1. Introduction
HC 1119
1.1. Post Office Counters Limited (“the Post Office”) began rolling out the Horizon IT System (“Horizon”) to branches and Crown Offices in about September 1999.[1] By about the end of 2001/early 2002 the process was complete, since which time and to this day all Post Office branches and Crown Offices have used a version of Horizon as an integral part of their business.
1.2. The first version of Horizon, now usually known as “Legacy Horizon”, was developed for, and supplied to, the Post Office by a company known as ICL Pathway Limited.[2] Legacy Horizon was in use in branches and Crown Offices until 2010.
1.3. Prior to roll out, some employees of Fujitsu had discovered that Legacy Horizon was capable of producing data which was false. Specifically, it was known to those employees that it could produce losses or gains in branch or Crown Office accounts which were illusory rather than real. That state of affairs came about because, from time to time, Legacy Horizon would be afflicted by what have come to be known as “bugs, errors and defects”.
1.4. Although many of the individuals who gave evidence before me were very reluctant to accept it, I am satisfied from the evidence that I have heard that a number of senior, and not so senior, employees of the Post Office knew or, at the very least, should have known that Legacy Horizon was capable of error as described above.[3] Yet, for all practical purposes, throughout the lifetime of Legacy Horizon, the Post Office maintained the fiction that its data was always accurate.[4]
1.5. In 2010, Legacy Horizon was replaced by the version of Horizon known as “HNG – X” or “Horizon Online”. This version was also developed for and supplied to the Post Office by Fujitsu. Like its predecessor, Horizon Online was also, from time to time, afflicted by bugs, errors and defects which had the effect of showing gains and losses in branch and Crown Office accounts which were illusory. I am satisfied that a number of employees of Fujitsu and the Post Office knew that this was so.[5]
1.6. In 2017, Horizon Online was replaced by HNG-A. This version too, was developed for and supplied to the Post Office by Fujitsu. My understanding is that this version of Horizon is in current use, albeit subject to some modifications since 2017. When I commenced hearing evidence in this Inquiry my working assumption was that this version of Horizon was “far more robust than Horizon in earlier times” or at least “different and more robust”.[6] However, as I will explain in a later volume of my Report, these assumptions may no longer be wholly justified given evidence provided to the Inquiry on behalf of Fujitsu and from postmasters who use this version of Horizon.[7]
1.7. Between 2000 and the autumn of 2013 the Post Office prosecuted postmasters and others who worked in branches and Crown Offices in England and Wales in reliance upon accounting data produced by Horizon. Such data was relied upon to prove that actual losses had occurred in branches or Crown Offices which could only be explained by theft, false accounting or fraud on the part of the person or persons who had been charged. In Northern Ireland and Scotland, the prosecuting authorities brought prosecutions of postmasters and others before the courts for offences of dishonesty during the same period and, indeed, for some years beyond 2013. In each, or at least most of those cases, they relied upon data from Horizon to prove that losses had actually occurred. In each such case brought against an accused within the United Kingdom, the Post Office and/ or the prosecuting authorities asserted either expressly, or by implication that the data produced by Horizon was wholly reliable.
1.8. Over the whole period since the roll out of Legacy Horizon, the Post Office has relied upon data from Horizon to hold postmasters liable under their contracts for apparent losses in branch. In each case in which this has occurred, the Post Office has asserted that the losses were real, as opposed to illusory and that data produced by Horizon was wholly reliable.
1.9. As a consequence of the activities described in the preceding two paragraphs, many hundreds of people have been convicted, wrongly, of criminal offences, and many thousands of people have been held responsible, wrongly, for losses which were illusory, as opposed to real. As later volumes of my Report will demonstrate, all of these people are properly to be regarded as victims of wholly unacceptable behaviour perpetrated by a number of individuals employed by and/or associated with the Post Office and Fujitsu from time to time and by the Post Office and Fujitsu as institutions.[8]
1.10. The impact upon those wrongly accused and prosecuted for criminal offences has been disastrous.[9] The impact upon those held liable for losses which had not actually occurred has also been disastrous in many instances. Some of the close family members of many of these persons have also suffered considerably.
1.11. Almost as soon as Legacy Horizon had been rolled out, postmasters began to complain that Horizon was, on occasions, producing false data which affected branch accounts. The complaints continued throughout the life span of both Legacy Horizon and Horizon Online. As the years went by the complaints grew louder and more persistent. Members of Parliament became involved and provided substantial support to postmasters. Still the Post Office trenchantly resisted the contention that on occasions Horizon produced false data.
1.12. In 2009 the organisation was formed which will forever be known by the acronym JFSA (“Justice for Subpostmasters Alliance”). By 2016, the organisation was ready for a battle in the courts with the Post Office over the reliability of Horizon and a myriad of other related disputes. There were sufficient numbers of claimants (approximately 555) to justify the making of a Group Litigation Order. The proceedings were extremely hard fought. They ended, apparently triumphantly for the claimants, after the managing Judge, the Honourable Mr Justice Fraser (as he then was), produced two substantive judgments in which the claimants’ main contentions were accepted without reservation.[10]
1.13. From the moment of my appointment as Chair of this Inquiry, I was always of the view that those who had been adversely affected by Horizon should have a major role in the work of the Inquiry. That is why Core Participants who fell into that category were the first persons to be asked for witness statements and called to give oral evidence. That is why, too, I thought it appropriate that the recognised legal representatives of these Core Participants should have a significant role in all aspects of the Inquiry.
1.14. I have formed the view too, that the impact upon those affected, the “human impact”, should be placed at the forefront of my Report to the Minister. That is why I have decided to publish this volume of my Report as soon as it was completed rather than wait for the whole of my Report to be ready for publication.
1.15. It also seemed to me to be natural to combine my description of the suffering endured by so many with my assessment of, and conclusions about, the attempts by the Post Office, the Minister and the Department to provide redress to those affected which is “full, fair and prompt” – a phrase used and an objective so often repeated during the course of the more than five years which has now elapsed since the litigation between Sir Alan Bates and other claimants, and the Post Office (“the Group Litigation”) was brought to an end.[11]
1.16. As followers of the Inquiry will be aware, I held many hearings to receive oral evidence about human impact between February and May 2022. I also held discrete hearings at which I received submissions about financial redress on 6 July 2022, 13 July 2022, 8 December 2022 and 27 April 2023. I have published the following:
“Chair’s Progress Update on Issues relating to Compensation” (“the Progress Update”) on 15 August 2022.[12]
“Chair’s Statement on Issues relating to Compensation” (“the Chair’s Statement”) on 9 January 2023.[13]
“First Interim Report: Compensation” (“the Interim Report”) on 17 July 2023.[14]
1.17. Those acting for postmaster Core Participants and/or their next of kin have suggested from time to time that these hearings and publications have played a part in persuading the Post Office, the Minister and the Department to refine and improve the administration of the schemes, then in being which were and still are the vehicles for delivering financial redress to those entitled to claim it. The conclusions which I reach and the recommendations which I make in Section 6 of this volume are aimed at ensuring further refinement and improvements to the schemes which now exist.
1.18. This volume is based primarily upon oral and written evidence provided to the Inquiry in response to formal requests, and upon published documents which were produced primarily by the Post Office and the Department. Additionally, however, it takes account of information provided to the Inquiry which does not constitute evidence in the strict legal sense, but which nonetheless, has assisted me.
1.19. I have considered all evidence and information available to me up to and including 6 June 2025.
Footnotes