14 June 2024 – Andrew Parsons
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Andrew Parsons
ANDREW PAUL PARSONS (continued).
Questioned by Mr Blake (continued)
Mr Blake: Good morning, sir, can you see and hear me?
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, I can, thank you.
Mr Blake: Thank you very much.
Mr Parsons, today I’m only going to be about an hour long and I just have a few miscellaneous topics to cover.
Before I do that could we please bring up on to screen WITN10390201. Yesterday when we confirmed the truth of your witness statement, there were also some amendments to be made, largely to spellings and reference numbers. Can you confirm that, subject to what we see on screen now, the statement that you confirmed as true is true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
Andrew Parsons: That is correct.
Mr Blake: Thank you very much, that can come down.
I’m going to begin today by asking a few more questions about the litigation. We left off yesterday with that strategy document. I want to ask you first about issues with witnesses. Could we please turn to FUJ00182166, please. If we could look at the bottom email, it’s an email of 22 October 2018, from somebody called Chris Jay to David Jones. He says as follows:
“The claimants and Post Office are at the stage of exchanging witness statements.
“One of the claimants’ witnesses is a Richard Rolls [sic]. He used to work for Fujitsu and left in about 2004. His witness statement is attached.
“We have checked to see if he left under a shadow and have no evidence that he did. He did however appear on the Panorama programme a few years ago about the Post Office and Horizon, which I did not see, but which from Womble Bond Dickinson believe that the claimants and their lawyers Freeths, determined that he may be able to assist with their case.
“One of our team, Steve Parker, worked with Mr Rolls [sic] and gave him a positive reference. Steve is now involved assisting Post Office the defence and has commented on Mr Roll’s [witness statements] (see attached). He has made clear that he does not wish to give a [witness statement] and appear in court as he saw the effect on another colleague. See attached correspondence with Jonny Gribble [sic] of [Womble Bond Dickinson] on the latter point.
“I also attach Gareth Jenkins’ commentary on Richard Roll’s [witness statement] for information.
“I had a conversation this morning with Andrew Parsons, the partner at [Womble Bond Dickinson] handling the case, and he made it very clear that it was absolutely essential for the Post Office case that Steve Parker appear as witness to rebut Mr Roll’s [witness statement]. [Womble Bond Dickinson] did make clear that Steve would receive witness training and support.
“He also said it was extremely urgent that we convince Steve to be a witness and asked if I could respond today on this.”
Do you recall an issue with this particular witness being concerned about giving evidence.
Andrew Parsons: Yes.
Mr Blake: There’s reference there to witness training. Did he receive witness training?
Andrew Parsons: I can’t recall if he specifically did but we offered witness training through a third-party company to, I think, all of our witnesses.
Mr Blake: How about support?
Andrew Parsons: I can’t recall specifically what support was given to Steve Parker.
Mr Blake: If we look at the email that was attached to that email, can we please look at FUJ00182096. I don’t know if you will have seen this at the time but I just want to ask you about the concerns that he expressed in that email:
“The minutes of our meeting are being turned into a witness statement. I have seen this process previously where a colleague signed such a statement which resulted in a very stressful court appearance. I am happy to continue supporting the process and refining the information but I will not be signing a witness statement, we need to find another way to use this information.
“Steve.”
Can you recall any discussions on this topic with Mr Parker?
Andrew Parsons: I can’t recall any discussions directly with Mr Parker.
Mr Blake: Did you understand anything about that court appearance that he is referring to in that email?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t believe I did.
Mr Blake: Could we please turn to FUJ00160244. Just on that, you said you don’t believe you did; do you now? Is there anything you know about that now?
Andrew Parsons: No, there’s nothing I know now about that.
Mr Blake: This is on the same topic, if we start on page 4, please, about halfway down, thank you. It’s an email from Graham Allen to Chris, Chris Jay. He says:
“Chris
“Steve and I are both early starters so I have had a long conversation with Steve this morning.
“I am afraid he is adamant that he does not want to voluntarily put himself through the stress he feels this will generate despite wanting to defend the team from that time. He was expecting someone to come back to him and had already given it a great deal of thought. He is aware that he may get subpoenaed and would deal with that if it happened. He didn’t think sharing the load with another team member would help.
“I tried to persuade but did not want to push too hard; not sure what else we can try. Steve is not the sort of person to take decisions lightly or be easily swayed from his chosen direction.”
If we scroll over to the first page, we can see that there is a response from you, at the bottom of the page. You say:
“There isn’t an alternative to witness evidence. We could look at summonsing Steve but that would be far from ideal.
“We need to urgently (today?) work out whether there is an alternative to Steve. If that hits a dead end then we will need to regroup and think again.”
If we scroll up to the top there’s a response, at the very top of the page, please:
“Andy,
“Have just heard back from the Account team [regarding] John Simpkins. Unfortunately he does not wish to become a witness either. Suggest we rethink.”
What did you understand the concerns of these individuals at Fujitsu to be about being called as witnesses in the Group Litigation?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t believe I knew anything about John Simpkins’ concerns. The understanding I had of Steve Parker is he just had a natural reluctance to be a witness and, from those emails, it appears it was because he had had a friend or someone he knew had given evidence somewhere else but I didn’t know much more than that.
Mr Blake: Were you aware of, for example, any historic issues within Fujitsu which would mean that individuals were reluctant to give evidence? We’ve heard, for example, in this Inquiry, about Anne Chambers giving evidence and being unhappy about the situation that she was put in.
Andrew Parsons: Nobody drew my attention to any connection between Steve’s concerns and any matters like that.
Mr Blake: I want to move on now to the strategy towards the claimants themselves. Can we please turn to POL00006379. This a document entitled “Litigation Strategy Options” produced for the steering group meeting of 11 September 2017. Was this a document that you produced?
Andrew Parsons: It was either me or my team.
Mr Blake: Can we please turn to the third page. It sets out various litigation strategy options as they then stood, and I’d like you to look at number 5, “Attrition”. It says there:
“Stretch out the litigation process so to increase costs in the hope that the Claimants, and more particularly their litigation funder, decide that it is too costly to pursue the litigation and give up.”
It says:
“Recommendation: this option is not recommended as we believe the pressure on, and cost to, Post Office would become unbearable before the claimants gave up.”
We see that on the right-hand side the reasons for that:
“The claimants’ litigation funder … is an experienced funder with deep pockets. It will be prepared for a long piece of litigation. So long as it believes the merits of the case are favourable, it can be expected to fund the litigation.
“Over time the litigation will become more disruptive to Post Office’s business as more operating practices are put under the spotlight and then have to be overseen by lawyers in order to avoid problems in the litigation process.
“Although media reporting on this matter is presently low key, there is increasing chatter in the network and a feeling that the litigation may start to dissuade individuals from being postmasters. This will increase as the litigation continues without a result in Post Office’s favour.”
So, at that stage, the clear recommendation is not to go for attrition because there are, amongst other things, downsides for the business and also the costs to the Post Office in pursuing that would be very significant; is that a fair summary?
Andrew Parsons: Correct. I would also just note there bullet 2 in column 2, which explains that what this means in practice would be agreeing with the claimants’ proposals for case management and they, at that time, were advocating a long course for the litigation.
Mr Blake: Thank you. You’ve addressed this in your witness statement. Can we bring up your witness statement, please. It’s page 204. Thank you.
Page 204, I think you’ve set it out at paragraphs 357 to 359. I just want to have a look at 357 and 358 if we may. You say there:
“As for option 5 [that’s option 5 from the document, the “Attrition” option] as the paper makes clear, this was not a strategy I recommended because the cost to [the Post Office] would be too high before the claimants would feel the impact of this approach. Insofar as it is to be suggested that this approach – or indeed any approach which had the effect of applying pressure to the claimants – would have been inappropriate (or that any individual steps that [Post Office] took that put pressure on the claimants were inappropriate), I highlight that applying a reasonable degree of pressure to one’s opponent, and/or pursuing strategies which have the effect of applying pressure to one’s opponent, are part and parcel of an adversarial system of litigation. It was proper to include this so [the Post Office] could see the full range of options. However, at no stage did I recommend that [the Post Office] adopt this strategy and at no stage did [the Post Office] instruct me to adopt such a strategy.”
Just pausing there, you say that it’s part and parcel of an adversarial system of litigation. For you, does it make any difference whether the party is owned by the Government or not?
Andrew Parsons: I saw this as an ordinary piece of commercial litigation.
Mr Blake: Then 358:
“More generally, as explained above, where it was consistent with my duties to the Court, my client and my professional obligations for [Womble Bond Dickinson] to advise on approaches which had the effect of applying pressure on Freeths and the Claimants’ litigation funder, these approaches would be explained to [the Post Office] as advantages of a particular step or action. However, at no stage did I advocate taking a step purely for this effect. Where this factor infrequently arose, there was always an overarching meritorious reason for recommending a particular course of action, a byproduct of which may have been to place pressure on the opposing Legal Team.”
So you’re setting out there that, at no point, did you recommend that as a strategy, it may be a byproduct of some other strategy; is that a fair summary of that?
Andrew Parsons: What we’re talking about here is what I would call is a pure attrition strategy, where a party takes unreasonable points for the predominant purpose of causing one’s opponent to incur costs. I don’t believe I ever advised Post Office to take such a strategy. There were times during the litigation where there were meritorious reasons to take a point that had a byproduct of applying pressure onto the claimants.
Mr Blake: Thank you. Could we please turn to POL00006380. I think this is another document you’ve explained in your witness statement. We’re now on 11 September 2017. It says:
“On 19 October 2017 there will be a Case Management Conference. At this court hearing, a judge will decide on the strategy strategic direction of the Group Litigation …
“This paper explains:
“The nature of a CMC and the court process that may flow from it.
“The general strategic direction that we recommend is adopted by the Post Office.”
Is this a document that you produced?
Andrew Parsons: I suspect I was the primary author but it may have had input from others as well.
Mr Blake: If we scroll over the page, please, there’s a section on overall Post Office strategy and it’s very similar to the strategy that we saw in that email from you yesterday. I’ll just read a few sections from it:
“There are no silver bullets in this case that will dispose of all claims in one go …
“4.2 This leads us to the view that, in the fullness of time, Post Office may need to address each of the 522 claims individually given the diversity of their circumstances. Taking [each] case to a full conclusion through the litigation process is unattractive as it would take years and the costs would be extremely high.”
So again, similar: it would cost a lot of money for the Post Office to pursue that kind of a strategy, therefore not recommended?
Andrew Parsons: Not to take the entire case to conclusion because what I was anticipating is there would probably be a series of thematic trials, followed by eventually having to deal with the details of 500 plus individual claims, and I didn’t think that was practically feasible.
Mr Blake: “4.3 We believe the better solution is to try to force the claimants into a collective position where they will either abandon the claims or seek a reasonable settlement. It should be remembered that the claims are financially supported by Freeths (whose fees are at least partially conditional on winning), a third party funder and insurers. Without this support these proceedings would not have been possible. All three entities will likely have the power to pull their support if the merits of the case drop below a certain level. Our target audience is therefore Freeths, the funder and the insurers who will adopt a cold, logical assessment of whether they will get a payout, rather than the Claimants who may wish to fight on principle regardless of merit.”
So that isn’t advocating, at this point, a strategy of attrition but it is saying that we need to keep an eye on those who are actually funding the litigation?
Andrew Parsons: Yes, and the key point of that sentence is that it refers to the fact that those entities may pull their support if the merits of the case drop below a certain level. So this is advocating a merit-based strategy.
Mr Blake: Does something change over time or is it your position that that was the approach throughout?
Andrew Parsons: I think that was largely the approach throughout. Later in the litigation, I think this is probably around the time of the trials, I got an impression, but I had no information, that the claimants’ Legal Team were struggling, potentially, to keep up with the pace. We were also struggling, to be fair. And we did in – and that became a bigger issue to consider, to factor in but I think always we were advocating strategies that had merit.
Mr Blake: Could we please turn to POL00111290. So this is a year later now, if we scroll down, 1 November 2018 and, as you say, I think this is probably the document, you may have been thinking about it, thinking about a third trial. So it says:
“All
“This is a long email setting out some initial thoughts on a possible trial in May 2019. I presume that at some point during the [Common Issues] trial Fraser will grab one of the free days to talk about this and so we need a plan. The below represents a straw man for everyone to take shots at.
“I appreciate that everyone is extremely busy but we need to put some time aside with the full Counsel team to talk through our proposal for May. I’m going to suggest a [conference] call for Monday at 10.00. Shout now if you really can’t do it.
“Also, I’m sure everyone can raise a million reasons why the below is crazy … I think it’s crazy … but we need to find a way forward so we all need a positive (if deluded) mental attitude!”
If we scroll over to the next page, please, “Key dates”. So the Common Issues trial finishes on 6 December, Horizon Issues trial begins 12 March onwards and you’re planning for the future.
“General objectives of a third trial
“I can see 3, potentially conflicting, objectives for a 3rd trial:
“1. To progress the litigation as a whole towards conclusion.
“2. To secure some form of tactical advantage that forces the [claimants] to quit/settle.
“3. To keep Fraser happy by doing something ‘productive’ in May ‘19.
“Challenges/factors [for consideration] …”
I’d like to take you to the fifth one of those, it begins “We should”:
“We should not assume that we have deeper resources than the [claimants]. We undoubtedly have more bench strength but every task is much more onerous for us (our disclosure is at least 10 times larger than the [claimants’]; we will have loads of witnesses, they will have a few, etc).”
Then you say:
“That said, my instinct is the [claimants’] funding is under pressure and they do not want to be burning money on a 3rd trial.”
Is this is the turning point you were describing just now?
Andrew Parsons: I wouldn’t describe it as a turning point, it was just an impression that we began to have, or I began to have around that time.
Mr Blake: If we please turn to page 5 there is the straw man that you are setting up for others to comment on. You say as follows:
“Drawing the attached together, I think we need a plan that can be [flexed] to accommodate the possibility of an appeal. Also tactically the best option for [the Post Office] are (i) to force the [claimants] to burn money and (ii) to target limitation. My straw man therefore tries to achieve these objectives whilst trying not to look tactical!”
Then you say, for example:
“We agree to a Lead Cases trial of 3 cases”, et cetera.
Now the witness statement I took you to before said that you never advised that as a strategy. Here, we have, it seems, you’re advising that at this point in time a strategy to force the claimants to burn money; do you agree with that?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t agree with that. This is a straw man discussion amongst the lawyers with the counsel team. I think I did forward it to Rodric Williams but it’s expressly under cover of an email that says, “This isn’t advice” I think I used the phrase “brain dump of ideas”. These points were discussed, even here though the strategy is to target limitation and, if you scroll slightly up in this email, you can see I set out the advantages of targeting a limitation issue, so there was reasonable merit.
And, in any event, what happened in practice was that the trial date moved back and this discussion never went anywhere. So I don’t believe this ever ended up as actually being advice to the client, as opposed to a point being discussed amongst the lawyers.
Mr Blake: What is the difference between a “brain dump” to a client by a solicitor and “advice” from a solicitor?
Andrew Parsons: I think Rodric Williams would have understood this, as an experienced in-house litigator, that this was just some ideas that were being knocked around amongst the Legal Team and it wasn’t a settled view on the way that Post Office should have proceeded.
Mr Blake: But it was your view as to how they could proceed?
Andrew Parsons: It was one option. I think if you scroll through the entire email, it sets out a whole range of different options and, as it sets out at the start, it’s a starter for ten for discussion amongst the Legal Team.
Mr Blake: Could we turn, please, to the judgment in the Common Issues trial. That’s at UKGI00009458, and it’s page 172. About halfway down that paragraph that’s on the top of the page, so if we scroll up slightly, Mr Justice Fraser says as follows:
“The Post Office has appeared determined to make this litigation, and therefore resolution of this intractable dispute, as difficult and expensive as it can.”
Does that not reflect the advice that you were giving to Post Office in 2018?
Andrew Parsons: As I say, I don’t accept that that was the advice that was given to Post Office. It was an idea being discussed amongst the lawyers and, ultimately, it never came to fruition because the trial date moved back and matters moved on. I don’t think, actually, decisions around trial 3 were made for several months after that point.
Mr Blake: I’m going to move on to another topic now and that’s the Post Office’s relationship with Government and UKGI. Rodric Williams has given evidence to this Inquiry describing a meeting in the middle of 2016 with the Department for Business – I think he said that you were present at that meeting – where the Department was asked by the Post Office to be able to conduct the litigation without external influence. Is that a meeting you have any recollection of?
Andrew Parsons: I’m afraid I have no recollection of that.
Mr Blake: Do you think it’s likely you attended a meeting with the Department for Business in mid-2016?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t recall – I don’t recall any meetings with the Department for Business. I recall –
Mr Blake: UKGI?
Andrew Parsons: Sorry, or UKGI. I recall briefing one of the Board directors who had been appointed by UKGI, I think there were some UKGI attendees at that meeting.
Mr Blake: Was that Tom Cooper?
Andrew Parsons: It was Tom Cooper.
Mr Blake: Let’s turn to that, then. Can we please turn to WBON0000528, please. This is in 2018, so two years after that apparent meeting. Now, this is an email from Amy Prime to you, “Subject: Notes from call with [the Post Office] on 23 March [2018]”. Can you assist us, is this Amy Prime sending you notes that she took while you were having this discussion?
Andrew Parsons: Give me a moment to read, please.
Mr Blake: We can scroll down, if you like. Perhaps I’ll take you through some paragraphs and, at the end, you can tell me how you think this was formulated?
Andrew Parsons: Thank you.
Mr Blake: She says:
“Andy
“Notes from the beginning of the call below:
“BEIS and UKGI are taking a more proactive approach, two issues with this (1) in relation to piece of litigation they got stung so worried about no surprise in [Post Office litigation]; and (2) wish to protect public money and value for money so being quite intrusive. Bill of £110 million in compensation to supplier in nuclear procurement deal which has caused more intrusive oversight.”
It then refers down there to Tom Cooper. So Tom Cooper was from UKGI, he sat on the Board of the Post Office as well; is that right?
Andrew Parsons: Yeah, he was on the Board of directors at Post Office and, as I understood it, UKGI had the power to appoint a director to the Board.
Mr Blake: So it says:
“… question whether we are tying him down to an information sharing structure and signing [a non-disclosure agreement]? Not NDA, director of company so has confidentiality undertakings already. Appointment letter has made issues with confidentiality. UKGI want Tom to tell UKGI what he wants to and not be constrained in his emailed to share information.”
So it looks as though there is a concern being expressed at this meeting about the ability for Tom Cooper, who sat on the Post Office Board, to share information with UKGI; is that your recollection of the discussion?
Andrew Parsons: It’s not my recollection because I’m not sure that I was on this call or not but that appears to be what the words are saying there.
Mr Blake: Do you recall an issue at this point in time arising from UKGI wanting to know more about the litigation and perhaps the Post Office pushing back on that information sharing?
Andrew Parsons: I was aware that there was an issue with information sharing with UKGI, particularly around sharing privileged information with UKGI and how to do it in a way that would maintain privilege.
Mr Blake: Was that a concern that you personally had?
Andrew Parsons: I would always be concerned about issues around privilege and making sure that Post Office were properly advised on those issues.
Mr Blake: Having read just those couple of paragraphs, are you able to assist us any further with how this note might have come about?
Andrew Parsons: I’m afraid not. I don’t recall this note and I don’t recall the call that it appears to be referring to.
Mr Blake: “After CCRC material, deeply suspicious about ability of UKGI to control flow of information.”
Is that something that you’re able to assist us with?
Andrew Parsons: I’m afraid not.
Mr Blake: It looks as though there was a concern that UKGI had shared some information relating to the Criminal Cases Review Commission; is that something you recall anything about?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t recall that.
Mr Blake: If we scroll down slightly more:
“Will give board update on progress of [litigation] as per [Womble Bond Dickinson] speaking notes.
“Discuss protocol for engagement with UKGI and concerns with appointment of Tom Cooper.”
Do you recall at this period a wish for Mr Cooper to stick to notes that were prepared by Womble Bond Dickinson to update UKGI, rather than, for example, being able to speak freely?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t recall – I don’t recall that issue being raised with me.
Mr Blake: If we scroll down, please, over the page, to near the bottom of that page. It says:
“Alex Chisholm is accounting officer for Post Office and accountable for spend in [Post Office] to ministers.”
It says at the bottom:
“Subcommittee papers to be kept to a minimum and updates from Committee to Board to be verbal, Tom Cooper will be updating UKGI which causes issues with directors duties.”
It might be suggested that that is quite consistent with some of the advice that we saw from you yesterday, keeping papers to a minimum, updates to the Board to be verbal. Is that advice that you gave in relation to UKGI at this time?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t believe I was deeply involved in these discussions. The arrangements between Post Office’s board and UKGI were mainly handled in-house by the Post Office Legal Team. I recall there was a concern, not about providing written updates but just the sheer volume of written updates that were being requested and the capacity and practicality of providing them.
Mr Blake: The suggestion here, though, seems to be, to use the language we were speaking about yesterday, updating on a verbal basis, rather than a written basis. As you say, you’ve expressed concerns about privilege.
Andrew Parsons: Mm-hm.
Mr Blake: Do you recall those kinds of concerns in relation to UKGI?
Andrew Parsons: I recall that Post Office had concerns about, if they provided information to UKGI, where else would it then go after that? Other than that high level, I don’t recall what the detail was or what caused Post Office to have those concerns.
Mr Blake: The final document on that topic, can we please turn to POL00041770. If we start on page 2, please, the second half of page 2. I think you’ve addressed this in your witness statement at paragraph 433. We don’t need to turn to the witness statement but, if we could just have a look at this email from Elizabeth O’Neill at UKGI to Rodric Williams, it’s about agreeing a protocol with UKGI, I think, for information sharing. She says:
“Thanks for your markup of the protocol. It looks as though we are still a long way apart on this as your draft doesn’t recognise a number of things that are essential to us in order to fulfil our function as shareholder and representative of the [Secretary of State].
“So I thought it would be helpful to provide some important background and explain the context in which are operating:
“Alex Chisholm is the accounting officer for [the Post Office] and as such is accountable to Parliament for its actions. In order to properly fulfil this role, he requires full and comprehensive information on the progress of this litigation. This will not be possible if [Post Office] is not willing to provide written updates. We revised our requirements to provide for updates following reports to the Board to reduce any administrative burden as far as possible, but we cannot agree to a protocol which includes no obligation on [Post Office] to report progress in writing in the litigation.”
So UKGI seemed to have the impression, at this stage, that the Post Office don’t want to report in writing relating to the litigation.
If we scroll up to the email above from Jane MacLeod, she says:
“Andy, Rod
“I am very concerned about this, and I’m struggling to see a way through this. Paula has offered a meeting with Alex Chisholm to explain the issues, and that may be the only way [to] get round this”, and asks for thoughts.
If we scroll up to the first page, you’re included in this email chain but I don’t think you have any comments to make on this chain. If we scroll down, please, we see, at the bottom email, Patrick Bourke, 11 May, it says:
“I have just come off the phone to Richard Callard when this came up.
“Andy, Rod – shall we get on a call?”
Do you remember any call in 2018 relating to this issue?
Andrew Parsons: I think I did have a call but I can’t remember the details of it.
Mr Blake: Looking at this and just from your general reflections, to what extent do you consider the Government and UKGI, so far as you were aware, were properly sighted on the progress of the litigation?
Andrew Parsons: That’s difficult for me to comment on because I had limited visibility as to what information was moving from Post Office to UKGI, that was mainly handled by the Post Office in-house.
Mr Blake: From those who we saw copied in or sending those emails, did they ever give you any impressions about the desire to which they wanted to share or not share information with UKGI?
Andrew Parsons: Yeah, there were concerns expressed by, I think, mainly Jane MacLeod and Rodric Williams about sharing privileged information with UKGI. That’s not because they didn’t want to give it to UKGI; they just wanted to make sure it was being provided in a way that maintained privilege and confidentiality around that information but, beyond that, that was the only impression I had.
Mr Blake: Did you provide advice in that respect?
Andrew Parsons: I provided some advice around how they might mark up the protocol to cover privilege issues.
Mr Blake: Thank you. I’m going to move on to my penultimate topic, certain advice given by Brian Altman. Could we start with POL00333855, please. These are notes of a conference on 9 September 2013. First of all, if we scroll down slightly so you can see some of the handwritten markings, are you able to assist us with whose handwriting that is?
Andrew Parsons: It’s not mine but I couldn’t tell you whose it was otherwise.
Mr Blake: Are you able to assist us with how these kinds of minutes would be agreed?
Andrew Parsons: Because this was with Brian, the minutes would have been prepared by Gavin Matthews, so I don’t know what process he followed. I don’t recall though I think, specifically on this minute, I remember, I think, this went to Brian for approval, I think.
Mr Blake: Brian Altman?
Andrew Parsons: Brian Altman.
Mr Blake: Thank you. If we please could turn over the page to the bottom of the second page. We can see there in this draft version the penultimate paragraph, please. It says:
“In relation to the cut-off date, 1 January 2010 was close to the Horizon Online rollout. Prior to the [Horizon Online] rollout there was a cash audit done so that all [Post Office] branches balanced.”
If we turn to page 4, we can see these are an updated version of the minutes and, if we turn to page 6, we can see the same paragraph there. It’s slightly changed, so it now says:
“In relation to the cut-off date, 1 January 2010 was close to the Horizon Online rollout. Prior to the [Horizon Online] rollout there was a cash audit done so that all [Post Office] branches balanced. [Brian Altman] advised that there was no positive duty to seek out individuals pre-1 January 2010 but if [the Post Office] was approached it would need to make case-specific decisions on disclosure.”
So it has that extra sentence added there. If we could also, please, turn to page 3 of this document, we can see there, in this first version, there’s another section on Mr Altman’s advice:
“[Brian Altman] advised considerable caution in relation to mediation cases involving previously convict individuals (Seema Misra has already indicated an intention to be within the scheme). The concern is that lawyers acting for those individuals may be using the scheme to obtain information which they would not [and somebody has put in the word ‘normally’] be entitled to in order to pursue an appeal.”
If we turn to page 6, the updated version, we see there that the word “normally” has been put into that paragraph, so there seems to be a process by which somebody is making handwritten changes and the minutes are updated.
Could we please have on screen, side by side, the current document, and also POL00333856. If we start on the first page on both, please, now on the 856 version, there is also handwriting. Could we scroll down. If we keep on scrolling over the page, we can see some more handwriting. Are you able to assist us at all with that handwriting?
Andrew Parsons: No, other than to say it’s not mine.
Mr Blake: You can see that, if we put that side by side with 855 but we look at page 2 of 855 – sorry, actually, if we go down the page on the left-hand side to the bottom of the page – thank you very much – that’s the “in relation to the cut-off date” section. On the right-hand side, if we look at the bottom of page 2, please, we can see that that wasn’t in the original and has been added in, and we saw the further, final version, which had those handwritten notes added.
We can see the same, if you go to page 3, on the left-hand side, and 3 on the right-hand side. So the right-hand side had “normally” added and that’s now in place on the left-hand side.
It looks as though quite a lot of care has been taken over the minutes. Is that your understanding of the practice of your firm around this time, taking these kinds of minutes?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t recall that I was involved in the preparation of these minutes, so I couldn’t comment as to – I suspect they were prepared by Gavin and I can’t comment as to what approach he took.
Mr Blake: The section there on Brian Altman advising considerable caution, is that something that you recall from the meeting?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t recall it specifically from the meeting, but the general tenor of that advice I recall around that time.
Mr Blake: Advice coming from Mr Altman himself?
Andrew Parsons: From Mr Altman and also Cartwright King.
Mr Blake: Thank you. Could we please move on to POL00139866. This is Simon Clarke’s own note of that particular meeting – martin Smith’s note of that meeting, thank you very much.
If we scroll over the page, please, we can see a section there, halfway down, it says:
“Simon: We discussed last Friday: main problem is cultural. People in different departments. Needs to be a proper coming together.
“Rod: A lot of issues not important – eg turn computer off and then on again. And then things which may affect continuity – still need a steer.
“Simon: We said we would write a protocol: roles and responsibilities etc, centrally archived: owners of issues.”
Then it says this:
“QC: Refers to a couple of non-identified individuals (referring to [Simon Clarke’s] Advice on Disclosure and Duty to Retain).”
Then Simon says:
“Think [Post Office] have resolved those issues.”
If we move on to the actual notes that we’ve just been looking at, can we look at POL00021998, and the bottom of the first page, the note says:
“[Rodric Williams] then confirmed that the weekly hub meetings were starting to bed in, picking up any issues across the business which may relate to Horizon, [Simon Clarke] said there had been some ‘cultural issues’ at the start which had now been overcome but he thought it was necessary to put duties on individuals”, et cetera.
There is no mention there of the Simon Clarke Advice on the duty to retain, the shredding advice, as we know it. Can you assist us with why that might be?
Andrew Parsons: I wasn’t author of these minutes, unfortunately I can’t.
Mr Blake: Do you recall at that meeting that issue being discussed?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t recall the meeting.
Mr Blake: You don’t recall the meeting at all?
Andrew Parsons: I recall there was a meeting, I don’t recall the content of the meeting.
Mr Blake: Final topic: Scotland, Northern Ireland. What was your understanding of the Post Office’s legal advisory arrangements for the devolved nations?
Andrew Parsons: In all regards, do you mean or –
Mr Blake: Yes. Did you have any particular understanding about their actions in Scotland, Northern Ireland or any involvement in those?
Andrew Parsons: I – from a civil side, I believe they operated the same way as they did in England. On a criminal side, I understood that there was – that they couldn’t bring private prosecutions in Scotland. I can’t remember what the position was in Northern Ireland.
Mr Blake: Did any cases from Scotland or Northern Ireland fall within the remit of the things that you were advising on?
Andrew Parsons: Yes, because there were cases from Scotland and Northern Ireland within the Group Litigation.
Mr Blake: And outside of the Group Litigation?
Andrew Parsons: There may have been some in the Mediation Scheme as well but I now can’t recall.
Mr Blake: Did you have any involvement with Scottish firms instructed by the Post Office at any stage?
Andrew Parsons: I can’t recall any but I may have done, but I can’t recall.
Mr Blake: How about the Scottish CCRC?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t recall any.
Mr Blake: Okay. Thank you very much.
Sir, those are all of my questions.
Sir Wyn Williams: Right. Now, is it still the case that we have three would-be questioners –
Mr Blake: That’s correct, yes.
Sir Wyn Williams: – and that one is – well, have they agreed an order between them? Let me put it in that way first?
Mr Blake: I believe they have although I think they would appreciate our first morning break now, if possible, before we begin.
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, well, I’ve got no problem with that. Given the timescales that you’ve mentioned to me for questioning, we can take 15 minutes, can we not?
Mr Blake: Absolutely.
Sir Wyn Williams: So we’ll resume at 10.45.
Mr Moloney: Sir, for the benefit of (unclear – microphone off) can I indicate that, during the course of the morning, Mr Blake has dealt with the document that I intended to focus on with Mr Parsons, so I can now say that the Inquiry will not be burdened with questions from me.
Sir Wyn Williams: Well, it’s never a burden, Mr Moloney, but thank you for letting me know.
Mr Blake: In that case, it will be Mr Stein followed by Mr Henry – ah, Mr Jacobs followed by Mr Henry.
Sir Wyn Williams: Mr Jacobs, fine. So that’s the order. Just so that we can plan it properly, Mr Jacobs is of the order of half an hour, yes?
Mr Jacobs: Sir, I hope to be shorter but, yes, about half an hour, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: That’s fine, and Mr Henry an hour?
Mr Henry: Sir, would you –
Sir Wyn Williams: I think we will – sorry, Mr Henry.
Mr Henry: I do apologise. I didn’t mean to cut across you. I just wanted to see if it might be possible that I could take an hour and ten.
Sir Wyn Williams: All right. I don’t think there’s any problem with that. It’s just ensuring that the stenographer has an appropriate break as between Mr Jacobs and you. Can I ask you, Mr Henry, do you want to do your hour and ten in one go, preferably or would you be happy to have a break in the middle of it?
Mr Henry: I’d be very happy to have a break in the middle of it, if that is what you and the shorthand-writer would like, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Right. Well, we’ll see how we go and I’ll bear all those things in mind.
So we’ll have our first break now and, since I’ve been talking in the 15 minutes, we’ll start at 10.50, Mr Blake.
Mr Blake: Thank you, sir.
Just to add, Ms Dobbin has a few questions, as well.
Sir Wyn Williams: Oh, well, if we’re talking about minutes, then that’s no problem.
Mr Blake: Thank you very much.
(10.34 am)
(A short break)
(10.50 am)
Sir Wyn Williams: Are we ready? Yes. I can see Mr Jacobs preparing his microphone.
Mr Jacobs: Thank you, sir. Can you hear me, sir?
Questioned by Mr Jacobs
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, I can, thank you very much.
Mr Jacobs: Mr Parsons, good morning. I ask questions on behalf of 156 subpostmasters who are Core Participants in this Inquiry and are represented by Howe+Co. Some of our clients attended the Inquiry yesterday and are here today, and many, many others are watching remotely through the live feed.
The view that they’ve expressed, and I think you were asked a question yesterday on the same point, is that you became too close to your client. We saw yesterday, after the Panorama programme in 2015, you asked a question of your client whether the Post Office could start attacking the postmasters’ credibility, calling people out as the “liars and criminals that they are”, your words, page 111 of the transcript from yesterday.
Mr Parsons, you had a client which was behaving badly but, instead of taking a step back, you joined in with what they were doing. You joined in and helped them, essentially, throwing subpostmasters under the bus.
Now, my question for you is, having been taken to the documents that Mr Blake took you to yesterday and today, are you now able to accept that that is what you did?
Andrew Parsons: Back at the time, I accept that some of the language I used was too strong. I look back on some of the decisions we made and think now we could have made different decisions and, as I say in my statement, I apologise for the mistakes my firm made along the way. But back – if we’re talking back at the beginning of the process, at that time, I understood Post Office to have a fairly arguable case, that Horizon worked and, as a result of that and being their lawyer, I am required to advance their case on their behalf.
Mr Jacobs: Mr Parsons, did you conspire with your client to downplay important matters so as to keep subpostmasters in the dark about the very issues which have given rise to this public scandal?
Andrew Parsons: I never conspired with my client in that regard. We would consider each matter as it came up. Some issues we thought were more important than others, some issues we would emphasise more than others and some issues, which we considered irrelevant, we would de-emphasise.
Mr Jacobs: Well, on the topic, then, of conspiring to downplay important matters can we look at POL00129392 and it’s page 2 of 3, if we could scroll down.
Mr Parsons, while we’re waiting for that to come up on our screens, it’s an email dated 17 June 2014, which you sent to Chris Aujard, Jarnail Singh, Angela van den Bogerd, Belinda Crowe and others. We’ll just wait for it to emerge.
Thank you. If we could go down to page 2., and further down, please. So it’s this email here. So it’s from you and you say:
“I’ve just spoken with [Cartwright King] about a new CQR from Howe+Co that references the Helen Rose Report.”
Then you talk about the Rose Report being retrospectively disclosed in a number of prosecution cases, drawing into question statements made by Gareth Jenkins, and a copy of the report has made its way to Howe+Co.
The paragraph I want to highlight is the paragraph that begins “The point of concern”, the third paragraph.
“The point of concern is that the M060 CQR is starting to make the link between (1) the fact that the [Helen Rose] Report makes it clear that [Gareth Jenkins] knew of issues with Horizon and (2) the fact that [Gareth Jenkins] never mentioned these issues in his prosecution evidence (see paragraph 53 …).”
We don’t have the CQR to hand.
Then you say:
“This line of inquiry draws into question the credibility of [Gareth Jenkins’] evidence.”
Then you make a criticism or potential criticism of Howe+Co, and you say:
“The sharing of the [Helen Rose] Report between applicants is potentially a breach of solicitors ethics/contempt of court. However, [Cartwright King] and I don’t believe attacking the solicitors on this point would be of benefit – if anything it may draw more attention to the [Helen Rose] Report.”
Then scrolling down again, the advice you give to your client is:
“Instead, our preferred approach is to downplay the importance of the [Helen Rose] report in any [Post Office] investigation reports. We recommend minimising or ignoring entirely the [Helen Rose] Report when responding to CQRs.”
My question for you, Mr Parsons, is: looking at this document, this clearly shows, doesn’t it, that you were concerned that Howe+Co were on the brink of discovering that Post Office’s expert in Horizon-based prosecutions had not been credible; that’s what you were downplaying or advising to downplay, isn’t it?
Andrew Parsons: I think it’s important to understand that the Helen Rose Report contained two separate pieces of information within the same document. One is the Gareth Jenkins issue, which was being addressed by the criminal lawyers, Cartwright King, and they had made a decision, some, I guess, nine months before this, to disclose the Helen Rose Report without telling subpostmasters about the Gareth Jenkins connection.
The second issue in the Helen Rose Report is about the reversal of transactions, which was the subject of spot review number 1. Now, from my perspective of advising on the scheme, where prosecution issues weren’t being considered, the relevant part of that report was the auto reversal of transactions in spot review one. So that’s my primary viewpoint on it. However, reading this again now, it seems to me that there was a more – there was a greater underlying problem here, which was the original disclosures by the criminal lawyers, and not drawing out that Gareth Jenkins connection.
Mr Jacobs: But it’s you, isn’t it, giving the advice to downplay the importance of the Helen Rose Report, not Cartwright King. You’re advising Post Office to minimise and ignore and downplay the report because you were concerned that Howe+Co were joining the dots together and would find out about Gareth Jenkins. This is what the email says, isn’t it?
Andrew Parsons: That was one of the concerns but I would just note, if you just scroll up slightly in that email, I believe it says, “I’ve just spoken to Cartwright King”.
Mr Jacobs: Yeah, yeah?
Andrew Parsons: And when it says “our approach”, that is clearly referencing the joint approach of both the criminal lawyers and the civil lawyers.
Mr Jacobs: The Helen Rose Report was a Pandora’s box, effectively, for solicitors acting for subpostmasters because it would enable them to challenge the Post Office and say on the reversals and the remote access points, “Well, you need to prove that the figures that you are accusing us of inputting actually came from the subpostmaster and not from the system or from Fujitsu”. That would have been an enormously important thing for Howe+Co and other lawyers representing people to have known about; that’s right, isn’t it?
Andrew Parsons: Sorry, as I understood it, Howe+Co had the Helen Rose Report. The only information that had been redacted from it was personal data. Those redactions were applied by the criminal lawyers, so I believe the rest of the issues in the report were there to be read.
Mr Jacobs: But not Gareth Jenkins?
Andrew Parsons: No, correct. Gareth Jenkins’ names had been redacted by the criminal lawyers.
Mr Jacobs: Well, you confirmed yesterday, didn’t you, in questions put to you by Mr Blake, that you advised that Gareth Jenkins’ name should stay redacted?
Andrew Parsons: As I said yesterday, I was passing on the advice of the criminal lawyers.
Mr Jacobs: Let’s have a look, shall we, going further up the email chain. So we need to scroll back up again, please. This was Jarnail Singh’s response to the email I have read out, and he says:
“Andy
“I am happy with the proposed approach and it’s sensible in the circumstances …”
Then he talks about issues being dealt with on a case-by-case basis.
My question for you is: what circumstances was Jarnail Singh talking about? Don’t you think he was referring to evidence having come to light which would cast doubt on Post Office’s assertion that Horizon was robust? Those were the circumstances: he knew and Post Office knew that their robust mantra could no longer be maintained.
Andrew Parsons: I don’t know what circumstances Jarnail Singh was referring to there.
Mr Jacobs: Well, isn’t the inference that when he says, “I am happy to take your advice and it’s sensible in the circumstances”, that you would know or there would be an understanding between you as to what the circumstances were?
Andrew Parsons: I’m reading that now and I can’t tell you what Jarnail Singh had in mind at that point.
Mr Jacobs: You had read the Simon Clarke Advice, I think, about nearly a year earlier.
Andrew Parsons: Mm-hm.
Mr Jacobs: Do you think he was referring to that because you were referring to Gareth Jenkins’ credibility in the email?
Andrew Parsons: He could quite possibly, especially given that he was a criminal lawyer at Post Office.
Mr Jacobs: So, essentially, what you were doing for your client was covering up the subject matter of the Clarke Advice, weren’t you?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t think that’s a fair characterisation of it. I think the – I think there is a question to be asked about the original decision back in, I guess, mid-2013 following the Clarke Advice and the disclosure of the Helen Rose Report by the criminal lawyers, as to why they redacted Gareth Jenkins’ name and why they didn’t call out at that point the connection. At this stage, I’m looking to pass on the advice from the criminal lawyers – which is their decision, they’ve made those choices, I’m not a criminal lawyer – and I’m looking at it also from the perspective of the scheme. As I say, from a scheme perspective, it’s a different question.
Mr Jacobs: I don’t want to repeat myself, Mr Parsons, but this is you advising your client. This isn’t a Cartwright King letter, it’s your letter, isn’t it?
Andrew Parsons: It is but I think it’s clear from the email sent below that I’d spoken to Cartwright King, it reflected a combined approach, and they’re all copied on the email.
Mr Jacobs: We’re now in 2024. It’s right, isn’t it, Mr Parsons that if you hadn’t advised Post Office to downplay, minimise or ignore the Gareth Jenkins issue in June 2014, the last ten years of the lives of hundreds of subpostmasters, who have been convicted, bankrupted, lost their reputations, would have been very different. Do you see that?
Andrew Parsons: I do see that but, as I say, I think that goes back to the original problem back in 2013 and the decisions Post Office made around their criminal disclosures at that point in time.
Mr Jacobs: I want to move on to another topic, which is the conduct of the Mediation Scheme. I’m just going to take you to – I’m going to refer you to a couple of statements you made in your witness statement. We don’t need to turn them up. At paragraph 149.2 of your statement, you say:
“If a case went to mediation, a lawyer from WBD would attend in person to represent POL. I recall attending two or three mediations personally but generally this was done by members of the WBD team who I supervised.”
That’s right, isn’t it?
Andrew Parsons: Sorry, can you give me the reference again, it hasn’t come up.
Mr Jacobs: Yes, it’s paragraph 149.2.
Sir Wyn Williams: I think, Mr Parsons, Mr Jacobs was wanting to do this without getting this up on screen but you want it up on screen so that you can see it?
Andrew Parsons: I’ve got a hard copy.
Mr Jacobs: You have a hard copy. That might save time. So you’ve got that, haven’t you?
Andrew Parsons: Yes.
Mr Jacobs: I’ll just read at paragraph 253.3 of your statement, that might involve a bit of rapid page turning on your part. I’ll read it out while you’re doing that. You say:
“I was not of the view that POL were refusing to engage properly in the mediation process.”
Now, my question to you is: you must have been aware, Mr Parsons, that, in practice, the Post Office approach to mediations was disingenuous and amounted to a sham. Post Office were not mediating in good faith, were they?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t accept that.
Mr Jacobs: Well, I’ll develop my questions to you. Because we’ve spoken to many of our clients and let me tell you what one of our clients, Peter Holloway, has told a us what happened to him. He says he spent a lot of work preparing for the mediation, turned up, presented what he wanted to say, produced lots of documents in support of his arguments and then everybody went away and the mediator came back to see him at about 3.00 in the afternoon, looking tired, Mr Holloway says haggard, and the mediator apologised to him and he said “Post Office are refusing to make any offer”. He couldn’t quite believe it. He said that “The Post Office representatives had been sent to the mediation with express instructions not to settle at all”.
This isn’t just Mr Holloway telling us this. We’ve spoken to at least a dozen other clients who attended mediations and they all say that Post Office sent representatives, Bond Dickinson were there, to mediations with no authority or instructions to settle. That’s what is what was going on, isn’t it?
Andrew Parsons: So each case was assessed on its own merits. Some of those cases we advised Post Office to settle, some of them we advised Post Office not to settle. There was then a discussion internally about whether performance should still attend mediations where it had no mandate to settle, and the view taken was that it was appropriate still to attend those mediations so that the issues between the parties could be discussed. I can understand why that would have been frustrating for some of your clients but it was a decision taken in good faith at the time.
Mr Jacobs: Well, there were offers made in some cases but our instructions from our clients are the offers were always derisory, and we’ve heard Paula Vennells talk about token offers, and they were made on the basis that the subpostmaster agreed not to bring any action in the future against the Post Office. So, essentially, what Post Office were doing, in the few cases where they made offers, which were derisory, was they were using the mediations to strengthen the position of Post Office against future claims, weren’t they?
Andrew Parsons: I think it’s fairly ordinary for two parties at a mediation who reach an arrangement to enter into a settlement and agreement of future claims.
Mr Jacobs: But making very derisory offers that didn’t represent the sort of claims that were made in the Group Litigation.
Andrew Parsons: I think two parties to a mediation will always have different views as to the value of offers put. As I say, Post Office went into those mediations in good faith, having considered every case. That was my understanding.
Mr Jacobs: Well, it’s not good faith, is it, Mr Parsons, to send representatives into a mediation with instructions to make no offer and not to settle?
Andrew Parsons: Well, I hope I explained that just a minute ago, that the intention – I accept that some mediations were conducted on the basis that there was no mandate to settle but the intention was to go and hopefully explain Post Office’s position, and it was thought there was still value in having that conversation.
Mr Jacobs: Can I put to you an explanation of Post Office’s position in the mediations that has already been received in evidence by the Inquiry, and it comes from Alan Bates. In his witness statement at paragraph 157 – and we don’t need to put it on the screen but the reference is WITN00050100 – what Mr Bates says is:
“I believe the Mediation Scheme failed as it was part of a cover-up by POL. I expect POL discovered things they did not like and did not want to come out. There was definitely an element of not wanting to accept fault. I believe POL had no intention whatsoever of getting to a mutually acceptable and fair decision. If anything, it seemed as if POL had been using the scheme as a fishing expedition to see what evidence subpostmasters actually had about Horizon.”
My question for you, Mr Parsons, is that Alan Bates is right, isn’t he? You supervised this; you were using the Mediation Scheme in an adversarial way in order to obtain some sort of tactical advantage against the subpostmasters?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t recognise that description of the Mediation Scheme. My understanding is Post Office went into it in good faith with an intention to reinvestigate the 150 cases and, where those cases showed errors on Post Office’s part, it was willing to settle.
Mr Jacobs: My final questions for you: in your witness statement, you haven’t made any apology or statement of regret for your actions and many of our clients have been aghast at the content of the evidence that you’ve given, the emails that Mr Blake took you to yesterday.
Sally Stringer is one of our clients and she emailed Mr Enright, who sits next to me, at 10.20 this morning, and what she says of you and your evidence:
“His evidence is the absolute epitome of arrogance, deceit, corporate corruption and is an absolute disgrace.”
I suppose you might think that’s quite strong language, Mr Parsons?
Andrew Parsons: I have apologised within my statement and, to make it clear, I’ll apologise again now. During my time acting for Post Office, we made some mistakes along the way. I apologised for them at the time and I apologise to your clients for them now.
Mr Jacobs: Do you have anything to say for the suffering that Post Office’s advice and your advice to Post Office caused to clients of ours, such as, for example Ms Stringer and Mr Holloway?
Andrew Parsons: Unfortunately, I don’t know them personally. I recognise the suffering of some of the subpostmasters and, to the extent that mistakes I made contributed to that, I apologise.
Mr Jacobs: I just need to find out if I have any more questions to ask. I may not, but Mr Stein and Enright will tell me.
I haven’t any more questions for you, thank you.
Sir Wyn Williams: Thank you.
Mr Henry, can I invite you to take a break in your questioning at some point which is convenient to your line of questioning but which will give the stenographer a bit of a breather?
Mr Henry: Of course, sir.
Questioned by Mr Henry
Mr Henry: Mr Parsons, on the contrary, I’m going to suggest that you didn’t make any mistakes at all and that what you did – I mean there were errors of judgement, obviously, there were very serious departures from standards that ought to have applied, but that what you did was deliberate. It was clear sighted, it was ruthless.
Andrew Parsons: Sorry, are you asking me to comment on that?
Mr Henry: Yes.
Andrew Parsons: I’m a lawyer acting for Post Office. As a lawyer, it’s my responsibility to defend their interests. For a large part of my engagement by Post Office, my instructions were that they considered the Horizon system to be a reliable system and, therefore, I defended it along those lines.
Mr Henry: That was the mantra, that was the creed, but you could see that that fundamentalist approach – you must have seen that that fundamentalist approach – had yawning gaps in it but you didn’t confront your client about that, did you?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t think it’s fair to characterise it that way. I think from the start, back when I began, which was mid-2013, the group that I was working with had in their mind that there could be another version of events out there. They believed Horizon was a reliable system but they were open to the possibility of it not being.
Mr Henry: They were open to the possibility?
Andrew Parsons: They were open to the possibility of it and that is why they decided, in my view, to open up a mediation scheme to allow subpostmasters to raise those issues.
Mr Henry: You know perfectly well why the Mediation Scheme was set up. You must have gathered that it was Paula Vennells’ idea, “We’ve been lumbered with this liability by the Royal Mail Group, let’s try and tie it all up, and get rid of it as cheaply as possible, and avert the risk of a class action”. That’s the whole point: it was grudging; it was insincere; it was cynical.
Andrew Parsons: No, I think it’s fair to say that Post Office believed the Horizon system worked and, therefore, they believed they were in the right position but, at the same time, the Mediation Scheme was set up, as much as I could see, with a genuine attempt to understand the complaints of the subpostmasters and, if possible, resolve them.
Mr Henry: Well, then why did you say – and there’s no need to go to the email because it’s already been canvassed by Counsel to the Inquiry – why did you say that you didn’t think there was any prospect of settling any of the cases through the mediation?
Andrew Parsons: As I explained yesterday, that email was set up – was sent before the scheme was fully developed and there was an investigation phase built into it, and my expectation at the point at which they built the investigation phase in, is that may give rise to new information which may cause Post Office to settle some cases. However, I accept there was a large delta between the parties and that makes it difficult to settle.
Mr Henry: But you say it was a view expressed before it was fully set up and worked out but, when you look at the history of the Mediation Scheme, it was a complete sham, wasn’t it?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t accept that for the –
Mr Henry: It ended in utter failure, didn’t it?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t believe so. I think it did a lot of good work investigating 150 cases and I don’t have the statistics before me but, in a good number of cases, settlements were reached.
Mr Henry: I want to go back now, very briefly, to 9 September 2013, and just help us, please. I don’t quite understand your evidence. What are your memories of that consultation that took place at 2 Bedford Row?
Andrew Parsons: I recall there was a consultation, I can recall being in 2 Bedford Row chambers in the room but I can’t really recall any of the details of what was discussed.
Mr Henry: Or is it that you don’t want to, Mr Parsons?
Andrew Parsons: I’m afraid it was a long time ago and I just can’t recall the details.
Mr Henry: A long time ago, of course, but let’s not forget the context. I mean, you were involved in arranging that consultation together with Mr Matthews, weren’t you?
Andrew Parsons: Primarily it was Mr Matthews but I accept that.
Mr Henry: Yes, and it was a very, very serious problem that you had because you had the coalescing of the Second Sight Interim Review and then the revelation, of course, of Gareth Jenkins and the Clarke Advice. You were made aware of the problems with Gareth Jenkins, you say, from about 8 July and you read the Clarke Advice on 17 July, correct?
Andrew Parsons: Correct.
Mr Henry: Right. So there must have been quite a lot of expectation and anticipation. I mean, “How is the great man, Mr Altman, going to get us out of this mess?” You must have been thinking like that. I mean, you did want to advance in your profession, didn’t you?
Andrew Parsons: As I’ve said before, I wasn’t advising on the criminal side but it’s fair to say I was interested to understand what Brian’s advice was going to be.
Mr Henry: I’m sure you were interested, and why were you interested?
Andrew Parsons: Because it was a serious issue.
Mr Henry: Yes, and that serious issue will have impacted with the civil cases that you were trying to keep at bay.
Andrew Parsons: I didn’t see it that way at the time, though I –
Mr Henry: You didn’t?
Andrew Parsons: – though I recognised there was a crossover between subpostmasters who had been criminally convicted and the civil claims they might then subsequently bring –
Mr Henry: Are you really saying to the Chairman of this Inquiry that you didn’t see it that way at the time?
Andrew Parsons: It wasn’t the way I was thinking about matters.
Mr Henry: Well, we’ll come to that but let’s just concentrate on who was there. Can I take it that you were the most junior person in the room?
Andrew Parsons: Yes.
Mr Henry: Now, Mr Jarnail Singh was there, and I don’t think he’s going to be taking many notes!
Then there was Susan Crichton, she was General Counsel, rather too senior, perhaps.
There was Rodric Williams: was he scribbling?
Andrew Parsons: My general recollection of Rod is he was someone who made notes. I can’t recall if he was in that meeting.
Mr Henry: You would recognise his handwriting?
Andrew Parsons: Maybe.
Mr Henry: Maybe. Mr Clarke was there, Mr Bowyer was there, Mr Smith was there. We know that Mr Smith was writing notes and then he typed them up. Your partner was there, Mr Matthews. You, however, were the senior associate, you would have been the deputed notetaker, wouldn’t you?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t recall being asked to take notes in that conference. I haven’t being able to locate any of my notes from that conference.
Mr Henry: You haven’t?
Andrew Parsons: We’ve had a look, I –
Mr Henry: What a shame. I wonder where they went to.
Sir Wyn Williams: Well, hang on: he hasn’t accepted that he made notes, Mr Henry.
Mr Henry: You’ve looked for you – you say you’ve looked?
Andrew Parsons: We’ve tried to locate my old notebooks.
Mr Henry: So would you have been doing it on to a computer or would you have been actually writing it out?
Andrew Parsons: I suspect, back at that time, I would have taken notes on paper.
Mr Henry: Right. I mean, it’s not an invariable practice but often the most junior person in the room, the senior associate in your case, would be the notetaker because they’re the least involved in the discussions and they are, more or less, observing events and so, therefore, they are there to take an assiduous note. Are you saying that you have no recollection of note taking?
Andrew Parsons: I have no recollection of taking notes in that meeting.
Mr Henry: Right. I mean, obviously you would have wanted to have been diligent and you would have wanted to have impressed, wouldn’t you?
Andrew Parsons: Well, at that time, impressed who?
Mr Henry: Well, your partner and the other people in the room. I mean, you were a senior associate. Presumably, you had designs on partnership?
Andrew Parsons: At the time, Gavin Matthews was the partner in the room. I knew him well and, as I explained, he was leading on that line of work.
Mr Henry: Right. Well, I want to come, please, to those notes because I’m going to suggest that the ones that were preserved by your firm were sanitised. You’ve already been taken to the point that there is no mention of shredding. Do you have no recollection of shredding being mentioned?
Andrew Parsons: No.
Mr Henry: There’s no mention of “other Misras crawling out of the woodwork”. Do you remember an expression of that kind being used by leading counsel?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t recall that.
Mr Henry: No. It’s a rather unfortunate expression, isn’t it?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t really have a view on it.
Mr Henry: You surely – I mean, are you saying that you have no recollection of that?
Andrew Parsons: I have no recollection.
Mr Henry: No mention of a direct question post by your partner Gavin Matthews, “Should we apologise to Seema Misra?” and leading counsel saying, “I wouldn’t”?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t recall that.
Mr Henry: And curiously at all, no mention at all whether, in the circumstances, there should be prompt disclosure to Mrs Misra of the discreditable conduct and breach of court duties of Gareth Jenkins.
Andrew Parsons: If that’s what the minute says, that’s what the minute says, but I don’t recall those discussions.
Mr Henry: No, I’m saying that there is no mention of it at all and, surely, Mr Parsons, in a case where the Post Office has relied upon Mr Jenkins as to the efficacy of the Horizon system, they would be bound to disclose material which undermined his status as an expert witness, wouldn’t they?
Andrew Parsons: That was a matter for the criminal lawyers to advise on.
Mr Henry: No, Mr Parsons. You’re a lawyer. You were heavily involved – and we’ll see how heavily you were involved when I ask you further questions about this in the instructions of Mr Altman – and you had a brain.
I put it to you again: in a case where the Post Office has relied on Mr Jenkins as to the efficacy of the Horizon system, they were bound to disclose material to Mrs Misra which undermined his status as an expert witness?
Andrew Parsons: That’s what I understand the position to be from the criminal lawyers.
Mr Henry: Yet there is no mention at all in the minutes, no mention at all of that being discussed. Do you find that odd?
Andrew Parsons: Yes, I do find that odd, given that that was probably the – one of the key issues that was under review at that point in time.
Mr Henry: Yes. Now, I want to come, please, to a document that you sent under cover of an email which we don’t need to get up but, just for the sake of the record, it’s POL00021991, and you sent it to Mr David Oliver and Mr Chris Aujard, and it was in connection with Linklaters being approached, and the document I want to put up is POL00006484. You’re familiar with this document?
Andrew Parsons: I’m aware of it.
Mr Henry: You were aware of it enough to forward it to David Oliver and Chris Aujard when they were considering the appointment of Linklaters, and I suggest that this shows what was really in the background all the time, which dictated the actions that you and others, Mr Parsons – because it’s not just you – that you and others took. So I want to go to the second bullet point. It is reported that leading counsel, Mr Morgan, said:
“The proposal to instruct an independent expert to prepare a report on the Horizon system is the highest risk response to the issue. What will it achieve? It will not be able to address any of the civil/criminal cases dealt with under ‘Old Horizon’ [so that would be Legacy Horizon]. Will it seek to review particular cases? If so, which ones?”
So immediately there, there is identified the problem of pre-2010 cases; do you agree?
Andrew Parsons: Correct, yes.
Mr Henry: Next bullet point:
“Whatever the findings of the expert report it will not resolve the problem. [The Post Office] will be ‘damned if they do and damned if they don’t’. If the findings are that there are no issues with Horizon people will see that as a ‘whitewash’ whereas if the findings are negative, that will open the floodgates to damages claims by SPMs who were imprisoned for false accounting and Access Legal will start to pursue all the civil cases they are currently sitting on.”
Now, can you just help us, please, who were Access Legal; were they a funder?
Sir Wyn Williams: No, I think they were Shoosmiths by another name, weren’t they?
Mr Henry: I’m very grateful, sir. Thank you.
So Shoosmiths, part of which Shoosmiths was one firm, part of a conglomerate of solicitors’ firms, a network of solicitors firms; is that right?
Andrew Parsons: That’s my recollection, yes.
Mr Henry: Right. So if the findings are that there are no issues with Horizon, it’s a whitewash; whereas, if they’re negative, floodgates. That was a matter, as well, that you were aware of, that there was a dam and, behind that dam, there were hundreds, and hundreds, and hundreds, perhaps, in fact, thousands of subpostmasters who were the victim of unjust claims for compensation by the Post Office in respect of fictitious losses, and a lesser number, but still in their hundreds, of people who had either been convicted or had been, through force of circumstance, forced to plead guilty to, as the example is given there, false accounting.
Andrew Parsons: Just as a point of context, this note is from June 2012. I didn’t become involved until nearly a year later. I don’t recall when this note was first provided to me. As to your question, I think it was always known by people at the Post Office and the Legal Team that, if Horizon was found to be fundamentally flawed, that would lead to a large, wide range of legal liabilities.
Mr Henry: So whether you actually had personal knowledge of this note or not, it reflects, nevertheless, what would have been the concerns to of the Post Office and also the concerns of Gavin Matthews, who was handling the Post Office Account?
Andrew Parsons: I think it’s an almost natural consequence: if the IT system was found to be fundamentally flawed, there would be a wide range of legal liabilities.
Mr Henry: Yes. That’s why I suggest you are part of the policy of keeping it all at bay. To put it in a nutshell: delay, deny, get rid of the judge, if you have to, but keep it all at bay. That was part of the policy that you signed up to, at Bond Dickinson.
Andrew Parsons: I don’t accept that. When I began in 2013, the instructions I had is that Post Office believed the system was reliable. Second Sight had just concluded their Interim Review and found that there was no systemic problem. The basis on which we operated was that understanding. That understanding is obviously wrong but it wasn’t understood to be wrong at the time.
Mr Henry: Now, do you remember, when I asked you to consider your mindset when you went to that consultation on 9 September 2013 about whether you had concerns about floodgates and civil claims if criminal prosecutions were undone, and you said it wasn’t operating in your mind at the time. There’s no need to get it up but you do remember that, not that long after that, on 8 October 2013, you made a presentation to the Sparrow Working Group, didn’t you?
Andrew Parsons: I may have done. If you can help me with –
Mr Henry: You were taken to it yesterday. If need be, if you’d like to see it again, we’ll get it up on the screen. It’s POL00022002, and it’s page 14 of that document. Mr Blake took you to it and I think it’s page 14. I do hope I’m right about that.
Yes. There it is:
“Horizon inaccurately records data/transactions.
“Recommended threshold of proof before offering a remedy.
“Very clear proof of technical defect in Horizon.
“Risks
“[The Post Office] should be slow to concede that Horizon has any technical faults.”
I thought you were saying they thought it was robust?
Andrew Parsons: They believed at that time it was a reliable system. It had obviously, at that point in time, already disclosed the three known bugs, at that point in time. As I accepted yesterday, I think the bar that is set there, on reflection, is now too high.
Mr Henry: But look what you say, “to do so could open up the floodgates to a large number of claims”. They must have been within your knowledge; you must have known that they were behind the damn.
Andrew Parsons: As I said before, if – it was always known to me, and I suspect others at Post Office, that, if there was found to be a fundamental problem in Horizon, that affected a large number of subpostmasters, then that would open them up to a large number of claims.
Mr Henry: Then, of course, you put it in terms like this: it would be almost impossible to reverse this position if conceded. I’m going to use the term “domino effect”; if the pin comes out of the grenade, then you can’t predict where the shrapnel is going to end up?
Andrew Parsons: The concern at this time was that there was some underlying fault in Horizon that was causing a wide range of losses that could explain the subpostmasters’ concerns. Now, we had no evidence of that at the time and that’s what we were concerned to understand and that’s what that’s a reference to.
Mr Henry: Did you like Second Sight?
Andrew Parsons: On a personal level, yes.
Mr Henry: Just help me with this because it may be that I’ve got the wrong end of the stick but could we go to POL00021686, and could we scroll down, I think it is. I always say scroll up but if we could scroll down.
We’ve got 15 February 2016, you to Mr Bourke, Mr Underwood, Rodric Williams, copied Daniel Fawcett:
“Patrick, Mark, Rodric
“[For you information] below. Dan found this in the [Second Sight] emails. It looks like [Second Sight] feeding questions to Alan for use with MPs.”
If we scroll up, we can see that Mr Fawcett has got access to, for example, emails from Chris Holyoak to Ian Henderson, Ron Warmington; who is Daniel Fawcett?
Andrew Parsons: He’s one of the lawyers at Womble Bond Dickinson.
Mr Henry: Was he junior to you or of the same – you were a managing associate at the time, I think?
Andrew Parsons: Scroll up, please, so I can see the date. I would have still been a managing associate then. I think I was made up to partner on 1 May 2016.
Mr Henry: So how did you get hold of these Second Sight emails?
Andrew Parsons: At the end of the Mediation Scheme, Second Sight was asked to return all its emails to Post Office for safekeeping.
Mr Henry: Was there any confidentiality implied in the return?
Andrew Parsons: Not in –
Mr Henry: In other words, that they were, you know, returned but nevertheless remained confidential?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t recall any.
Mr Henry: Right. So this is after they’ve left the scheme. What were you trying to do, accumulate dirt on them?
Andrew Parsons: No. It was just an observation I’d made to others at the Post Office. As I explained yesterday, one of the concerns I had about Second Sight is I felt that they were leaning too much in favour of the subpostmasters, and had lost some of their neutrality. I think I probably forwarded it because that email seems to be evidence of that point.
Mr Henry: Who instructed you to do this? I say “you”, of course it was done by Mr Fawcett but you’re forwarding his product. Who was instructing you to do this?
Andrew Parsons: Sorry, to review Second Sight’s emails, do you mean?
Mr Henry: Yes.
Andrew Parsons: I can’t recall the context here I’m just looking at the subject line, which says “POL DSARs – SS Docs”. If I remember, there was a period around 2015/2016, where Post Office received a lot of data subject access requests from subpostmasters, so it may have been they were being reviewed in that context.
Mr Henry: Well, let’s go, please, now to POL00413924. We can see that the heading “Second Sight – disclosure information to [the Post Office] on prosecutions”, Mr Jarnail Singh forwards it. Could we scroll down, please, and could we scroll further down, please. Yes, there we are:
“Andy
“This was a formal request and needs to be dealt with formally by Second Sight. As [Mr Altman] advised it can then be reconsidered. If then Second Sight still feel uncomfortable dealing with our request for disclosure, we may ask them to provide a witness statement to clarify their position on disclosure.”
So this is trying to obtain information from Second Sight, is it?
Andrew Parsons: I believe the context to this is that, at a Working Group meeting, I think it was, Second Sight had indicated that they believed they had evidence that was relevant to prosecutions.
Mr Henry: Yes. Can we just scroll up, please, or scroll down – we want to go to the next one. Yes.
Then there is an email from you, if we could keep on scrolling down, please – further, please. I’m so sorry, I’m not finding the part. There is an email where you say that you “gently warned” Mr Ron Warmington. So if we could just go and see that. It’s in the body of this email. It’s page 2., yes. Thank you so much.
It’s the penultimate paragraph:
“Ron is going to write a response to Post Office along the above lines. I have gently warned [Ron Warmington] that he needs to be careful about anything he says in relation to criminal prosecutions as such comments are under heavy scrutiny and will have consequences.
“… he is now more comfortable with how to handle the situation. Hopefully, [the Second Sight] letter will close down the issue.”
Can you help, please: who was heavily scrutinising Mr Warmington’s comments about criminal prosecutions?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t think it was specifically aimed at Mr Warmington’s clients, he –
Mr Henry: Well, then why did you “gently warn” him?
Andrew Parsons: So my recollection, and it is rather dim now, is that Mr Warmington had said at a meeting that he had material that he thought was relevant to prosecutions. That had caused Post Office to respond to that and discuss whether they then needed to get access to that information, what they were going to do with the information if he did have it, et cetera, et cetera, but the output of this, actually, is Mr Warmington accepted he didn’t have such information or at least he didn’t have any new information.
And so the point of the conversation with Ron was that – to say to him he needs to be careful of what he says because he’ll set hares running on these points which causes a lot of work to be done, in this case, actually, for no purpose at all.
Mr Henry: Why didn’t you say that? Why have you said instead “I gently warned him that he needs to be careful about anything he says in relation to criminal prosecutions as such comments are under heavy scrutiny and will have consequences”?
Andrew Parsons: I’ve given you my explanation for it, which is, if comments are made by people at this time that they believe they had material relevant to prosecutions, that was something Post Office was alive to and they needed to do something about.
Mr Henry: At its most anodyne, this was an attempt to steer Second Sight away from their interest in criminal cases, the investigation of criminal cases and the prosecution of criminal cases, wasn’t it?
Andrew Parsons: No, it wasn’t.
Mr Henry: At its worst, it has all of the appearances of a threat?
Andrew Parsons: No, it wasn’t. I don’t believe it was and I believe there is a letter, actually, from Second Sight at the end of this somewhere –
Mr Henry: Was this is an attempt to close the lid on potential criminal appeals that might be caused by, to use the expression, “careless lips costs ships”, or, you know, blurting out something which might then be used by a prospective criminal appellant?
Andrew Parsons: Not at all. In fact, I think it’s the opposite. I think Post Office heard something in a meeting and acted diligently to figure out whether that was something of substance.
Mr Henry: What about the hare that you said this could set running?
Andrew Parsons: In terms of work being done in this case for no purpose because I believe the output is that Ron decided he didn’t actually have any material.
Mr Henry: We saw that you’re quite good at closing things down. I mean, for example – no need to take you to it but Mr Blake took you yesterday to what you described as “high-level advice”, which shut down the Lessons Learned Review, or, if it didn’t shut it down, it diluted the Lessons Learned Review because you were concerned about proactive disclosure in criminal cases. You remember that, you were taken to it?
Andrew Parsons: I remember the document but I think it’s important to remember that the instruction we had was to point out the risks. We weren’t asked to give an opinion on whether it should go forward, hence why my email contains a series of negative statements and risks.
Mr Henry: You also, I suggest, were quite astute in positioning Mr Altman so he did not feel it incumbent upon himself to point out a flagrant miscarriage of justice.
Andrew Parsons: I don’t recall any such conversation with Mr Altman and, as I tried to explain yesterday, I don’t believe I had substantial involvement in Mr Altman’s terms of reference.
Mr Henry: We saw yesterday, of course, Mr Matthews saying that Mr Altman should not opine on safety but wasn’t there also a debate as to whether his advice should be private or public?
Andrew Parsons: I recall that as a topic that was discussed.
Mr Henry: Wasn’t there also some fudging about the fact that, although he was being instructed by Bond Dickinson, there was toing and froing as to establishing his terms of reference –
Andrew Parsons: I –
Mr Henry: – the ambit of his instructions?
Andrew Parsons: I recall there was a terms of reference and there was some discussion about them but, as I explained yesterday, I don’t believe I had substantial involvement in them.
Mr Henry: Well, I want to go, please, to POL00297951, and this is you to Mr Rodric Williams, copied to Mr Matthews, regarding Mr Altman:
“… Brian looks like the right man for the job. In my view he was very impressive.
“He’s clearly undertaken this type of exercise before and is very live to the political dimension.”
Which was?
Andrew Parsons: At that time, Post Office was under pressure from a group of MPs following the publication of the Second Sight review.
Mr Henry: And the Post Office must not fail?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t recognise that comment.
Mr Henry: “Big question – is Brian’s work private advice for [the Post Office] or an independent assessment of [the Post Office’s] criminal law position? One for us all to think about.”
There, your partner – when I say your partner, the partner above you because you hadn’t yet been made a partner, had you?
Andrew Parsons: No, not at this time.
Mr Henry: No. The partner above you is being copied. Then you say:
“Short-term – Brian is going to assist with the response to the CCRC.”
Would that be the holding response?
Andrew Parsons: I can’t recall now where we were in the –
Mr Henry: It must have been the holding response, mustn’t it?
Andrew Parsons: It may well have been but, as I say, I can’t recall the exact sequence of letters.
Mr Henry: “Longer term – we need to draw up some terms of reference for his work. Gavin and I will have a first stab at this and then circulate this to the team.”
Then could I ask you, please, could we go to POL00298123 and could we go to page 2. This is, of course, signed off by Gavin Matthews:
“Our advice is:
“[The Post Office] legal needs to disclose Brian Altman’s interim review to [Cartwright King] and discuss it with them.
“[Cartwright King] should be asked to respond in writing to the recommendations made at paragraph 24 and paragraph 15.”
Then this:
“Bond Dickinson [that’s you] should sit down with Brian Altman to walk him through the spot review process and the [Second Sight] Report so that he can understand the impact of his review on the civil side.”
Help us about that, Mr Parsons. What does that mean?
Andrew Parsons: I think Brian wanted to understand more about the Second Sight Report and the spot review process. I don’t understand the comment at the end about the impact of his review on the civil side.
Mr Henry: You don’t understand that comment?
Andrew Parsons: I can understand that, if any of the convictions were found to be unsafe and overturned, it would have civil liabilities for Post Office but I don’t know what Gavin had specifically in mind with that comment.
Mr Henry: It’s all about the dam again, isn’t it?
Andrew Parsons: As I’ve accepted, my view at the time, and I believe others at the time, accepted that, if Horizon was to be found to be fundamentally flawed, it would give rise to potential legal liabilities.
Mr Henry: It would only take one successful criminal appeal where there was proper, candid disclosure, in accordance with the law, and the whole dam would collapse, wouldn’t it?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t recall thinking about things that way at the time.
Mr Henry: But you don’t understand, you say, so that Mr Altman can understand the impact of his review on the civil side. You tell the Chairman that you don’t understand what “on the civil side” means?
Andrew Parsons: No, I think I’ve tried to explain that I understood that, if a conviction was found to be unsafe, it would give rise to civil liabilities. That’s my general understanding of the interrelation of those, of the criminal side and the civil side. What I said is I didn’t understand what specifically Mr Matthews had in mind when he drafted that sentence.
Mr Henry: I want to try and deal, please, with one, if the shorthand writer, can cope with another ten minutes, I’m very grateful, sir –
Sir Wyn Williams: Well, hang on, Mr Henry. When you say another ten minutes, does that mean you’ll finish?
Mr Henry: No, sir, because I think I started at 11.20.
Sir Wyn Williams: Sure, I think it was a little earlier but never mind. I think, I’d prefer to take a break, if you don’t mind.
Mr Henry: Certainly, sir. Certainly.
Sir Wyn Williams: We’ll start again at 12.05, and then you can keep going, so to speak, until about 1.40, 1.45.
Mr Henry: That’s very kind of you, sir, thank you.
(11.50 am)
(A short break)
(12.05 pm)
Sir Wyn Williams: Ready when you are, Mr Henry.
Mr Henry: Thank you, sir.
Mr Parsons, solicitors have a fundamental duty to act in a way that upholds justice, do they not?
Andrew Parsons: Alongside a series of other ethical duties, correct.
Mr Henry: You don’t suggest, by saying that, that that fundamental principle is, as it were, subject or dependent upon the other principles?
Let’s reflect upon it: solicitors have a fundamental duty to act in a way that upholds justice. Yes or no?
Andrew Parsons: It is one of the duties. There are other duties as well. I don’t think those duties necessarily need to be incompatible with one another.
Mr Henry: Now, just help me, please. Who was giving the advice in relation to the redaction of Gareth Jenkins’ name? Do you say that was not your responsibility?
Andrew Parsons: Are you talking about the Helen Rose Report?
Mr Henry: Yes.
Andrew Parsons: No, I don’t believe it was my responsibility. It was redacted by Cartwright King.
Mr Henry: Anybody else?
Andrew Parsons: Not as far as I am aware.
Mr Henry: Did you ever gather anything at all from Mr Altman about what was to be done with Mrs Misra?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t recall Brian advising on anything specific with Mrs Misra but that may simply be, because so much time has passed, I can’t recall it.
Mr Henry: We know he was advising on 9 September 2013 that she should not be involved in the mediation process and the reason for that was that it might give her a ground of appeal, was it not?
Andrew Parsons: I recall the criminal lawyers, both Cartwright King and Brian, both voiced objections to subpostmasters with convictions participating in the scheme.
Mr Henry: I’m talking about the actual name of Mrs Misra being raised in that specific context, not just convicted people but Mrs Misra herself. It’s in the note.
Andrew Parsons: It may be. I don’t have it in front of me. I’m just saying I can’t recall that now.
Mr Henry: But you do recall – well, you’ve already agreed with Mr Blake. I won’t need to go further.
What happens if a criminal lawyer is giving advice which you don’t understand or which you consider to be wrong? That would surely put you under a duty to do something about it, wouldn’t it?
Andrew Parsons: I – if I had such awareness, I would, yes.
Mr Henry: You’ve already confirmed that you did have such an awareness because you don’t dissent from the proposition I put to you that, if the Post Office relied on Gareth Jenkins as a witness to convict any particular person, they would be bound to disclose material which undermined his status as an expert witness.
Andrew Parsons: That was my understanding from the criminal lawyers, yes.
Mr Henry: Right. Okay. Well, I want to now deal with Mrs Misra particularly, and could we go to WBON0000746. This is you to Mr Williams, to Mr Pheasant and also to Mr Matthews:
“I think I’ve pinned down what happened with Misra.
“This was a criminal case. We subsequently reviewed transcripts of the criminal proceedings to identify anything relevant to Horizon …
“[Attaches a memo, key findings].
“3 tables with detailed cross-reference to the Misra court transcripts identifying all the relevant material.”
I omit words.
“… having re-reviewed these documents, I can’t see anything that looks like the 14 Bug, the 62 Bug or the Falkirk Bug. However, it does appear that the Misra case went through Horizon in detail.”
Can we now turn, please, to – well, insofar as you can, by the 1 July, you got up to speed with Mrs Misra’s case?
Andrew Parsons: No. I think this was – work was undertaken by an associate in the team, and it was undertaken to specifically look for references to bugs, and so it had a very narrow remit as per the instruction we had from –
Mr Henry: But look at the materials referred to, a memo of the key findings, three tables with detailed cross-references, et cetera, et cetera. I mean, you said at the outset, “I think I pinned down what happened with Misra”.
Andrew Parsons: Yes. Based on those documents, I would have read them at the time to identify the question we were being asked, which is was there any references to bugs? I do note and just want to correct there, “I can’t see anything that looks like the Falkirk bug”. I think the Falkirk bug was referred to in Misra and that was a mistake.
Mr Henry: Quite right. POL00111625, please. Can we make the bottom left-hand corner – can we focus on the bottom left-hand corner. You drafted this, didn’t you?
Andrew Parsons: This document was provided to me at the start of today, so I’ve not had a chance to look into it. Though I note the bottom left-hand corner has a reference that looks like my firm’s reference.
Mr Henry: Yes.
Andrew Parsons: But the rest of the document isn’t in my firm’s house style, so I can’t now recall the provenance of the document.
Mr Henry: It’s got a “4A” reference, which is exactly the same reference that was put on the “Horizon Risks” document which at one point you thought had gone to the Board and served the dual purpose of advising the Board and also notifying the insurers. So that’s your firm’s reference, isn’t it?
Andrew Parsons: It looks like my firm’s reference.
Mr Henry: Right. So can we just go to page 2 of this document, please, paragraph 8, in brackets:
“We believe [James Arbuthnot] may feel that any interim findings which disclose any issue with Horizon should result in past criminal prosecutions by Post Office Limited being reopened and overturned.”
Paragraph 19, on page 4, please. You’re dealing with “The 2 Anomalies” there, the 62 branch, paragraph 20, page 5, the 14 branch, and then could we deal with paragraphs 30 to 32, please, on page 6. Now:
“The Falkirk Anomaly was the subject of evidence in the ‘Misra’ criminal prosecution, where:
“the defence expert asserted that its existence demonstrate that Horizon had faults which could cause losses, and therefore that possibility could not be excluded in Misra’s case.
“The prosecution expert (Gareth Jenkins from Fujitsu) asserted that it could not have been responsible for the losses because its clearly visible events had not manifested themselves in the branch records, and that it had been fixed more than a year earlier.
“Misra pleaded guilty to false accounting, and was convicted by a jury of theft. To reach this verdict, the jury had to be satisfied that the charges were proved beyond all reasonable doubt. She was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment. There has been no appeals against conviction.”
Of course, anybody reading that and anybody preparing that document would realise that, in order for her to be convicted on theft, the jury would have had to have been satisfied, as it says, beyond all reasonable doubt; and who was the prosecution expert? Gareth Jenkins.
Now, you were aware, as you’ve already said today, from paragraph 87 of your witness statement, of the Gareth Jenkins problem from 8 July and you received the Clarke Advice on 17 July 2013 from Susan Crichton. You read this document, didn’t you? Did you prepare it or were you part and parcel of preparing it?
Andrew Parsons: As I say, I haven’t had a chance to investigate it because I was only provided a copy this morning. It’s got our reference on it, which means it probably was sent to us at some point in time at least. I can’t now recall whether – what input I may have had into it or not.
Mr Henry: Could investigations be made into who was the author of that document; is that what you’re saying?
Andrew Parsons: It might be possible.
Mr Henry: Right. Well, Mr Parsons, Mrs Seema Misra and her lawyers should have been provided with information of Gareth Jenkins’ misfeasance as soon as possible after that misfeasance came to light, shouldn’t they?
Andrew Parsons: Looking back on it now, that seems – that would be my view but, at the time, that was being advised on by Cartwright King and Brian Altman, and I followed their advice.
Mr Henry: What about your fundamental duty to act in a way that upholds justice?
Andrew Parsons: At that time, I wasn’t aware that there was any problem with what – the choices the criminal lawyers had made.
Mr Henry: Can we just focus upon that because, of course, you’ve read the Clarke Advice, you are alerted to the problem, at least a week before – or slightly more than a week before you read the Clarke Advice. Mr Jenkins, an unreliable witness, correct?
Andrew Parsons: Correct.
Mr Henry: Post Office could no longer call him because his credibility was shot, correct?
Andrew Parsons: Correct.
Mr Henry: Failed in his duties to the court?
Andrew Parsons: That was the advice from the criminal lawyers.
Mr Henry: Said to have given false or misleading evidence in the cases in which he was involved?
Andrew Parsons: Again, that’s from the advice from the criminal lawyers.
Mr Henry: And you knew he had given oral evidence against Mrs Misra?
Andrew Parsons: I did.
Mr Henry: Right. Isn’t it obvious that the substance of the Clarke Advice, the facts which were not cloaked in privilege, should have been stated clearly to the CCRC in the holding letter you drafted?
Andrew Parsons: At that time, I was just drafting a holding letter whilst Post Office sought advice from their criminal lawyers.
Mr Henry: It seems, however, in that holding letter, that the Post Office is trading on Brian Altman, all in the context of the Second Sight Interim Review, but the tainted witness, the unsafe witness that gave evidence against Seema Misra isn’t mentioned in that CCRC letter at all.
Andrew Parsons: I haven’t got it in front of me but I don’t recall that he was mentioned in it.
Mr Henry: You accept that, don’t you, he’s not mentioned at all?
Andrew Parsons: That’s right.
Mr Henry: That letter is indefensible because of that omission, isn’t it?
Andrew Parsons: No –
Mr Henry: It gives false reassurance to the CCRC?
Andrew Parsons: At that time, it was just intended with a holding letter with an intention that further correspondence would follow about these issues.
Mr Henry: The omissions – and I’ve no need to repeat them, you’ve accepted what they are – the omissions are indefensible, aren’t they?
Andrew Parsons: Which omission are you referring to, Mr –
Mr Henry: Well, that Gareth Jenkins was in breach of his duty to the court, that “Oh, by the way we know he gave evidence orally and in writing in numerous cases, which is said to be misleading and he hasn’t acted in accordance with his obligations mandated by law, and the Criminal Procedure Rules, Rule 19. Instead we’ve appointed Brian Altman in relation to the Second Sight Interim Review”, and you continue to trade off Brian Altman’s reputation going forward as well, don’t you?
Andrew Parsons: That isn’t how I recall the events. My recollection is that Post Office was seriously concerned about the Clarke Advice and Gareth Jenkins’ past testimony. That is why they instructed Brian Altman, to give them a view that they were doing the right things in response to that situation.
Mr Henry: They were seriously concerned because the facts are dealt with in the Clarke Advice and the Clarke Advice itself is the pin in the grenade and they wanted to keep the pin in the grenade, rather than the grenade going off; that’s the truth, isn’t it?
Andrew Parsons: Not as far as – not that I can recall at that time but I wasn’t sighted on the decisions that were made on who should get what disclosure and what disclosure should be given.
Mr Henry: Well, you actually are concerned sometimes in cases and you actually query Mr Clarke – we’ll come to it if necessary – and say, “Well, shouldn’t this be given?”
Andrew Parsons: I saw that as the role of Cartwright King under the supervision of Brian Altman.
Mr Henry: Right. Advice is given, and you give this advice, that the report – that’s Mr Altman’s general review – gives good grounds to resist any formal external review of the Post Office’s historic prosecutions, ie by the CCRC – that document is POL00123004, I don’t need to take you to it – but no one is mentioning Seema Misra, are they?
Andrew Parsons: Do you mean in that particular document?
Mr Henry: Yes.
Andrew Parsons: I don’t recall her being mentioned in that document.
Mr Henry: No. Again, an indefensible position. The advice is given that the report gives good grounds to resist any formal, external review, yet all of that rottenness, all of that taint in relation to the architect of the system and the expert that the Post Office had used is airbrushed from the picture. It’s deliberate, isn’t it?
Andrew Parsons: No, not as far as I can recall. My understanding was that Post Office thought that, if Cartwright King were to make the correct disclosures in the cases having undertaken their review and that Brian Altman had reviewed that process and agreed that it was a sound process, and that was information – information was provided to the CCRC, the CCRC may then decide that they don’t need to undertake their own investigation. And, of course, Brian Altman’s advice was provided to the CCRC, admittedly later, but at the beginning of 2015.
Mr Henry: What you’re getting, in fact, is layer upon layer of external lawyers giving the vestige of respectability but, at the heart of it, buried underneath all of this, is the fact that an obvious disclosure decision, to disclose to Mrs Misra’s lawyers, is never taken so far as Gareth Jenkins’ misfeasance?
Andrew Parsons: That appears to have been the case but, as I say, I wasn’t involved in that decision at that time.
Mr Henry: I want to come very briefly to the comparison of your “Horizon Risks” document and the document that Mr Rodric Williams was involved in. If we can get up your document, which is POL00021996, and if we could go to the prosecution risks chapter or section, please, the second page. “Prosecutions & convictions”, and we’ll take it as read that that second paragraph, “In particular, the expert evidence … Dr Gareth Jenkins of Fujitsu”, and we can see that there is, in the last sentence:
“… may have undermined a prosecution case or assisted with an accused’s defence.”
Forgive me, sir, I’m just looking at a reference. Right.
Do you see there, even you have put “a prosecution case”:
“… may have undermined a prosecution case …”
Andrew Parsons: Yes, I can see those words.
Mr Henry: Singular. That’s a reference to Seema Misra, isn’t it?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t believe so. I think you’re reading it differently to the way I’m reading it. I don’t think I’m reading that as there has been a single prosecution case, as opposed to it could undermine a prosecution case, as in there could be many of them but it might undermine them.
Mr Henry: But he did give evidence orally in only one case but let’s contrast that, because the contrast is even more pronounced, if we go to POL00040026, and this is the draft which you said was I think unacceptable because it was apparently misleading. Could we go to the same section, “Prosecution”, please.
Yes. There, “Prosecutions & Convictions”, second paragraph:
“Post Office has an obligation to consider whether further discourse [it should be disclosure] should be made to defendants. It is of concern to Post Office that the expert evidence of one prosecution witness, Dr Gareth Jenkins of Fujitsu, may have failed to disclose certain problems in the Horizon system potentially relevant to a case.”
There can be no doubt there: that is singular and that is referring, is it not, to Seema Misra?
Andrew Parsons: It definitely seems to be singular. I don’t know what it was referring to because I think it appears that those amendments were made by the either Rodric Williams or Cartwright King.
Mr Henry: Yes, and that’s clear, because it has been done, and there’s no need for me to take you to it, but I’ll give the reference for the transcript, POL00040025. That was done after amendments by Rodric Williams and Cartwright King.
But, paradoxically, although it would have appeared to have been misleading, it made it clearer that that one case must refer to the only case in which Mr Jenkins gave oral evidence: the case of Seema Misra?
Andrew Parsons: It seems a fair possibility but I don’t know for certain.
Mr Henry: It does. Now, Cartwright King – clearly an appeal is on the cards because the amendment is 26 August 2013. That’s the email back to you, which says, “This has been done with amendments by me and Cartwright King”.
So that suggests that there may be an appeal in the offing, hence the disclosure to the insurers. 5 October, there’s a document drafted by Cartwright King that she was due to receive disclosure, Mrs Misra, that disclosure ought to be given to her. But then we have to fast forward to January 2014 and a decision is made that she isn’t to get disclosure.
Do you have anything to say about that?
Andrew Parsons: I was unaware as to the decisions made in relation to individual cases as to who got disclosure and who didn’t.
Mr Henry: I suggest that 21 October could be a key date in understanding this. No need to get it up on screen but you were taken it to yesterday and Counsel to the Inquiry, Mr Blake, linked two documents. One was POL00372551, which was Ms Vennells to Alice Perkins, talking about the unsafe witness, and then there’s another one, you writing to Andy Holt, Gavin Matthews, Belinda Cortes-Martin and Jarnail Singh, and it’s POL00123004, and perhaps we should get that up on the screen, please. Could we scroll up, please.
This is from you – and scroll up – scroll down, sorry – and scroll up. Yes:
“Brian Altman’s … First Review has now been received.”
Again, no mention. It’s the same day as Ms Vennells talks about the unsafe witness but no mention at all by you of the Gareth Jenkins problem, is there?
Andrew Parsons: No, at that time I presume that everybody receiving this would have been aware of the Gareth Jenkins problem because it had been raised some months before.
Mr Henry: But it’s always a sensible idea, in considering this whole issue, about whether there are good grounds to resist any formal external review of its historic prosecutions, to mention one thing which eminently qualifies for investigation and review by the CCRC, which would be the Clarke Advice.
Andrew Parsons: As I said, I assume that the recipients of this would have all have been sighted on the original issue that was raised in the Clarke Advice.
Mr Henry: Now, you’re familiar with the issues, you’ve already given evidence about them, but, if Mrs Misra had had prompt disclosure, she would have had an unstoppable appeal and her appeal would have exploded not only Mr Jenkins but also the Post Office’s management of Mr Jenkins, wouldn’t it?
Andrew Parsons: I can’t comment on how her appeal may have gone but it seems to me that she would have had grounds to appeal and that would have had – and, had she been successful in that appeal, it would have had serious knock-on consequences for Post Office.
Mr Henry: We take the terms of the Inquiry, of course, by reference to the Horizon Common Issues, the Horizon Issues and also the Hamilton appeals. But it would have also blown up remote access because of material non-disclosure of documents known to the Post Office in 2010, in relation to remote access and insertions of data to resolve the receipts and payments mismatch bug, which ought to have been disclosed to her as well. So it would have been catastrophic for the Post Office, haven’t it?
Andrew Parsons: An appeal – a successful appeal against a conviction on the grounds that Horizon was not a reliable system would have been seriously damaging for Post Office.
Mr Henry: In fact, the very document that caused Mr Justice Fraser so much concern, a Fujitsu document which talked about the receipts and payments mismatch bug and the insertion of data, Solution One, Solution Two, Solution Three, which ought to have been disclosed in Mrs Misra’s trial, I mean, it would have made it incredibly difficult to defend the Horizon Issues trial, wouldn’t it, as well?
Andrew Parsons: If it’s – if we’re thinking about the same document I understood that document had been provided to Second Sight, I believe, if we’re talking about the same document. So the document was out there with them to investigate at the time, yes, if it was the document I’m thinking about, then it was referred to in the Horizon trial.
Mr Henry: So what I’m going to suggest instead, this is my last topic and I’ve got a quarter of an hour, is that, instead, a rationale for limited disclosure was devised, namely the provision of the Helen Rose Report, because it potentially revealed Mr Jenkins to be unreliable based on his knowledge of system errors, which he did not reveal, and you knew that, of course, because you’d read the Altman general review, hadn’t you?
Andrew Parsons: I was aware of the problems with Gareth Jenkins’ evidence.
Mr Henry: Yes, and I’m going to give the reference – no need to take you to it, but it’s POL00006803 at page 54 – because in the Altman general review, there is a reference to that and how the Helen Rose Report might have a potential for an impact on Gareth Jenkins’ credibility.
Now, in paragraph 183 of your statement, you relate a conversation you had with Mr Simon Clarke – whether the conversation was oral or in writing I don’t think is clear – but paragraph 183 of your statement at page 110, I’m just going to quote the last sentence:
“He [Mr Clarke] explained that the reason for disclosing the Helen Rose Report was its potential to impugn Gareth Jenkins’ credibility as a witness and the appendix did not speak to that issue.”
Do you remember that?
Andrew Parsons: Yes.
Mr Henry: So can I now come, please, to POL00029707. This, you’ll remember, is an email that you write to Belinda Crowe – Belinda Cortes-Martin – as is now, and could we scroll up to a paragraph which has contained within it – yes, see that paragraph:
“Just for background information, the material part of the Helen Rose Report has nothing to do with her comments about reversal data.”
Then I omit words:
“The concern was not with the data’s accuracy but that the presentation of the data could be misleading if its limitation were not fully understood. Putting this issue aside, the real (and confidential) reason that the report was disclosed was because Helen’s comment at the bottom of page 3 suggests that it was widely known that there were problems with Horizon. This statement (regardless of whether it is correct) could have been used to attack Gareth Jenkins’ credibility as [a] Horizon expert as he had previously stated that there were no problems with Horizon.”
Now, I’ve already referred you back to the general review by Mr Altman, where he said, at the page reference I’ve given, quotation:
“The Helen Rose Report adds very little [or at least so it seemed to him] other than to point to a particular issue at Lepton and the implication from the report is that, as early as February 2013, Gareth Jenkins was aware of integrity issues with Horizon, none of which he revealed.”
Can I ask you this: did Mr Altman tell you that the real and confidential reason for disclosure was that it might permit an elliptical attack on Gareth Jenkins’ credibility?
Andrew Parsons: I can’t recall if it was Brian Altman that had told me that but I understood that was the concern with the Helen Rose Report.
Mr Henry: That concern was a concern that was shared, it’s obvious, because Mr Altman has written what he’s written, but it’s a concern, you say, that is shared among the criminal lawyers.
Andrew Parsons: Yes.
Mr Henry: Right. So, in other words, the widely known problems with Horizon could therefore be used to attack his credibility because he’d stated previously, Mr Jenkins, that there were none. Correct?
Andrew Parsons: Yes, as I described it there, page 3 suggests there were widely known problems.
Mr Henry: Right. Now Simon Clarke, Mr Clarke, based on your statement, he thought that credibility was the real reason to disclose, didn’t he?
Andrew Parsons: I believe that was the case. I can’t –
Mr Henry: You checked it with him the day after your email of 8 April. On 9 April, you footnoted – in fact, you footnote 127 and 128 of paragraph 183. They are your email to him about it, and his email to you.
Andrew Parsons: Yeah, I recall around this time I spoke to Simon about these issues and the redactions that had been made in the Gareth Jenkins document.
Mr Henry: Right. So I want to go now to one of the documents that you refer to in footnotes, which is WBON0000834. This what he’s saying to you:
“This is the first I’ve seen of an appendix so it did not go out with the disclosure pack. Nevertheless my opinion (and) advice is unchanged. This was a data presentation issue, not a Horizon failure – see last question and answer and a recommend in main report. Thus the disclosure issue remains that relating to the credibility of [Gareth Jenkins] as a witness only. I do not see that the appendix is disclosable in the criminal arena: it adds nothing to the credibility issue [of Gareth Jenkins] and cannot therefore meet the test for disclosure. Hope this helps.”
So it follows from that, out of his own mouth, that Mr Clarke knew the reason to disclose was that it revealed the Gareth Jenkins credibility issue?
Andrew Parsons: Correct.
Mr Henry: Not just the problems with Horizon that need to be disclosed about bugs but also Mr Jenkins’ knowledge of them and his failure to reveal them before ordering trials: in other words, the classic unsafe witness point.
Andrew Parsons: Correct, there was a credibility issue with Gareth Jenkins’ evidence.
Mr Henry: Right, and it seems that Mr Altman appreciated the same point, given what I’ve taken you to from his general review?
Andrew Parsons: Agreed.
Mr Henry: But it seems – and you of course, as an intelligent observer, apprised of the issues, it seemed that neither of them were going the whole hog, as it were, neither were following the logic inevitably demanded – that logic inevitably demanded that character and credit is indivisible and Mr Jenkins’ failure to disclose the existence of bugs was inseparable from his failure to act in accordance with his duties as an expert. You must have realised this?
Andrew Parsons: I was aware of those issues, yes.
Mr Henry: Did it not strike you as extraordinary that these two experienced criminal lawyers were, as it were, dancing around the elephant in the room?
Andrew Parsons: It didn’t at the time, no.
Sir Wyn Williams: Is that it, Mr Henry?
Mr Henry: I think that is it, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Thank you.
Ms Dobbin?
Questioned by Ms Dobbin
Ms Dobbin: Thank you, sir. Mr Parsons, can you see me?
Andrew Parsons: Yes, I can.
Ms Dobbin: I represent Gareth Jenkins, my name is Clair Dobbin.
I wanted to ask you about two things, if I may, and the first thing is something, in fact, that my learned friend, Mr Henry, has already touched upon. So I’m not going to go back to this document but you’ll recollect, at the outset, he took you to an email of the 1 July 2013, that you wrote. Do you recollect that?
Andrew Parsons: No, I’m afraid – would you mind putting it up? Sorry.
Ms Dobbin: Of course I will. It’s WBON0000746.
Andrew Parsons: Thank you.
Ms Dobbin: So I think we can see, can’t we, from this email, Mr Parsons, that some work had been undertaken by your firm, I think they had prepared some notes of the trial of Mrs Seema Misra; is that correct?
Andrew Parsons: Yes, but specifically targeting one question, which is whether there was something in the transcripts that referred to specific bugs in Horizon.
Ms Dobbin: Yes. You had reviewed those notes and, as you’ve set out there, you couldn’t see anything that looked like the 14 bug, the 62 bug, or the Falkirk bug, correct?
Andrew Parsons: That’s what it says there but, as I accepted earlier, that was wrong because I think it does refer to the Falkirk bug.
Ms Dobbin: Yes, quite so. In fact, I think Mr Jenkins and a number of questions, didn’t he, about the Callendar Square bug?
Andrew Parsons: I can’t recall now. I haven’t looked at those memos for a long time.
Ms Dobbin: All right. But have you actually been through the transcripts of the Misra trial?
Andrew Parsons: No, I’ll have only read the memo that was provided by my team.
Ms Dobbin: Right. So to be clear about this, this email of 1 July is based upon a misreading of the memos that were prepared for you; is that right?
Andrew Parsons: Correct.
Ms Dobbin: And you have never gone back and examined the transcripts of the trial of Mrs Seema Misra?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t believe I’ve ever read the transcripts of Seema Misra’s trial.
Ms Dobbin: Right. Well, Mr Parsons, I won’t you any questions, then, about those transcripts.
But then, just in terms of the other bugs, I think it’s right, isn’t it, the 14 bug, I think you probably now know, after the civil proceedings, that’s a bug that came to light at a later point, correct, the suspense account bug?
Andrew Parsons: Yes, this would have been around – this is around 2011/2012, I think.
Ms Dobbin: Yes, and I think came to Fujitsu’s notice in 2013. Do you recollect that?
Andrew Parsons: That’s – that’s my understanding.
Ms Dobbin: I just wanted to ask you about this 62 bug, which Mr Henry has also touched upon. I wanted to ask you this: at the time you were speaking to Post Office about this, did anyone mention to you or explain that Mr Wilson, one of the prosecutors of Post Office, had, in fact, made a decision that notes relating to that bug shouldn’t be disclosed to Mrs Misra at her trial?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t believe anybody told me that.
Ms Dobbin: Did you ever speak at all – again when you were doing this work for Post Office and asking questions or trying to ascertain what had been known at this time – did you ever speak to Mr Singh about what he knew, given the role – or given that he was the prosecutor, in fact, in a number of cases?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t recall when I first spoke to Mr Singh. It may have been after this. I don’t recall asking Mr Singh any questions about his state of knowledge.
Ms Dobbin: Did he ever volunteer any information to you about what, in fact, Mr Jenkins – or information that Mr Jenkins had provided to him in the course of Mrs Seema Misra’s trial –
Andrew Parsons: I don’t believe –
Ms Dobbin: – or the proceedings?
Andrew Parsons: I don’t believe so.
Ms Dobbin: Another question that I wanted to ask you, related to this, is that the Inquiry has seen evidence that, in and around September 2013, a lawyer from Cartwright King and a lawyer from the Post Office appeared to understand that there was a serious issue as to whether or not Mr Jenkins had ever been instructed as an expert. Again, was that information that was ever brought to your attention at the time by them?
Andrew Parsons: I only first heard of that issue in the course of this Inquiry.
Ms Dobbin: It appears that your firm had recommended the instruction of leading counsel in relation to the review of the prosecutions because there was the concern that there might be a conflict with Cartwright King; is that correct?
Andrew Parsons: I recall there being a concern over the conflict with Cartwright King.
Ms Dobbin: Do you think, then, that it was – ought that information, information that they knew in 2013, that there was a serious issue as to whether or not Mr Jenkins had been instructed as an expert, ought that information not have been brought to your attention, given the reason or the rationale for the instruction of leading counsel?
Andrew Parsons: I think it’s important to understand the nature of my firm’s role –
Ms Dobbin: Yes.
Andrew Parsons: – which was to act, as I said yesterday, as a conduit to Brian Altman. The scope of information that Mr Altman then needed to do his job was left to Mr Altman to inform us, actually, as to what information he needed.
Ms Dobbin: Yes. That’s information that would be difficult for Mr Altman to know, that information, unless someone volunteered it to him. Correct?
Andrew Parsons: I guess so, though I wonder whether, if Mr Altman had asked certain questions, that information would have been brought to light.
Ms Dobbin: All right, Mr Parsons, this isn’t a criticism of you; I’m just trying to understand, given your concerns or your firm’s concerns, about potential conflict related to Cartwright King’s conduct of prosecutions and their understanding that there was a serious question as to whether Mr Jenkins had been instructed as an expert, again, whether you think that that is information that ought to have been brought to your attention at the time?
Andrew Parsons: Looking back now, it seems like it’s information that should have been but I’m very cautious about the phrase “brought to my attention” because, as I say, we were – our role was to make sure the information was flowed through to Brian Altman and for Brian to make requests for what information he needed.
Ms Dobbin: Well, let me broaden it out, then. It’s right, isn’t it, that that is information that ought to have been brought to Mr Altman’s attention at that time?
Andrew Parsons: It strikes me that that’s – that would be useful information for Mr Altman to have known.
Ms Dobbin: Yes, it’s useful because, I think – to use Mr Henry’s turn of phrase – it would have opened up questions, wouldn’t it, about Post Office’s management, to use his term, of Mr Jenkins – correct –
Andrew Parsons: Yes, I can see that line of inquiry.
Ms Dobbin: – and may, indeed, have opened up wider questions as to Post Office’s ability to conduct prosecutions as well; do you agree?
Andrew Parsons: I’m not sure I am able to answer that second question as to what Post Office might do with future prosecutions.
Ms Dobbin: Sorry, it was badly put by me. It might open up questions as to the competency with which Post Office had been prosecuting cases; do you agree?
Andrew Parsons: Yes, if Mr Jenkins had been improperly instructed.
Ms Dobbin: Yes, all right. I’m going to be move on and ask you about a completely separate topic, if I may, and that’s related to the civil proceedings.
I’m not going to go back to your witness statement, Mr Parsons, to cover this. I wanted to see if I could just do it without having to do that. I think that you suggest that there was the concern about using Mr Jenkins as a source of information in the civil proceedings, correct?
Andrew Parsons: There was a concern about using him as a witness in the proceedings and, related to that, there was then doubts over the information that we were getting from Gareth Jenkins, but we still, nevertheless, spoke to him and sought his opinion on certain points.
Ms Dobbin: All right. I wanted to ask you this: can you point us to any communications, for example, emails or written correspondence, with Fujitsu in which you set out any direction or instruction about the approach that they were to take to Mr Jenkins, or the use that was to be made of Mr Jenkins in providing information in the civil proceedings?
Andrew Parsons: I can’t recall any such email at the moment.
Ms Dobbin: Was there such an email, Mr Parsons?
Andrew Parsons: The best of my recollection is no but there was, obviously, a lot of correspondence around that time so I couldn’t state definitively.
Ms Dobbin: Right. So is it the position, Mr Parsons, that, despite this concern or caution around using Mr Jenkins, that was not, in fact, something that was communicated to Fujitsu?
Andrew Parsons: It – I don’t – it wasn’t communicated by me to Fujitsu. I don’t know if somebody else had communicated it from Post Office to Fujitsu. But I was operating on the understanding that Fujitsu were unaware of the concerns we had about Gareth Jenkins’ evidence.
Ms Dobbin: I was just looking at the transcript because I wanted to make sure I hadn’t misheard you. Fujitsu were unaware of the concerns about Mr Jenkins’ evidence; is that correct?
Andrew Parsons: I’m saying that was my understanding at the time.
Ms Dobbin: Yes. You are the key person, Mr Parsons, aren’t you, in terms of the conduct of the civil litigation?
Andrew Parsons: Yes, I think that’s fair, alongside leading counsel.
Ms Dobbin: Yes, and it follows from all of that, doesn’t it, Mr Parsons, that Mr Jenkins didn’t know the position that he was being put in in the civil litigation either?
Andrew Parsons: I can’t talk to Mr Jenkins’ state of knowledge.
Ms Dobbin: Well, he didn’t know, did he, because you didn’t communicate it to Fujitsu, that he wasn’t being used as a witness because of these historic concerns about the evidence that he had given previously or the criticisms that had been made of him?
Andrew Parsons: I think – as I say, I can’t speak to Gareth Jenkins’ knowledge but, as far as I was aware, he was not aware, if I can put it that way.
Ms Dobbin: Can I just ask: how could you have let that situation arise, Mr Parsons, whereby you were making use of someone as a source of information in the civil proceedings and yet, all the while, not telling them that they had been subject to this previous criticism and, in fact, that was the reason why they weren’t being used as a witness?
Andrew Parsons: So, as I explained in my statement, it was a less than ideal situation. In fact, it was a very difficult situation. Our expectation, until much later in the Group Litigation, is that we wouldn’t need to rely on Gareth Jenkins. We thought we’d be able to get the evidence from Torstein Godeseth or some others at Fujitsu. I was aware there was always a concern that there would be points on which only Gareth may be able to give evidence, but until the issues in the litigation took shape, around the Horizon issues, that is, that only really took shape around, I think it was, August ‘18, so quite deep into the litigation, the point around Gareth Jenkins’ role and his role as a witness hadn’t taken – hadn’t really taken hold until that point in time.
Ms Dobbin: But do you see the position that you were putting him in but without him knowing anything about the reality of his situation?
Andrew Parsons: I think we were speaking to Gareth as a source of information and, given that we had decided not to call him as a witness, I didn’t see there was a challenge with that.
Ms Dobbin: But you didn’t see that you were potentially exposing him or putting him in a difficult position by doing that, given, for example, you know, whenever witnesses said that they had spoken to him about something, whenever they came to give evidence, can you not see that that’s putting someone in a difficult position?
Andrew Parsons: I’m not sure what difficulties you are envisaging here. We were asking Gareth questions, he was, I’m sure to the best of his availability answering those questions. I don’t see asking someone questions and getting answers puts them in a spot of difficulty.
Ms Dobbin: You don’t see a difficulty in using someone in litigation, in making a decision not to call them as a witness, in deciding that you need to be very cautious and careful about how you’re using them, and yet not tell that person that that’s the position they’re in; you don’t see a problem with that?
Andrew Parsons: There’s several difficulties but they’re mainly for Post Office to manage in the litigation process but I – that idea did not cross my mind whilst we were in the litigation.
Ms Dobbin: Yes. Thank you, Mr Parsons.
Sir Wyn Williams: Is that it, Mr Blake?
Mr Blake: I believe that is, sir. Yes.
Sir Wyn Williams: All right.
Well, thank you very much, Mr Parsons, for your very detailed witness statement and for answering questions posed to you by a number of people over a day and a half at this Inquiry. I’m grateful to you.
So we’ll stop now and adjourn until Tuesday morning, when we’ll hear from Mr Henderson, I believe.
Mr Blake: That’s correct, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: All right. Thank you all very much.
Mr Blake: Thank you very much.
(12.56 pm)
(The hearing adjourned until 9.45 am on Tuesday 18 June 2024)