be on top of if you’re investigating?
John Bartlett: So on a case-by-case basis they would be looked at.
Mr Blake: I don’t understand what “case-by-case basis” means. If we scroll down –
John Bartlett: Well, I can explain –
Mr Blake: Well, let’s just have a look at what it says here then perhaps you can explain in that context. It says:
“Among those that have experienced an issue in the last 12 months, about two in three … say that they have experienced these issues on a monthly basis.”
So we have there 65 per cent experiencing issues on a monthly basis. If we scroll down, it says:
“This equates to about three in five (59%) of [subpostmasters] surveyed.”
Should you, in your position, not have a view on the everyday experience of postmasters, irrespective of the specific case?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Does that cause you any concern, in respect of matters going forward in the prosecution of subpostmasters?
John Bartlett: So I think that this underlines the requirement to take each case that we take into my team, that we do absolutely nail down that we’re satisfied or not that – whether or not the accuracy of the data is an issue that should rule out or rule in that investigation.
Mr Blake: How are you going to determine the accuracy of the data?
John Bartlett: So that’s the process that we’ve previously described.
Mr Blake: Will that involve close liaison with Fujitsu?
John Bartlett: Well, yes, if we’re reporting a case to law enforcement, if they’re willing to talk to us, or it will be close liaison with the police to help them understand the environment.
Mr Blake: Could we please turn to FUJ00243299. I’m going to take you back to a document from December 2023. These are issues that were raised with the Post Office about the extension of the Horizon system. If we scroll down, we can see that Fujitsu raise a few issues. They say:
“There are various challenges to the feasibility of the continued delivery of the Horizon system and associated services.”
Number 1, it says:
“Due to the age and consequent end of service life status of the underpinning Horizon infrastructure there is an increasing risk of failure of the infrastructure that could result in adverse impact in the delivery of services to the public.
“2. The technical complexity and risk associated with (i) updating infrastructure at varying states of obsolescence and compatibility, and (ii) delivering new system requirements, including because of lessons learned and commitments to end users. These activities are increasingly risky and technically challenging …”
Over the page, please.
“In consequence, we strongly recommend that Post Office should continue to prioritise its objective of replacing Horizon and its associated services, as early as it can. Fujitsu will continue to support and facilitate orderly transition to an alternative solution …”
Have you given thought to the impact of the aging system on the reliability of the data and in respect of the evidence that you’re going to have to give to the criminal courts?
John Bartlett: So we look at the individual branch, the individual transactions, and we have to assure ourselves that there’s nothing there that suggests that that data can’t be relied upon. Whether it was a brand new computer system or not, that same test needs to be applied.
Mr Blake: Stepping back, though, and looking at all that correspondence that we’ve just been looking at, you’re going to have Horizon for a number of years still to come, possibly 2030, possibly onwards – is your view onwards, you look like –
John Bartlett: I think our Chairman is committed to 2028 but maybe 2030 – I think my eyebrows when you said “perhaps beyond 2030”.
Mr Blake: A number of years, you’ll still have the Horizon system.
We have those concerns that are raised by Fujitsu about the reliability of the current system.
John Bartlett: (The witness nodded)
Mr Blake: We have further concerns raised about the ageing system.
John Bartlett: (The witness nodded)
Mr Blake: We have the Inquiry’s own survey of current subpostmasters.
John Bartlett: (The witness nodded)
Mr Blake: Do you think it’s realistic to expect any successful prosecutions based on Horizon data during that period?
John Bartlett: It would depend on the evidence related to each of those cases, and –
Mr Blake: But what is your view –
John Bartlett: – do remember that the – I’m absolutely convinced that no police force will take forward to a prosecutor a case that solely relies on Horizon data, that there must be corroborative evidence because no one, rightly, should seek to rely entirely on Horizon.
Mr Blake: I think your evidence earlier, in terms of the statistics, though, was that none of those cases had yet proceeded to a prosecution?
John Bartlett: Correct.
Mr Blake: Looking forward, do you think there will be imminently, in the next year, the next two years –
John Bartlett: I think if Lancashire, in particular – because that’s the one I’m probably a bit closer to – I think if they can satisfy themselves that the transactions that relate to their investigation are reliable, then I think that stands a good chance of going forward back to the CPS and that they may make a decision to proceed. Obviously, if the validation process that Lancashire carry out does not confirm that that data can be relied upon, then that’s a different matter.
Mr Blake: I’d like to move on to a different topic. I’ll just address one short topic before we take our mid-afternoon break and that is the investigation into Mr Jacobs, the Subpostmaster Non-Executive Director. I’ll look at number to different complaints about your team. Can we start by looking at WITN11180101. It’s page 5, please. At the bottom of page 5, we have an email from Mr Morley, the Senior Investigations Manager within your team, to Mr Jacobs. He says:
“I am employed by [Post Office] as Senior Investigations Manager … and I have reason to conduct an investigation into alleged discrepancies at post offices within the Universal Office Equipment Group. I would now like to arrange to interview you in connection with the alleged discrepancies and to this end please can you provide your availability …”
A reference there to an interview: Mr Jacobs is a subpostmaster, the investigation is into the Universal Office Equipment Group; is that or is that not a proposal to interview a subpostmaster?
John Bartlett: No, it’s to interview a NED who happens to be a postmaster.
Mr Blake: Is that such an easy distinction to make?
John Bartlett: Well, the purpose of that investigation revolves centrally around Elliot’s status as a NED, that’s the purpose of the investigation.
Mr Blake: But the suggestion in that email is that it’s an investigation into alleged discrepancies at post offices within his Post Office?
John Bartlett: Yes, because the existence or not of any discrepancies is central to the other elements, the principal elements, of that investigation.
Mr Blake: Was Mr Jacobs suspected of having committed a crime?
John Bartlett: No.
Mr Blake: Did you have any view as to whether, for example, the build up of discrepancies was dishonest or not?
John Bartlett: No.
Mr Blake: Can we scroll up, please. Mr Jacobs says:
“As I explained to [Mr Foat] I would be happy to assist … your enquiry.”
If we scroll up, we have Mr Morley. He says:
“The interview will be conducted by myself and [Mr Bartlett] who is the Head of the Post Office Investigation Branch. Please find attached a letter from John explaining in some detail the format of the interview and the areas you wish to cover.”
Can we please look at that letter. That’s WITN11180102. So is it your evidence that this investigation would never now take place in respect of an ordinary subpostmaster?
John Bartlett: If they weren’t a NED then it wouldn’t be with us.
Mr Blake: When you say “with us”, do you mean –
John Bartlett: Well, a shortfall discussion or shortfall remedy or investigation, however you want to characterise it, they take place all the time in the Retail Team. So that’s why I didn’t want to say it would never happen.
Mr Blake: I think we’re again getting back to the discussion or the interview point. If a subpostmaster, like the evidence that is presented in this letter – a £200,000 approximate shortfall, and the suggestion is that there was a lack of, or stop in engagement with the relevant team, would the Retail Team interview that person or not interview that person?
John Bartlett: I don’t know. I think the PAST team, the Postmaster Support Team would be the ones that would interact with the postmaster.
Mr Blake: How can you not answer whether they would interview them or not when you are providing the assurance for that very team?
John Bartlett: So we – I accept your point from earlier today that we need to look at that.
Mr Blake: This is your letter, it says:
“My name is John Bartlett. I am the Head of the Central Investigation Unit …”
You say:
“Andrew has been investigating shortfalls at post office branches within the Universal Office Equipment Group and has invited you to a voluntary investigative meeting.”
What is a “voluntary investigative meeting”?
John Bartlett: It’s effectively an interview.
Mr Blake: Again, are there issues within the department as to how to describe an interview –
John Bartlett: No, there’s issues within Post Office as to how much clarity we can use in our language; “victim” was another one – is another example of that, of fearfulness of using clear language that people would understand because it might attract an adverse comment.
Mr Blake: The shortfall that is alleged, as I’ve said, approximately £200,000 originally alleged.
The allegation was that he had stopped engaging, and you say below that:
“We would like to circumstances with you this mounting shortfall, understand what you think caused them, and identify any reasons for not continuing to engage with the PAST team.”
Is it really your view that there was no suspicion of criminal activity at that stage?
John Bartlett: None had been raised with us.
Mr Blake: Let’s say you had that discussion, you’re having what’s described as an investigative meeting. Halfway through, you form a view as to whether he is honest or dishonest; what do you do?
John Bartlett: Well, if we feel he’s honest, we carry on. If we feel that there is – that we have formed a suspicion that an offence may have happened, we would stop.
Mr Blake: Have you done that in cases?
John Bartlett: We haven’t needed to.
Mr Blake: Is there guidance about when to stop, how to stop –
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: – what to say? Yes.
If we scroll down, when you say “yes”, is that Post Office guidance?
John Bartlett: Should be in the manual.
Mr Blake: Conflicts of interest. If we scroll down, there are other allegations about conflicts of interest and directors declarations.
John Bartlett: Mm-hm.
Mr Blake: If we scroll down, under “Conduct of the meeting”, we have seen there that it’s not an under-caution interview, and then there’s discussion about audio recording and we’ll come to discussion about that.
If we go over the page, please, and scroll to the bottom, it says there:
“Any decisions made based on this report, or any resulting non-investigative actions, falls outside the remit of the Investigation Team.”
Can you assist us with what is meant there?
John Bartlett: Yes, that means our job as investigators to collect information and evidence, and we pass it to decision makers.
Mr Blake: Thank you. Could we please turn back to that email chain so that’s WITN11180101, and if we could start at the bottom of page 3.
We have seen in this correspondence a discussion between Mr Jacobs and Mr Morley about the provision of information.
John Bartlett: Mm-hm.
Mr Blake: He says:
“To begin, can you supply the 44-page PDF statement in Excel format, broken down by branch”, because it was quite difficult to understand.
Scrolling down:
“Please provide line detail, including the reason for each TC or BD … so that it can be properly reviewed …
“Additionally the attached file cannot be accessed …
“Please also provide the [relevant] email address …”
If we scroll up, there is the response from Mr Morley. He says:
“Can I respectfully suggest that you address the rest of your requests below to the postmaster support team as per their letters/emails sent to you at the time of the occurrence by PAST in which they offered to work with you to understand the discrepancy.”
So he has provided the relevant email address but, in terms of the remaining request, it seems he has directed Mr Jacobs to the PAST team; do you think that that is appropriate?
John Bartlett: So I think the reason that happened is that this was very – we chose to engage with Elliot and ask his – get him involved in the discussion or, sorry, the – through an interview, engaged with Elliot to understand his view of events early, so we had a sample of the 140-something emails that had been sent to Elliot by the PAST team.
What was being suggested here was that they were all provided to Elliot and the simplest, best format and rooting would have been from them.
Mr Blake: If you are investigating somebody and have a body of evidence and are making an allegation, would it not be more straightforward for you to be the team that provides that information?
John Bartlett: I think technologically wise, it was more effective for it to come from the PAST team.
Mr Blake: If we scroll up, please, the discussion continues about the provision of information.
Then, please, could we turn to WITN11180103, page 2. This is where things reach by 20 March 2023. Mr Jacobs says:
“I await your proper and fully disclosures and will then take the matter under advisement.
“In addition, you have provided a highlighted section of Board minutes – can you please specify the accusation being made for the avoidance of doubt and the evidence on which you are relying in this regard?”
If we scroll over, please. This is the response that we’ve already been through, and you’ll be familiar with, but I’ll just read it out. Mr Morley says:
“I do not intend to enter in pre-interview protected correspondence regarding advance disclosure which I am under no legal obligation to provide and is provided on this occasion out of courtesy in order that you can have a high level understanding of the topics we wish to cover, which are set out in the letter from Mr Bartlett. Further detail regarding [the Post Office’s] concerns will be provided during the interview.”
Do you think that that is appropriate?
John Bartlett: Absolutely not.
Mr Blake: “I am seeking in advance of the interview your agreement to the recording of the interview …”
Then he suggests, in effect, that if he doesn’t agree to the recording of the interview it will be wise to allow six hours for that interview; do you think that is appropriate?
John Bartlett: I think it’s factual, that it would be – we were asking – in order that people don’t have to make highly detailed written notes, it would be – if he willing, then we could have an audio recording made.
Mr Blake: Would it really take six hours to interview or is that more of a threat?
John Bartlett: No, I don’t think it was a threat.
Mr Blake: Do you think, realistically, that interview would have taken six hours if it hadn’t been recorded.
John Bartlett: I think the interview, as it stood, was over three hours anyway.
Mr Blake: So it would have doubled in length?
John Bartlett: So it would have taken a lot more to make – I think that is perhaps overegging it slightly, a cautious approximation.
Mr Blake: Why is it your view that the first paragraph is not correct or not –
John Bartlett: That is not the tone that I want our team to use. I have raised it with him and he knows that that’s not what we do.
Mr Blake: He is your Senior Investigations Manager, he is one of your more senior staff.
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: We saw that earlier on. What was his response?
John Bartlett: He accepted that.
Mr Blake: Are you aware that, after the interview, the Post Office auditors attended Mr Jacobs’ premises?
John Bartlett: I believe it was a week later, yes.
Mr Blake: What’s your view of that, the approach that was taken?
John Bartlett: I think for the resolution of the shortfall issue, it – a count of stock and cash needed to be done.
Mr Blake: Do you think that you gave in your letter sufficient information to Mr Jacobs, as to whether he was in any way suspected of something criminal, or what kind of an interview it was?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Can we turn, please, to WITN11180104. That correspondence we were just looking at is in March 2023. We now get to February 2024, so almost a year later, where we have a letter from you to Mr Jacobs, saying, “As you’re aware, the Assurance & Complex Investigation Team conducted a fact-finding investigation … with your assistance”, and essentially, the matter was closed.
Do you think that is a reasonable time in which to give Mr Jacobs a final closure on his investigation?
John Bartlett: No, I don’t, but I can explain why I don’t.
Mr Blake: Please do.
John Bartlett: So it isn’t right it took that long but, if you look at the date – and I’m afraid I can’t recall it – that we submitted the two investigation reports, the final investigation report and, by the time Mel Park submitted her report, they then sat with the Chairman and the CEO for a very, very long time. We had no explanation provided to us as to what they were doing with the investigation reports, despite us chasing, and we couldn’t issue a closure letter until we knew what the outcome was.
Mr Blake: Where do you say responsibility lies, who with?
John Bartlett: I would say the former Chairman and Nick Read.
Mr Blake: That’s Mr Staunton –
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: – and Nick Read. Do you have any targets, completion targets –
John Bartlett: No.
Mr Blake: – in your team? Do you think it might be appropriate to have some sort of target as to when people are notified of the closure of investigation?
John Bartlett: So I think it’s reasonable to have a completion of investigation target but, where the output of that investigation goes, is out of our control, then that would be a false target that we wouldn’t be able to keep to because we have no control over it.
Mr Blake: Thank you.
Sir, that might be an appropriate moment to take our mid-afternoon break.
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, certainly. But can I just ask one or two process questions about the Horizon reliability issue, which you’ve examined at significant and proper length, if I may say so.
But I just want to understand one or two things while they’re fresh in my mind, all right, Mr Bartlett.
The first thing is this, this is me just dotting the Is: I take it that the City of London Police investigation which is the subject of correspondence between Fujitsu and the Post Office is the City of London case mentioned in your schedule?
John Bartlett: Yes, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: So that case was referred to the police in October 2022, according to your schedule, yes?
John Bartlett: If that is on the schedule, sir, yes.
Sir Wyn Williams: I think I’ve got it right, yes. The Lancashire one was 14 September 2022, and I believe the City of London Police came shortly after afterwards. But, in any event, that case has been ongoing in the sense of being alive now for approximately two years, if I’m right in my reading of your schedule?
John Bartlett: That appears to be the case, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: It got to the point in 2024, earlier this year, where, if not expressly, the indication was that the City of London Police weren’t going to take it any further without a lot more information; is that a fair summary?
John Bartlett: Without a lot more information and evidence, yes, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Sure. So you have resolved, ie Post Office – and I’m choosing my words reasonably carefully, so I’ll start again.
Is it correct that Post Office Limited has resolved to provide a witness statement to the City of London Police about this case, or is it a case that events have been put in hand for Mr Oldnall to make a statement but a decision as to whether to submit it to the police has yet to be made?
John Bartlett: So a draft witness statement from Mr Oldnall has been produced, it needs to be finalised, which he wanted to do after giving evidence here.
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes.
John Bartlett: And then SEG – so the Strategic Executive Group – and no doubt Board would like to consider that witness statement because of its significance.
Sir Wyn Williams: That’s what I wanted to flush out. I appreciate this is just a summary, where you say in your appendix, that police have requested a statement regarding robustness of Horizon, POL are producing a statement, what you actually mean – and I’m not saying this in a critical sense – is that certain employees of the Post Office have put in hand the making of a statement, but it is yet to be decided whether or not that will be submitted to the police.
John Bartlett: That’s correct, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Fine. Can you give me some kind of timescale for that?
John Bartlett: So Post Office is committed to provide, if authorised to, that witness statement to Lancashire Police by the end of next month.
Sir Wyn Williams: So Lancashire first and there is a time commitment with them?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Sir Wyn Williams: Right. The last question and then we’ll have our break.
My impression from your evidence about seeking to establish the reliability of Horizon in each particular case is that, although Post Office can go so far in providing evidence to establish reliability, it is also necessary that additional evidence is given, either by Fujitsu, and/or by an independent expert; is that your understanding?
John Bartlett: I’d say both are required, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Both. So in order for there to be any prosecution, in truth, because the five cases that we have outstanding saying that you are going to produce a statement, according to the schedule, in order to bring an investigation to a sufficient point that it can be submitted to the prosecuting authorities, ie the CPS, if it’s England and Wales, there would have to be witness statements and supporting exhibits from Post Office Limited, Fujitsu Services Limited, and then an appraisal by an independent expert?
John Bartlett: Yes, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Right. Thank you very much. So we’ll resume a bit later than you anticipated, Mr Blake, yes?
Mr Blake: It makes it more of a round number sir, actually. 3.45, please.
Sir Wyn Williams: All right, fine.
(3.33 pm)
(A short break)
(3.45 pm)
Mr Blake: Moving on to Project Pineapple and Saf Ismail. Could we please bring up onto screen POL00448302. This is the well-known Project Pineapple email on page 4 of that document. If we could turn to page 4. If we scroll down slightly, the note of the discussion with Mr Ismail and Mr Jacobs, it says:
“Equally Saf and Elliot are FED UP WITH THE AMOUNT OF POWER WIELDED, BY FOAT. He and other members to senior team act as if PMs ARE GUILTY UNTIL PROVED INNOCENT … ‘No one believes us’ is a constant refrain from PMs. WHILST FOAT IS AT THE HELM NOTHING WILL CHANGE. We must also part company with all those investigators who behaved so terribly with PMs. What on earth is happening if Steve Bradshaw is still with us – his performance at the Inquiry was a disgrace and reflected terribly on Post Office. Foat uses his leadership of the Inquiry Team as an instrument of his power – it all has to stop. The PM ‘is not the enemy’, ‘Only PMs can solve this’ and tell us how to change.”
Here is a reference to you:
“JB is an ex-policeman. His behaviour has been unacceptable and he needs to move on to prove we have changed.”
Were you aware of this at the time?
John Bartlett: No.
Mr Blake: When did you first become aware of this allegation?
John Bartlett: It was raised to me by Ben Foat. Once he received whatever he received, he mentioned that to me.
Mr Blake: What is your view of what is said there?
John Bartlett: I don’t know what they’re alluding to.
Mr Blake: Can I just ask, in terms of Mr Foat, it has been suggested by at least one witness that Mr Foat wasn’t responsible for your team; is that right or wrong, because we saw the organogram and it looked as though Mr Foat was, at that particular, time responsible?
John Bartlett: So Sarah Gray reported into him and I reported into Sarah Gray.
Mr Blake: So, insofar as it addresses his responsibility, that is correct?
John Bartlett: Absolutely.
Mr Blake: Thank you. We’ve spoken about the various policies and the changes in the group policy. Has that had input from subpostmasters?
John Bartlett: The combined one has had input from the Postmaster Experience Director.
Mr Blake: Has it had, for example, input from the NFSP or the Voice of the Postmaster; have they been invited to make any comment?
John Bartlett: So we have talked to the NFSP, primarily around Speak Up but, obviously, connected to Speak Up are investigations from that and, in terms of how we conduct investigations, the Speak Up manager meets with the NFSP every week where they talk about investigations. I’ve attended those meetings on occasion and we’ve talked about our approach to investigations, and the feedback we’ve received is that it’s supportive of our approach, to the extent – sorry, to follow that up, to the extent that we have had cases referred to us by the NFSP, for us to deal with.
Mr Blake: But in terms of the policy that is not yet finalised, is there any plan for any more involvement of subpostmasters, whether it be via the NFSP, via the Non-Executive Directors or some other –
John Bartlett: Yes, so the NFSP we would like to have look at it and provide an input.
Mr Blake: Could we please turn to POL00446706. This is feedback from an anonymous survey at the Post Office. It’s not an Inquiry-led survey; it’s from the Post Office. I’m going to just take you to two lines from it and ask your view. The first is 1461. It says:
“Teams could work better with each other such as A&CI as they do not take on feedback and assume their way of working is correct without having the knowledge to back it up so come across as non-transparent and belittling.”
Then 1494, it says:
“Overall there is great teamwork and cooperation between departments, however the A&CI team can at times come across the aggressive, refuse to accept feedback, and can work in isolation not understanding our ways of working/policies.”
Are those complaints that you recognise, not as per the individual who made them, but simply are they concerns that you are aware of?
John Bartlett: No.
Mr Blake: What is your view of them?
John Bartlett: It’s a bit worrying, if that’s how – was this from a colleague survey –
Mr Blake: Yes.
John Bartlett: – as opposed to a postmaster survey?
Mr Blake: Yes, I believe so.
John Bartlett: So if there are colleagues that feel this way, I’d like to understand why and see what we can do to change if we need to.
Mr Blake: Prior to being shown that by the Inquiry, had those concerns been drawn to your attention at all?
John Bartlett: No.
Mr Blake: Project May, you’ve provided a separate witness statement on. That’s the project relating to the race identity codes?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: That was first commissioned on 30 May 2023, the final report was 8 February 2024. You’ve addressed it in your statement, and the background. Am I right to summarise that those codes are likely to have originated from Royal Mail Group before the split?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Has the Post Office established the actual origins of how the racist terminology came to be used?
John Bartlett: As in an individual?
Mr Blake: How it first came to be formulated within the Royal Mail Group?
John Bartlett: Well, what we know is that someone within the investigations section within Royal Mail Group created that document but we don’t know who.
Mr Blake: An external company called ETICA has been involved. Very briefly, what is their involvement?
John Bartlett: They’re a non-government organisation that are – they support organisations like the International Criminal Court and human rights activities in terms of ethical investigation.
Mr Blake: The report was produced on 1 March 2024. One of their recommendations was annual training on unconscious bias –
John Bartlett: (The witness nodded)
Mr Blake: – and also regular training to remain up-to-date with best practice.
John Bartlett: Mm-hm.
Mr Blake: Again, is this is an area of training that is not yet finalised?
John Bartlett: So we’re hoping this will form part of the provision from the College of Policing.
Mr Blake: Thank you. So, again, as we discussed earlier today –
John Bartlett: It’s imminent.
Mr Blake: Imminent. There was originally going to be Part 2 of Project May. Very briefly, what was the plan for Project 2 and what has happened to it?
John Bartlett: So originally we hoped that an organisation like ETICA would look at a large sample of historic investigations, so those that are pertinent to this Inquiry, with a view of using various scientific and academic methods to review a large number of cases to see if they could determine whether there was any conscious or unconscious bias in decision making, particularly around the raising of cases, the decision to prosecute, or acceptance of payment via the contract enforcement.
Mr Blake: Why is that not taking place?
John Bartlett: I don’t know.
Mr Blake: Who is responsible for deciding whether it takes place or not?
John Bartlett: Nick Read made the decision to change Phase 2.
Mr Blake: What did he change it to?
John Bartlett: So it’s now – it looks like it’s going to be the establishment of a focus or consultative group within Post Office as to the use of language and approaches that take into account difference from an EDI perspective in relation to investigations.
Mr Blake: So is it now forward looking, rather than backward looking?
John Bartlett: Absolutely.
Mr Blake: At paragraph 20 of your statement, you’ve said that your team has purposely removed fields which would capture demographic data on –
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: – the case management system. Might that cause issues with not actually being now able to monitor, for example, disproportionate impact or disproportionate numbers of investigations into certain ethnic groups?
John Bartlett: Potentially. But the more prominent issue is that it’s not felt that we are required to collate that data, but I take your point. I think it’s a trade-off between people not being comfortable with their ethnicity being recorded, but the value to an organisation in capturing that data.
Mr Blake: Are you aware, for example, that the Inquiry sought subpostmaster demographic information in advance of its survey but, in fact, the Post Office doesn’t hold that kind of data in respect of the subpostmaster population?
John Bartlett: No, I wasn’t aware.
Mr Blake: There’s been some evidence in previous phases, for example, relating to the Helpdesk, where negative assumptions were made about certain ethnic groups. How does that failure to collect that kind of data impact on your ability to monitor those kinds of things?
John Bartlett: We have a very small caseload, so we will know who’s connected to that caseload. So we could recreate that if needed. But within Post Office in relation to Project May, there was a very strong upsurge of opinion that the collation of ethnic data was an issue.
Mr Blake: Moving on to Project Phoenix, could we please turn to POL00448649. These are the Board minutes of 29 April 2024. I’m only taking you to that because it provides a helpful summary of where things were at by this stage and it’s page 2. The bottom of the second paragraph sets out various categories of investigations. Current roles is not part of your remit, is it?
John Bartlett: No.
Mr Blake: Right. In terms of Project Phoenix, it says:
“The third category included and expanded upon the scope of Project Phoenix and would focus on addressing any misconduct allegations arising against current employees as a result of evidence given at the Inquiry in later Phases, in addition to the evidence provided at the Human Impact Hearings.”
Are you aware of when Project Phoenix was first established; was that related to the Human Impact Hearings?
John Bartlett: Directly.
Mr Blake: Why is it that the Post Office, in your view hadn’t started looking into the historic conduct of its employees before the Human Impact Hearings?
John Bartlett: I don’t know for sure but my impression, which I think I maybe mentioned this morning, is that that sort of understanding was expected to come out of the Inquiry itself but I think it demonstrated a lack of curiosity on behalf of the organisation to learn by itself.
Mr Blake: In terms of that investigation, Phoenix, that’s carried out by a team that’s within your division?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Blake: Was any thought given to whether an internal group of investigators was appropriate to be, for example, liaising directly with subpostmasters?
John Bartlett: So they’re not internal in the sense that they were existing members of the team. They weren’t. They were recruited specifically to do this, and they only do matters relating to the Inquiry. So they don’t do business as usual work.
Mr Blake: What’s your view on the proposal that individuals should be suspended whilst they’re being investigated in respect of Project Phoenix?
John Bartlett: I think the appropriate policies have to be applied.
Mr Blake: What do you mean by that?
John Bartlett: So there are policies – ER-owned policies that have to be applied in terms of misconduct issues and they’ve got to be applied.
Mr Blake: There’s been a thematic report that has been produced in respect of Project Phoenix. That can be found at POL00458007. That was completed on 28 August of this year. We’ll skip through this relatively quickly because everybody has it and it can be considered in due course. Over the page, please, to page 2. There are a number of failings that were identified in this thematic report; is that right?
John Bartlett: Correct.
Mr Blake: Can you broadly summarise the findings there?
John Bartlett: So I think bullet point three identifies five key themes: so quality and application of investigations – of investigative activity is one; recordkeeping; the recruitment and training of investigators; separation of function, so that’s between those conducting criminal investigations and those that were conducting contract advising or contract resolution issues; and then there’s themes around poor conduct of Post Office staff.
Mr Blake: If we could turn to the conduct of Post Office staff, and that’s on page 3, please. A number of issues were raised in terms of the investigation, in terms of compliance with legal obligations, et cetera, but I’m just going to focus on this particular section. It says:
“A range of issues were raised in the Human Impact evidence and was the main driver for the initiation of Project Phoenix. Some allegations have been disproved with factual evidence obtained by the Phoenix team but there have also been matters relating to current [Post Office] employees that have been referred for code of conduct investigations by the Employee Relations team that are currently ongoing.
“Matters of a potential criminal nature have also been identified and with Panel approval and submission through the [Post Office] Cooperation with Law Enforcement Policy, have been passed to the Metropolitan Police Service for their consideration.
“Although the prosecution aspect of the reviewed cases was not covered by the terms of reference for Project Phoenix there have been matters identified by the review team that have met with panel approval for referral to the Solicitors Regulation Authority and MPS.”
Are we to understand that Phoenix conducts its investigation, waits for that investigation to conclude and then, in cases, for example, that are employment matters, then passes it on to the Employee Relations Team to conduct another investigation?
John Bartlett: So I think some clarity over language is useful.
Mr Blake: Yes.
John Bartlett: So the Project Phoenix team conducts reviews, not investigations. Again, I think that might be something we could talk about for some time, but the reason for saying “review” is that they don’t reinvestigate the original allegations made against the postmasters or their staff. What they do is review the material that is available and then make observations, findings and recommendations.
So they do that, they produce what is called a merits assessment – which we have shared all of them that we have completed through the panel so far with the Inquiry – they then go to the panel, and there could be, and there have been, recommendations in there of the nature that are described there. And that’s when employment policies would kick in, at that point.
Mr Blake: “Review” sounds perhaps quicker and more achievable than an investigation. Why has it taken so long?
John Bartlett: The appalling state of Post Office’s databases – data systems. Going back that far, it is – well, if you’ve read any of the merits assessments you’ll see that the team that complete them put in there that there was an expectation that when they started they would literally be handed a case file and related papers for them to review. That has absolutely not been the case.
So there’s 5.4 million documents that are potentially in play, and the way I try and explain it – because everyone asks why has it taken so long. The way I explain it is: you should be able to go to a filing cabinet, find a file, take it out, whether that’s electronic or physical.
The way I tried to describe it is: imagine room with 5.4 million documents in but they’ve just been thrown in there, there is no index, no description, you have to search through each of those documents to try to find it.
Mr Blake: Are we now to expect that matters have been passed in certain cases to the Employee Relations Team or the police who are then, as you’ve only carried out a review, then going to have to investigate and, if so, what do you expect the timelines to be?
John Bartlett: So I don’t know about the police investigation because obviously that’s out our control and we don’t know what other evidence they have, but we actively cooperate with them, and pass – and make referrals proactively to them where we have concerns, and then they take it from there. We’re in the process of agreeing how we can pass them the material that’s been collected, so they don’t have to repeat that process.
And with the employment relations type HR type investigations, at the moment we’re trying to work out with the police how those two functions interact and we will be guided by the police – Post Office will be guided by the police.
Mr Blake: Thank you. I’d just like to provide updates on two other investigations. The first is Project Willow. Can you assist us briefly with where things stand with that?
John Bartlett: So there are three Project Willows, which one –
Mr Blake: Can you assist us with all of them, as quickly as you can.
John Bartlett: Okay, so Project Willow was an investigation to test whether someone who believed that they were a PIDA qualifying whistleblower had received detriment. So that’s that investigation. That’s closed.
Willow2 is an investigation in relation to NBIT, and there are two particular themes in there. One is that senior decision makers, so CEO and SEG, were provided with selective information in order to make decisions. That is currently open and is being investigated externally – by an external organisation, one of the law firms and accountancy firms.
The second part of that is that – I think you mentioned it to Chris Brocklesby, which is that the information security elements, some relating to the NBIT build, were deliberately deactivated in order to –
Mr Blake: What is the status of that?
John Bartlett: So that is also being dealt with by the same investigation team externally.
Project Willow3 is a newer allegation, and that relates to whether a potential supplier that could assist with various elements of delivery of NBIT process was properly briefed to the Board or whether that was skewed, and that is underway.
Mr Blake: Nearing completion or just underway?
John Bartlett: That investigation had to be paused because, for speed purposes, we chose to use the same team to conduct the investigation around Saf Ismail that recently surfaced and that you are aware of. So that team has completed that investigation and now they are back on Willow3.
Mr Blake: Finally, Project Acer, can you give us an update as to first of all, in very overview terms, what that is and where it’s up to?
John Bartlett: Sure. So Project Acer is an allegation that came up through the Speak Up service function that an individual within Post Office had instructed their team to destroy or otherwise remove material that might be of value to the Inquiry. We told the Inquiry about it, you informed the Met Police about it; it is now a Met Police investigation.
Mr Blake: Just for clarity’s sake, it doesn’t involve a witness in Phase 7?
John Bartlett: No.
Mr Blake: Thank you.
Sir, those are all of my questions. There are some questions from Core Participants. We have discussed orders and timings.
Sir Wyn Williams: Well, I mean, let’s be realistic. How many questioners are there?
Mr Blake: There are three. Mr Stein proposes to be first and the longest but he will be ten minutes.
The other two questioners are no more than five minutes each.
Sir Wyn Williams: Right, well, I’m going to make it easy for everyone by saying that it is now 4.10, and I propose to sit no later than 4.40, all right? So I’ll allow a little latitude because I don’t want to rush people but I’m not going to sit beyond 4.40. So between the three of you, you’ll have to work it out, as they say.
Mr Blake: Thank you, sir.
Mr Stein?
Questioned by Mr Stein
Mr Stein: Thank you, sir, I have my watch by me which is, you know, always a very reliable judge of my timings.
The questions I have for you, Mr Bartlett, come from the direction of obviously a very large group of people that have been badly affected by the scandal but the group of people I represent also includes current subpostmasters; do you understand?
John Bartlett: (No audible answer)
Mr Stein: Now, you have been asked number of questions by Mr Blake about NBIT and what is happening –
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Stein: – and you’ve provided some more recent information. You address that in your statement. I don’t need to go to it because I’m just referring to the fact that you’re talking about NBIT. So, for your purposes, it’s within your statement, Mr Bartlett, it is page 15, paragraph 25. What you’re saying there is that on 28 June 2023, the GE agreed that A&CI priorities for the financial years 23/24, 24/25, would be, and then you give an order of priority.
Then the fourth order of priority, therefore, at (d) was preparing for transition of the network to New Branch IT System, NBIT. Okay?
Then slightly further down you start to talk about the fact that work on NBIT is delayed because, essentially, the landscape is not sufficiently developed to require this work.
John Bartlett: (The witness nodded)
Mr Stein: All right. So we understand and just hopefully you’ll agree with me that your work that was proposed for NBIT was put on hold pending more development, more information?
John Bartlett: Correct.
Mr Stein: Okay. Now, your statement, which contains those references, is dated 22 August of this year. Yes?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Stein: Okay. Now, since that time, we have heard from Mr Railton, the new Chair of Post Office, who I think towards the end of his evidence was talking about whether NBIT is really a very good idea or not, and was wondering whether, in fact, it was a poor idea. That was information that presumably you are aware of and heard?
John Bartlett: No.
Mr Stein: Okay. Well, in the magazine Computer Weekly, which has been an integral part of the background to the development of this scandal, they are a news organisation that were one of the principal organisations that actually broke the scandal in the press. Now, they’ve been setting out the fact that they have hold of information, internal Post Office document, from the new Acting CEO, Neil Brocklehurst, revealing that:
“While the strategic review is ongoing and informed by other discussions with the Board and stakeholders, we have taken the opportunity to review our current approach to our delivery of new technology to make sure it will deliver what postmasters need in the most effective way possible.”
Then goes on to say this:
“This means from next week we will start reassessing and reprioritising the NBIT programme.”
Now, is that a document that you’re aware of, an internal Post Office document, from the Acting CEO, Neil Brocklehurst, saying, essentially, the Post Office is going to start reassessing and reprioritising?
John Bartlett: I’m aware that they’re reassessing and reprioritising.
Mr Stein: So the question of NBIT and what is going to happen with it does seem to be under fairly close examination within the Post Office; that seems to be where we’re at?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Stein: It doesn’t seem at all certain that it’s likely to go ahead. Again, that seems to be where we’re at; do you agree?
John Bartlett: I have heard those things but I’m not closely associated to it because it’s a technology process.
Mr Stein: You have had discussed with the Mr Blake towards the end of the questions, he asked you Willows – I think it’s Willow2 3, and 4, I wasn’t certain –
John Bartlett: No.
Mr Stein: Willow2 and 3?
John Bartlett: Willow2 and 3 relate to NBIT.
Mr Stein: You were talking about information that has been skewed. Can you help us, who is doing the skewing?
John Bartlett: That’s the purpose of the investigation.
Mr Stein: Right. Nobody has been identified?
John Bartlett: Er –
Mr Stein: As to the skewer?
John Bartlett: There have been allegations made and the external investigators are seeking to corroborate or otherwise that.
Mr Stein: The person that is doing the skewing, is that an important person within the organisation?
John Bartlett: Potentially but the – there are also a number of people who have left the organisation that that might also relate to.
Mr Stein: Are you able to provide the name of the person that is the suspect for the skewing?
John Bartlett: That would depend on what the Chair is –
Mr Stein: What is the name of the person that’s doing the skewing?
Mr Blake: Mr Stein –
Sir Wyn Williams: I don’t think he need answer that.
Mr Stein: Right, okay. I’ll change subjects because it sounds like that’s a developing situation, Mr Bartlett.
We also have a new statement from Mr Patterson. Mr Patterson is the European Director of Fujitsu. Okay? Mr Patterson has given evidence in the Inquiry and has provided a statement, again, demonstrating things are among on, that is dated 23 September 2024. He says this in relation to police requests:
“Fujitsu has informed the relevant police forces and POL that, whilst Fujitsu is willing to cooperate with the investigations through the provision of documentary records, Fujitsu is not in a position to provide the witness statements requested. Fujitsu is of the view that such witness statements will amount to expert opinion evidence, which Fujitsu cannot provide on the basis that Fujitsu is not independent (amongst other reasons). Fujitsu has made clear to POL that discussions regarding these investigations are confidential as between Fujitsu and relevant police forces.”
Then it goes on to say:
“It became apparent to Fujitsu, through the police requests, that the views of POL and Fujitsu, with respect to the use of Horizon data in enforcement action against postmasters and branch staff, are fundamentally different.”
Okay?
John Bartlett: Okay.
Mr Stein: So if we trace through the questions that Mr Blake was asking you earlier, from December 2023, Fujitsu was describing the system as being obsolescent, old, patched up, constant needing for repairs?
John Bartlett: (The witness nodded)
Mr Stein: You’ve then seen other correspondence talking about the fact of current BEDs that they know about and others that they don’t know about. Yes?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Stein: You’ve then heard from me, reading part of Mr Patterson’s statement recently provided to this Inquiry, saying that Fujitsu, frankly, are not prepared to provide any statements to support the system. They are just not doing it, Mr Bartlett.
John Bartlett: Well, they have responded to a production order, or are intending to, and that will be followed up with a witness statement in order to produce that evidence. I would also challenge their assertion that they are an expert witness. In my opinion and legal advice that we have received is they are not an expert witness.
Mr Stein: I’m going to come to that. Now, the position between Fujitsu and the Post Office does seem to be rather at odds. We’ve had now this whole series of correspondence, starting with December 2023, right the way through to only a few days ago, essentially, saying that Fujitsu and the Post Office have very serious disagreement between their stance on these matters.
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Stein: That’s at the very least –
John Bartlett: I think that’s fair.
Mr Stein: Yes, that’s at the very least what we’ve got. Okay?
So it does seem as though Fujitsu may have slightly different advice in relation to the provision of statements than you’ve got. Who has your advice been given by?
John Bartlett: I don’t know. It was external counsel but I don’t know the name of –
Mr Stein: Have you seen written advice?
John Bartlett: I’ve seen a summary of that written advice.
Mr Stein: Right. So the position in relation to Fujitsu appears to be that they’re not prepared to provide any expert evidence at all, from their point of view, in relation to the operation of the system. It also seems to be they’re saying the system is old, it’s out of date, it needs a lot of work, it needs a lot of support and there are bugs in the system. It doesn’t seem as though they’re particularly keen on saying, “There’s no problems in the system, we’ll provide a statement to say that it’s okay”. It doesn’t seem that way, does it, Mr Bartlett?
John Bartlett: That’s what they are not being asked for. They’re being asked around specific transactions –
Mr Stein: Well, hang on, Mr Bartlett. You said in your evidence that “because Fujitsu haven’t said that it’s unreliable, we are therefore prepared to assume it is reliable”?
John Bartlett: Mm-hm.
Mr Stein: You’ve also said in your evidence that “because the POL Senior Executive and Directors Board haven’t said it’s unreliable, we will assume it’s reliable”. So you’re working on the basis of two negative assumptions, aren’t you, Mr Bartlett?
John Bartlett: And then the next step is that the police, to an evidential standard, test those transactions in the system.
Mr Stein: Right. We’ve now got evidence, in relation to your statement, of ongoing investigations. You describe one as being some sort of test case that you’re thinking about, yes?
John Bartlett: I’m not sure –
Mr Stein: Lancashire or the City?
John Bartlett: I think that’s likely to be the first case.
Mr Stein: Right, okay.
Now, we can see, at the back of your statements, a schedule that relates to those investigations –
John Bartlett: Mm-hm.
Mr Stein: – and, indeed, the individuals being investigated can identify their own cases, can’t they, because they’ve got the numbers, the figures for each case?
John Bartlett: Yeah.
Mr Stein: Right. Have those investigation teams, for each one of the police forces involved, been given all of the correspondence that you’ve had questions asked by Mr Blake about? Have they been given all that correspondence?
John Bartlett: So we’ve discussed with Lancashire some of that correspondence since those letters have come in, and we’ve made them aware of it, and they’re still engaging with Fujitsu, as I understand. As the next cases come up, then we will talk to them about that too. We will make everything available to them and we will share it as they would like.
Mr Stein: That’s Lancashire. City?
John Bartlett: I haven’t spoken to City for some time.
Mr Stein: Given that on 17 May 2024, Mr Patterson was expressing very strong reservations about the use of data from Fujitsu in relation to investigations –
John Bartlett: Mm-hm.
Mr Stein: – why wasn’t that immediately provided to the police forces that were conducting these ongoing investigations?
John Bartlett: My – the interpretation of the letters is that he wasn’t saying the data was unreliable; he was saying he didn’t want it to be used in a prosecution.
Mr Stein: In fact it says, the 17 May letter, that they don’t believe it should be used at all in relation to prosecutions, civil actions or shortfalls generally. It is a pretty strong letter, Mr Bartlett.
John Bartlett: It is a strong letter.
Mr Stein: You would have thought it should go to a police investigation to look at these issues. Why didn’t it go to those police investigations immediately?
John Bartlett: Because it wasn’t saying that there was an issue with the data; it’s saying their intent, their preference, their desire, their position, is that it’s not used in those circumstances.
Mr Stein: So it was considered for disclosure –
John Bartlett: Yes.
Mr Stein: – was it, Mr Bartlett? So you actually looked at it and said, “Should this go to police forces that are conducting investigations?”, and your decision or someone else’s was, “No, it shouldn’t”?
John Bartlett: Well, we subsequently had legal advice, as well, which says it shouldn’t.
Mr Stein: It doesn’t seem that the Post Office has changed very much, Mr Bartlett –
John Bartlett: Well, that’s –
Mr Stein: – if we analyse everything that you say.
John Bartlett: Well, that’s a little bit unfair, actually, because we’ve discussed those issues with those law enforcement teams as they’ve cropped up. We’re not concealing anything at all.
Mr Stein: Mr Bartlett, overall, what we seem to have from your evidence is we seem to have a situation whereby you and your team are prepared to back the Horizon system with no evidence whatsoever that the thing should actually be presented before any court in relation to any shortfall. That’s basically the situation, Mr Bartlett, isn’t it?
John Bartlett: No.
Mr Stein: Thank you.
Mr Blake: Sir, we have Ms Watt and Ms Allan.
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes.
Questioned by Ms Watt
Ms Watt: Good afternoon, Mr Bartlett. I ask questions on behalf of the NFSP.
John Bartlett: Hello.
Ms Watt: You’ve been answering questions about the development of the post-Horizon scandal conduct of investigations throughout today and also what seems to be the vexed issue of when is it an interview, a meeting or a discussion.
I just want to take a look at some of those issues regarding the cases of Elliot Jacobs and the other Postmaster Non-Executive Director who underwent an investigation, Saf Ismail. You just mentioned that one, I think.
John Bartlett: There is a current investigation. There is no previous investigation.
Ms Watt: Right. Did you see their evidence to the Inquiry?
John Bartlett: Some of it.
Ms Watt: Okay. So I’m just going to ask you something about that. Saf Ismail says in his witness statement – I’m not calling these up but, just for the record, WITN11170100 – at paragraph 221:
“Often postmasters will be suspended prior to interview without understanding the reasons for that suspension. Postmasters are still not shown evidence relating to investigation into their branches prior to investigation interviews being conducted by Post Office Investigators.”
You’ve been taken to Mr Jacobs’ concerns – Mr Blake took you to a series of documents this afternoon – about the lack of information provided to him when he was notified of an investigation and invited to an interview. At paragraph 24 of his witness statement, WITN11180100, he talks about his experience:
“I considered the interview to be an interrogation and adversarial. It was not a collaborative discussion. The interview was similar in style to a formal police interview, as the questions put to me were interrogatory and the documents were put to me as exhibits.”
Okay, so that’s my summary. Just a couple of questions now.
At paragraph 69(b)(ii) of your second witness statement, you talk about the policy – Mr Blake took you to it this morning, I’m not sure how to pronounce it, I’ll say GICLEP.
John Bartlett: The new Combined –
Ms Watt: The new Combined policy, yes, and that’s POL00448353. You described the commitment to ethically executed, evidence-led, transparent investigations. Given the evidence of Mr Ismail and Mr Jacobs, in what way would you say the Post Office investigations met those standards?
John Bartlett: So we’ve never dealt with Mr Ismail in that –
Ms Watt: Can you refer just to Mr Jacobs?
John Bartlett: So Mr Jacobs. Well, I’m very pleased that the interview with Elliot Jacobs was recorded because it can go on record to show what the nature of that interview was. It absolutely was not an interrogation. It was an early engagement with him to understand his position and for him to give explanations, and for us to be open-minded as to what that may be. There was a subsequent – off the back of Project Pineapple, which people have heard about, the ER team conducted a review of the conduct of that, of Elliot Jacobs’ investigation, and they found that his complaints were completely unfounded.
Ms Watt: I’ve just got one final question after this one. Would you agree that how postmasters, whether NEDs or not, feel about the way they’re dealt with is important?
John Bartlett: Absolutely.
Ms Watt: Would you not agree that the conduct of, for instance, that investigation, certainly the reporting of it, would simply reinforce to today’s postmasters that not a great deal has actually changed. Some of the wording in your new Combined Policy has changed, some of the deck chairs have been rearranged, but what’s said about their recent experience, if that’s anything to go by, there’s still a long way to go to win back the trust of postmasters in the conduct of investigations?
John Bartlett: There is a long way to go but what I would say is, if postmasters were to listen to the interview that we had with Elliot, I’m absolutely confident that they would think that things are different compared to how they were done before, and also, it might be helpful to add a couple of matters that were referred to us by the NFSP were dealt with very sensitively and we received feedback from the NFSP to that effect. So I think it is different from the past.
Ms Watt: Because the NFSP liaise with you on the way in which you are in fact conducting matters; is that not correct?
John Bartlett: Yes, and in those particular cases, they brought them to us, and we discussed with them our approach and what the outcome was, and they were happy with how that was conducted.
Ms Watt: But we’re not talking about Mr Jacobs’ case when you’re talking about that?
John Bartlett: Yes, certainly not Mr Jacobs. It’s two other matters.
Ms Watt: Yes, thank you.
Sir Wyn Williams: Sorry, just so I’m clear, Mr Bartlett, are you saying that following the interview with Mr Jacobs, he made a complaint which was investigated and found to be unjustified?
John Bartlett: Yes, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Right, fine. Next, please.
Questioned by Ms Allan
Ms Allan: Good afternoon, Mr Bartlett.
My name is Christie Allan, and I represent Core Participant Susan Sinclair, who is a wrongfully convicted subpostmaster and the first to successfully appeal her conviction in Scotland.
In your second paragraph at paragraph 69, which I don’t propose to turn up, you describe the activity of the A&CI staff as a POL criminal investigation, but caveat this with the fact that it’s not an end-to-end investigation, and it is for law enforcement agencies to conduct a full criminal investigation following a report from the Post Office of suspected criminality.
Prior to May this year and during your tenure at the Post Office, I assume that you’re aware that the Post Office was a Specialist Reporting Agency in Scotland, meaning it was entitled to carry out its own full criminal investigation into suspected criminal conduct and to report the findings of that directly to the Public Prosecutor in Scotland without the requirement to have this first reported to the police?
John Bartlett: Yes.
Ms Allan: I assume that you’re also aware that, in May of this year, the Lord Advocate, Scotland’s most senior law officer, confirmed that the Post Office was no longer fit to continue in its own as a Specialist Reporting Agency in Scotland, due to its failure to comply with its duties of disclosure and candour?
John Bartlett: Yes, we were consulted around that and I contributed to a response back saying that we did not want to have that status any more.
Ms Allan: If you can elaborate, what were the reasons that you provided for not wanting to have that status?
John Bartlett: Because we’re not a prosecuting agency. Therefore, we shouldn’t have that right or ability to have that status.
Ms Allan: You mentioned earlier that there seemed to be an apparent reluctance by authorities in Scotland to adopt evidence collected by non-law enforcement agencies. Do you think that this, the stripping of Post Office’s role as a Specialist Reporting Agency, has had a bearing on that?
John Bartlett: I’m sure it has but it’s not limited to the Post Office. So, in my previous role at a financial regulator, the Procurator Fiscal insisted that Police Scotland recreate an investigation that had already been completed by the Regulator, because they wanted Police Scotland to do it.
Ms Allan: Okay, thank you. Has any official review work been undertaken by your team or within wider Post Office, as a result of the decision by the Lord Advocate?
John Bartlett: No, we supported it being removed.
Ms Allan: Okay, thank you. I think that ends my questions there. Thank you.
The Witness: Thank you.
Sir Wyn Williams: Thank you very much.
So is that it, Mr Blake?
Mr Blake: That’s it, sir, yes.
Sir Wyn Williams: Right. Very good. Well, I think everybody knows that tomorrow we are starting at 9.00 am. In part, at least, that is on my convenience, because I have a personal appointment, which I have to keep, which means that we won’t be able to sit beyond 1.00, all right? So I want everybody to know that the sitting hours tomorrow are conditioned by that.
It is also the case that Mr Foat will be giving evidence remotely. I acceded to a request to that effect on the grounds of his health and so I am giving everyone warning that his evidence, save in the most exceptional circumstances, has to end tomorrow, so that means by around 1.00, so that Mr Blake, and anyone who wishes to ask him questions, should tailor their questioning with all that in mind. All right?
With those remarks, I will bid you good evening and see you in the morning.
Mr Blake: Thank you very much, sir.
(4.31 pm)
(The hearing adjourned until 9.00 am the following day)