28 June 2024 – Gareth Jenkins
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Gareth Jenkins
GARETH IDRIS JENKINS (continued).
Mr Beer: Good morning, sir, can you see and hear us?
Sir Wyn Williams: No, I can’t hear you actually. I can see you fine but I can’t hear you.
Mr Beer: Can you hear me now, sir? I’ll try once more. Can you hear me now, sir? (Pause)
Can you hear us now, sir?
Sir Wyn Williams: I can.
Mr Beer: Thank you very much, sir.
This morning’s questioning is going to begin with questions from Ms Page.
Sir Wyn Williams: Thank you very much.
Questioned by Ms Page
Ms Page: Do you remember going into the witness box in Guildford Crown Court on 14 October 2010?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I do.
Ms Page: Seema Misra was in the dock, she sits beside me now. Do you recognise her?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I do.
Ms Page: The judge will have been on the bench, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Page: The jury will have been opposite you, looking straight at you. Did you know that the reason that the jury are positioned in that way is so that they have the very best view of the witness, so that they can see and hear the witness in the best way?
Gareth Jenkins: I wasn’t aware that that was why the court was arranged that way, no.
Ms Page: It’s arranged that way because it was for them to weigh up your evidence, wasn’t it, the truth of what you were saying?
Gareth Jenkins: I was aware that that was what they were trying to do, yes.
Ms Page: Do you remember taking the oath? Because that was the moment after which you were bound to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I remember that.
Ms Page: Was it just like the day job, just like supporting another ticket?
Gareth Jenkins: No, it wasn’t. It was a very different experience from what I was normally doing.
Ms Page: Because you said earlier this week that you approached giving evidence in the same way, and that’s why you just confined yourself to the narrow answers to the narrow questions that you were asked; do you remember saying that?
Gareth Jenkins: I remember saying that, yes.
Ms Page: But, actually, you acknowledge it was very different to the day job, wasn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, it was.
Ms Page: It will have felt –
Gareth Jenkins: Sorry, yes, it was.
Ms Page: I’m so sorry. It will have felt very different. It will have felt probably, I would imagine, quite extraordinary to be there in the witness box with Mrs Misra in the dock, knowing that her fate would turn on what you said. Did it feel extraordinary?
Gareth Jenkins: It certainly felt different from normal, yes.
Ms Page: Did you know that the trial was also a test for Horizon?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not sure whether I did or not.
Ms Page: By then, Horizon was an out-of-control monster, hundreds of innocent people had already had their lives ruined to protect it, but you don’t accept that, do you?
Gareth Jenkins: I was not aware of that at the time, no.
Ms Page: You told us yesterday, “As far as I was aware, all the bugs had been fixed. That was my true belief at the time and still is”, and you confirmed that you rejected the findings of the Horizon Issues judgment.
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, and I still stand by that.
Ms Page: Isn’t the truth that you knew that Horizon was a monster and that it was causing harm?
Gareth Jenkins: No, that was not how I felt.
Ms Page: You hid it, didn’t you?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I did not.
Ms Page: You answered a lot of questions yesterday about the Misra trial which were effectively aimed at understanding why you didn’t tell the jury about the monster, and you answered most of them with variations of “I realise that now”, “I should have done that, I realise that now”.
You had to say that, didn’t you?
Gareth Jenkins: That’s the truth. That’s why I said it.
Ms Page: In fact, you knew what you were doing. You threw mud in the jury’s eyes, didn’t you?
Gareth Jenkins: I did not.
Ms Page: Well, Mr Jenkins, in the 1931 film of Frankenstein, the monster is an assemblage of body parts from various corpses and they’re brought to live by stitching and bolting them together. I’m going to go through some of the body parts that were stitched into Horizon and see what you accept and what you don’t accept.
So let’s start, please, with cash accounts. If I could ask, please, for EXPG0000001. It’s Professor Charles Cipione’s expert report prepared for this Inquiry.
Can we go to page 118, please. What I’m going to take you to is his conclusions about his analysis of some 57,000 PEAKs, PinICLs and KELs. Now, if we go to 17.1.3 please, and I’ll start a little way in, where it says that AI376 – end of the first line:
“AI376 (Accounting Integrity) caught my attention. Accounting integrity is a fundamental requirement of the LHITS [that’s one his acronym for the Horizon system]. AI376 was one of the final AIs to be closed.”
That’s Acceptance Incidents, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Page: At 17.1.6, if we go down a little, it says:
“In January 2000, ICL Pathway states ‘If pressed POCL [Post Office] would agree that AIs 342, 372, 376, 378, 218, 391 are closed/incapable of further update. Their Acceptance Manager is leaving [blah, blah, blah]’. Further in the same report it states that ‘The outturn AI376 was 0.06% Cash Account Discrepancies, exactly an order of magnitude better than the target …’”
Now, did you know that AI376 was ultimately resolved by an agreement that a small number of cash account discrepancies would, in fact, be acceptable?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t know that I knew that at the time, I do know that now.
Ms Page: A bit further down, 17.1.9, Professor Cipione says this:
“Regardless, the fact that accounting integrity was a persistent issue in the national rollout of the [Horizon system] cannot have been the intention of the sponsors nor the goal of ICL Pathway.”
Do you accept that?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not sure I quite understand what that means.
Ms Page: What that means is that accounting integrity was absolutely fundamental to an accounting system and the fact that he saw, through this analysis, that it was a persistent issue in the national rollout, he says, well, that just can’t have been the intention of those who were designing or commissioning the system.
Gareth Jenkins: I think it was the intention that there was accounting integrity in the system.
Ms Page: But it wasn’t the intention that that would continue to be a problem holding up acceptance, was it?
Gareth Jenkins: I wasn’t involved in the acceptance area and I wasn’t involved in the accounting side of things, at that time.
Ms Page: Is that right? Because I could take you to a document – and I will if I need to – which refers to resolving AI376. It’s a progress report by a fellow called Roger Donato from August 1999. Do you know Roger Donato?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Page: It says there – shall I bring it up for you? If we could go, please, to FUJ00079162. We see at the top it says it’s a progress report and we can see it’s prepared by Roger Donato, dated 20 August 1999, and if we go down please a little to paragraph 2.1, you’re named here. It says:
“Last week’s activities:
“As part of the Acceptance discussions Pathway has documented a plan to incorporate carry out reconciliation processing in the TIP interface: (documented by John Pope and Gareth Jenkins) …”
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Page: “Pathway is not committed to producing a tool to re-input lost transactions (though I expect it to remain on the agenda – Acceptance Incident 376).”
The same one we’ve just been talking about. So you may not have been centrally involved but you must have known, Mr Jenkins, that AI376 was an Acceptance Incident about cash accounts?
Gareth Jenkins: I was aware there were Acceptance Incidents, I’m not sure that I was that aware of the details but I was aware that there was some work required in terms of adding further reconciliation into the system.
Ms Page: All right. Well, we can take that down. So you don’t accept that you knew that cash accounts were a persistent problem through the rollout. Am I right?
Gareth Jenkins: I was aware that there were a number of problems but I wasn’t involved in the detail of the problems that were actually occurring. My role at that point was with the agent’s side of things.
Ms Page: Can we go back, please, to Professor Cipione’s report, I’m sorry to have had to take it down. EXPG0000001. If we could go, please, to page 135. That figure, in the middle of the page, is his review of the PEAKs, PinICLs and KELs, and it’s those that he’s picked out where there is a bug causing receipts and payments mismatches, so in other words cash account problems. Do you see on the right, “Development Code” was the cause of 33 per cent of them? Then we’ve also got various other causes to do with development: low-level design, development reference data, et cetera.
If we go a bit further down at 18.1.19, please, just there:
“Based on this data I make the following observation:
“A significant proportion of these [PEAKs and PinICLs, that’s his abbreviation] had defect causes that were recognised as being related to the design or development of [the Horizon system] (45%). This indicates to me that there were acknowledged bugs, errors or defects in [the Horizon system] that were capable of giving rise to a payment and receipt imbalances.”
Do you accept what he says there?
Gareth Jenkins: I think this is referring to the very early days during the rollout of Legacy Horizon.
Ms Page: Well, it’s over number of years and they were mostly from the relatively early years but they go into the early 2000s, so we’re not talking just about rollout, we’re talking about going into the early 2000s here?
Gareth Jenkins: I think rollout didn’t complete until about 2002.
Ms Page: Well, we can find out the exact dates on that if you like, but what we’ll do, if I may, is ask you this: do you accept that, in those early years of Horizon when people were being prosecuted, a significant proportion of the PEAKs and PinICLs which related to accounting problems were down to the design and the coding of Horizon?
Gareth Jenkins: I accept that is what Professor Cipione found out. I wasn’t involved at that time and wasn’t aware that people were being prosecuted at that time.
Ms Page: If we go a little bit further down, please, at 18.2.4, he says this about his review of the documents:
“… I make the following general observations:
“Many of these [PEAKs and PinICLs and KELs] seem to have been raised as a result of internal reconciliations.”
So that was your area, wasn’t it, the reconciliations?
Gareth Jenkins: No, my area was to do with the harvesting of the transactions that had been generated as part of the reconciliation.
Ms Page: “There does appear to be an earnest effort, on the part of SSC, to investigate these issues, identify a root cause, and mitigate future recurrences.
“The tickets show that different teams were involved when investigating these issues.
“In the majority of these [PEAKs and PinICLs], it is not evident that the identified fight issue was resolved.
“In a majority of these [PEAKs and PinICLs] the root cause is related to [the Horizon system].”
So the issues were not always resolved, Mr Jenkins.
Gareth Jenkins: I believe –
Ms Page: You believe they were, you say?
Gareth Jenkins: I believe they were by the time I got involved with the counter system a few years later.
Ms Page: You told us, when all these issues had been resolved, all issues had always resolved, that was based on informal chats, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Page: But if you chatted to any of the people involved in these PEAKs and PinICLs and if they’d been honest with you, they’d have said, “Well, you know, Gareth, sometimes, despite my very best efforts, I just can’t get to the bottom of these accounting problems, and I just have to close the ticket without a resolution”. Did none of them ever say that to you in these informal chats?
Gareth Jenkins: I can’t remember that sort of discussion, no.
Ms Page: Did none of them ever say to you, “When I am stuck, I just have to inject transactions into the branch accounts to sort the problem out. Needs must. I know it’s not ideal. I haven’t really got to the bottom of the problem but at least the branch can balance and I can move on to all the other tickets waiting in my stack”.
Did any of them ever say something like that to you in those informal chats?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t think it would be quite in that way. It would be a case of, when there was a problem, you would need to make some adjustment to address the fact that that problem would happen, but you would then need to actually go and fix the underlying root cause of the problem. A good example of that is what we were talking about a day or two ago, in terms of the receipts and payments mismatch. Not only did we have to actually fix the root cause of the problem, but we – but then changes did need to be made to actually take into account the impact that it had had on the branches.
Ms Page: The point is, Professor Cipione tells us that they couldn’t always find the root cause of the problem, Mr Jenkins, and they would just close the ticket anyway.
Gareth Jenkins: I understand that that is what he says in his report but his report was only on the very early days of the problem. I think things improved after that point.
Ms Page: All right, well, let’s just think about that and when it might have improved and what we’ll do is move to what I call body part number 2, which is remote access.
Mr Beer asked you some questions about Mr Roll’s evidence on this subject but I don’t think that he read out a section of it, which was Mr Roll’s explanation for why SSC used the ability to inject messages at the counter using the SPM’s ID. I won’t take you to it unless you need me to. What he said was this:
“Without the correct user ID at the start of every message, then there would have been errors, things wouldn’t have been processed properly, from what I remember. So you wouldn’t have gone in that way to make changes to the message store.”
So during the GLO, SSC witnesses did ultimately admit that they injected messages at the counter, didn’t they?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I was aware of that.
Ms Page: They must have had their reasons for doing that rather than injecting them at the correspondence server, as you said you believed was the proper routine?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, and I did have that conversation with John Simpkins as part of the preparation for the GLO.
Ms Page: Did he agree with Mr Roll that the reason for doing it at the counter was because, otherwise, there would have been errors and things that wouldn’t have processed properly?
Gareth Jenkins: No, because there was a mechanism that, if messages were injected at the correspondence server, that an artificial user ID could be picked up for those messages, so that they would process correctly through the system.
Ms Page: But he admitted that sometimes they would do it at the counter, so there must have been a reason for that. Sometimes, presumably, doing it on the correspondence server, the proper-ish way, didn’t work?
Gareth Jenkins: I didn’t fully understand the details of the reason. There was one specific example that he did explain to me where it had to be done at the counter and it was nothing to do with injecting a transaction. I can’t remember the other examples he gave to me but, as far as that was concerned, it was sufficient for me to know that there had been some injections at the counter to realise that it had been done.
Ms Page: Do you accept that one of the problems or one of the possibilities of injecting transactions is that there might be knock-on consequences, unintended consequences: you tried to fix one problem by injecting a transaction and then it causes another problem?
Gareth Jenkins: I accept that that’s a possibility.
Ms Page: But you say that, at the time, you knew nothing about any of this: it was just a theoretical possibility?
Gareth Jenkins: That was what I understood, yes.
Ms Page: Let’s look at your witness statement, your fourth witness statement, please, at page 33, paragraph 106. Now, just before paragraph 106, you had set out the explanation that you gave us here in the tribunal, in other words what you’ve just said now, that you didn’t believe that they were using the theoretical ability to inject at the counter until the GLO. But then in 106 you say this:
“In the years when Legacy Horizon was operational (ie up to 2010), my understanding from my colleagues was that, on the rare occasions it was used, the default position was that substantive remote access was done at the correspondence server. During this period, I may have been told that substantive remote access had been done at the counter on one or two occasions (although I cannot now remember and cannot point to any examples of this). My lawyers have looked at the Inquiry’s database but they have been unable to find any records where I gave advice about substantive remote access at the counter. However, I am aware that Anne Chambers emailed me and others in 2007 and referred to a possible case for ‘writing a corrective message at the counter’ in relation to a particular problem she was dealing with.”
Then you cite the email reference:
“My lawyers have not found any reply from me on the Inquiry’s database and I am not mentioned on the associated PEAK. It is difficult to say therefore what I thought or understood in 2007 about what Anne was proposing (ie whether she meant writing a message at the correspondence server which would cause it to be replicated to the counter or writing a message at the counter itself). I do note though that in her email, Anne remembers to taking the question up with Tony [Jamasb] or Gary Blackburn of POL, so she was clearly adopting an open approach to POL about the possible use of substantive remote access.
“At this time, in 2007, I doubt that I would have drawn, or thought a great deal, about any distinction between substantive remote access at the counter and substantive remote access at the correspondence server.”
You wouldn’t have thought about it, Mr Jenkins. You wouldn’t have thought about the distinction which you now tell us is really rather important?
Gareth Jenkins: I agree with what I said in my statement, yes.
Ms Page: Is that a truthful account, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: It is.
Ms Page: It’s rather at odds, isn’t it, with the account that you have wanted to give over the last few days, isn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t think so.
Ms Page: Well, you’ve wanted to give a tidy explanation. You’ve wanted to say that you knew nothing about SSC injecting transactions at the counter until the GLO, didn’t you?
Gareth Jenkins: My memory is that I thought that the transactions had been injected at the correspondence server because that was much easier for SSC to actually do things and I couldn’t see any reason why they would need to do things at the counter rather than at the correspondence server.
Ms Page: The truth is that you knew that injecting them at the counter was tampering with branch accounts and you knew that, if you admitted to that, it would not help your position, because you had been providing witness statements and giving evidence against Seema Misra, and yet you knew that your Fujitsu colleagues not only could but did tamper with branch accounts, didn’t you?
Gareth Jenkins: I didn’t feel that it made any significant difference in terms of – the accounts were being changed, whether it was done at the correspondence server or the counter, I just felt – my understanding was that it was normally done at the correspondence server because that was the simples way of doing things.
Ms Page: You knew, Mr Jenkins, as any sensible person would, that it was essential for the safety of prosecutions to have a tamper-proof evidential chain when presenting ARQ data in court. You knew that, Mr Jenkins, didn’t you?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I didn’t.
Ms Page: You knew, as everyone in SSC did, that the practice of injecting transactions at the counter was wholly contrary to being able to rely on Horizon as a source of truth. You knew that, didn’t you?
Gareth Jenkins: I didn’t know that.
Ms Page: You needed to be able to produce 100 per cent accurate records of transactions that took place at the counter in the branch but this practice corrupted that, didn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: It didn’t occur to me that had an impact on things.
Ms Page: Failing to tell the court that you knew SSC were injecting transactions at the counter was failing to tell the whole truth, wasn’t it, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: I didn’t think that at the time.
Ms Page: Let’s have a look at the email which caused you to devise this tortured explanation in your witness statement. If we could go, please, to FUJ00142197, Anne Chambers to you, 10 December 2007. You say in your witness statement it was two others but, in fact, that’s not correct. Two others are copied in and you are the person it is directed to:
“Gareth,
“We have a problem with a branch where a single SC line was written for 100 euros (£484) with no settlement.”
She gives some technical explanation:
“… in the middle of two RISP transactions and I suspect it’s another oddity in the LFS counter code.”
Note: another oddity in the counter code, Mr Jenkins. She evidently expected you to know that there had been more oddities, didn’t she?
Gareth Jenkins: Um, I don’t recall this discussion. I don’t recall that.
Ms Page: But they’d all been fixed, had they, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: That was my understanding.
Ms Page: She goes on with a little more rather technical terminology, which most of us, I’m afraid, probably won’t understand, but if we go down to her paragraph which begins:
“I don’t know what to do about it. As it stands, when they balance I think they will have a gain at the branch. If we correct the POLFS feed so it nets to zero, it will not be in line with the branch, and will probably cause problems in future.
“This might be a case for writing a corrective message at the counter but this has not been a popular approach in the past. I could try talking to Gary Blackburn or Tony [Jamasb].
“Do you have any bright ideas?”
So yes, she was planning to tell Post Office about it but she knew and you must have known that they weren’t going to like it. Do you accept that’s clear from the way she said this?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Page: Did you know that, when she wrote this up for them later in the OCP, the sort of mechanism that was used for approving these injections, she stressed that what she planned to do would not be visible to the branch, Mr Jenkins; did you know that?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I didn’t know that.
Ms Page: But the main point, from your point of view is this: the words are, in fact, unambiguous, aren’t they? She was proposing to write a message at the counter. She was not proposing to write a message at the correspondence server which could cause it to be replicated at the counter, in the way that you suggest she might have meant in your witness statement.
Gareth Jenkins: I took that as a loose language. I took that as being a representation of doing it – affecting the counter accounts rather than the back end accounts.
Ms Page: Loose language, Mr Jenkins, really?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, yes. So what I was thinking that to mean was that, when you inject a message at the correspondence server, it has an effect on the counter, as opposed to making a correction to the back-end system, which was the other option she was talking about in terms of changing things in POLSAP.
Ms Page: This is just a complication or an obfuscation which you have brought in to suggest that this email is somehow ambiguous, isn’t it, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: That is – I don’t know what to say to that.
Ms Page: This email shows that you knew full well that Fujitsu colleagues not only could but did tamper with branch records, doesn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: I would not necessarily have taken that as being – putting in an injection at the counter at that point.
Ms Page: You must have consciously hidden that knowledge when you provided witness statements and gave evidence at Seema Misra’s trial, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I – the concept of injecting messages was not something that occurred to me when I was doing that. Clearly, that was wrong, but that – I’d not thought about whether messages were being injected by the SSC.
Ms Page: All right, well, we’ll move on to body part number 3: bad error handling in the EPOSS code. Because there’s another reason why you don’t want to admit to knowing that transactions were inserted at the counter because that’s the unintended consequences point I was talking about earlier, isn’t it? If there were unintended consequences, as a result of inserting transactions, you wouldn’t necessarily know about them. They were hidden by definition. Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t quite understand where you’re getting at with that.
Ms Page: Horizon might have been failing silently all across the system, mightn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t believe Horizon was failing silently all across the system. I believe that when Horizon had failures, it was generating events that – I accept the fact that it wasn’t necessarily informing postmasters that there had been problems but I believed that there were events there that were being tracked.
Ms Page: If there were unintended consequences, silent failures – they’re what we might call known unknowns – you knew that they were likely to be there but you didn’t know how to find them to fix them, did you?
Gareth Jenkins: I believed that the event trails would be left and events would be picked up. There was a process in place whereby events should be picked up and investigated.
Ms Page: Well, let’s just have a think about that in the context of the evidence given by Gerald Barnes, one of your colleagues in fourth line support. Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Page: I will try to give a fair summary of what he said on this to avoid the time that would be taken if we went through it in full, and I am sure I’ll be corrected if I’ve got this wrong. He said:
“Good error handling should be coded in from the start. Really bad error handling allows a process to ‘blunder on’ even when it has hit a problem and that means that the error is silent, at least to the subpostmaster at the time.”
What he said was, agreeing with you:
“It will leave a trace in the event log which a diagnostician would be able to read but, because the subpostmaster is not alerted to the error at the time, no one would know where to look in the event log. Good error handling ensures that when an error occurs, the program aborts with a clear error message for the subpostmaster to see and that way the process will not ‘blunder on’.”
The reason that’s important, Mr Jenkins, is because, if it does “blunder on”, it may create potentially incorrect results. What he said is it’s far better to abort and create no results than to “blunder on” and create incorrect results that no one can identify because the error was silent; do you see his logic, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: I understand that, yes.
Ms Page: Later in his evidence, he said this:
“On the whole, the EPOSS code did not have good error handling.”
In other words, there were a lot of silent errors, Mr Jenkins. Then, even more than that, he said this: after going through an example of a process that had failed as a result of encountering transactions that the SSC had inserted – so the inserted transactions had caused a process to fail – he conceded that:
“… it was not possible to know how many other processes had failed silently as a direct result of SSC inserting transactions into the branch.”
So the inserting capability that was intended to correct accounting problems could perfectly well have been causing many, many other uncountable numbers of other problems in the system when the processes “blundered on” and failed silently; what do you say to that, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: I accept that it is a theoretical possibility.
Ms Page: Known unknowns – let’s look at it this way: what are known errors before they become known?
Gareth Jenkins: Well, until they’re known, they are unknown, obviously.
Ms Page: In some cases, Mr Jenkins, unknown errors which became known errors had existed in the system for a long time before they became known, correct?
Gareth Jenkins: That is a possibility.
Ms Page: There were thousands of Known Error Log entries, weren’t there, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not sure how many Known Error Log entries there were. I don’t know the volumes.
Ms Page: There were thousands, weren’t there; you knew that?
Gareth Jenkins: I didn’t know how many Known Error Log entries there were.
Ms Page: There’s no way of knowing, Mr Jenkins, how many unknown errors there were, is there?
Gareth Jenkins: My understanding was that the system was behaving well.
Ms Page: You’re not a fool, are you, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t believe so.
Ms Page: You would have known of the potential unintended consequences of the SSC going off piste, wouldn’t you?
Gareth Jenkins: I wasn’t aware that the SSC were getting involved on – my understanding was it was very, very rare for the SSC to need to inject any sort of transactions. Yes, you’ve got – you’ve shown me an example here but my understanding was that it was a very rare occurrence for such things to happen.
Ms Page: Body part number 4: the EPOSS code itself. Professor Cipione assessed the examples of EPOSS code that David McDonnell used to draw attention to problems with the EPOSS code back in 1998. I don’t intend to call what he says up, a few quotes will do. Take into example 1, Professor Cipione said:
“This is terrible code. This is terrible code.”
He said it twice:
“This has to be a joke. I mean, this has to be a joke because this is a ridiculous set of code.”
Taken to another example:
“It’s just not the right structure and it indicates to me that they don’t understand what those particular structures are.”
Taken to another example:
“So either this is written by someone not so smart in here or there’s been multiple updates to this code. Either way, it’s a bad example.”
When did you take over as the counters man, Mr Jenkins? When did the EPOSS code become your problem?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not sure the EPOSS code became my problem. My role was to do with actually designing the – at the high level, the way that the counter needed to work in terms of impact, which would have been around 2004/2005, something like that.
Ms Page: But you would accept, wouldn’t you, that, for the counter to work, it has to work on the basis of the EPOSS code, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Page: So when did the quality of the EPOSS code become your problem?
Gareth Jenkins: Like I say, around 2004/2005. That sort of time.
Ms Page: Do you say it had stabilised when you took it over?
Gareth Jenkins: I believed that it had.
Ms Page: What safeguards did you put in place to assess that?
Gareth Jenkins: I didn’t do anything specific about that. My understanding was that it had been working well for some time before I got involved with it. I accept that there were these problems in the early days, which I hadn’t been involved in specifically, but there had been plenty of time then for things to have been sorted out and for it to be working stably.
Ms Page: Did anyone tell you in 2004 about this history?
Gareth Jenkins: Not that I recall.
Ms Page: So no one told you that it might be important to keep an eye on this beast which had these sections of dreadful code in?
Gareth Jenkins: Not that I can recall.
Ms Page: Did you have anyone assessing the quality of the fixes that were being put in under your watch, as it were?
Gareth Jenkins: I was relying on the competence of the designers and developers who were actually doing the detailed coding at that time.
Ms Page: So no one assessed their work to ensure it was done to a high standard?
Gareth Jenkins: Well, they were assessing each other’s work. That was part of their process.
Ms Page: When they were assessing each other, did anyone raise any concerns with you about the quality of the code or the fixes?
Gareth Jenkins: I can’t recall any examples of that.
Ms Page: Do you say you can’t recall but there might have been some?
Gareth Jenkins: It is possible but I can’t recall. My understanding was that it was working well by that time.
Ms Page: How many bugs were being addressed on a weekly basis?
Gareth Jenkins: I can’t remember.
Ms Page: Tens? Hundreds? Thousands?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t know.
Ms Page: You don’t know?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t know.
Ms Page: Who was your line manager, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: It varied a lot over the time.
Ms Page: What was their job title; what was their role?
Gareth Jenkins: Design Managers, Chief Architect. There was that sort of role.
Ms Page: What was your reporting line to the Board?
Gareth Jenkins: What do you mean by “the Board”? Do you mean the Post Office Account Board or the Fujitsu Board, or whatever?
Ms Page: The Fujitsu Board: what director were you sitting under?
Gareth Jenkins: I’ve no idea. This would have been about sort of seven or eight levels above me.
Ms Page: So, in other words, a very indirect reporting line, then, all the way up to the Board; is that right?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Page: How would anybody have raised any problems to the Board if they were concerned about the quality of the EPOSS code and the fixes that were going in to try to make it better?
Gareth Jenkins: I’ve no idea.
Ms Page: No whistleblowing procedures that you were aware of?
Gareth Jenkins: Not that I’m aware of.
Ms Page: Body part number 5, Mr Jenkins: hardware failure. Would you accept that, from the year 2000, you knew that when hardware failed and was swapped out, there could be problems with recovering transactions?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I was aware of that but I was also aware that it didn’t happen very often.
Ms Page: How were you aware of that?
Gareth Jenkins: Again, informal conversations.
Ms Page: Informal chats, I see. People said to you in informal chats, “Oh yeah, no, we don’t have recovery problems after hardware failures very often. That’s not something that happens very much”; is that right?
Gareth Jenkins: That was how I understood things.
Ms Page: I see. Well, I won’t need to take you, then, to one of the PinICLs from the year 2000, in which you yourself dealt with a recovery problem and in which you said this:
“This was another example of recovery having gone wrong after a box swap.”
Do you take my point from the way I emphasised the word “another example”?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I understand what you’re getting at there.
Ms Page: You personally knew that there were plenty of examples of recovery problems after box swaps, didn’t you?
Gareth Jenkins: It depends what you mean by “plenty”. Clearly, there were – it had happened more than once.
Ms Page: You were aware of persistent problems with synchronisation between counters, within a branch, after a hardware failure. You knew that they were a persistent problem, didn’t you?
Gareth Jenkins: I knew they had been in the early days but I believe the problem you’re referring to did get fixed.
Ms Page: Let’s look at what you said about hardware in your Misra evidence. Your third statement for the Seema Misra trial, you attached the Horizon Data Integrity Report to it, didn’t you?
Gareth Jenkins: I did.
Ms Page: In fact, what you did was a formal process that we lawyers refer to as exhibiting your report. Did anyone tell you what “exhibiting” means?
Gareth Jenkins: Just attaching a document, rather than cutting and pasting it into the formal statement.
Ms Page: It makes it part of the evidence, Mr Jenkins. Did you understand that?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I didn’t understand that.
Ms Page: You told Mr Beer that you did this, you exhibited this report, because you thought it gave a useful summary of the sort of hardware failures that could occur that could possibly cause loss of data.
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I accept that.
Ms Page: But you conceded that you’d, in fact, done nothing at that stage to find out whether there had been any hardware failures at Mrs Misra’s branch?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I accept that.
Ms Page: The fact is, your Data Integrity Report reassures, doesn’t it? It’s intended to give comfort that there won’t be a loss of data if there is a hardware failure. That’s the point of it, isn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: It says that, in normal circumstances, there won’t be but it does accept the fact that potentially there could be.
Ms Page: The message really, by attaching it, was that “You, Professor McLachlan, you can rule out the idea that hardware failures might have caused discrepancies”; that was the point of attaching it, wasn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: No, it was to show that there was a possibility of it happening but otherwise that it was a very rare possibility.
Ms Page: On Tuesday when Mr Beer first asked you what you knew of the duties of an expert you said, “I just thought I had to answer the questions I was asked truthfully”, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Page: You relied on that a lot in your answers when Mr Beer asked you why you didn’t reveal the complete picture. You would say, well, you’d just answer the questions that you were asked, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Page: That also applied to the way you approached your witness statements for the Misra trial on the whole, isn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Page: But that’s not what happened here, is it, Mr Jenkins? The question that you were supposedly answering was this:
“I have been requested to comment on the issue raised by the defence in relation to a post office called Callendar Square, Falkirk that was mentioned at the Castleton trial.”
No one had asked you about hardware, had they, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: I can’t remember.
Ms Page: Well, they hadn’t, had they?
Gareth Jenkins: I –
Ms Page: It was not one of Professor Cipione’s questions, was it?
Sir Wyn Williams: Sorry, not Professor Cipione.
Ms Page: I’m so sorry, Professor McLachlan.
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes.
Gareth Jenkins: I can’t remember.
Ms Page: Well, you were answering a series of his questions in that statement and the one that you had just answered when you attached this report was about the Callendar Square bug. He had not asked you about hardware and he had not asked you about data integrity. He had asked you about the Callendar Square bug. Attaching your data integrity report there was an attempt, wasn’t it, to answer an implied question which flowed from all of his hypotheses. That implied question might have been something like “Could any system failures have affected Mrs Misra’s branch accounts?” That was a sort of implied question from all of the whole piece of work that he’d been doing, the hypotheses he’d been putting forward; do you accept that?
Gareth Jenkins: I’d not thought of it that way.
Ms Page: No, you’d not thought of it that way. Well, the report that you attached was specifically about data integrity. So were you answering an implied question along these lines: how do we know that the data underpinning Mrs Misra’s branch accounts has integrity?
Was that the question that you thought you were answering?
Gareth Jenkins: I can’t remember what – the exact circumstances of what I thought I was answering.
Ms Page: What you did here, in truth, is you exhibited this report to your witness statement as if it were providing the wider picture showing what Horizon was really about. That’s what you were doing, wasn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: I can’t remember. Sorry.
Ms Page: You were stepping outside the narrow task of responding to Professor McLachlan’s hypotheses and questions, and you were purporting to give the wider picture, “Don’t worry about data integrity, this is a good system. The data is sound. The system couldn’t have caused the discrepancies”. That’s why you exhibited it, isn’t it, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: I can’t remember exactly why I decided to exhibit it at the time.
Ms Page: Even though you told us, during the course of this week, that the report had been created for a narrow purpose, only intended to respond to the narrow hardware failure scenarios that Post Office had asked you to deal with, and then yet you then exhibit it to a witness statement. Why did you do that, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: I can’t remember.
Ms Page: This was a deliberately and knowingly deceptive reassuring report to exhibit to this statement in this context, wasn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not sure that it was reassuring, particularly. It did indicate that there were circumstances in which data could be lost.
Ms Page: You were throwing mud in Mr McLachlan’s eyes, weren’t you, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: That is not what I was trying to do.
Ms Page: Ultimately, that meant you were throwing mud in the jury’s eyes?
Gareth Jenkins: That was not my intent.
Ms Page: Let’s just remind ourselves of the question you were asked which you didn’t answer. It went like this: do you know whether there are any known problems with the Horizon system that Fujitsu are aware of?
The truthful answer to that question would have covered all the body parts, wouldn’t it? Cash accounts; remote access; tampering; bad error handling; silent faults across the system; the EPOSS code; the terrible code – the terrible code; hardware failures, persistent hardware failures; recovering transactions that were lost; failing to recover transactions that were lost.
Gareth Jenkins: That was not how I understood the question to be.
Ms Page: That was not how you understood the question. No.
There was even a bit more, wasn’t there, because there was also the true bolt-ones, the Bank of Ireland cash points; they were a catastrophe, weren’t they?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t have any real knowledge about the Bank of Ireland cash points and what the issues were with those.
Ms Page: The Horizon Lottery terminals: they were a problem in Mrs Misra’s branch, weren’t they?
Gareth Jenkins: I was not aware there were any problems with the Lottery terminals.
Ms Page: Bureau de Change: that was another disaster area, wasn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not aware of any specific problems with Bureau de Change.
Ms Page: You hid all these issues and problems when you gave evidence against Seema Misra, didn’t you?
Gareth Jenkins: No.
Ms Page: You did that, even though she was standing right there in the dock in front of you?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t believe that I deliberately hid anything.
Ms Page: Let’s just take a quick final look before I finish with how you reacted after she was convicted on the strength of your evidence. We’ve already seen how, after the trial, you were jokingly rather pleased with the mistaken title of Professor, so I won’t go to that. What I’ll go to is this, FUJ00156418. This is in February 2011. It’s from you to Penny Thomas. Now, if we just scroll down a bit, it’s a reply from her. She says:
“Okay, Gareth.
“Did you watch the Inside Out programme last evening?”
Let’s go up to your reply.
“Yes, I did.”
Do you remember that Inside Out programme?
Gareth Jenkins: Not in detail, no.
Ms Page: Do you remember that it starts with Davinder Misra, Mrs Misra’s husband, who sits a little further along from me, in tears, because his wife is behind bars?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t remember that, I’m afraid, sorry.
Ms Page: This is what you said about that:
“I was pleased that Fujitsu wasn’t mentioned. [Post Office] have a significant problem!
“I also note that the screenshots were HNG-X [Horizon Online] and not Horizon.
“I remember chatting to Mr Misra outside the court!”
Do you have anything to say about that, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: My feeling was then and is now that the issues to do with this are down to the way that Post Office has behaved, rather than actually faults in the Horizon system, and that, I think, is what was behind what I said there.
Ms Page: Yet you told the judge that you being a Fujitsu man had no impact on your evidence?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t believe that it did. I believe that I told the truth as I understood it at the time.
Ms Page: “I was pleased that Fujitsu wasn’t mentioned.”
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Page: You were a Fujitsu company man doing what Fujitsu needed you to do: protect the monster.
Gareth Jenkins: I didn’t think it was a monster.
Ms Page: Let’s go finally to one last document, please: FUJ00156460. If we go to the bottom of page 1 and zoom in, please, on paragraph 8a. This is you providing some content for your appraisal. I should have shown you the date, I’m so sorry, this is March 2011.
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Page: So this is your performance appraisal. 8a:
“I spent some time with POL supporting a series of court cases where POL was prosecuting ex-postmasters for theft where the postmasters were claiming a problem with the system. Cases were:
“a. West Byfleet: For this case I spent some time analysing a year’s worth of transactions and explaining to the defence expert how Horizon worked. I was required to comment on the defence expert’s reports and spent a week at the court during the trial including a full day in the witness box being examined and cross-examined by the barristers. The defendant was found guilty of Theft and Horizon was given a clean bill of health.”
You knew that the Misra trial was a test case for Horizon, didn’t you?
Gareth Jenkins: I realised that afterwards. I’m not sure if I did at the time.
Ms Page: You knew that your role was to help get that clean bill of health, wasn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: My role was to tell the truth.
Ms Page: You tailored your evidence accordingly, didn’t you?
Gareth Jenkins: No. I addressed – I attempted to answer as best as I could the questions that I was asked.
Ms Page: Never mind whether a byproduct of protecting the monster was that a woman was sent to jail, Mr Jenkins: never mind that.
Gareth Jenkins: I’m sorry for what happened to Mrs Misra but I feel that was down to the way that POL had actually behaved and wasn’t purely down to me. I clearly got trapped into doing things that I shouldn’t have done but that was not intentional on my behalf – my part.
Ms Page: Thank you, sir. Those are my questions.
Sir Wyn Williams: Thank you very much, Ms Page. We will break off now and we will resume again at 10.55.
(10.45 am)
(A short break)
(10.56 am)
Mr Beer: Sir, good morning. Can you see and hear us?
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, thank you.
Mr Beer: I think Mr Stein is next to ask questions.
Questioned by Mr Stein
Mr Stein: Mr Jenkins, I’ve got a number of questions for you but can we travel back in time to the development of the Horizon system. You were part of the team that was working on what became the Horizon system; that’s right, isn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: I was involved with the agent side of things, rather than the counter side of things at that time.
Mr Stein: Okay. Now, from your knowledge of that I want you to help us with something that Mr Coombs – that’s Mike Coombs, he’s the former Horizon Programme Director at ICL Pathway, and he gave evidence on the 1st November 2022 – I want to ask you about something he said and he if you can help. He was asked this question:
“Were you aware, during your time working as Programme Director, that Post Office Counters Limited were intending to place reliance upon data recorded on Horizon to support the bringing of civil and criminal proceedings against subpostmasters and office managers suspected of fraud?”
Mr Coombs answer was this:
“I didn’t have the faintest idea that they were considering using information and I had no idea at all they were considering taking the step of prosecuting members of their own organisation.”
Now, if we go back in time to the work you did do that at least contributed to the overall system at that stage and then perhaps the beginning of the Horizon period, in around about, what, 1999/2000. At that time, were you aware that Post Office was intending to place reliance on the data recorded on the Horizon system to support the bringing of civil and criminal proceedings?
Gareth Jenkins: I was aware at some time. I can’t remember at what stage. It was probably in the early 2000s but I’m not sure exactly when.
Mr Stein: Right. Were you aware at that same perhaps early stage that the Post Office was using the data from the Horizon system in order to conduct audit visits, in other words – from the point of view of subpostmasters and be stresses – essentially, raids on their premises; were you aware that it was being used in that way?
Gareth Jenkins: I can’t remember at what stage that I got involved in that sort of detail but it would be probably some time in the early 2000s, but exactly when I can’t remember.
Mr Stein: So at some point, this was to your knowledge, and you think in the early 2000s?
Gareth Jenkins: Yeah.
Mr Stein: Can you help us with whether, to your knowledge, either Fujitsu or the Post Office made sure that the design parameters of the Horizon system were up for the task of supporting civil actions and prosecutions?
Gareth Jenkins: Sorry, I can’t help you with that.
Mr Stein: Is there anything, to your knowledge, that was done to make sure that the Horizon system was good or fit for purpose, the fit for purpose being the support of proceedings against subpostmasters/mistresses, and people working in their branches?
Gareth Jenkins: I believe I heard someone saying that they’d taken advice as to whether the audit trail was something that could be used in court proceedings but that’s sort of second, thirdhand type knowledge, but exactly when I acquired that knowledge, I’m not sure.
Mr Stein: All right, so from your work, since before 2000 and then you were still consulting for Fujitsu in 2022; is that right?
Gareth Jenkins: I think my last actual consultation was just before Covid in 2000 but I was still on a retainer until 2022.
Mr Stein: Okay. So for the period of time that we’re talking about, roughly – certainly over 20 years, you’re not aware that there was a “Let’s make sure that this Horizon is up for the task of supporting prosecutions, civil actions or indeed properly attending upon people in audit”? You’re not aware of anything that was done to guarantee that the system was good for that; is that fair?
Gareth Jenkins: That’s probably fair.
Mr Stein: Now, we know from your evidence and from your statements that you were very much part of the Litigation Support system. I think you called it in your statement, prosecution support, or something similar to that? Is that what –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I mean, I can’t remember the exact term that was used but, yeah –
Mr Stein: Something like prosecution support –
Gareth Jenkins: Yeah.
Mr Stein: – seems to be what you say?
Gareth Jenkins: Yeah.
Mr Stein: Okay. Now, Terence Austin gave evidence in October 2022 and he was asked questions, which I will paraphrase, which were about what training events and training material was available in relation to the question of support for litigation, prosecution support. Okay?
Gareth Jenkins: Okay.
Mr Stein: Let me take that in bits for you. Were there any training events, opportunities, you know, hours in the day set aside, parts of maybe a weekend or a day set aside, for training purposes to do with the prosecution support job?
Gareth Jenkins: Not as far as I was concerned. I don’t know what the people whose its full time job was to do, to support that, people like Penny Thomas, and so on, but I wasn’t aware of any training.
Mr Stein: When you say not aware –
Gareth Jenkins: I mean, I didn’t have any training.
Mr Stein: Right. That’s what I’m trying to find out –
Gareth Jenkins: No, I’ve had no training in that and I realise now I should have done but it didn’t occur to me at the time that I was lacking that.
Mr Stein: Were you offered any such training opportunities, you know, opportunities to learn about systems in litigation, either civil litigation or in criminal litigation? Were you offered such opportunities to –
Gareth Jenkins: No, I wasn’t.
Mr Stein: Now, you’ve been asked in your statements about whether you were provided with guidance, standards or protocols or something similar that relates to investigations and prosecutions. As we understand your statement, I think it’s your third statement – I don’t need to go to the paragraph, I have a note of it – your third statement, which is WITN00460300, at paragraph 35, you say this you “don’t recall reading any of them at the time”. Now, the “them” you were referring to there was guidance, policies, protocols about giving evidence, okay?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not sure that I was aware that any such things existed.
Mr Stein: Right. In a way, you’re anticipating my next question.
Gareth Jenkins: Sorry.
Mr Stein: No, that’s fine. Are you saying that you were not provided with any of these manuals; is that what you’re saying: nobody brought them to your attention?
Gareth Jenkins: No.
Mr Stein: No?
Gareth Jenkins: No.
Mr Stein: You didn’t ask to see any of these things?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I didn’t. I realise now I should have done but it didn’t occur to me at the time.
Mr Stein: Who, within the Fujitsu organisation that you worked for, should have been responsible, in your view, for providing you with such materials?
Gareth Jenkins: I assume it’s the Security Team or possibly some of the lawyers that were behind that, so to speak. Though I’m not sure that there were direct lawyers responsible for the Security Team, which I think is another one of the issues that I concede, looking back with hindsight.
Mr Stein: Within the Security Team, I’ve asked you questions about training opportunities, events, manuals, guidance, policies, all of those possible opportunities to enhance your understanding of what you were about; who within security should have provided you with such opportunities?
Gareth Jenkins: I guess the Manager of the Security Team, that varied over time. The one name I can remember is Brian Pinder, but there were a number of Security Managers over the time.
Mr Stein: Now, in your statements you discuss the question of whether the PEAK, PinICL or KEL system was effective. This is from your first statement, I think, WITN00460100, paragraph – I think it is 47, page 13. You state this and, again, if I summarise this wrong or badly then I’m sure that someone will correct me. You say about the PEAK-PinICL system, that:
“Used properly [you] believed that it was a good tool but only as good as the users handling it.”
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I accept that.
Mr Stein: You stand by that, do you?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: Okay. So as far as it goes, the PEAK, PinICL, and you include within that the KEL system, was okay, but you can’t speak to the quality of those people that were operating it; is that fair?
Gareth Jenkins: Not quite. KELs, I had very little to do with. I saw KELs as being primarily something to support the Helpdesks, rather than something to use at the back end. As far as the PEAKs were concerned, then that was down to whatever anyone put on it. I believed that the guys in the SSC were competent and were doing a good job of things. So I don’t know if that answers your question.
Mr Stein: It does, and you will recall being asked many a question by Mr Beer about this question of belief: things that you were told –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: – and information that you had been supplied?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: So on this question of belief that the people within the system, operating the system and putting the entries to the PEAK and PinICLs in, and the like, what did you have to say in the fact that they were doing – well, as an example, quality assurance reports, reports to you saying that, actually, there are these issues, we’re addressing them. This is regarding the inputting of data. What do you have to provide a measurement of how well they were doing it? Did you have any of that sort of material?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I didn’t.
Mr Stein: Just moving that on slightly further, what quality assurance systems were embedded within the system to assure the quality of the PEAK/PinICL process? So what was there by way of, I don’t know, comparison to other similar systems, that type of comparative quality assurance?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t know, is the simple answer.
Mr Stein: You say in your first witness statement, WITN00460100, page 13, paragraph 47, as regards the system itself, in terms of the PEAK/PinICL system and, I suppose, the operation of the Horizon system, you say this:
“I have no point of comparison to offer the Inquiry”, because your work has only been, essentially on the Horizon system.
Is that fair?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, that’s fair.
Mr Stein: Right. Were you aware of any industry standard or benchmark being applied to the Horizon system?
Gareth Jenkins: There were standards in particular areas. So, for example, when we interacted with the banks we had to conform with banking standards, and things like that but, in terms of it overall system, then no.
Mr Stein: If we bring all of this together, essentially what appears to be the situation is that at no time were you either given or did you ask for an overall measurement of the quality of the Horizon system, its operation through from the inputting of materials or data on to the PEAK/PinICLs. That just simply wasn’t something that you had; is that fair?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I think that’s probably fair.
I’d not thought of it that way before but, yes, I accept what you’re saying.
Mr Stein: Now, subpostmasters/mistresses, their branch managers, their employees. Unless I misunderstand what you’ve said about your work for Fujitsu, you’ve worked in this country?
Gareth Jenkins: And I’ve worked abroad for brief periods as well.
Mr Stein: Brief periods. You’ve lived in this country for essentially your life?
Gareth Jenkins: Most of my life, yes.
Mr Stein: You’re as familiar with the Post Office branches as then many people are. You know, you go to different parts of the country, you see the small branches in small villages. You’re familiar with that.
Gareth Jenkins: I see that – I’m not sure that I visit post office branches that often. I probably visited more often the last two or three years because the banks have closed down and I have to use post office for banking money.
Mr Stein: You’re aware that the small places sometimes have grocery side to them and operate as more of a general store?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I am aware of that.
Mr Stein: You’re aware that, very often, not always, always, but very often that they’re run by families working and living effectively in the same premises?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: You’re aware that there’s, therefore, a reliance upon the Post Office, I suppose, from the postmaster/mistress point of view, for the Post Office to treat them fairly? I’m sure that you would think that that should be what was happening?
Gareth Jenkins: And that’s what I would expect to happen, yes, but I appreciate now that that isn’t what has happened.
Mr Stein: I want you to help us with one aspect of the way the postmasters/mistresses and, indeed, their branch employees were dealt with by the Post Office. Were you aware that the branches were told that they were liable contractually for any shortfalls and they had to make good those shortfalls? Were you aware that that was the consistent message that was sent and given to subpostmasters/mistresses and people working in branches?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m certainly aware of that now. I’m not sure exactly when I became aware of that.
Mr Stein: Again, that was going to be my next question.
Gareth Jenkins: Sorry.
Mr Stein: When did you become aware that subpostmasters/ mistresses, people working in branches, were told, “Look, if there’s a shortfall, you have got to pay up and make it good”? Help us understand when you knew that.
Gareth Jenkins: I think I was aware of that when I was involved with the prosecutions but I’m not sure exactly when I became aware of that.
Mr Stein: Right. You understand that people working in branches of the Post Office aren’t necessarily computer experts; you know that?
Gareth Jenkins: Oh, yes.
Mr Stein: You know that the data given to people working in branches is, as it’s been described by many witnesses, relatively limited?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not quite sure what you mean by “relatively limited”.
Mr Stein: Well, they don’t have full access to the system that you enjoyed?
Gareth Jenkins: My understanding was that, if someone was being prosecuted, then they would be given access to the data. I now appreciate that they weren’t always – that didn’t always happen.
Mr Stein: So the answer is, yes, you are, at least now aware –
Gareth Jenkins: Yeah.
Mr Stein: – that the people in branches were not given the full access to the system that you enjoyed?
Gareth Jenkins: Oh, yes, I certainly accept that now, yes.
Mr Stein: Right. So this pressing of subpostmasters to pay up for any shortfall, did that concern you, Mr Jenkins, when, as you say, you knew that, you think, when giving these statements? Did that make you think, “Hmm, that doesn’t seem quite right”?
Gareth Jenkins: I didn’t understand it quite in those ways at that time, is the issue, I think.
Mr Stein: Well, you either understand it, Mr Jenkins, or you don’t, don’t you? You either go, “Right, I understand that people are being told to pay up for shortfalls irrespective of fault,” or “I don’t know that”. You seemed to be saying a minute ago that you did know that.
Gareth Jenkins: It’s not something I’d really considered seriously at the time and I accept, with hindsight, I should have done.
Mr Stein: Well, you said repeatedly in your evidence – and I’ll come to this again a bit later – that you don’t think that the Post Office handled subpostmasters fairly. But you knew that the Post Office was pressing people to pay up irrespective of fault. That seems to be something that was in your knowledge. How do you ignore that, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: Well, I’m not sure what – I’d not taken it as being – the without-fault bit of it is the bit that I’d not really fully understood and comprehended at the time, I think, is really what it comes down to.
Mr Stein: Let’s try to work out what you’re saying. You seem to be saying that, whilst you were giving statements supporting the prosecution role of the Post Office, that you had some awareness that people were being told to pay up for shortfalls but you didn’t know perhaps how that was being explained to the people in the branches; is that what you’re saying?
Gareth Jenkins: I was looking – my approach was looking at how Horizon was working, rather than the effect on postmasters, and I appreciate that was wrong and I should have been more concerned about the impact on postmasters. But my role was, I saw, was more of a technical one and that’s where I was coming from.
Mr Stein: Do you regard yourself as being an uncaring person?
Gareth Jenkins: No, but I deal better with systems and things than people.
Mr Stein: That doesn’t mean that you –
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not saying I’m uncaring at all.
Mr Stein: Yes, but despite –
Gareth Jenkins: I just wasn’t thinking things through, like I should have done.
Mr Stein: Did you turn to anyone and say, “Well, I’d like to know a bit more about what’s going on in these branches”?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I didn’t.
Mr Stein: Is it perhaps more likely to be the truth that none of the work that you did for the Post Office in supporting the prosecutions had even a glimmer of a care about the subpostmasters and their branches?
Gareth Jenkins: I’d just not been looking at it in that way. I appreciate I should have done but I was just looking at things from the point of view of how Horizon was operating.
Mr Stein: Turning to a different topic –
Sir Wyn Williams: Before you do that, Mr Stein, can I just ask:
So far as you can recall, Mr Jenkins, were you aware brought into a case before a decision to prosecute was taken or was it, as far as you can recall, always the case that you were asked to assist once a decision to prosecute had been taken?
Gareth Jenkins: As far as I’m aware, a decision to prosecute had always been taken long before I got involved. I can’t say that – I can’t be absolutely certain that was the case, but from what –
Sir Wyn Williams: But that’s your recollection.
Gareth Jenkins: That’s my recollection, yes.
Sir Wyn Williams: All right.
Sorry, Mr Stein.
Mr Stein: We know that, on occasions, call handler scripts would advise subpostmasters to turn off the system. I can give a reference if we need it and go to –
Gareth Jenkins: I’ve seen such scripts now. I wasn’t aware of the scripts at the time.
Mr Stein: No. Now, the problem with turning off the branch system is that it disconnects from the rest of the network; is that right?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, but with Legacy Horizon the whole system was designed to be able to operate when turned off from the rest of the network anyway and, certainly in the early days, it was expected that most branches would be off the network most of the time.
Mr Stein: The idea is that when actually relinked, in other words turned back on or power restored, whatever it is, that the systems would catch up with each other.
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: That’s how it was planned?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, indeed.
Mr Stein: But that’s not a 100 per cent guaranteed system. It can lead to problems with data transfer?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I would dispute that. I would say that the design of the system was that it would catch up. If it was just a simple case of turning the box off and on again, then the data would all be caught up in time and that was one of the main reasons why the Riposte product was chosen by Post Office.
Mr Stein: There’s some suggestion that there are different bits of the Horizon system, that, in other words, if you have a part of the system working in Leeds, that that might relate to servers that relate to that area. Were there different operational areas for Horizon?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not quite sure what you mean. We – with Legacy Horizon, we had two data centres, in Wigan and Bootle, and all the systems in the UK connected through to one or other of those data centres, using the BT telephone network in general, though I think there was some differences in Hull because that’s not on BT, but – and there were a few obscure offices that used satellite systems, rather than the BT network when there wasn’t suitable BT coverage.
But the systems did, in general, all connect through to the main data centres.
Mr Stein: So we’ve got – so I can understand your evidence is about this. Legacy Horizon, you’ve got essentially two different servers?
Gareth Jenkins: No, we had two separate data centres, really for disaster recovery, so I think the example that was used was that if a Jumbo Jet landed on one of them the other could carry on doing the work. Obviously that never happened. So the idea was just to make sure we had two data centres sufficiently far apart that they were very unlikely to both fail at the same time.
Mr Stein: Would bugs, defects or errors affect every counter on Horizon or could some affect only a limited number of counters?
Gareth Jenkins: It depends on the bug. So yes, there could be issues to do with what was happening in the background on the boxes and things like that, could cause timing type issues, and so on, and those were the more difficult things to actually understand what was going on. But in general, my understanding was that the system was working well in the majority of branches. The problem has been that in a few branches things didn’t always operate correctly.
Mr Stein: Why would it be possible for particular bugs, errors and defects to affect a particular group of branches and not the entire system if, going back to your evidence a second ago, it’s operating as one system?
Gareth Jenkins: To do with issues of timing and just minor differences in terms of how the hardware operated all the sort of sequence of activities, different postmasters would do different sequences of activities and others, some typed faster than others, and things like that. So it was timing-type issues and things like that. So things that were basically unpredictable.
Mr Stein: So correspondence, in other words similar things happening at a similar time, could mean that particular branches all doing that at a similar time could be affected; is that what you’re trying to say?
Gareth Jenkins: I think most issues were – would – that occurred were affecting sort of just one or two isolated branches at a time rather than group of branches. I don’t think – I think what you’re trying to suggest is that there may have been a geographical grouping or something like that. I’m not aware of issues that would affect things like that.
Mr Stein: We know some bugs affected larger numbers and one or two we know that –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, and particularly after a new piece of software got rolled out, there may be some initial teething problems that would get sorted out in a few days after that.
Mr Stein: Right. So there’s no geographical suggestion that it would affect a particular group of people, say, in a particular county or something like that?
Gareth Jenkins: Not that I can think of.
Mr Stein: It’s more about the way the system itself operates and timing issues, you –
Gareth Jenkins: And the sort of activities that were being carried out. So there might be specific transactions that could cause issues.
Mr Stein: As regards software updates, you’ve mentioned in your statements that you believed that the Post Office was aware of those software updates?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes –
Mr Stein: Okay –
Gareth Jenkins: – they had to sign them all off.
Mr Stein: – and that those software updates included references to the bugs that had been fixed by them, that sort of –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: Right, okay. We’ve had the benefit – when I say “we”, I’m instructed by a firm of solicitors that have been involved with these issues now for well over a decade, Howe+Co solicitors. We’ve had the benefit of some pro bono advice, as allowed for by the Inquiry, in relation to computer expert advice. Okay? One of the parts of that advice that sticks with me is that, in the software fixing world, you fix 20 bugs, errors or defects and 19 more crop up; is that sort of a familiar IT expectation, that fix one bug, others crop up, because, necessarily, it affects the system as you go forward?
Gareth Jenkins: I certainly accept the fact that fixing a bug can introduce other bugs. I don’t think I would go as far as to say fix 20 and you get 19 new ones, but I understand what you’re getting at.
Mr Stein: You understand the point –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: – and the problem?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: How open was the Post Office in recognising bugs, errors or defects to the Horizon system, in your mind?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not quite sure what –
Mr Stein: Well, did they seem to be interested, the Post Office; were they welcoming; did they go “Thanks for telling us”?
Gareth Jenkins: I wasn’t actually involved in that direct communication with Post Office but I – I think one of the problems is that – from what I’ve realised now, looking back, is that Post Office wasn’t fully joined up, in that there were some people in Post Office who were well aware of these sort of issues but there were clearly other people in Post Office who weren’t.
Mr Stein: Outside of Fujitsu software – I include within that, if you like, the jigsaw puzzle that was the Horizon system made up of other software from other companies – so outside of the Fujitsu software, what else, what other hardware or telecommunications could cause data to be lost or corrupted, in your mind?
Gareth Jenkins: I think it’s a case of – I’m not quite sure I understand what you’re getting at. In terms of the branch accounts, then the branch accounts were all done based on the Horizon system within itself. There were then back-end systems that Post Office then used for running their back-end business and Horizon was responsible for feeding data into those back-end systems.
Mr Stein: Hardware problems, could that cause difficulties with branch accounts, in other words the terminals themselves? That was capable of causing difficulties?
Gareth Jenkins: I suppose, I suppose it could have done but, yeah, I’m not – err, yeah.
Mr Stein: Now, we know from your evidence and we know from other parts of the evidence in this case that there obviously were these bugs, errors and defects. We know about the support system at Fujitsu, and so on. Help us understand a little bit more about the way that there was communication to the subpostmasters/mistresses and their branches. Was there bug-of-the-day system, or a “Watch out for this, this could affect your system” type notification from Fujitsu?
Gareth Jenkins: Not that I’m aware of.
Mr Stein: The people –
Gareth Jenkins: Communication with branches, I think, was, in general, Post Office’s responsibility, rather than Fujitsu’s.
Mr Stein: Well, was anything done within Fujitsu to provide the information in the way that I’ve suggested? In other words, that “We think it would be a jolly good idea if the people that are operating their small businesses were told about, you know, watch out for this problem”; was there anything like that being done by Fujitsu?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not aware of anything like that but I wouldn’t have been directly involved in any such communication.
Mr Stein: It would have been a good idea, wouldn’t it, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: With hindsight, yes.
Mr Stein: You’ve stated a number of times, and I’ve touched on this in the questions I’ve asked of you, about the fact that the Post Office didn’t support or help, you think, in your mind, the subpostmasters. I’ll give you some quotes. Your fourth witness statement, WITN00460400. You state that the NBSC has, for some subpostmasters, not really helped and, in some cases, the advice made things worse.
Gareth Jenkins: I understand that, looking back. I wasn’t particularly aware of that at the time but it’s something I’ve been – I’ve learnt over the course of the last few years.
Mr Stein: You said yesterday, at just 2.32 in the afternoon, that the NBSC didn’t handle referrals very well, referrals being from the helpline at Post Office to Fujitsu?
Gareth Jenkins: That’s something I now understand, yes.
Mr Stein: The problem, which is that if the Post Office isn’t handling their helpline very well, that means that subpostmasters can be saying, “Look, I’ve got a problem. I don’t understand what’s going on. The system just doesn’t work”, or something like that. I can take –
Gareth Jenkins: I understand that and I understand now that that is exactly what was happening and I wasn’t aware of it at the time.
Mr Stein: And this information was not getting through to the support line at Fujitsu; you understand that now?
Gareth Jenkins: I understand that now, yes. I didn’t at the time.
Mr Stein: That’s a problem, isn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, it is indeed.
Mr Stein: Well, explain why it’s a problem, Mr Jenkins.
Gareth Jenkins: Because then people would – when there were genuine problems in the system, then we weren’t being informed about them and therefore couldn’t actually fix them.
Mr Stein: Now, the support lines at Fujitsu were not only just dealing with problems that were let through this Post Office filter system to Fujitsu but they were also seeking within the helplines to identify faults of themselves that would come to their own attention; is that right?
Gareth Jenkins: As I understand it, the distinction was that the Fujitsu Helpdesk was primarily dealing with hardware issues and business issues were to be dealt with by NBSC. But if NBSC identified something as being a potential software issue, then it would be passed over to the Fujitsu Helpdesks, is I understand how the system was supposed to work. But I wasn’t actually involved in that side of things then.
Mr Stein: At the very beginning of your evidence, Mr Beer was asking you questions about whether there was a kind of – this is my summary of the way the questions he was asking you – but whether there was essentially a big book, a list of problems that you could consult.
Gareth Jenkins: The nearest thing I think we had to that was the Known Error Log, which was there to support the Fujitsu Helpdesks but I don’t think that was available to the NBSC. But I’m – I am not 100 per cent certain about that.
Mr Stein: This failure in communication between Fujitsu and the Post Office, this inability, it seems, to reconcile a helpline system that is run by the Post Office with the operation of the Fujitsu system; how on earth could that come about, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t know. That wasn’t an area that I was particularly involved in.
Mr Stein: Paragraph 51 of your first witness statement, WITN00460100, you say this: you’re describing your impression that the Post Office did not provide enough support to subpostmasters who were struggling with the system and that your impression was that Post Office blamed the subpostmasters rather than conducting further investigations.
I think it may be useful if we, in fact, go to that paragraph, paragraph 51, WITN00460100. So the paragraph starts in relation to what POL could have done differently.
Gareth Jenkins: I mean, this part of my statement is looking back on how I see things now, not how I necessarily saw things at the time. So this is looking back in 2023, rather than what I was aware of at the time that I was working with Fujitsu.
Mr Stein: “… my impression is that POL did not provide enough support to [subpostmasters] when they were struggling to use Legacy Horizon and Horizon Online. Instead of investigating the issues that [subpostmasters] reported (and trying to assist them), my impression is that POL blamed them instead.”
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: How did you come to this view, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: From what I’ve heard from the Inquiry and what I’ve learnt from the Group Litigation that took place in 2018/2019. It’s stuff that I’ve learnt after my involvement with the design of Horizon. So this is looking back, rather than what I knew at the time.
Mr Stein: Your impression is that POL blamed them instead; blamed them in what way, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: Back to what you were saying before, that if money was lost, then they were asked to pay up.
Mr Stein: Now, I’m going to ask you about a particular email that was sent on 16 May 2013. I’ll ask it to go on the screen, please. Hopefully I’ve got the right reference, POL00029587. If we scroll down this email, please, this is from Alwen Lyons. Essentially, it says at the top there “Paula”, that will be Paula Vennells:
“… here are my speaking notes for your call with Alice this afternoon …”
Mr Jenkins, I know you were not privy to this email. I’m going to ask you about one particular section, okay? Now, you’ll see as you go down to the bullet points that it gets to the “The Good News is” bit and then if we read across:
“The Good News is that where we have found to bugs, [where we have found bugs] since [new Horizon] they have been detected and put right with no loss for the subpostmaster, and Fujitsu now monitor the suspense account for any such problems.”
All right? Now, this is an email in May 2013. You’ve given evidence regarding suspense accounts and you, in fact, when giving evidence, I think on the first day, you asked Mr Beer to be careful about the way that the term “suspense accounts” was being used.
Gareth Jenkins: Yeah.
Mr Stein: All right, so let’s see if I get this right. The first pre-IMPACT Programme suspense accounts were branch suspense accounts; are you okay with that description?
Gareth Jenkins: Yeah.
Mr Stein: After IMPACT Programme, there’s then the more centralised suspense accounts; is that again right?
Gareth Jenkins: There were still suspense accounts in the branches.
Mr Stein: Okay. Help us with the way the system operated. Fujitsu, is this correct, had access to the Post Office Accounts; is that right?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not quite –
Mr Stein: So could look at what was in the accounts?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not quite sure what you mean. I mean, Fujitsu was able to look at any data that was going through the system.
Mr Stein: Right. Well, it is saying here that, from May 2013, Fujitsu now monitored the suspense account for any such problems?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t understand what that means. I don’t understand what is being got at by that.
Mr Stein: What it might mean is that the theory was that Fujitsu should keep an eye on suspense accounts to monitor the rise of money being put into suspense which might correlate to problems within the system?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t think that’s what’s behind there. As I say, I don’t know what that referring to. There was an issue that was discovered in 2013 to do with some old data from suspense accounts that came forward a year or so later. I think it was being referred to as the local suspense issue, that affected 12 branches on 14 occasions, and that was a problem that was detected in 2013. So it could be a reference to that.
Mr Stein: All right. Well, I’ll move on.
Now, you’ve been asked a number of questions about what you’ve described in your statement as the boilerplate parts of statements that you gave. Now, I’ll take you to a particular paragraph of your statement, WITN00460300, so that’s the third witness statement, paragraph 102 – so WITN00460300, paragraph 102. Right. Thank you very much.
So paragraph 102 there is from your statement, you’re saying this:
“[You’re] aware that there is a question in the Inquiry as to what the two ‘boilerplate’ or ‘standard’ paragraphs that appear at the very end of the standard Fujitsu witness statement … actually meant.”
Okay? That’s what –
Gareth Jenkins: Yeah.
Mr Stein: – you’re talking about and you’ve been asked a number of questions about that.
Gareth Jenkins: Yeah.
Mr Stein: I don’t want to repeat those questions. Okay?
Gareth Jenkins: Okay.
Mr Stein: What I want to do is just understand what’s going on here a bit more. Now, you said essentially that this didn’t and wasn’t meant to mean that the Horizon system was working at any particular level of integrity, that wasn’t what this was about; that’s what you’re saying?
Gareth Jenkins: I can’t understand how the people who were signing these statements would be in a position to say that.
Mr Stein: Right, okay. The people that you’re talking about, that signed these statements, include you?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: Yes. Okay. So the people that signed these statements, containing these paragraphs, you’re saying you can’t understand how they could sign such declarations –
Gareth Jenkins: Yeah.
Mr Stein: – to warranty the integrity of the Horizon system?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: Okay, got it. Fine. Now, when you’re saying that that’s something you don’t understand, help us a bit more on that. Are you saying that these two paragraphs you assumed were about the laptop or the computer that you were writing things on, or about the audit data production? Are you saying that you assumed that or you knew that: which?
Gareth Jenkins: Assumed.
Mr Stein: Assumed. Right, okay. Now, help us understand a little bit more about what you mean about this word “assumption”, then. You know that giving statements to courts are important things, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Oh, yes.
Mr Stein: You can affect those people’s lives that you’re giving statements about, those people living in the small businesses in various parts of the country, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: You knew that, and you knew that statements contain a declaration at the top saying that “This statement is true to the best of your knowledge and belief”.
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: And you make it knowing that, if you say anything in it that is effectively untrue, or wrong, you may be opening yourself up to prosecution. You know that that’s what’s on those statements, don’t you?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: You know you have to sign a statement at the bottom of each page, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: In some cases, yes.
Mr Stein: Right. Well, you know you have to sign statements, don’t you, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not aware – I believe that there are some statements that were served in my name that weren’t actually signed by me.
Mr Stein: Okay, well, we’ll come back to that one in a moment.
So when you are making a statement that’s got this important declaration at the top, saying that, if you say something in the statement that you know not to be true, that you could be prosecuted, how does that reconcile itself with making an assumption about what these two paragraphs mean? You don’t really know, you’re just sort of guessing a bit?
Gareth Jenkins: I see now that it doesn’t necessarily reconcile but I’d not thought that through at the time.
Mr Stein: Just understanding your evidence, I think this has to be true, you are saying that you would never have signed paragraphs that warranted the working integrity of the Horizon system?
Gareth Jenkins: I was happy that the Horizon system was working correctly. I wasn’t – I wouldn’t have said that it was working correctly everywhere in all particular circumstances but I didn’t think that’s what I was being asked to say.
Mr Stein: Which is why you’re saying you’d have never signed these paragraphs to have meant that –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: – and you don’t think anybody else should have signed paragraphs to say that the Horizon system was absolutely tickety-boo at all times?
Gareth Jenkins: Well, certainly, the people who – these paragraphs were coming from the statement that was used to exhibit ARQs and the people who were providing those statements didn’t have any knowledge of how the Horizon system was working. All they knew was how the ARQ extraction process was working.
Mr Stein: Do you find it a little odd that other people may say that they also assumed that this just meant that they were saying that the system producing the statements was working okay; are you finding it a bit odd that everyone is making the same assumption, without checking with each other?
Gareth Jenkins: I realise now that I should have done more investigation and tried to understand more what was being said, but I didn’t.
Mr Stein: What about having a natter with somebody like Ms Chambers and saying “What on Earth does that mean, why are we signing this”?
Gareth Jenkins: I didn’t do that.
Mr Stein: Lastly, if we just touch, just very briefly, before I finish on this entire question of your status as an expert –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: – giving evidence as an expert. You’re saying, essentially, that you know now that it has a different status within the legal proceedings –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: – that experts are allowed to give an opinion about matters to which they have expert knowledge; that’s one of the big differences about being an expert. You know that now?
Gareth Jenkins: I understand that now, yes.
Mr Stein: Because, otherwise, a factual witness, a witness that just says, I don’t know, “I saw a particular person outside of a shop at a particular time”, they’re not allowed to give an opinion as to what they think is going on, they’ve just got to say what they’ve seen; do you understand the difference?
Gareth Jenkins: I do now. I don’t know if I did fully understand those differences at the time.
Mr Stein: Now through the period of time that we’re talking about, there’s Google, yes –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: – and we should add that there are other search engines!
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: Did you ever, as an example, Google, the question of giving evidence in court proceedings?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I didn’t.
Mr Stein: Did you ever speak to somebody else within your team and say, “Well, has anybody ever looked up what we should be doing in court proceedings”?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I didn’t. Again, I should have done –
Mr Stein: Did you ever ask – yes –
Gareth Jenkins: Again, I should have done but I didn’t, yeah.
Mr Stein: Did you ever ask for advice about it?
Gareth Jenkins: Well, I did seek some advice in – with – from David Jones, for example, back in February 2010, and there was no suggestion that I needed to do anything special at that time.
Mr Stein: So the odd situation that you were in, from your point of view, which is giving evidence in court proceedings, serious evidence affecting people in Post Office branches, you didn’t look it up? You didn’t speak to other people in your situation, like Ms Chambers, about it; is that right?
Gareth Jenkins: Correct.
Mr Stein: Do you think you could have done more to help people in this situation?
Gareth Jenkins: I clearly appreciate that now and I appreciate that I did get things very wrong but I – it was done through ignorance rather than maliciousness.
Mr Stein: Looking back in relation to your employer, Fujitsu, what should they have done better?
Gareth Jenkins: They should have given me some training in terms of what I – what they were asking me to do.
Mr Stein: And about the system itself, what should they have done better? You must have thought about this, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: Sorry?
Mr Stein: You must have thought about this. What should Fujitsu have done better?
Gareth Jenkins: I think the system as a whole was working well but it clearly wasn’t working perfectly, and I don’t think anyone ever suggested that it was.
Mr Stein: What should Fujitsu have done better, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: Probably not put me in the situation that I was put in.
Mr Stein: Lastly, Mr Jenkins, it was at the end of 2020 where, by chance, I happened to be the person that was presenting the evidence that related to the Clarke Advices in the Criminal Court of Appeal, so end of 2020 when that happened.
Gareth Jenkins: Right yes.
Mr Stein: That’s when the Clarke Advices then started to become part of discussion, generally –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: – in relation to Post Office matters. Now, you were on retainer until 2022?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: You were saying, essentially, that you weren’t doing very much work from about 2020 onwards but you were still theoretically consulting, if possible – you know –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: – if they wanted you to?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: After the time when the Clarke Advices started to become part of the discussion within Post Office Inquiry matters, as it became, did Fujitsu bring you to whatever office and say, “Mr Jenkins, there has been this Advice written by a chap called Simon Clarke that says you’ve not told the truth or the whole truth to court proceedings”; did Fujitsu bring you in and ask questions of you about that?
Gareth Jenkins: They – I was certainly sent a copy of the Clarke Advice at the time and, after the Horizon trial, I was brought in to discuss with Fujitsu lawyers to give my view as to what had actually, you know, the outcome from the Horizon trial that had happened in 2019, and that was the reason for my last couple of consultancy meetings in early 2020.
Mr Stein: Was there an internal inquiry by Fujitsu into the question of your integrity, your honesty, your probity, your credibility, when giving the statements going back in time for the Post Office?
Gareth Jenkins: Not that I can remember as such, at least not one that involves me.
Mr Stein: You’ve mentioned – and I’m grateful to Mr Enright – that there were statements that were served in your name that weren’t actually signed by you?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Stein: Are those statements that you’ve seen during the course of your preparation for your evidence in this hearing, these hearings?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, as I say, I can’t remember exactly which ones I’ve signed and which ones I haven’t but I am not using that as an excuse. It’s just that it’s been pointed out that some of the statements that have been shown to me do not have my signature on them. I’m not saying that I don’t stand by what they say; I’m just saying I – my understanding is that some of them were served before I had actually signed them.
Mr Stein: Language is important. Your understanding is that some were served, it seems, without them having been passed by you, is that what you’re saying, or are you saying that some statements were served in court proceedings that did not go via you: which?
Gareth Jenkins: I believe that I saw all of the statements. I’m not – what I’m saying is I haven’t necessarily actually put my physical signature on the bottom of each one of them. I’m not – I’m not tying to distance myself from statements that were put in my name. All I’m saying is that I hadn’t necessarily actually physically signed them all.
Mr Stein: Thank you, Mr Jenkins.
Sir Wyn Williams: Is that it, Mr Stein?
Mr Stein: Yes, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Thank you very much.
So Mr Moloney, is it appropriate to take our second break now and then you can have your question time after that break?
Mr Moloney: Yes, please, sir. Thank you.
Sir Wyn Williams: Fine.
So we’ll start again, well, 12.05. Is that all right with everyone?
Mr Beer: Thank you, sir.
(11.52 am)
(A short break)
(12.05 pm)
Mr Beer: Good afternoon, sir, can you see and hear us?
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, thank you very much.
Mr Beer: I’ll just wait for the room to settle down before handing over to Mr Moloney.
Sir Wyn Williams: All right.
Questioned by Mr Moloney
Mr Moloney: Thank you, Mr Beer. Thank you, sir.
Mr Jenkins, I’ve three topics to deal with you, please. Just to start with a few general questions, then a very short section on Mr Grant Allen’s case and then the most lengthy section on Mr Khayyam Ishaq’s case.
Gareth Jenkins: Okay.
Mr Moloney: Okay thank you. Just the general questions to start with. As your services were utilised in more and more prosecutions, did you become more familiar with the types of documents prepared for the purposes of criminal proceedings, such as witness statements, case summaries, defence statements, and so on?
Gareth Jenkins: I got to recognise a bit more about the type of documents that I would be shown, so yes, I think that’s a fair comment.
Mr Moloney: Yes. But it’s a question rather than a comment, but –
Gareth Jenkins: Well, yes, okay, yes. But yes.
Mr Moloney: Entirely. Did you become more familiar with the language used by lawyers in such documents?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not sure that I – I thought much about the language used. I was just looking at them in terms of just reading them in the same way as I would any other sort of document.
Mr Moloney: All right. Thank you. Did you become more familiar with how cases might be conducted, the issues in the case, and how the defence might seek to resist the prosecution case and how the prosecution might seek to rebut what the defence was saying?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not sure, is the simple answer to that. I’ve not done really any sort of comparison as to how things have changed over time, particularly.
Mr Moloney: Just to try and put it in more simple terms, did you actually say, “Right, this is the point the prosecution are making and this is what the defence are saying to it and this is how the prosecution might rebut that”?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I suppose so.
Mr Moloney: When you were involved in a case, writing a report, meeting with counsel, did you ever consider how a bad result in the case, a negative outcome on the issues in the case, might have negative implications for Fujitsu?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I don’t think I was considering that particularly. I was just trying to address the questions that I was being asked.
Mr Moloney: Right. So you confined yourself, really, to answering the questions that you were asked?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Moloney: May I just – the answer may be obvious because of the answer you’ve just given but, just to repeat it – when you were involved in a case, writing a report, meeting with counsel, did you ever consider how a bad result in the case, a negative outcome on the issues, might affect or have negative implications for Post Office?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I didn’t really consider that.
Mr Moloney: Okay. I’d now like to ask you just a few questions about Grant Allen’s case. He’s one of the Core Participants represented by Hudgells Solicitors. Do you have the recollection of this case from having read the papers in preparation for your evidence?
Gareth Jenkins: I’ve read the stuff about that, yes, as far as the preparation, yes.
Mr Moloney: So I’ll just try and give a quick summary and then you’ll see if there’s anything you disagree with?
Gareth Jenkins: Okay.
Mr Moloney: So in January 2013, Mr Allen plead the guilty to a single count of fraud by false representation. When his branch had been audited, there had been a shortfall of about £17,000 and Mr Allen told Auditors that they would find a shortfall in excess of £10,000. He told Investigators he’d inflated the balance in the branch in order to cover losses he’d experienced and he thought that the shortfall was associated with problems he encountered with hardware not functioning properly, as he moved over to the new system; do you remember that?
Gareth Jenkins: I didn’t remember it was to do with moving over to the new system; I thought it was to do with moving hardware from one branch to – one location to another.
Mr Moloney: Absolutely. Now, can we look at POL00089427. That’s POL00089427. Can we please go to the final page to start with, so we can scroll up to the penultimate page, and keep going, and keep going. Thank you.
It’s an email from Rachael Panter to you on 31 January 2013 and it follows on, really, in time from an email that Mr Beer asked you about yesterday afternoon when all the cases were set out and your generic statements were going to be served in relation to those cases?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I’m familiar with those sort of emails.
Mr Moloney: Yes, entirely. So I’ll read it, if I may:
“Hi Gareth
“Hope you are well. Just to let you know where we are with a couple of cases.
“Grant Allen – this case has concluded now so you will not need to attend.”
I will deal with what is said about Mr Ishaq here because that will save time when I come to ask you about Mr Ishaq.
Gareth Jenkins: Sure.
Mr Moloney: “Ishaq – Having served your report, the defence have queried it and are claiming that Ishaq had to make false entries in order for the figures to reconcile, as the Horizon system kept malfunctioning.
“The trial is listed for 25 February 2013 for 3-4 days. Please could you make a note in your diary, as you will be needed to attend to clarify our position with Horizon.”
If we could go down. Thank you:
“Our barrister has asked if you could read the Defence Case Statement attached and make a list of your initial thoughts on the assertions that he is making. We may need you to add a few of those comments into your report so that each issue is addressed.
“I have attached a copy of the case summary for your assistance.”
Then it deals with the case of Sefton and Nield, which we don’t have to spend any time on, and the usual salutations.
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Moloney: We see from that that you were told that Grant Allen’s case had concluded –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Moloney: – and Ms Panter refers to having served your report, which of course follows on from reference in the previous email that we saw about expert reports.
Gareth Jenkins: It was my generic witness statement, I believe, was what was being served.
Mr Moloney: Absolutely, which was described as an expert report from you.
Gareth Jenkins: I thought of it as being an expert witness statement but I won’t quibble the terms.
Mr Moloney: Okay. You reply in due course to this email, at 17.01, so not long after. If we could go up the page, please, and there we see:
“Rachael,
“I’m fine thanks. Hope you are too.
“Thanks for the update. I’ll make a note of the dates. No problem with them at present.
“I’ll have a look at the Ishaq stuff and get back to you. When do you need anything? I’m tied up all of next week so I may not be able to get anything formalised until the week of 11 February. Is that okay?”
In fact, you were much quicker than that –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I found a bit of space in my schedules during that week but, yes, I was trying to set expectations.
Mr Moloney: It’s this I’d like to ask you about, Mr Jenkins, if I may. You go on to say:
“What exactly was the conclusion of the Grant Allen case? I was particularly concerned about his allegations regarding the problems caught due to refurbishment and comms issues being the reason for some of his losses. Was anything said publicly about that? We were quite concerned that this might set a precedent.”
Then you referred to the case of Mr Patel and Kim Wylie, to conclude the email.
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Moloney: Who was “we” there, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: I guess it was “we,” Fujitsu. I’m not 100 per cent sure, about that would be – it wasn’t a royal ‘we’, if that’s what you mean.
Mr Moloney: Well, that was one option, although you’d said “I” in the previous sentence –
Gareth Jenkins: Yeah.
Mr Moloney: – which rather precluded it being a royal ‘we’.
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Moloney: So it was Fujitsu who were worried. Why would Fujitsu be worried about a precedent being set in a case?
Gareth Jenkins: I think it was – there was a suggestion that a refurbishment had caused a loss and I’d not been given the opportunity to investigate what was actually happening, so I just wanted to sort of clarify exactly what the outcome was, as to whether it needed further investigation.
Mr Moloney: Because if a refurbishment had been shown to cause a loss or it had not been challenged that a refurbishment had caused a loss, that might cause problems for Fujitsu?
Gareth Jenkins: Potentially, yes.
Mr Moloney: Yes. Specifically here, there is a reference to “precedent” and that this perhaps could cause problems in future cases?
Gareth Jenkins: Yeah, I guess so.
Mr Moloney: Were you involving yourself, as it were, in strategy at this point, Mr Jenkins, and not simply answering the questions that were asked of you?
Gareth Jenkins: I didn’t see it that way.
Mr Moloney: Was there a risk of reputational damage to Fujitsu if this had gone wrong?
Gareth Jenkins: I suppose there was a risk there but I was more concerned in actually understanding what had actually happened in that particular case and what the outcome was.
Mr Moloney: And what the possible detriment was?
Gareth Jenkins: I suppose that may have come into it.
Mr Moloney: You were looking ahead with the interests of those who’d been your effective employers for the whole of your career?
Gareth Jenkins: Possibly.
Mr Moloney: Can I move on, please, now just to look at the case of Khayyam Ishaq, and could we please put up the case of Hamilton, which has the Inquiry URN POL00113278, and it is paragraph 214. There it is.
This is what the Court of Appeal said about the case of Khayyam Ishaq in the judgment Hamilton and others at paragraph 214, and it goes through to paragraph 218 for the facts:
“On 7 March 2013, in the Crown Court at Bradford, before HHJ Potter, Khayyam Ishaq changed his plea to guilty to the theft of £17,863. On 22 April 2013, he was sentenced to 54 weeks’ imprisonment.”
So what that means is that it’s a sentence of immediate custody, not suspended:
“215. The defence challenge to the Horizon system was clear from a very early stage in the proceedings. Mr Ishaq’s solicitor had informed [Post Office] of the issue and of the defence intention to instruct an expert at an earlier Magistrates’ Courts hearing on 25 July 2012. A defence statement of 29 August 2012 repeated the defence challenge to Horizon and made a series of disclosure requests targeted at the Horizon system.
“Mr Ishaq denied theft but admitted to altering items on Horizon out of necessity in order to reconcile the accounts and due to the system malfunctioning. The defence sought any information relating to the malfunctioning of the Horizon system generally (such as the outcome of any enquiries or investigations or internal memoranda record malfunctioning) and the data produced by Horizon. The defence repeatedly sought disclosure in relation to Horizon and instructed an accountancy expert to analyse the accounts.
“[Post Office] produced evidence to demonstrate the integrity of Horizon and relied in particular upon the involvement of Mr Jenkins who provided witness statements and contributed to a joint expert report. In a served witness statement dated 15 January 2013, Mr Jenkins defended the integrity of the Horizon system.
“On 5 February 2013, the defence made a formal application to a judge for further disclosure on Horizon. The application was refused. On 20 February 2013, the defence served an addendum defence statement which alleged Horizon malfunction and set out reports of technical faults which Mr Ishaq had made to the Horizon Helpdesk. He had also made reports to the National Business Support Centre about shortfalls and discrepancies.”
Paragraph 219, which is the next paragraph, simply deals with Post Office’s response to the appeal on behalf of Mr Ishaq and points out about the absence of analysis.
At the fifth line:
“The fact that Mr Jenkins provided witness statements in itself suggested that [Post Office] did not disclose the full and accurate position regarding the reliability of Horizon. There was no proof of an actual loss as opposed to a Horizon-generated shortage.”
So that’s sets the factual background, as it were, to the questions that I’d like to ask you, Mr Jenkins. But just to add a little more, which I think you may recollect of it, from the terms of your witness statement, that Mr Ishaq had pleaded not guilty and was due to be tried on 25 February 2013 in the Bradford Crown Court but, although the trial started, his counsel was not well and so the trial was adjourned until 6 March 2013.
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I remember that.
Mr Moloney: Then on 7 March he was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty. In fact, you’ll remember that because you went to Bradford, didn’t you?
Gareth Jenkins: On both occasions, I was in Bradford, yes.
Mr Moloney: Absolutely. You had served a report in the case and, as it says in the judgment in Hamilton and Others, Mr Ishaq had served the defence statement setting out his defence to the case and explaining why he took issue with the prosecution case, and he’d also commissioned an expert report from Beverley Ibbotson supporting his defence, and you had a number of emails with Beverley Ibbotson and did you meet her briefly, as well?
Gareth Jenkins: Met her briefly outside of the court on the first day of the first trial but I’d not seen anything to do with that report until that point.
Mr Moloney: Yeah. In fact, you got it very late in the day, didn’t you?
Gareth Jenkins: I got it on the first day – the morning of the first day of the first trial, yeah.
Mr Moloney: Absolutely. When at court, did you meet the prosecution team, trial counsel, Mr Mark Ford?
Gareth Jenkins: I believe I must have done.
Mr Moloney: The purpose of your email exchanges with the defence expert, Beverley Ibbotson, prior to the part of the trial, just prior to the start of the trial, was in order that you could discuss each other’s potential evidence and produce a joint report that identified any points of agreement and identified any differences between you?
Gareth Jenkins: That’s what I now understand, yes. I’m not sure it was actually explained to me at the time, I was just given the report and said, “Have a look at this, what do you think about it?”, or words to that effect.
Mr Moloney: Right, because you did produce a joint …
Gareth Jenkins: Yes. Well, I think it was called a joint report. Basically what it was, it was Ms Ibbotson’s report with some comments interleaved with it that – as to whether I agreed or disagreed with what she was saying and, in the event, on the whole, I agreed with most of what she was saying.
Mr Moloney: Entirely, and we’ll come on to have a look at that shortly. But, as you say, your views in relation to the separate aspects of the report were incorporated into Ms Ibbotson’s report, in bold and italics.
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Moloney: We’ll see that. First of all, I want to ask you about the defence statement. Now, the essence of Mr Ishaq’s sense, as is made clear, was set out in his defence statement and, for these purposes, can we look at a document which contains quotes from his defence statement and your comments upon those quotes.
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Moloney: You’re aware of this document –
Gareth Jenkins: I know – I recognise your description of the document, yes.
Mr Moloney: This is POL00059602. We can see this is 1 February 2013, 9.31 in the morning. This is when you’re essentially commenting on this document.
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Moloney: Yes. We see the introduction explaining what you’ve been asked to do, so this is about five weeks before trial. If we could move up slightly so we can see the full section on Defence Case Statement. Thank you.
So this is the first quote, as it were, from Mr Ishaq’s defence statement, reproduced in this document for you to comment on.
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Moloney: Yeah. We see:
“This Defence Case Statement sets out in general terms the defence of Khayyam Ishaq and the principal matters upon which issue is taken with the [court]. It is served for no other purpose.”
It carries on five paragraphs, introducing the Defence Case Statement, which you say:
“All of the above appears to be standard legal preamble and doesn’t require any comment from me.”
Reflective of your familiarity with documents of this nature?
Gareth Jenkins: Well, it was more a case of I didn’t think there was anything technical there and I assumed it was something to do with the legal side of things that I didn’t really fully understand and, as I understood it, I was expected to comment on the technical aspects, rather than the stuff there.
Mr Moloney: The next section is “General nature of the defence case”, and we see that as the heading. Here we see:
“The defendant is charged with theft of £21,168.64 …
“Again no comment. I have not seen any of the detail as to how this figure was arrived at.
“Note that I have been involved in a previous case where the figure was disputed and was able to show why the defendant had misunderstood the way the system operated, due to the way they were trying to hide the loss.”
Then at paragraph 7, if you could scroll up a bit, thank you:
“The nature of the Defence in relation to this allegation is:
“There was no appropriation of monies. The Post Office ‘Horizon’ software/hardware system had in the past on numerous occasions malfunctioned causing difficulties in reconciling sales, receipt and stock figures. The defendant had reported the same to the Post Office helpline seeking assistance but little or no successful assistance was arranged to him despite the said requests.”
Your response here is:
“If the defence can specify some examples of this, I am happy to investigate them. However I would contend that the system doesn’t malfunction without leaving some trail to indicate what has happened. Without examining the logs it is difficult to be any more specific.
“I think there are 3 possibilities here:
“The defendant has not understood of the way the system operates and that the difficulties in reconciliation have been due to the defendant’s lack of understanding of the system and the way in which it operates.
“The defendant has stolen the money.
“There is a fault in the system.
“There is no evidence of a fault in the system (and the fact that the system operates without issue in 12,000 other branches supports this fact), so I would suggest that it is one of the other two. I can offer no opinion in identifying which is the case. The Post Office helpline is run by Post Office Limited and so I am unable to comment on the assistance it did or did not provide.”
The system was faulty at times though, Mr Jenkins, wasn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: I was aware of, at that stage, one fault that had occurred after the pilot of Horizon Online, because this case was to do with Horizon Online, if I remember correctly, and that was the receipts and payments mismatch issue that I think we discussed a day or two ago, and I was confident that we knew the scope of that and which branches that had actually affected.
Mr Moloney: Yes, and it could cause problems that had to be rectified, the system could do that. You knew that from Horizon Legacy and Horizon Online was relatively new, and you knew that any computer system could cause problems which had to be rectified?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, but, as I was saying there, that as we were talking about Horizon Online in this case, that I wasn’t aware of any specific problems that would have affected that particular branch.
Mr Moloney: You had not, at this stage, examined the data?
Gareth Jenkins: And I make that clear at the time.
Mr Moloney: But you were nevertheless venturing an opinion that it is one of the other two, without having looked at the data.
Gareth Jenkins: But I qualified that as saying that I’d not looked at the data.
Mr Moloney: You qualified it before you came to that conclusion though, didn’t you? You first of all said, “I’ve not looked at the data but I think there are three possibilities here”, you say, and the two that it must be are that the defendant must have misunderstood the operation of the system or the defendant was a thief, but you could not say which, and that was before you’d looked at the data.
Gareth Jenkins: That’s what I say. I had no reason to think there was a problem with the system at that time.
Mr Moloney: Without having looked at the data?
Gareth Jenkins: I have not – I’d not been asked to look at the data and hadn’t been given the data at that stage.
Mr Moloney: You say:
“Note that this is a common complaint.”
What was a common complaint?
Gareth Jenkins: The common complaint was that, by then, I was understanding that people were complaining about the NBSC helpline not being very helpful.
Mr Moloney: Is that part of your expertise?
Gareth Jenkins: No, it wasn’t.
Mr Moloney: If we could move to (iv), please, on this, if we scroll down to (iv):
“The defendant contends that upon all core data from the Horizon hardware/software system (used by the Post Office Auditors) being provided to him the defence should be able to demonstrate that all sales, receipt and stock figures properly reconcile.”
You say:
“Not sure I understand this. Is he asking to see the detailed logs to do his own analysis? If so I would suggest that he may need some help in understanding them and in the past I’ve worked with defence experts to provide that understanding.”
You realise that the matters that were being raised were the proper subject of expertise –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Moloney: – not something that an ordinary person could be expected to understand?
Gareth Jenkins: It was a case of explaining what the logs actually meant, yes.
Mr Moloney: Then could we please go down to the disclosure requests, yes, and that’s at 11(ii). It reads:
“All material to the knowledge of the prosecution in existence (whether in the hands of the prosecution or third parties) that reasonably supports (or is reasonably capable of supporting) the contention that the Post Office Horizon software/hardware system has proved to be unreliable and/or inaccurate and/or unstable and/or susceptible to malfunction and/or otherwise prone to the production of erroneous results.”
You reply:
“I am not aware of any such material other than previous such challenges.”
You were aware of material, weren’t you, that showed, whether or not it had been fixed, that, actually, the Post Office Horizon software and hardware system has proved to be unreliable and/or inaccurate?
Gareth Jenkins: I didn’t have – I was aware that Post Office had been building up material of previous challenges but I didn’t have a complete set of that and that’s really what I was referring to.
Mr Moloney: You knew about the problems during rollout?
Gareth Jenkins: But the problems during rollout would have not been relevant because I had found out at what time this branch had actually moved from Legacy Horizon to Horizon Online, and it wasn’t operating on Horizon Online during that trial period.
Mr Moloney: So you’re saying that you’ve confined yourself to Horizon Online here, and that you’ve not considered this as a general request about Horizon software and hardware. You’ve read Post Office Horizon Online software and hardware system?
Gareth Jenkins: That is how I was taking that.
Mr Moloney: You knew all about the problems during rollout. You knew all about the problems with Riposte.
Gareth Jenkins: But this case was to do with Horizon Online and nothing to do with Riposte.
Mr Moloney: Yes. But this was an invitation to set out all you knew, really, Mr Jenkins, wasn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: I didn’t see it that way.
Mr Moloney: Then down to (iv), please. We see there:
“The full results (whether provisional or final) of all internal and/or external investigations and/or enquiries and/or reviews (whether instigated by the Post Office or any other body) into the correct functioning of the Post Office Horizon hardware/software system …”
You reply:
“Again, I do not have this information but presumably Post Office Limited does. I am aware of an ongoing investigation into this area by an independent 3rd party which is due to report in a couple of months’ time.”
That was the Second Sight investigation, was it?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, yeah.
Mr Moloney: When you met with Beverley Ibbotson, or emailed her, did you tell her about the ongoing Second Sight investigation?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I didn’t know that I needed to.
Mr Moloney: Having seen what Mr Ishaq was getting at in this case, meeting with the expert, did you not feel that it might be appropriate to tell her about what was going on with Horizon at this time, when she was essentially raising accountancy related problems in relation to Horizon?
Gareth Jenkins: I can see now that maybe I should have done but I didn’t think of that at the time.
Mr Moloney: Then, finally for this, at (v):
“Any internal memoranda and/or guidance notes and/or other material dealing with the correct or incorrect functioning of the Post Office hardware/software system …”
You say:
“I don’t believe that I have anything specific that comes in this category. I assume that this is being addressed by Post Office Limited.”
Didn’t you know about the Known Error Log?
Gareth Jenkins: That was not – I’d not interpreted that question as meaning that.
Mr Moloney: Well, that identifies incorrect functioning of the Post Office Horizon hardware and software system and gives fixes, doesn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I accept that now but I’d not seen that as being what this question was about.
Mr Moloney: So far as the answers you’ve given in this document are concerned, did you appreciate that Post Office would rely on your answers?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t think – I don’t think I heard anything further from when I passed this response back to – I think it was Cartwright King, rather than Post Office, as such, and I didn’t get any further feedback in terms of progressing this any further, that I can remember.
Mr Moloney: Because we know, as we’ve seen from the terms of the Hamilton judgment, that a disclosure request was made by Mr Ishaq on 5 February, that’s just four days after this, which related to that material and the application was refused by the judge.
Now, we don’t have a transcript of that disclosure application but do you appreciate now that, on the basis of what you said, Post Office would be able to say that it had no material to disclose?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not sure that that, on the basis of what I said, that they would be able to say that because what I’m saying here is that Post Office probably does have material that I didn’t have personally and, therefore, it was up to them as to what they should be disclosing or not.
Mr Moloney: What material were you thinking of, Mr Jenkins? That Post Office would have?
Gareth Jenkins: I didn’t know what they had. All I’m saying is that I didn’t think that I had anything that was relevant.
Mr Moloney: Well, you’re saying that “Post Office probably does have material that I didn’t have personally”, are your words and, therefore, it would be up to them –
Gareth Jenkins: I think that’s what I’m trying to say here, “Again, I do not have this information but presumably Post Office Limited does”.
Mr Moloney: What did you suspect they had?
Gareth Jenkins: I was aware of the work that Helen Rose had done a few months earlier, in terms of cataloguing previous challenges to Horizon.
Mr Moloney: But wasn’t that something that you were aware of as an expert, that you should be pointing out here, in terms of the answers to it?
Gareth Jenkins: That was not my material. That was Post Office’s material and, when I looked at that, I didn’t recognise a lot of the information in there. So I felt the Post Office had a better picture than I had.
Mr Moloney: Why didn’t you say, presumably, you’ll disclose the Helen Rose Report? You knew about it, Mr Jenkins.
Gareth Jenkins: Well, I assume that Post Office knew about it as well because they were the ones who had shown it to me.
Mr Moloney: Well, precisely. But you were the person who was tasked with being the expert in this case, Mr Jenkins, and you knew about the Helen Rose Report, but you didn’t tell anybody.
Gareth Jenkins: I didn’t know that I was expected to tell anybody about it. I thought Post Office had that information and they could tell people about it.
Mr Moloney: In any event, matters progressed and the defence served an expert report from Ms Ibbotson and, as you’ve explained, you had email exchanges with Ms Ibbotson and you met her briefly at court?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Moloney: Could we now, please, have a look at Ms Ibbotson’s report and the contributions from you, that are contained therein, the joint statement. This is POL00059927. We can see there it’s dated 26 February 2013. It’s the report of Beverley Ibbotson and the joint statement of Beverley Ibbotson and Gareth Jenkins. Now, I assume, Mr Jenkins, that you read this report?
Gareth Jenkins: I did at the time, yes.
Mr Moloney: Yes. I’d like to take you to particular sections of it, if I may. First to page 4, and paragraph 1.10. Now, there’s a part of Beverley Ibbotson’s report that says here:
“I understand that my duty in providing this report is to the court and this report is addressed to the Court and not to those instructing me.”
Did you read this as written by Ms Ibbotson?
Gareth Jenkins: That was part of her statement. I was commenting more on the technical aspects that came later.
Mr Moloney: No, of course. I’m asking you, though, whether or not you read that?
Gareth Jenkins: I probably read it, yes.
Mr Moloney: Did that inform your understanding of the section in your generic statement that – where you said, “I understand that my duty in providing this report is to the Court”?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t think I related the two together, at the time.
Mr Moloney: Right. Then, at page 4, please, 1.11:
“In accordance with Part 33 of the Criminal Procedure Rules and the Practice Direction supplementing it, I set out my expert’s declaration at the conclusion of the body of this report.”
Did it never occur to you that you might be subject to the same duty?
Gareth Jenkins: It hadn’t, until it was pointed out to me much later.
Mr Moloney: When you read that, “in accordance with Part 33 of the Criminal Procedure Rules and the practice directions supplementing it, I set out my expert’s declaration at the conclusion of the body of this report”, did you not wonder what Part 33 of the Criminal Procedure Rules was and the Practice Direction supplementing it?
Gareth Jenkins: No, as I say, this was all – the first time that I saw the report was the previous day. I’d spent most of the evening analysing a whole load of data to be able to address the issues, so that’s what I was concentrating on at this time.
Mr Moloney: Can we please go to page 5, please, which is the next page, and to 2.3. This is really the body of Ms Ibbotson’s report, dealing with the issues in the case, and what had happened was that essentially there was an audit, Mr Ishaq was suspended and there was a difference between the shortfalls from when he was suspended and a later check?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, yes.
Mr Moloney: Of course, you could see the obvious point that’s being made, which is how has this balance changed, this shortfall, how has it increased, if Mr Ishaq has been suspended? It reads:
“A repeat balance snapshot exercise was carried out on 11 February 2011, 3 days after the defendant had been suspended, at which time the shortfall was identified as being £21,213.79.”
Then what you say is:
“GJ agrees that these exhibits are clearly different but is unable to explain the differences at this point. GJ points out, however, that the difference is only £45.15.”
Why did you mention that, Mr Jenkins, about that figure, that it’s only £45.15?
Gareth Jenkins: Because I saw that as being small compared to the £21,000 that was being talked about and, in the work that I’d done in a fairly limited timescale, I’d been unable to sort of track down exactly what – why that difference was.
Mr Moloney: Wasn’t that a matter for comment by the lawyers, rather than you?
Gareth Jenkins: Possibly it was. I don’t know. As I say, I don’t know what – I’d been asked to actually look at this report and I was agreeing with the fact that the figures were different, but I was just pointing out that the difference was only £45.
Mr Moloney: Can we go to page 17, please, and to paragraph 3.29. This case was all about reversals, wasn’t it, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I think it was. I can’t remember all the details, I’m afraid.
Mr Moloney: We see at 3.29, and of course the issue is, a central issue is, who was responsible for the reversals?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Mr Moloney: Yeah. We see Ms Ibbotson dealing with that issue and something which perhaps undermined the assertion that Khayyam Ishaq had been physically responsible for the reversals. It reads:
“I have summarised, at Appendix G3, all reversals between 9 September 2010 (start of branch trading statement period 1) and 8 February 2011, which I have further subcategorised by user ID and by product code. As my analysis shows of the 248 reversals over the period, 14 were made by Mr Dennis Watson, following the audit on 8 February 2011, 173 were carried out under the usernames associated with Mr Ishaq and 61 reversals were carried out under the username associated with Mr Liaquat.”
You then say:
“[Gareth Jenkins] agrees that there were 248 items and with the split on the total basis as above. GJ points out that if only 4 product lines are analysed (as SB/21) then other than one transaction all were carried out by under name KI001 or KIS002. BI agrees.”
Was this part of your expertise, to be able to identify who made the reversals?
Gareth Jenkins: I was identifying what the logs said had been done in terms of the reversals. So I’d been looking through the transaction logs for the branch for that. As I say, I can’t remember the analysis I did now but I had spent was of the previous evening going through the logs looking to see what these reversals were and trying to marry them up with what was mentioned in the report here by Ms Ibbotson.
Mr Moloney: But that was a fact for the investigator and the prosecutor, not expert evidence from you, wasn’t it; that’s not part of your expertise?
Gareth Jenkins: That’s what I’d been asked to look at.
Mr Moloney: Then, just finally, looking at this report, could we go to page 19 and the expert’s declaration. This is the expert’s declaration that Ms Ibbotson had referred to in the early part of her report that is in accordance with Part 33 of the Criminal Procedure Rules and the Practice Direction. Could we just look at 5.12, thank you. If we could move all of that up. Thank you very much.
“I understand that …”
Then at (b):
“… the Court may at any stage direct a discussion to take place between experts …”
Did you understand, when you had a discussion with Beverley Ibbotson, that you were essentially as two experts discussing the issues in the case?
Gareth Jenkins: I was aware that I was there as an expert on understanding how the Horizon system operated.
Mr Moloney: Yes. At (c):
“… the court may direct that, following a discussion between the experts, a statement should be prepared showing those issues which are agreed and those issues which are not agreed, together with a summary of the reasons for disagreeing.”
What did you think your joint statement was about?
Gareth Jenkins: I think it – I think it was actually – looking at that now, I think it was fulfilling what it says at (c) there.
Mr Moloney: Yes. Then at (f):
“… I have read Part 33 of the Criminal Procedure Rules and I have complied with its requirements.”
Beverley Ibbotson is saying, as part of her declaration, that she’s read Part 33 of the Criminal Procedure Rules and “I have complied with its requirements”. She says that in the context of it being mentioned that the court can direct a discussion to take place between experts and that the court can direct a joint statement. She says “I have read Part 33 of the Criminal” – and she’s declared this, “and I have complied with its requirements”.
Did you not wonder whether or not that was something you ought to have done?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I didn’t because, as I say, I was concerned about analysing the data and commenting on the technical aspects of the report, and that’s all I thought that I needed to be doing.
Mr Moloney: Did you read this?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not sure.
Mr Moloney: You read the report but did you – you’re not sure?
Gareth Jenkins: The bit of the report that I was concentrating on was the analysis of the – what had been taking place in the branch.
Mr Moloney: Yes. At (g):
“I confirm that I have acted in accordance with the Code of Practice for Experts.”
Did you ever ask anybody about whether or not there might be a Code of Practice for Experts?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I did not.
Mr Moloney: You had been party to a joint statement with Charles McLachlan in Mrs Misra’s case, as well, hadn’t you?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I probably had.
Mr Moloney: Yes. Mr Beer took you to your notes on the expert report in the case of Wylie?
Gareth Jenkins: He did.
Mr Moloney: You were also looking at that in February 2013, shortly before you came to consider the work of Beverley Ibbotson.
Gareth Jenkins: I can’t remember the chronology but I won’t argue with you.
Mr Moloney: You’d received a letter from Bond Pearce at the earliest stages of your work on Litigation Support, before working on the Castleton case.
Gareth Jenkins: I have no recollection of that, and – but as it was established a couple of days ago, I clearly had seen that letter.
Mr Moloney: All of those documents contained the same or similar aspects to that which is contained within Beverley Ibbotson’s report. You’d become familiar with the language of documents, legal preamble, format of documents. Why did never occur to you that any of this might apply to you in your role as somebody giving expert evidence on behalf of, essentially, Fujitsu and Post Office?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t know. Clearly it should have done but it didn’t.
Mr Moloney: Is it because you knew you could not be – you couldn’t sign this because you weren’t independent, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: I– I’d just not thought it through.
Mr Moloney: Because you knew that you were part of the prosecution team batting for Post Office and Fujitsu?
Gareth Jenkins: That’s how they were treating me.
Mr Moloney: So you couldn’t sign this expert’s declaration, could you?
Gareth Jenkins: I was never asked to.
Mr Moloney: Even if you’d looked at it, you couldn’t sign it, could you?
Gareth Jenkins: Well, I’ve certainly never seen Part 33 of the Criminal Procedure Rules and I certainly haven’t seen the Code of Practice for Experts, so on that basis I definitely couldn’t have signed it.
Mr Moloney: Because you were considering matters of strategy, such as this would have been an unhelpful precedent?
Gareth Jenkins: I wouldn’t call that a matter of strategy.
Mr Moloney: That’s all I ask. Thank you, Mr Jenkins.
Sir Wyn Williams: Thank you, Mr Moloney.
Now, where have we got to? It’s – well, 12.53. There are potential questions on behalf of Ms Sinclair; is that correct?
Mr Beer: Yes, sir. Might I suggest that we break until 1.55 and take those questions then?
Sir Wyn Williams: Fine. Certainly, then. That’s what we’ll do.
Mr Beer: Thank you very much, sir.
(12.53 pm)
(The Short Adjournment)
(1.55 pm)
Mr Beer: Good afternoon, sir, can you hear and see us?
Sir Wyn Williams: Yes, I can, thank you very much.
Mr Beer: Thank you, I think it’s Ms Allan on behalf of Ms Sinclair next.
Sir Wyn Williams: Right.
Questioned by Ms Allan
Ms Allan: Good afternoon, Mr Jenkins, can you see me?
Gareth Jenkins: Oh, sorry, right.
Ms Allan: Hello. My name is Christie Allan. I represent Core Participant Susan Sinclair, who is a wrongfully convicted subpostmistress and the first to successfully appeal her conviction in Scotland, which only happened in September last year.
In the various witness statements that you’ve provided to the Inquiry to date and in your oral evidence this week, you’ve described the use of case-specific witness statements in cases such as Seema Misra and Hughie Thomas, and you’ve described the use of generic witness statements in a number of criminal cases thereafter, up until December 2013.
Am I correct in my understanding that you estimate that you provided witness statements, in one form or another, for approximately 15 Post Office prosecutions in total?
Gareth Jenkins: I can’t remember the number. I thought it was less than that but I won’t argue with the figure. It’s that sort of order of magnitude.
Ms Allan: So thereabouts.
Gareth Jenkins: Yeah.
Ms Allan: 15 or thereabouts?
Gareth Jenkins: Yeah.
Ms Allan: Of these 15 or thereabouts cases, approximately how many times did you attend court to give oral evidence at trial as an expert witness?
Gareth Jenkins: Only – I only gave oral evidence in one case.
Ms Allan: Of that one attendance at court, how many times – or on that one occasion, was your independence called into question, given your employment with Fujitsu, which was commercially contracted by Post Office?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not quite sure what you mean by that, sorry.
Ms Allan: On the one attendance – I’ll repeat the question – on the one attendance that you did appear at court, am I right in thinking that your independence was called into question at trial, given your employment with Fujitsu, which was commercially contracted, of course, by Post Office?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not sure that it was – I was just asked was I biased because I worked for Fujitsu, or words to that effect.
Ms Allan: So how was the issue of your independence overcome at trial?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not quite clear. I was just asked what was my – the fact that I worked for Fujitsu relevant by the judge and I said I didn’t think it was, and that was the end of it, as far as I’m aware.
Ms Allan: And that’s, I think, the point where you were called “the Fujitsu man” at trial?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, that’s right, yes.
Ms Allan: Thank you. Given that the Core Participant who I represent was prosecuted in accordance with the criminal justice system in Scotland, I want to now turn to focus on the position in Scotland. Firstly, what was your understanding of the legal procedure for Post Office Prosecutions in Scotland and the involvement, therefore, of the Crown Office and the Procurator Fiscal Service?
Gareth Jenkins: At the time I had no knowledge. I do understand that the Scottish system is different from the English one but that’s the level of my knowledge, I’m afraid.
Ms Allan: Okay, thank you. Is it right to assume that you never provided oral evidence in a Scottish criminal prosecution?
Gareth Jenkins: Correct.
Ms Allan: What was the extent of your involvement in providing evidence in Scottish cases as to the functionality or integrity of Horizon, if any?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t believe I was involved in any Scottish cases but I can’t be 100 per cent sure of that.
Ms Allan: On that basis, as far as you’re aware, was your generic witness statements, and/or your Horizon integrity reports, relied upon in such cases?
Gareth Jenkins: Not that I’m aware of.
Ms Allan: Just finally on this topic, to the best of your knowledge, was anyone else from Fujitsu, or indeed Post Office, involved in providing evidence in Scottish cases?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t know, is the simple answer.
Ms Allan: Thank you.
If we could just move on to another topic, at paragraph 10 of your fourth witness statement, you refer to Post Office’s instruction of Second Sight in 2012 as a good thing and state that you believed that an independent review would conclude that Horizon was sound, but they might also provide recommendations for improvements, which you would welcome.
You also note that you understood the need for an independent review of Horizon, given the criticism of it in the media. Were you concerned by the growing criticisms of Horizon in the media?
Gareth Jenkins: I wasn’t concerned about it. I just wanted – I felt it was a sound system, and I was – welcomed the opportunity to actually show that it was.
Ms Allan: So, therefore, did you consider the impact of these concerns and public criticisms of Horizon as having any bearing on the witness evidence that you provided in criminal cases, whether in the past or indeed going forwards in considering you carried on your role in prosecution support until 2013?
Gareth Jenkins: I think the last case I was involved in was about the same sort of – I think it was the case of Mr Ishaq that we talked about this morning, was the time that I first became involved with Second Sight. So they seemed to coincide, I think.
Ms Allan: Would you consider that the impact of these emerging public concerns and criticism of Horizon had any impact on the way that you conducted your evidence at that point?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I just continued to explain what I thought I knew about the system.
Ms Allan: Thank you. If we move on, at paragraph 28 of your fourth witness statement, you state that you recall suggesting that Post Office should provide information to Second Sight about the receipts and payments mismatch bug and the suspense account bug. Given that we’re talking about Second Sight, I assume that you made this suggestion around the time of Second Sight’s instruction in 2012?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I believe so. I can’t remember exactly. I think it was probably 2013 by then, rather than 2012, but yes.
Ms Allan: By this time, was the existence of these bugs accepted as being within the common knowledge of Fujitsu and Post Office, if not the defence teams and the accused?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I believe so. I wasn’t aware that there was any secret about them between Fujitsu and Post Office.
Ms Allan: So why did you feel the need, therefore, to make this point to Post Office, if Post Office already knew about such issues and that these were indeed within the common knowledge?
Gareth Jenkins: I thought they were – I thought it was a good example of how we were able to identify a problem, diagnose the problem and fix the problem, and work out its full extent.
Ms Allan: So that would be beneficial for Second Sight’s instruction?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Allan: Why, when you’ve maintained throughout your evidence to the Inquiry this week, that past problems and bugs in Horizon were not relevant for inclusion in your case-specific and generic witness statements, nor did you deem them relevant to the purposes of your Horizon Integrity Reports, did you now, in 2012 to 2013, consider these issues relevant to disclose for the purposes of Second Sight?
Gareth Jenkins: Because I saw this as being a much broader issue and, again, I was seeing that as good example of how we were able to diagnose and identify and fix problems.
Ms Allan: It was a broader issue, as opposed to the disclosure in criminal cases?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Allan: Thank you. I have just one final question for you. In your evidence to the Inquiry this week, you were asked by Mr Beer why, when you were not the lead engineer for the Post Office Account, nor were you the only one involved in the maintenance and development of Horizon, that Post Office relied on you specifically to provide evidence relating to the integrity of Horizon in criminal prosecutions? I note that your answer was you had a fairly good overview knowledge of Horizon, due to your role on the agent team, your work in middle account, back end and IMPACT, so you had a detailed knowledge of how counter operated and a good overview knowledge of how Horizon worked, but that you were not the only person who could be used as an expert.
You stated that, despite some email correspondence, where other names within Fujitsu were suggested, for one reason or another, it was you in the end that was picked to support Post Office in this way. Indeed, you confirmed, when asked by Dave Jennings in 2009, whether there was anyone else that could cover this activity as well or instead of you, your answer was:
“Should? Then probably yes. Could? Then probably no.”
Do you therefore consider that you had a monopoly, in terms of the availability of alternative experts who were able to speak to the integrity of Horizon, which effectively contributed significantly, perhaps, to what’s been suggested as the Post Office’s over-reliance on your services in the criminal prosecutions of subpostmasters, and indeed again in a Group Litigation, notwithstanding the criticisms of you five years previously?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I disagree with that. There was an example, for example, at the beginning of February, when I was getting fairly heavily involved with the case of Mrs Misra, I was off sick for a few days and there was a question about, well, if I’m off sick, who could take my place? And there was an email discussion about suggesting some alternative names to get involved instead of me.
Ms Allan: Out of interest, who were those alternative names?
Gareth Jenkins: I think the name that was mentioned was someone called Dave Jones.
Ms Allan: To the best of your knowledge did these get involved in –
Gareth Jenkins: No, he didn’t because I came back from my sick leave after that. I was only off for about two or three days, as it turned out, but people didn’t know that at the time.
Ms Allan: But you would disagree that you maybe had the monopoly in terms of experts available to speak to those issues?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Allan: Okay, thank you, Mr Jenkins. That’s the end of my questions?
Sir Wyn Williams: Thank you, Ms Allan.
So Mr Beer, do I take it had those are the questions on behalf of Core Participants, other than any questions to come from Mr Jenkins’ own representative?
Mr Beer: That’s right, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: So, Ms Dobbin, do you want to ask any questions?
Ms Dobbin: I do sir, if I may.
Questioned by Ms Dobbin
Ms Dobbin: Mr Jenkins, as you know, I represent you in these proceedings. I’m going to stand up because you’re quite far away from me and it’s easier for me to see you if I do.
Gareth Jenkins: Okay.
Ms Dobbin: All right? I hope you can hear me as well.
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: All right. Mr Jenkins, when I ask you these questions, I’m going to ask you that you try and answer as best you can, unclouded by everything that you know now. Okay?
Gareth Jenkins: Okay.
Ms Dobbin: I’ll ask you to do your best with that. Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: So what you’re saying is, in terms of what I knew at the time, as opposed to what I know now?
Ms Dobbin: Yes.
Gareth Jenkins: Okay.
Ms Dobbin: Exactly, Mr Jenkins. The first thing that I wanted to go back and ask you about was the email that you were sent in 2006 in the Castleton case, on 6 June 2006. Do you recollect that?
Gareth Jenkins: Is this the one in preparation for the meeting the following day?
Ms Dobbin: Yes, it is. Exactly. So this is the one where it appears that you were sent the quite technical document, the Part 18 reply, that set out various things that Mr Castleton was particularising in his case. Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I remember the email you’re talking about.
Ms Dobbin: You know that it also appears that you were sent the letter as well from November 2005. Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: I now understand that, yes.
Ms Dobbin: All right. Now, before I go back to that, I just want to go to your statement, if I may, and this is your third statement, at paragraph 249. I’m going to ask that that be brought up. That’s WITN00460300. If we could just go over the page. Thank you. Can you see that, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: I think you set out at paragraph 249 – and perhaps it’s easier if I read it – that:
“Until I saw the documents provided to me by the Inquiry, I had virtually no memory of being involved in the civil proceedings between POL and Mr Lee Castleton …”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: “… bar perhaps one or two conversations.”
If we go over the page, it sets out that:
“The Inquiry has referred me to 27 documents to assist my recall of it but nonetheless I have little memory of my involvement. I am reliant upon these documents to help me to reconstruct what happened. My lawyers have alerted me to a number of additional documents on the Inquiry’s database to which I refer below. Having read all of this material, I believe that my actual involvement in the case was fairly limited. I neither signed a witness statement nor gave evidence in court.”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I agree.
Ms Dobbin: Is that right, Mr Jenkins: that you don’t really have very much memory of the involvement that you had in that case?
Gareth Jenkins: Correct.
Ms Dobbin: And that you’ve been dependent on the documents to try to help you reconstruct, as you say, what happened?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, indeed.
Ms Dobbin: All right. If we go, just dropping down please, to paragraph 252, and this is just to pick up the thread and orientate you, you set out – if we see the second line – that you were:
“… invited to attend a meeting with POL’s solicitors on 6 June. My lawyers have shown me an email from Brian Pinder dated 5 June 2006. This email attached an agenda for the next day’s meeting …”
I think that’s what we now know to be the letter, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: “… and a scanned extract from a document which recorded issues which Mr Castleton had experienced …”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: You had set out there:
“I probably read both attachments in advance although I don’t recall doing so.”
Is that right?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Okay. So have you any memory, for example, of reading the Part 18 reply or the sort of technical document that was sent to you with that email?
Gareth Jenkins: No, as I say, I have a vague memory of going to a meeting but that’s about it, and clearly having read the notes of the meeting, then I clearly, at that meeting, answered some technical questions and that other document attached there seemed to have similar technical questions. So that’s all I’m basing my memory on.
Ms Dobbin: All right. Now, on the morning that you started to give evidence, so before we knew the correct position about what had been sent with the email, Mr Beer asked you questions about what you would have done if you’d received this letter in 2006. Yes –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: – you recollect that? You said – and if anyone wants the reference it’s the transcript for 26 June, internal page 73, line 5 – that you would have skimmed through it; is that right?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: All right. I wonder, then, if we could just turn to this document, the email that you were sent ahead of the meeting, and that’s FUJ00152601, and I think we’ve looked at this, Mr Jenkins.
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Again, it’s just to help you orientate yourself in time. We see there:
“Please be advised of the email regarding the meeting tomorrow and attachments.”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: We’ve seen that and that’s the email that directed you towards the scanned document; is that right?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: If we just look very quickly at this scanned document, please. That’s FUJ00152602. If we just scroll through that document, please.
Thank you. If we could just keep scrolling through, and keep scrolling through.
So I think it carries on, Mr Jenkins, to about page 8, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: That seems to be it, yes.
Ms Dobbin: Yes. So I think eight pages of quite, perhaps dense sort of technical information or queries set out; is that right?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: All right. Is that the document, is that the information that you would have been interested in, in order to prepare for the meeting the next day?
Gareth Jenkins: I think so, as best as I can work out from what I’ve seen of what happened at the time.
Ms Dobbin: Did you understand that that’s why you were being invited to the meeting, to help contribute in relation to that information?
Gareth Jenkins: That is – yes, I think so, from seeing what is said in the covering email and so on, yes.
Ms Dobbin: Exactly. Now I’m showing you these documents to see if I can just put you again, just back in time, Mr Jenkins, but, at the point that you were sent these, had anyone actually mentioned to you that you might be any sort of witness in this case?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t believe so but I can’t be 100 per cent sure.
Ms Dobbin: There are no emails to that effect, are there?
Gareth Jenkins: Not that I’ve seen.
Ms Dobbin: Had anyone suggested to you that the meeting was to consider whether anyone might be a witness in this case?
Gareth Jenkins: Again, I have no recollection of that.
Ms Dobbin: And that’s not reflected in the email that you were sent either, is it?
Gareth Jenkins: No.
Ms Dobbin: We’ve seen an attendance note of the meeting, haven’t we?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: You’ve been through that attendance note, I think, haven’t you, for preparing –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I have.
Ms Dobbin: – for the inquiry. There is no suggestion in that attendance note, is there, that there is discussion about anyone being a witness in that case?
Gareth Jenkins: I can’t remember that.
Ms Dobbin: All right. Well, perhaps you’ll take it from me –
Gareth Jenkins: I’m happy to take it from you, yes.
Ms Dobbin: All right. In fact, if we look at POL00071138, this is an email from Mr Dilley the solicitor, and that was sent on 27 June 2006.
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: If we just scroll down a bit to the witnesses of fact, we see your name there, don’t we?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, that’s me.
Ms Dobbin: Then if we just look at the next line, it says:
“We will also have one or two expert witnesses on the IT and accountancy side.”
Correct?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Thank you. It’s right, isn’t it, when Mr Dilley came to draft a witness statement for you, Mr Jenkins, it was a witness statement of fact, wasn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: I believe so. As I say, at the time I had no concept of the difference.
Ms Dobbin: All right. Well, let’s have a quick look. FUJ00122284. Perhaps if we could just go to the last paragraph in that witness statement.
Okay, we’ve seen this, this first part of it, Mr Jenkins. You can see it says, “Witness statement”. If we go to the last paragraph, please, paragraph 38, that was drafted for you by Mr Dilley, wasn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes. Well, I assume so at least.
Ms Dobbin: I think we know from the emails, Mr Jenkins, that it was.
Gareth Jenkins: Yeah.
Ms Dobbin: That’s not in dispute.
Gareth Jenkins: Yeah.
Ms Dobbin: He sets out there what it was that he wanted or he was proposing that you say. Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: He sets out – I’m not going to through all of it:
“There are no grounds for believing that the problems Mr Castleton says he experienced with his computer would have caused either theoretical or real losses.”
Correct?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: We can see what you say underneath that:
“Not sure I can agree to this without looking more closely at what has gone on.”
Correct?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, that’s right.
Ms Dobbin: Then we – sorry, Mr Jenkins, I didn’t mean to cut across you. We can see that it was proposed that you sign that as a witness of fact, correct?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: It just says:
“I believe the facts in this … statement are true.”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: You can see that. Thank you, that can be taken down.
When you were taken to the letter about expert duties, the one from November 2005 –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: – Mr Beer put this to you:
“If we scan through the letter just slowly – I think you will have read it carefully overnight – the letter doesn’t refer, would you accept, to the provider of a report from Fujitsu as being an expert witness.”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Mr Beer then took you through the letter, didn’t he?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, he did.
Ms Dobbin: In fact you agreed with him that that’s what the letter said, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: In fact, I think we see, if we go to the letter, that it refers to that twice. I’m going to ask if we go to it, FUJ00152573. I’m going to go to the second place where it mentions it, but if we go, please, to the final page of it, page 3 – sorry, it’s page 14 of the document.
If you could just scroll down, please, and if perhaps we could just pause there. So for example, it says at paragraph 7, doesn’t it, Mr Jenkins, if we look at the paragraph there, that the report should:
“Contain a declaration that it’s been prepared in accordance with the Code of Guidance on Expert Evidence.”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: If we continue scrolling, please, to paragraph (5). So this immediately under “Duty to the Post Office” it sets out:
“In performing all of your duties, for which the client will pay, you will owe a duty to the client to act with the professional standards of skill, care and diligence adhered to by experienced and competent consultants acting as expert witnesses.”
Correct?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I see that.
Ms Dobbin: All right. Now, that shows you, doesn’t it, Mr Jenkins, that two people can read a document like this, or perhaps skim over it, and miss important points, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Even someone as forensic as Mr Beer can miss that, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Or not understand it, correct?
Gareth Jenkins: Yeah.
Ms Dobbin: All right. I’m just going to ask if that be taken down, please.
Now, the Inquiry saw, when it was decided that you wouldn’t be a witness in that case, Mr Pinder emailed you on 4 September, didn’t he?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I believe there was an email around that sort of time.
Ms Dobbin: All right. If we look at FUJ00154733. We didn’t come back to this again yesterday, Mr Jenkins, when this was revisited, but if we just look at what it says again, so Mr Pinder is telling you why you’re not going to be a witness. Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: “He states that although you will probably [be] a good witness, it is for evidential reasons …”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I saw that.
Ms Dobbin: You saw that. Then you said:
“Fine (I won’t [even] try [and] understand what this means!)”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Now, I know this was about 18 years ago, Mr Jenkins, but again, reading that email now, does it assist you as to whether, had you read the November 2005 letter, you had digested its contents or understood it in any way?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t think so because, as I say – as I say there, I won’t try and understand what that means, talking about opinion evidence and expert evidence, and it didn’t really have any meaning for me then.
Ms Dobbin: All right. Now, you’ve been asked about what guidance you sought about being a witness, haven’t you –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: – in the course of the past few days. I wanted to ask you about one of the occasions, proximate to this, when you did ask for guidance. Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Okay.
Ms Dobbin: If we could go, please, to FUJ00152616. If we could scroll down, please, and scroll down again, please, and keep scrolling down. Okay. If we could just stop there. So this was an email that you were sending to Ms Matthews; is that right?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, it looks like that, yes.
Ms Dobbin: So one of the Post Office Investigators, correct?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, as I understand it.
Ms Dobbin: If we just look there, we can see that this is an email about arrangements. Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: You say to her:
“Do you have any idea as to how much time will be involved and exactly what is required? I’ve never been to court in any capacity and my knowledge of such things is based on films and TV (which I’m sure are inaccurate!)”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: If we just scroll up, please, and she answers you and we can see this is on 12 July, isn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: We see a couple of paragraphs down:
“All witnesses will have to be present on the 1st day of trial unless the defence has agreed [their] statement and don’t wish to ask any questions about that evidence. It’s pretty much as you see on the TV really but remember that you will have sight of your statement prior to taking the stand can only be asked questions specifically about your statement.”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I see that.
Ms Dobbin: Was that pretty much the height of the sort of guidance that you were given about being a witness when you sought that guidance?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I think so.
Ms Dobbin: Now, that was in July 2006, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: So that was a few months after the conference that had taken place in June 2006, wasn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, the following month, yes.
Ms Dobbin: Again, does that throw any light, Mr Jenkins, on what you understood about giving evidence in court, do you think?
Gareth Jenkins: Well, it shows that I didn’t have much idea about what was involved.
Ms Dobbin: Right. I’m going to move on, if I may, in time, Mr Jenkins, to 2010, and to Mrs Misra’s case. Okay?
Gareth Jenkins: Okay.
Ms Dobbin: Now, some expert reports have been put to you, yes –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: – and you’ve been asked the question why didn’t they trigger you to think “Does this all apply to me? Am I subject to these sorts of duties?” Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I’ve certainly been asked that.
Ms Dobbin: I wanted to ask you this: in the years that you provided support to Post Office and its prosecutions, did those type of reports ever trigger any lawyer to send to you formal instructions as an expert in any case?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t believe so.
Ms Dobbin: Did those sorts of reports trigger any lawyer to tell you that the evidence that you were giving was opinion evidence and that you were therefore subject to those sorts of duties?
Gareth Jenkins: Not that I can recall.
Ms Dobbin: Did they ever trigger any lawyer to tell you that your response should be in the form of an expert report?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I believe all – the only things I ever produced were witness statements.
Ms Dobbin: Did they ever trigger any lawyer to sit down with you and actually explain what expert duties are and what they mean?
Gareth Jenkins: Not that I can recall.
Ms Dobbin: Did they ever trigger any lawyer to explain to you or to say to you that you were in the same sort of category as these experts?
Gareth Jenkins: Not that I can recall.
Ms Dobbin: Did they ever trigger any lawyer to say to you that your statements ought to bear an expert declaration?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I don’t believe they ever did.
Ms Dobbin: Did any of that ever happen, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t believe so.
Ms Dobbin: In the case of Mr Ishaq, Mr Jenkins, I think it’s right, isn’t it, that you went to trial on the first day without having been provided with Ms Ibbotson’s expert report; is that right?
Gareth Jenkins: That’s my understanding of things from looking at the email documentation, and I do recall meeting with her on the first day of the trial in Bradford.
Ms Dobbin: It was an accountancy report, wasn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: I believe so, yes.
Ms Dobbin: You had to ask Ms Ibbotson for all of the appendices to her report because you didn’t have them; that’s right, isn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: I believe so. I got emailed the report and I think later on I had to ask her for the appendices so I could try to do some sort of analysis to try and correlate her figures against the ARQ data that I’d happened to have with me because I’d asked for it.
Ms Dobbin: All right. The email that sent you her report was in fact a blank email, wasn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I believe it was.
Ms Dobbin: Did you have to work into the night on the first day of trial in order to be able to respond to her report?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I think it was about 9.00/10.00 in the evening when I sent my response to her report to her.
Ms Dobbin: Did you have to, as I understand it, do a reconciliation exercise –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: – overnight, in order to be able to, as it were, agree with her report; is that what you had to do with the material that you’d been provided with?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I had to go through the ARQ – I can’t remember all the details now but I didn’t start looking at the ARQ data until I’d got that and I’d spent quite a bit of time, both in the afternoon and in the evening, going through the ARQ data to try to agree the figures that she had in her report and try and work out where she’d got her figures from.
Ms Dobbin: Did it occur to you, Mr Jenkins, to object or to say that that wasn’t a very fair way of treating you, to expect you to come along to a trial on the first day and to do all of that and to be expected to get on top of her report?
Gareth Jenkins: I just thought I’d try and get on with it and do the best that I could with the limited information that I had.
Ms Dobbin: We’ve seen, and Mr Moloney asked you about this, that you were also sent a Defence Case Statement in Mr Ishaq’s case, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, that was sort of a week or two before that, I believe.
Ms Dobbin: The fact that a lawyer sent you, a witness in a case, the Defence Case Statement, did that make you think that that was all right, that that was the sort of thing that a lawyer could do?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I’d been sent Defence Case Statements before. So I thought it was the normal thing to do.
Ms Dobbin: Did you think that it was all right to comment on disclosure requests that were being made to Post Office?
Gareth Jenkins: It didn’t occur to me to question it.
Ms Dobbin: Did you have any responsibility for Post Office’s disclosure obligations?
Gareth Jenkins: I didn’t think I had.
Ms Dobbin: Did anyone properly explain to you the sorts of duties that Post Office owed as a prosecutor?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I didn’t understand what disclosure meant or – and what responsibilities anybody had to do with it.
Ms Dobbin: All right. I’m going to move on, then, if I may, Mr Jenkins, to ask you about the boilerplate paragraphs that appear in Penny Thomas’ witness statement, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yeah.
Ms Dobbin: All right. So I wanted to start then, if I could, exactly as Mr Stein did, with your statement at paragraph 102. That’s your third witness statement, okay? Do you have that?
Sir Wyn Williams: Did you say page or paragraph 102, Ms Dobbin, sorry?
Ms Dobbin: Sorry, sir, it’s paragraph 102. I apologise if I said that. Page 33.
Okay, Mr Jenkins, do you see that?
Gareth Jenkins: I see that in front of me now, yes.
Ms Dobbin: All right. I’m not going to read all of this out, I’m just going to ask you to look at paragraph 102. And you see the heading above that, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: If we just scroll through, you see at paragraph 103, Mr Jenkins, you set out there the understanding on the part of some witnesses to the Inquiry that those paragraphs in Penny’s statement were about how Horizon was working, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: If we go on to paragraph 104, I don’t think we need worry about that. If we scan through to paragraph 105, yes –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: – and you set out there about why you didn’t think they could give an opinion on the operation of Horizon, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Paragraph 106: you set out that their witness statement was concerned with the production of ARQ data, correct?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Now, I want to ask you about this and I’m going to come on to Mr Thomas’ case as well but, if we look at paragraph 107, you were taken to this. You were explaining that there was no guidance, as it were, as to what the standard paragraphs were supposed to mean, correct?
Gareth Jenkins: Correct.
Ms Dobbin: You set out that you could see from the communications in Mr Thomas’ case that you raised a question about these paragraphs, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: I’ll come back to that and the question or the query that you raised. If you just read through that.
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Have you read that to the end of the paragraph, yes? You set out:
“In Mr Thomas’ case, I think my concern was that I could not include these paragraphs because I had not extracted the ARQ spreadsheets that my draft statement was referring to. By this … I could not speak to the computer which had extracted the spreadsheets as working properly. I deal with the contemporaneous evidence about this …”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: I just wanted to remind you of the background against which you were asked questions about this. All right?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: So I wonder then if we could go to Penny Thomas’ statement and this is at FUJ00122139. If we could go to the final two paragraphs, please, I think, Mr Jenkins, you might recognise this. I think Ms Thomas asked you, and then I think some other people, to look at her witness statement?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Is that right? Sorry, if we could go to the penultimate page, please. So we see, don’t we, those two paragraphs at the end of her standard statement. Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Is that the standard statement by which the ARQ data would be produced?
Gareth Jenkins: I believe so.
Ms Dobbin: I think she’s made some notes there, that may not matter; do you see that?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I can see that.
Ms Dobbin: I just wanted to be clear about this, Mr Jenkins. If we just – yes, that’s fine.
In terms of what you understood the first paragraph to relate to and what computer it related to, can you explain that?
Gareth Jenkins: I think it’s the computer that’s actually doing the extraction of the audit data. So I think there’s a comment there about the “AW”, so that would be the audit workstation.
Ms Dobbin: Where she has said:
“I hold a responsible position in relation to the working of the [Audit Workstation].”
Gareth Jenkins: Yeah.
Ms Dobbin: I just want to ask you about your understanding of that paragraph and what was meant by it?
Gareth Jenkins: It was to do with the computer, on which she was actually doing the extraction, working properly.
Ms Dobbin: Why did you not think, or what was the basis for your belief, that she was not speaking to the Horizon system in that paragraph?
Gareth Jenkins: I didn’t feel that she understood the way that the Horizon system worked at all, so therefore was not qualified to be able to talk about whether the Horizon was working or not. That wasn’t her background or expertise.
Ms Dobbin: If we then go to Mr Thomas’ case, it’s right, isn’t it, that those paragraphs appeared in a draft of your statement, yes –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: – and we’ve seen that. Perhaps if we just go to that, first of all, and look at your comment on it. So this is FUJ00122204. If we just go to the end of that, please. Sorry, if we just go up, please. All right, we’ve seen this before, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Those were your highlighted paragraphs, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Just noting what you say there:
“I’m not sure that the yellow bit is true. Can this be deleted? All I’ve done is interpret the data in the spreadsheets that you have emailed to me.”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: I’m going to look, then, in a bit more detail about what your concern was but can you, just before we do, explain what it was that was concerning you to make that comment?
Gareth Jenkins: Well, this is saying that I’d actually extracted the data, which I hadn’t.
Ms Dobbin: Yes. Do we see, if we go to FUJ00122218, and if we scroll down a little bit, and if we just look at that second paragraph, Mr Jenkins. So ARQ queries, I won’t read them all out:
“… requested information in relation to Gaerwen … I was asked to produce information relating to ‘Nil’ transactions during the periods specified. I have provided three spreadsheets which I now produce …”
Then I think this is where you make your comment, isn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, so I’m saying I’m not sure about this, I’ve had nothing to do with producing those spreadsheets.
Ms Dobbin: “All I’ve done is make some statements based on what are in the spreadsheets. I assume that Neneh or Penny produced the spreadsheets, but I have no personal knowledge as to what was included with then or what was excluded, [and we’ve seen this] for all I know you could have typed them up from scratch.”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: So it’s quite hard to discuss this without having the boilerplate paragraphs in front of us but, perhaps if we go back to FUJ00122204 – sorry – and to the final two paragraphs, please.
All right. So having looked at that, and your concern as set out in the other – it’s a draft, I think, at around the same time, isn’t it, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, yes.
Ms Dobbin: Again, can you just help us. Having looked that, help us understand, then, when you were looking at the first part of the standard statement, again, just to understand what your concern was in relation to the computer and what computer you were referring to?
Gareth Jenkins: I wasn’t sure about that. My main concern was with the second part, the second paragraph, rather than the first.
Ms Dobbin: That was to do with producing the records?
Gareth Jenkins: Producing the data, yes.
Ms Dobbin: All right. In terms of the first part, the improper use of the computer, did you understand that to refer to the Horizon system?
Gareth Jenkins: No, I did not.
Ms Dobbin: Can you just explain why you didn’t think that that related to the Horizon system?
Gareth Jenkins: Because this was a standard paragraph that I could see had been used by Penny and I knew that she was in no position to talk about how Horizon was working or not.
Ms Dobbin: When it appeared in your witness statement, did you understand it to be concerned with the production of the material that comprised the ARQ data?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, yes, particularly in relation to the second bit as well, which was talking about generating the ARQ data.
Ms Dobbin: Was that something that you could speak to without having undertaken that process yourself?
Gareth Jenkins: Well, no, I couldn’t speak about generating ARQ data because I had no access to it myself.
Ms Dobbin: Were the spreadsheets that you were talking about and discussing in this witness statement, had they come from the ARQ data in the first place?
Gareth Jenkins: I can’t remember exactly what the spreadsheets were but they would have come from the ARQ data. I can’t remember exactly what extracts they were.
Ms Dobbin: All right. I think what – and this is the bit that I wanted to try and understand, Mr Jenkins, and in fact what you did in order to try and remedy the concern that you had, it appeared from what you were saying yesterday in your evidence that you went to the PEAK system; is that right?
Gareth Jenkins: That’s what it said in the final version of the statement, so I assume that must have been what I did because I can’t actually remember what I did at the time. But the fact that my final version of the witness statement talks about having extracted the information from PEAK, then that must have been what I’d done.
Ms Dobbin: I think you mentioned yesterday that you obtained the message store from PEAK; is that right?
Gareth Jenkins: That – yes, exactly how I did that, I can’t remember now, but that’s what it said in the statement so that must have been what I did.
Ms Dobbin: Again, just to try and understand, if you’d got the message store, what is the message store?
Gareth Jenkins: The message store is the raw data which is actually put on to the ARQ system from which the ARQ spreadsheets are extracted. So I would have extracted similar sort of spreadsheets from the message store but using tools of my own, rather than the standard tools that Penny and Neneh would have used on the ARQ workstation.
Ms Dobbin: Can you just, in terms of why – or was that a more reliable way of obtaining the data than simply relying on the spreadsheets that had been produced for you by someone else?
Gareth Jenkins: Thinking about it, it’s probably less reliable because the ARQ data in the audit server had a better auditable means of proof that it came from the right place, rather than what I did from PEAK. But I’d not thought that through properly at the time.
Ms Dobbin: All right. But in terms of what it allowed you to do, did it allow you to look at the kind of preserved record?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, it was the same underlying data that would have been on the audit server that was there on the PEAK data. So, yes, in terms of extracting the data, it should have been the same data. It’s just that – yeah.
Ms Dobbin: So it allowed you, as it were, to undertake that process –
Gareth Jenkins: So I could do the extraction process myself, yes.
Ms Dobbin: All right. At the time, did that meet your concerns about –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, it did, because I’d actually done the extraction of the data myself rather than relying on Neneh or Penny doing it on my behalf.
Ms Dobbin: All right. Now, I think we know, after all of this happened, that Ms Matthews then came to take a witness statement from you; is that right?
Gareth Jenkins: So I understand. I have no actual memory of meeting Ms Matthews but, clearly, from the various emails around then, that must have happened, yes.
Ms Dobbin: I think we can tell, can’t we, that she did come to visit you to take the witness statement from you?
Gareth Jenkins: I believe so yes.
Ms Dobbin: All right. Just a point that we didn’t really touch on in your evidence but I wanted to ask you was why it was that you were content to take out of the statement the reference to system failure, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, okay.
Ms Dobbin: Can I just ask you a basic question about that. Was what was being referred to as a zero transaction a failure in the Horizon system?
Gareth Jenkins: No, it wasn’t.
Ms Dobbin: What was it a failure in?
Gareth Jenkins: It was a failure in the end-to-end banking system. So the things that I was referring to as system failures were failures in the communication, either between Horizon and the banks or between the banks, because, in effect, when doing a banking transaction, what Horizon connected to was Link, which then communicated with the specific bank that was associated with the transaction concerned. So those response codes would have been ones that were generated by the banking system, rather than by Horizon itself.
Ms Dobbin: All right, thank you. I’m going to move on, Mr Jenkins, if I may, to a separate issue and that’s the initial question that you were asked in the case of Mrs Misra. All right?
Gareth Jenkins: Okay.
Ms Dobbin: If we could go, please, to FUJ00152930, at page 2.
All right, we’ve looked at this, if we could scroll down, please. Okay, so this is the question that we’ve looked at a few times, Mr Jenkins:
“When Gareth completes his statement could he also mention whether there are any known problems with the Horizon system that Fujitsu are aware of. If none could this be clarified …”
Yes.
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Scrolling up to your reply, or the reply that was sent, you having provided the information. So if we look at (3), that’s where you say:
“This is where I’m reluctant to make a clear statement. I am aware of one problem where transactions have been lost in particular circumstances due to locking issues.”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: That question and your answer to it goes to Mr Jones in Fujitsu, yes –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: – Mr Singh –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: – from Post Office, Mr Longman, the Investigator –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: – and it also went to Mr Tatford as well, didn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: I believe so.
Ms Dobbin: You having provided that information, Mr Jenkins, did any of those individuals respond to that information? Did anyone ask you, “Could you explain more about, for example, the locking problems to which you’ve referred”?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not aware of anyone asking for any clarification on that.
Ms Dobbin: Did anyone ask you if they could speak to you about that in order to understand more about what you were talking about in respect of the locking issues?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t believe so.
Ms Dobbin: Or did anyone ask if they could speak to you about the process that you undertook to look at the event logs that you were referring to in that response?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t believe so.
Ms Dobbin: Did anyone, for example, in Fujitsu say, “Well, this question is asking what Fujitsu knows, that might require a broader response, but that ought not to lie on your shoulders, for example, Mr Jenkins”; did anyone say anything like that?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t believe so.
Ms Dobbin: Did anyone from Prosecution Support speak to you at that point in order to discuss or explore with you what might be required? Was there any of that sort of conversation?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t believe so.
Ms Dobbin: Now, I think it’s right, Mr Jenkins, that you insisted that the data be obtained for Mrs Misra’s branch, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: I did.
Ms Dobbin: I think you had to press over a period of about five weeks or so, maybe longer?
Gareth Jenkins: It was about a month later that the data became available.
Ms Dobbin: Now, I think at some point, this is on 4 March – and perhaps we can go to this, this is FUJ00153027. Mr Jenkins, you were sent a number of communications?
Gareth Jenkins: Yeah.
Ms Dobbin: I don’t have time to go to them all, so I’m just going to go to this one. All right, and if we just scroll down, please. I think this is from Mr Singh and we just see set out there:
“Thank you for your email … What has been requested [are the] transaction logs …”
I’m not going to read all of this out, Mr Jenkins, but if you just read it, the first paragraph –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: – and then perhaps a bit of the second paragraph, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Can I just ask you, having received that further instruction of sort, Mr Jenkins, what did you understand that your task was, or what you were being asked to do after that?
Gareth Jenkins: To respond to the reports that Professor McLachlan had produced and to make my comment on his theories. Now, that actually talks to rebutting or answering them. My approach was to just respond to them with what I – with what I thought how they reflected on the Horizon system’s operation.
Ms Dobbin: Then at paragraph 1, to look at, as well, “errors within the Horizon system for the transaction log period”; what did you understand that –
Gareth Jenkins: Looking at the associated NT events associated with the periods for which I had the transaction logs.
Ms Dobbin: All right. I’m just going to try to break that down a bit. So you received this, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: You understand that you’ve got to look at the report, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: And that you need to look at the NT events. Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Why were you looking at the NT events?
Gareth Jenkins: Primarily to see whether there was anything in there that would reflect that something had been going wrong with the Horizon system in the period for which we had the NT events.
Ms Dobbin: All right. Now, you said yesterday, and this is at page 27, line 19:
“I thought that what I needed to do was a thorough review of NT events.”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: I just want to start with a general question: how important are NT events for the purposes of diagnosing the sorts of bugs at a branch that might cause discrepancies?
Gareth Jenkins: That tends to be where you’d find that there would be a problem.
Ms Dobbin: All right. Did you get the NT events for the whole of the period under indictment –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: – 2005 to 2009?
Gareth Jenkins: I think I’d received those about a week or two earlier.
Ms Dobbin: All right. So a four-year period, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: I believe so, yes.
Ms Dobbin: All right. What work was done on the NT events, Mr Jenkins?
Gareth Jenkins: I think, initially, Anne Chambers had a review through them and passed me an email of what she had actually found there, which I then had a look at, and I believe I looked at the events myself.
Ms Dobbin: All right. Was that exercise confined to just looking for Callendar Square events?
Gareth Jenkins: It was looking for anything that looked out of the ordinary.
Ms Dobbin: I should ask you the question: did you find anything out of the ordinary when you did that exercise?
Gareth Jenkins: I can’t be specifically remember that I found anything out of the ordinary but I’m sure, if I had, I would have noted it.
Ms Dobbin: All right. Now, it been suggested to you that you could have looked, for example, at PEAKs or perhaps KELs for this period as well, in order to look at the ARQ data in relation to that as well, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: I believe I did make some enquiries as to what PEAKs had been raised associated with that branch over that period but I can’t be absolutely certain that did so. But I believe that I – it’s the sort of thing that I think I would have done.
Ms Dobbin: All right. Would you have obtained assistance from looking at other KELs, for example –
Gareth Jenkins: I –
Ms Dobbin: – or other PEAKs related to the same broad period of time?
Gareth Jenkins: I would tended to have looked at PEAKs rather than KELs and I was relying on the fact that – I think we mentioned at some point the concept of having a master PEAK, when there was a problem affecting multiple branches. So, therefore, I thought that a search of PEAKs looking for the specific branch would identify if there’d been any problems associate with that branch.
Ms Dobbin: Right. Had that check been done?
Gareth Jenkins: I believe so but I can’t be absolutely certain.
Ms Dobbin: All right. There’s been focus about things that you didn’t do in the Misra case. I just wanted to ask you, if I may, about some of the things you did do, okay?
Gareth Jenkins: Yeah.
Ms Dobbin: I’m going to set the NT events to one side.
So you had the transaction logs, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: I did.
Ms Dobbin: I think that that came to about 500,000 transactions, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Something like that, yes.
Ms Dobbin: I think is it right you were looking at that to test it against Professor McLachlan’s hypothesis?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I was.
Ms Dobbin: Did you also get the raw message store?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I did have the raw message store.
Ms Dobbin: Did you do some work on that to look at failed credit card debits, as well?
Gareth Jenkins: I think I did that from the ARQ data, rather than the raw message store.
Ms Dobbin: All right. What about transaction corrections, did you look at those as well?
Gareth Jenkins: I looked at those again in the ARQ data, and I believe that I also, at some stage – I think this may be a month or two later – I was sent a spreadsheet from Mr Longman of the transaction corrections that had been generated from the back-end POLSAP system, and I did a self-correlation between the report that he gave me of transaction corrections and those which appeared in the message store.
Ms Dobbin: All right. Did you look at pouch reversals as well?
Gareth Jenkins: I did.
Ms Dobbin: Did you also seek to do an analysis of the daily cash movements?
Gareth Jenkins: I did.
Ms Dobbin: All right. Was that a type of reconciliation exercise?
Gareth Jenkins: It would have been, except for the fact that the daily cash declarations didn’t seem to match at all the sort of movements of cash within the day and, therefore, it made it difficult to try and pin down where losses had actually occurred.
Ms Dobbin: All right. Now, just coming back to the Callendar Square point, you made a statement referring to the fact that you had checked the system events –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: – in relation to that, in March, on 9 March 2010; correct?
Gareth Jenkins: I made a statement – yes, yes.
Ms Dobbin: Having mentioned and said that you had undertaken that exercise and looked at this statement – the system events – did anyone say at that point “We need to get a copy of the system events” or “Can you provide those”?
Gareth Jenkins: I don’t believe so.
Ms Dobbin: So was it a surprise, or had you expected that Professor McLachlan had been provided with those?
Gareth Jenkins: I was surprised when it came to the trial that he was asking me for them because I thought that, if he was interested in them, he would have been given them earlier but – which I think is effectively what you’re asking.
Ms Dobbin: All right. I understand. All right. So in terms of all of – and also, sorry, I forgot to ask you about this, you did have the PEAK, and that was also provided to Professor McLachlan as well; is that right?
Gareth Jenkins: The Callendar Square PEAK?
Ms Dobbin: Sorry, the Callendar Square PEAK.
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, again, I don’t think I provided it to him until the time of the trial and, again, I was surprised that he hadn’t been given that sort of information –
Ms Dobbin: All right?
Gareth Jenkins: – because he’d been asking about it.
Ms Dobbin: You were asked many questions about the PEAK as well, at the trial, weren’t you?
Gareth Jenkins: I was.
Ms Dobbin: All right, well, we will come back to that. Just on a similar point, Mr Jenkins, may I also ask you about this: in terms of the ability of Fujitsu engineers to detect bugs and to be knowledgeable about them, were there systems within Fujitsu intended to pick up whenever, for example, unusual events were generated, or whenever there were bugs that caused discrepancies?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, there was a group called SMC – I forget exactly what it stands for – but they were monitoring events from the overall system both at the counters and the data centres, and they were monitoring these 24 hours a day, seven days a week. It was the only part of the operation that actually operated on a 24/7 basis.
Ms Dobbin: So was that part of the systems in place then, by which Fujitsu knew and understood about bugs in the system?
Gareth Jenkins: It was, yeah, yeah.
Ms Dobbin: All right. In terms of all of the work that you did over the years working on the Horizon system, are those the sorts of mechanisms that you were familiar with and knew about?
Gareth Jenkins: I knew about them. I don’t know that I knew the detail of exactly what was going on but I was aware that these sort of things were in place.
Ms Dobbin: In terms of the work that you were doing, were Fujitsu systems picking up whenever things were going wrong, or discrepancies were arising?
Gareth Jenkins: That was my understanding and that was the purpose of this sort of monitored, yes. And there were also reconciliation systems in place that were picking up, for example, failed banking transactions and things like that. And there daily reports being produced that were being monitored and checked for, and there was a group that actually did that on a – daily checks and things like that.
Ms Dobbin: All right, so these are systems in place, yes –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: – as opposed to sort of conversations with people –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: – about whether or not bugs might come to light?
There’s been a focus, Mr Jenkins, on what your state of mind was during the time, particularly in Mrs Misra’s case, yes –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: – and how you approached prosecutions. I want to ask you about the information that you provided to Professor McLachlan, and if we can go to FUJ00153157, and if we could go to page 2 of that, please. If we could just scroll up, please. Okay, sorry, if we could just go up. Sorry, keep scrolling down, I apologise. Thank you. If you keep scrolling until we get to Jarnail. Thank you.
So Mr Jenkins, this was an email that was sent by Ms Hogg on 22 July 2010, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: “As a result of the meeting that took place between Charles McLachlan and Gareth Jenkins as directed by the judge, we now need to have:
“access to the system in the Midlands …”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: “… access to the operations at Chesterfield …”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: “… access to the system change requests …”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: “… Known Error Log …”
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: “… and new release documentation to understand what problems have had to be fixed.”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: So I think we can tell from that, can’t we, Mr Jenkins, that you were the person that provided Professor McLachlan with that information, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I believe so.
Ms Dobbin: If we scroll up, and keep scrolling up, please, and if we just scroll down a bit, please. Thank you – sorry, if we could go to the body of that email. Sorry, yes, thank you. If you keep it there.
So this is Ms Thomas reflecting the views that, or reflecting why it is or how it came to pass that you provided that information; is that right?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I believe there’s a separate email in which most of that text has been cut and pasted from, from me to Penny Thomas.
Ms Dobbin: I’m just going to look at page 3, “System Change Requests”.
“Basically he was asking to look at all system faults. I suggested that as we kept all testing and live faults in the same system, and there was around 200,000 of them, then that wasn’t going to get him very far.”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: So just to be clear about this, Mr Jenkins, you told Professor McLachlan not just about the Known Error Log but you told him that there were 200,000 faults on this system, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: In effect, though many of them were from the testing systems, and so on, but that’s really a reference to the PEAK system.
Ms Dobbin: So you were quite clear with him, weren’t you, that those were the sorts of numbers of fault in the testing and live system, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Do you understand, then, that the defence applied to get disclosure of those materials from Post Office?
Gareth Jenkins: That’s what this email chain seems to be showing, yes.
Ms Dobbin: I think it’s right, it’s not contentious, that Post Office refused that, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: So I understood.
Ms Dobbin: I think you can see from your paragraph at the end that he’s “fishing”; you don’t personally support the requests but they seem “harmless”, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: So you didn’t see any harm in he being able to obtain the information that was set out or –
Gareth Jenkins: No.
Ms Dobbin: – the access that he wanted –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I didn’t see any need to stop him actually looking at that sort of information, no.
Ms Dobbin: I think it’s right that Fujitsu did start a scoping exercise in order to be able to explain, or to be able to set out, all of the changes that had been at the counter; is that right?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, we came up with a cost for actually doing that but it would appear the Post Office had already, by the – long before we’d actually done that costing exercise, Post Office had rejected the requests.
Ms Dobbin: All right. But, again, was there any problem with putting that information together and providing it, if Post Office had wanted that to happen?
Gareth Jenkins: Well, there was a problem in terms of time and effort for doing it but there wasn’t a technical problem in terms of actually providing that information, and, in fact, Post Office should have had all that information themselves anyway because all these change requests should have been signed off by Post Office at the time.
Ms Dobbin: All right. Thank you.
Right. I’m going to turn then, if I may, to a different subject, Mr Jenkins –
Sir Wyn Williams: Ms Dobbin, I understood from Mr Beer that around about an hour was a reasonable estimate of your questioning. I think you’ve probably had a generous hour. Can you give me some idea of what you have in mind?
Ms Dobbin: Sir, I’m almost finished. It’s probably just about ten minutes more.
Sir Wyn Williams: All right, okay, that’s fine.
Ms Dobbin: Mr Jenkins, I want to ask you then about the evidence you gave when it came to Mrs Misra’s trial.
Gareth Jenkins: Okay.
Ms Dobbin: I’m just going to pick up the transcript and ask if we go to that, please. That’s at POL00029406. All right, if we could go – and let’s just orientate ourselves. We can see that this is the transcript, Mr Jenkins, yes –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: – of 14 October?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: If we just go, please, to page 8. We saw a little bit of this yesterday but we didn’t go the full way down this page but, if we just look at C, you were being asked, weren’t you, “Can a computer system be perfect”, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: If we go, please, to page –
“Can a computer system be perfect?”
You were saying:
“No, I don’t think so.”
Correct?
Gareth Jenkins: Correct.
Ms Dobbin: That’s something that the transcript comes back to, Mr Jenkins; I don’t have time to go through all of it. I am just going to pick out some bits, if I may. So if we look at page 58, and go to the letter D. We looked at this yesterday, Mr Jenkins, and this is the bit where you set out that you were doing a high level analysis, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Was this you being candid and open about this sort of investigation that you had carried out, yes –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: – that you couldn’t exclude, is that right –
Gareth Jenkins: Correct.
Ms Dobbin: – that there was a computer issue, correct?
Gareth Jenkins: Correct.
Ms Dobbin: I think we can see, if we go on, first of all if we look at page 91. Sorry, if we start at page 90 at letter G. You explained, didn’t you, and you were questioned about the fact that you didn’t know about the Callendar Square bug at the time, correct?
Gareth Jenkins: Correct.
Ms Dobbin: If we go over the page, you explained, didn’t you – we can see that from letter A – that you wouldn’t know about every call that’s been raised, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Correct.
Ms Dobbin: And accepting that Callendar Square was the failing by the computer, yes –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: – by the Horizon system?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Now, I won’t go on with that but you were questioned about that and about it not being the fault of the subpostmaster. Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: If we go to page 94, this is where we see you being questioned about the PEAK –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: – in Callendar Square, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: I think that goes on for some time, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: If we go to page 96, you were also asked questions about the Known Error Log as well, yes –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, I am.
Ms Dobbin: – at letter C. At 106 – this goes on for some time, this topic – from line F onwards, we can see the reference to the Callendar Square PEAK, can’t we?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes, it seems to be.
Ms Dobbin: “A few of these errors seem to occur every week at different sites. So it’s not just isolated …”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: I’m not quite sure where we are on that.
Ms Dobbin: I’m so sorry. Letter G.
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: That’s taken from the PEAK, isn’t it?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: That’s what you’re being questioned about?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Again, coming back to the idea it’s been generated by the computer, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: If we look at page 123, again, I think you were asked questions, we can see, if we look at letters E and F –
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: – yes – that there could be problems that you weren’t aware of, yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: If we go to 124, please, and if we look at the letter E., and you say in your evidence, don’t you, Mr Jenkins, that you couldn’t even say. I’m just looking at the answer:
“I’ve no way of knowing whether any money loss was due to theft. I don’t even know that money was lost.”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: Correct.
Ms Dobbin: Indeed, I think at page 114, that you also agreed about defence questions about mismanagement of the branch as well. So if we look at the very bottom of page 114, that there would appear to be mismanagement to the financial running of this Post Office. You agreed and said:
“That’s certainly what it looks like.”
Yes?
Gareth Jenkins: I’ve not quite got to – which letter are we at?
Ms Dobbin: I’m so sorry. Bottom of page 114.
Gareth Jenkins: And then it goes over the page, are we?
Ms Dobbin: The top of page 115, please.
Gareth Jenkins: Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Do you agree, Mr Jenkins, that at a number of points – and I’m afraid I can’t go through the whole of the transcript – might be thought that you gave evidence that wasn’t helpful to the prosecution case.
Gareth Jenkins: Indeed.
Ms Dobbin: Can you see that?
Thank you, if you wait just one moment.
Thank you, sir, I’m grateful for being able to ask questions.
Sir Wyn Williams: Thank you.
Mr Beer, is that it?
Mr Beer: It is.
Sir Wyn Williams: Well, thank you, Mr Jenkins, for making a total of five witness statements, at least two of which can properly be described as extremely detailed, and thank you very much for giving oral evidence over four days.
So we will adjourn now until Tuesday, when we well hear from Mr Parker. 9.45 as usual, Mr Beer?
Mr Beer: That’s right, sir. I think there might be an amendment to that. It might be – and we’ll discuss this at the end of the day with you, I suspect – that only one day is required and that day may be Wednesday. So the Core Participants and the public interested in the proceedings should keep an eye on their emails and the website respectively, just in case there is an update.
Sir Wyn Williams: All right. Well, I look forward to further discussions with you about it.
Mr Beer: Yes. We will speak in a moment, sir.
Sir Wyn Williams: Fine.
Mr Beer: Thank you.
(3.20 pm)
(The hearing adjourned until 09.45 am on Tuesday, 2 July 2024)